



# FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

APRIL 1981, VOLUME 50, NUMBER 4

## Contents

- Administration**    **1**    **XIII Olympic Winter Games—New York State Police Coordination Of Emergency Services**  
By Lt. Leigh F. Hunt
- Personnel**    **7**    **Police Stress**  
By James D. Sewell
- Training**    **12**    **Department Training Officers And The Training Process**  
By George R. Bandics
- Equipment**    **16**    **An Automated Police Photo Lab**  
By William J. Miederhoff
- Physical Security**    **22**    **Suicide Prevention At The County Jail**  
By Dennis G. Donahue and Hugh E. Chavern
- The Legal Digest**    **25**    **Search Of Persons During Search Warrant Execution (Part 1)**  
By Joseph R. Davis
- 32**    **Wanted By The FBI**



**The Cover:**  
Two officers check equipment prior to processing a crime scene. The officers are members of the Criminalistics Unit of the Fairfax County, Va., Police Department.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20535**

**William H. Webster, Director**

The Attorney General has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of the Department of Justice. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through December 28, 1983.

Published by the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs,  
Roger S. Young  
Assistant Director

*Editor*—Thomas J. Deakin  
*Assistant Editor*—Kathryn E. Sulewski  
*Art Director*—Kevin J. Mulholland  
*Writer/Editor*—Karen McCarron  
*Production Manager*—Jeffery L. Summers



ISSN 0014-5688

USPS 383-310





# XIII Olympic Winter Games

## NEW YORK STATE POLICE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

By LT. LEIGH F. HUNT

*New York State Police  
Bureau of Criminal Investigation  
Troop B  
Ray Brook, N.Y.*





Lieutenant Hunt



Supt. William G. Connelie

The United States has had the opportunity to host the Olympic winter games only three times during the past 56 years. Lake Placid, N.Y., was selected as the site at which these games were to be held in 1932 and in 1980.

On January 18, 1977, the Division of State Police was assigned as the agency responsible for the coordination and planning of security for the XIII Olympic winter games. The New York State Police then began the planning phase of the largest task ever assumed in its history.

Security planning involved not only providing physical security for the athletes but also addressing such areas as traffic control, area policing, and emergency services to residents and visitors. It was anticipated that there would be an average 54,000 spectators each day during the Olympics. In addition to the spectators, the athlete support personnel, as well as numerous other persons, would be present in the area during this time period. All of the Olympic events were to be held in what was known as the primary area, shown within the circle on the map. (See fig. 1.) Since the estimated 54,000 spectators would be coming into the primary area on only three main highways, the emergency services detail was faced with a formidable challenge.

The responsibilities of the emergency service detail were twofold. It was to prepare a comprehensive disaster operational plan that would be the source document in the event of a disaster and to coordinate all rescue squads, fire departments, and other service agencies within the primary and secondary areas to insure proper responses on a day-to-day basis during the Olympic winter games.

## Development of the Disaster Operational Plan

The first step taken in preparing the disaster operational plan was to initiate correspondence with various major police departments within the United States requesting information pertaining to aircraft accidents and disasters. The New York State Police manual was also researched for information on disasters.

Questionnaires were sent out to the ambulance squads and fire departments within the primary and secondary areas to ascertain what personnel would be available during the Olympic time period, their level of training, and a detailed list of the equipment possessed by each department.

The material received from various sources was carefully reviewed and a plan was developed. This plan was tailored to the Olympic region with respect to the resources available.

In order to coordinate all organizations that would be affected by the disaster operational plan, meetings were held with rescue squads, fire departments, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, travelers aid, county coroners, hospital administrators, and the New York State Department of Health and Transportation. During these meetings, each topic covered in the disaster operational plan was reviewed in depth. (See fig. 2). As a result of the expertise of the individuals present at the meetings, additions and deletions were made in each of these areas. Also, as a result of these meetings, the disaster operational plan was tailored to the specific needs and requirements of each agency represented. It was also decided that after the completion of the Olympics, the plan would be amended by the New York State Police to become a regional disaster plan.

## Training and Coordination of Emergency Services Within the Olympic Region

After the completion of the disaster operational plan, the emergency services detail determined that the rescue squads within the primary and sec-



During the initial meetings it became apparent that the individual departments worked strictly within their own specified areas and had little, if any, contact with the other rescue squads and fire departments in the region. The training programs allowed personnel from the various agencies to become familiar with each other and work toward a common goal.


Training courses included a wide variety of subjects, including hypothermia, triage (sorting of casualties), techniques of fighting propane gas fires, and vehicle extrication. The classes were held biweekly in the evening so that the volunteers from the rescue and fire departments within the area could attend.

Because large numbers of buses would be transporting spectators into the area during the Olympics, a large bus corporation was contacted to supply a driver and bus for training purposes. Safety measures to be taken in the event a bus was involved in an accident, procedures for shutting off the electricity to the bus, and emergency entering and exiting were demonstrated and discussed.

The training sessions commenced during the latter part of July 1979, and continued through the end of January 1980. Specific topics designed to familiarize the members of the rescue squads and fire departments with various types of emergencies they might be confronted with during the 1980 Olympic winter games were discussed.

Attendance at the various training sessions was outstanding. Volunteers continually made personal sacrifices in order to attend the classes.

### Olympic Transportation Region





**Figure 2**

Aircraft Incidents and Accidents  
Ambulance Duties Defined  
Bomb Threat Procedures  
Bus Accidents  
Casualty Information Center  
Clergy  
Command Post—Ray Brook  
Communications  
Coroners Duties  
Doctors  
Dentists  
Emergency Scene Command Post  
Environmental Conservation  
Department  
Fire Mutual Aid System  
Floods  
Hazardous Material  
Hospitals  
Hostage Situations  
Intoxicated Persons  
Lost Persons  
Maps of Area  
Medical Evacuation  
Medical Mutual Aid Systems  
Mental Health Programs  
Morgue Facilities  
National Guard Duties  
News Media and Information  
Disclosure  
Public Utilities Emergencies  
Radioactive Material  
Red Cross  
Salvation Army  
Security At Disaster Scene  
Telephone Listings  
911 Telephone System  
Traffic  
Travelers Aid  
Travelers Information Stations  
Triage Protocol  
Winter Storms and Other Hazards  
Wreckers

---

**"The favorable  
comments and  
correspondence  
received . . . are not  
only a tribute to the  
New York State Police  
but to all of law  
enforcement as well."**

---

Invaluable training assistance was rendered by the New York State Department of Health, which also supplemented the manpower of the rescue squads during the games. Additionally, arrangements were made through the Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee to provide additional manpower and firefighting equipment. These two steps were taken due to the volunteer status of the rescue squad and fire department personnel.

**Emergency Services—Resources  
Available During Olympic Winter  
Games**

Fire departments and rescue squads would handle most major incidents during the games. However, it was also important to coordinate the activities of other involved agencies. All agencies were represented at meetings by individuals who would be present in the Olympic region during the time of the games. Proposals were submitted by each of the agencies outlining what they would respond to, as well as their overall resources and capabilities. Each agency played an important role during the Olympic winter games. The Red Cross and Salvation Army had their base headquarters at the main command and control center. Travelers aid provided assistance to individuals who experienced difficulties in travel arrangements. It also provided shelter during the time period when problems arose regarding the busing and transportation system.

**911 Emergency Communications  
System**

Prior to the commencement of the Olympics, an emergency 911 telephone communications system was installed in the New York State Police headquarters which was used as the main command and control center during the Olympics. The 911 system fulfilled communication requirements, tying together all emergency services. An added benefit was that the 911 system remained intact after the completion of the games, providing full service to the area.

**Emergency Services Provided  
During Olympic Winter Games**

The disaster operational plan was used during the handling of an aircraft accident which occurred near the Lake Clear Airport, involving a twin-engine aircraft occupied by a pilot and two passengers. Two of the occupants of the aircraft were evacuated by helicopter to the Saranac Lake Hospital, based at the Plattsburgh, N.Y., Air Force Base. The pilot and two passengers subsequently expired from hypothermia and injuries received in the accident.

The disaster operational plan was again used during the initial 5 days of the games when there were severe problems with busing to and from the various sport venues and parking lots, thereby exposing the spectators to harsh weather conditions.

In the initial training phase, it was estimated that with the number of spectators coming into the area during the time of the games, rescue squad personnel could anticipate approximately a 300-percent increase in emergency calls. This estimate proved to be relatively accurate. During the period February 13th to February 24th, the eight rescue squads within the primary and secondary areas recorded the following activity:

Number of calls requiring transportation to hospital:	128
Number of automobile accidents responded to:	134



Number of other incidents responded to: 134  
 Number of calls received through the 911 system: 86  
 Number of calls responded to during the same period in 1979: 68

The number of calls responded to during the Olympics, compared to the same time period in 1979, represents an overall increase of 221 percent.

The ambulance squad in Lake Placid registered the largest increase in calls for assistance. During the Olympics, the squad responded to 69 calls compared to only 16 during the same period in 1979. This represents a 334.5-percent increase.

The fire departments registered the following activity during the games:

Number of fire calls responded to: 25  
 Number of false alarms: 3  
 Number of one-alarm fires: 17  
 Number of calls received through the 911 systems: 4  
 Number of fire calls responded to during the same period in 1979: 26

A comparison between the 1980 and 1979 responses to fires within the primary and secondary areas indicates a decrease of 1.04 percent.

The Village of Lake Placid Fire Department registered a total of eight fire calls responded to during the Olympic period. A total of five fire calls were responded to during the same period in 1979. This represents an increase of 60 percent.

#### **The American Red Cross**

The American Red Cross activity centered around parking lots throughout the secondary area. At the start of the Olympics, parking lots had organization only in terms of parking cars.





There were no bus site designations nor were there any signs in the buses for specific events or venues. As a result, people were boarding buses without knowing their destinations. Buses were not available at any scheduled time nor did they appear with any regularity. To compound this problem, the local area was hindered with extremely cold weather and high winds which made a windchill factor well below zero degrees Fahrenheit. Potential medical problems arose due to the weather conditions and the lengthy wait for buses. American Red Cross personnel treated frostbite and several mild cases of hypothermia. Volunteer workers walked through crowded areas attempting to convince spectators that they should leave their spot in line and proceed to warming shelters provided by the Department of Transportation. Red Cross volunteers and staff also taught other groups supporting the Olympics how to recognize the effects of cold on spectators, how to dress for cold weather, and how to rewarm those suffering from hypothermia. During the games, Red Cross personnel assisted 187 persons afflicted with hypothermia, frostbite, lacerations, and abrasions.

As part of their overall responsibility the American Red Cross also provided immediate aid to lost persons and to persons looking for lost relatives and friends. The Red Cross also acted as liaison between travelers aid and the New York State Police in lost person cases.

#### **Salvation Army**

During the games, the Salvation Army, using mobile canteens, provided hot coffee, hot chocolate, soups, and sandwiches to spectators and support personnel. Acting in close liaison with the New York State Police command center at Ray Brook, the Salvation Army served 26,146 spectators and staff personnel during the games.

---

**“The accomplishments achieved in the areas of security and human services illustrate that law enforcement is prepared to meet challenges and to respond to them with intelligent and dedicated personnel.”**

---

#### **Capitol District Travelers Aid Society**

The Capitol District Travelers Aid Society set up information and referral crisis intervention centers in the secondary area, assisting a total of 994 persons. In addition to the referral centers, there were emergency shelters throughout the secondary area and along the main arteries used during the games.

#### **New York State Department of Transportation**

The New York State Department of Transportation, in addition to providing road services, was responsible for the administration of the towing contract. The need for a comprehensive towing plan was recognized early in the planning stages of the games. The geographical location of Lake Placid dictated that a rapid response to any problems was essential to keeping a smooth traffic flow and 441 vehicles were towed during this period. Of the 441 total dispatches, 18 of these were requested by the Department of Transportation and 423 were requested by the New York State Police.

#### **Summary**

The XIII Olympic winter games held in Lake Placid are now history. The New York State Police have gained worldwide recognition in being able to plan, coordinate, and execute their security responsibilities. The ability to diversify and at the same time be creative in the overall security responsibilities played a large part in their success.

The role of coordinator is quite new in the field of law enforcement. Characteristically, law enforcement agencies are involved with human service agencies on a short term, case-by-case basis, making it impossible for either agency to become fully aware of the capabilities of the other.

Prior to and during the Olympics, an outstanding, long term working relationship was established with State, national, and international agencies. Agency representatives saw, firsthand, the caliber of personnel within the New York State Police. The favorable comments and correspondence received from them are not only a tribute to the New York State Police but to all of law enforcement as well. The accomplishments achieved in the areas of security and human services illustrate that law enforcement is prepared to meet challenges and to respond to them with intelligent and dedicated personnel.

**FBI**



# Police Stress

By JAMES D. SEWELL


Chief

*Criminal Intelligence Bureau  
Department of Law Enforcement  
Tallahassee, Fla.*


Stress may be viewed as the result of "physical, mental, and emotional reactions to situations that cause fear, uncertainty, danger, excitement, irritation, confusion, or change."<sup>1</sup> The results of the negative effects of stress on an individual can be seen in a variety of physical and psychological manifestations, especially the "diseases of adaptation," such as coronary heart disease, ulcers, high blood pressure, and digestive disturbances. Other reactions include increased alcohol consumption, depression, anxiety clusters, paranoid patterns, and those transient situational disturbances resulting from specific incidents of overwhelming stress. While this phenomenon of stress affects most people in some manner, research indicates that persons within certain occupations, such as accountants, air traffic controllers, lawyers, physicians, psychiatrists, dentists, and law enforcement officers, experience a higher than average amount of its physical and mental signs.

Of these stress-prone occupations, recent statistics have indicated that "although law enforcement may not be the most physically dangerous profession in the world, it is, by far, the most emotionally dangerous occupation."<sup>2</sup> Previous researchers who have analyzed stress as it affects police officers have attributed its cause to a number of factors, including the community and its often conflicting demands upon and reactions to law enforcement officers, other components of the criminal justice system, intraorganizational practices, especially poor administration and supervision and inadequate pay, factors related to contemporary police work, such as "people pain," fear, and danger, and specific stressors faced by unique groups of officers.<sup>3</sup> The physical and psychological evidence of stress within this occupation include a particularly high incidence of Selye's diseases of adaptation and accompanying circumstances, such as reportedly severe rates of divorce, suicide, and alcohol abuse.





Mr. Sewell



James W. York  
Commissioner

The consequences of occupational stress in law enforcement can be viewed as unusually severe, for the "potential negative consequences of it affect society in general more than stress from most other occupational groups."<sup>4</sup> As some authors have indicated, the specific nonaccepted reaction to intense police stress "which surfaces more frequently is the use of excessive force when dealing with suspects or subjects."<sup>5</sup> In recent years, highly publicized individual incidents, especially homicides and suicides committed by police officers throughout this country, serve as further indications of the ultimate consequences of pressure "on the job."

Several trends have developed in analyzing, understanding, and controlling stress in the general population. For example, the development of a stress readjustment rating scale, by Holmes and Rahe<sup>6</sup> and subsequent researchers, has attempted to evaluate specific life stressors according to the magnitude of readjustment required in successfully coping with them and reestablishing psychological/physical equilibrium. Applications of such instruments have indicated their predictive value in relating specific stressors or amounts of stress to the onset of certain physical illnesses, principally those characterized as diseases of adaptation and emotional disturbances.

#### Research Methodology

Following the pattern established by researchers into stress among the general population, particularly Holmes and Rahe, the primary goal in my research was to develop a professional

critical life events scale for law enforcement, pinpointing specific stressful events experienced by officers and relating these events along a continuum of perceived magnitudes, i.e., "stressfulness." The first step in this evaluation, then, was to define these critical events.

As a result of an open-ended questionnaire completed by selected law enforcement officers, including those attending the 117th session of the FBI National Academy (FBINA), and following review by a panel of academic and law enforcement personnel, 144 events were identified as stressful in the professional life of a police officer. Many of these were commonly experienced, including court appearances, writing a routine report, making a routine traffic stop, making a routine arrest, work on a holiday, and changing work shifts. Less common events identified as stressful included violent death of a partner in the line of duty, dismissal, murder committed by a police officer, taking a life in the line of duty, and suicide of an officer who is a close friend. A number of the events, particularly those concerned with violence and with personnel and administrative issues, were repeatedly suggested by a considerable number of preliminary questionnaire respondents.

Placed in questionnaire format, these 144 events were evaluated on a scale of 1 to 100 by officers attending the 118th and 119th sessions of the FBINA and officers of a Virginia county police department. For ease of rating, a relatively common event among police officers, changing work shifts, was assigned a value of 50, and each of the other events rated against it. Of a total of 770 questionnaires distributed to these officers, 378 (49.1%) were returned and used in the study. The overall geometric mean (a statistical technique which reduces the effect of extreme values, hereinafter referred to simply as the "mean") of the respondents' estimations of the magnitude of these events determined the ultimate ranking and value assigned each event on the Law Enforcement Critical Life Events Scale.



In its final form, the scale runs from a high score of 88 for the most stressful event, violent death of a partner in the line of duty, to a low of 13 for the least stressful, completion of a routine report. Many events, due to the proximity of their mean score, received the same whole-number value. Table 1 and table 2 reflect the 25 most stressful and 25 least stressful events, respectively.

As table 1 indicates, the 25 events reflecting the highest level of stress, and consequently requiring the greatest amount of readjustment, were generally concerned with violence, personnel matters, or ethical concerns. One other event—assignment away from family for a long period of time—ranked higher than expected, possibly because the majority of respondents, those attending the FBINA, were away from home for 11 weeks, the length of a National Academy session. A similarly high ranking of that event by the county police subgroup indicates, however, that such a family separation is still a significant stressor.

The 25 least stressful events depicted in table 2, i.e., those requiring the least amount of readjustment after the event, can be also broadly classified as involving community relations and legal/judicial, administrative, and operational concerns. Within this table, event 1, completion of a routine report, is the least stressful; the amount of stress associated with the events increases as the numerical ranking and the mean increases. Each of these events can be defined as "routine" and with one exception, award from a citizen's group, had been experienced by a minimum of 70 percent of each component group of the total sample. It is highly likely that the regular occurrence of these common events reduces the perceived magnitude of the stress which they cause; it seems apparent, then, that repeated experience lessens much of the fear and frustration which underlies the problem of stress.

**TABLE 1**

**25 Most Stressful Law Enforcement Critical Life Events**

Event	Value	Event	Value
1) Violent death of a partner in the line of duty	88	14) Assignment away from family for a long period of time	70
2) Dismissal	85	15) Personal involvement in a shooting incident	70
3) Taking a life in the line of duty	84	16) Reduction in pay	70
4) Shooting someone in the line of duty	81	17) Observing an act of police corruption	69
5) Suicide of an officer who is a close friend	80	18) Accepting a bribe	69
6) Violent death of another officer in the line of duty	79	19) Participating in an act of police corruption	68
7) Murder committed by a police officer	78	20) Hostage situation resulting from aborted criminal action	68
8) Duty-related violent injury (shooting)	76	21) Response to a scene involving the accidental death of a child	68
9) Violent job-related injury to another officer	75	22) Promotion of inexperienced/incompetent officer over you	68
10) Suspension	72	23) Internal affairs investigation against self	66
11) Passed over for promotion	71	24) Barricaded suspect	66
12) Pursuit of an armed suspect	71	25) Hostage situation resulting from a domestic disturbance	65
13) Answering a call to a scene involving violent nonaccidental death of a child	70		



TABLE 2

## 25 Least Stressful Law Enforcement Critical Life Events

Event	Value	Event	Value
1) Completion of a routine report	13	14) Call involving juveniles	25
2) Court appearance (traffic)	19	15) Assignment to a two-man car	25
3) Issuing a traffic citation	20	16) Making a routine arrest	26
4) Vacation	20	17) Work on a holiday	26
5) Making a routine traffic stop	22	18) Assignment to day shift	26
6) Overtime pay	22	19) Award from a citizen's group	27
7) Pay raise	23	20) Response to a "sick or injured person" call	28
8) Dealing with a drunk	23	21) Delay in a trial	28
9) Working a traffic accident	23	22) Letter of recognition from the public	29
10) Court appearance (misdemeanor)	24	23) Overtime duty	29
11) Call involving the arrest of a female	24	24) Release of an offender by a jury	33
12) Assignment to a single-man car	25	25) Departmental budget cut	33
13) Routine patrol stop	25		

It is interesting to note that in a detailed analysis, the subgroup comprised of Virginia county police officers ranked its most stressful events, dismissal and violent death of a partner in the line of duty, with higher mean values (94.825 and 92.921, respectively) than the values assigned to any event by either of the National Academy classes. More of these county police officers (7.9% and 27.0%) had experienced those two stressors than had

the other groups of responding officers. A significant part of the perception of stress magnitude by these officers may be due to the emphasis placed upon both the job and one's partner, particularly for line officers, for whom the risk of losing either is often perceived and expressed as greater than by personnel in investigative, supervisory, and administrative positions, i.e., the bulk of personnel attending the National Academy.

### Practical Applications

The successful development of a scale as this has a number of practical applications in the field of law enforcement. First, with refinement of scale

items and values and established correlations between a given level of stress and the onset of disease, the scale, in its more developed and validated form, should have predictive value in anticipating times of crisis and forecasting high potential for a negative showing of stress. The benefit of such prediction is two-fold: To enable administrators to reduce or control the stress to which danger-prone officers are exposed, and to allow for more effective reduction/control efforts on the part of physiological and psychological health professionals.

Second, over the last decade, many police administrators who viewed themselves as "top cops" rather than true managers dealt with stress through a variety of ineffective mechanisms, many of which resulted in ignoring the problem or considering the stressed individuals as less manly and not worthy of law enforcement positions. Rather than considering officers under stress as unique, the results of this research would indicate a commonality of reactions to and manifestations of stress in law enforcement throughout the profession. Consequently, the education of police administrators and supervisors to the problem and implications of police stress can allow the phenomenon to be addressed more directly and efficiently for the benefit of the profession and its public.

Third, from an administrative point of view, the knowledge gained through research such as this will allow for the development of more comprehensive programs of stress recognition and



stress management and will affect both police training academies and institutions of higher education. At a time when most educational/training courses have emphasized theoretical frameworks or basic practical skills, the officer actually affected by the stress of the occupation has too frequently been overlooked. Such research underscores the need for increased education on stress management, intrapersonal awareness, aerobic/physical fitness, and diet. Hopefully, such programs will result in more comprehensive training for officers, better control of the problem of police stress, and ultimately, better protection and service to the citizens employing these officers.

Fourth, such research will allow individual law enforcement officers to better understand and manage the pressures of their profession. It should give them a stronger view of the common characteristics of police stress, and perhaps more important, a realization of the similar reactions experienced by other officers. Since the image of the profession has often encouraged a withholding of emotions for sake of manliness, this understanding will hopefully foster an improved peer acceptance of and reaction to the stress of the job and reduce some of the stereotypic, ultramasculine reluctance to admit and confront personal problems. With such understanding, officers would hopefully become more willing to share their problems and concerns with their peers and with trained mental health/stress reduction personnel.

Fifth, this research can serve as an educational tool for police families. Contemporary police training too often fails to recognize the impact of stress on the officer's home, and in too many agencies, fails to prepare the officer or spouse for this effect adequately. The use of information from this research can allow for the development of spouse stress awareness programs and more directly affect the high rate of domestic problems, particularly divorce, related to the job.

Finally, in a country where the media regularly paints pictures of officers which range from villain to hero to buffoon, the transmittal of research results such as this to the public and the open admission of human qualities of law enforcement officers may set more realistically the level of public expectations and reduce some of the frustration and conflict in police-citizen encounters. With this, some of the fear and frustration underlying stress may be significantly curtailed.

### Conclusion

The research, both literary and empirical, conducted during this study fosters the development of several specific conclusions concerning stress in law enforcement. First, stress can be seen as a major problem affecting law enforcement and confronting law enforcement administrators today. Its overt effects can be seen in the high percentage of officers who have experienced a stress-related illness and in its other critical sociocultural manifestations, such as increased alcohol use and a high rate of divorce.

Second, a stress magnitude scale similar to the scale developed for the general population by Holmes and Rahe can be developed for law enforcement officers. Such an instrument can make successful use of current research techniques to develop a practical social consensus scale. The use of such an instrument can also allow for the specific identification of major stressors by those in the occupation experiencing them.

As the scale developed during this research indicates, law enforcement officers perceive as particularly stressful those incidents relating to violence, severe personnel/disciplinary matters, and critical administrative issues, all of which may be considered as threatening because of their potential damage to an officer's person, career, or self-image. This evaluation also indicated considerably less concern and significantly less stress centering around operational and administrative issues which are perceived as common, routine, and consequently, less threatening. Between the two extremes fall a number of events which cause a varying amount of stress and which may occur with some regular degree of frequency, but which still jeopardize the philosophy and image of the officer and are not subject to easy discrimination of a scale such as this.

**FBI**

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> Rosalind Forbes, *Corporate Stress* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, Inc., 1979), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Russell Golech, "Thank God for a Wife Who Cares," *Police Stress*, vol. 1, Spring 1979, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Terry Eisenburg, "Labor-Management Relations and Psychological Stress: View from the Bottom," *Police Chief*, vol. 42, November 1975, pp. 54-58.

<sup>4</sup> Judith Grencik, "Toward an Understanding of Stress," eds. William Kroes and Joseph Hurrell, *Job Stress and the Police Officer* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> Larry Moore and John T. Donohue, "The Patrol Officer: Special Problems/Special Cures," *Police Chief*, vol. 45, November 1978, p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe, "The Social Readjustment Rating Scale," *Journal of Psychosomatic Research*, vol. 11, 1967, pp. 213-218.




# Department Training Officers And The Training Process

By GEORGE R. BANDICS

*Investigator*

*Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office  
New Brunswick, N.J.*







*Investigator Bandics*



*Richard S. Rebeck  
Prosecutor of Middlesex County*

"I can't afford to send everyone to school; with the way things are going, my training budget will be cut in half. It's going to be tough to keep up the morale of the department or maintain efficiency."

These are comments often heard in the chief's office or in one of the commander's offices. Administrators are complaining about the lack of trained personnel and training funds. How can police agencies maintain trained personnel while at the same time keeping the costs down? The answer is to select department training officers (DTO) to offset the expense and still provide quality training.

Most police agencies send officers to school arbitrarily, without any purpose or plan in mind. Too often, officers are selected for training on an ad hoc basis, simply because of seniority, favoritism, or because he hasn't been to a school in a long time. The officer, in turn, and soon the entire department view this training as a chance to get away from the job for awhile, while everyone else sees this school assignment as a vacation. There is little regard for budget limitations, purpose or plan, and the overall impact on the department. Will the cost of this training benefit the officer and the department, or is there a lack of planning? Today's chief of police must recognize that one of the most important allocations in the department budget is that for training. He should also recognize, however, that when funds must be cut, it will usually be in the area of training. One fact emerges from this: It is impossible to send every officer to school.

The constant economic strain in law enforcement prohibits sending officers to school without a need. Doing this diminishes what little funding may be available. Administrators must give serious attention not only to course description but to the standard of who, what, where, when, why, and how. Who should I send to this course that will best bring back the important information? What does the course deal with, and what changes will it have on the department? Where is the course being held, and is it cost-effective to send someone there? When is the course being conducted? Will there be manpower problems if the officer is excused from duty? Why is this type of training necessary? Is the department too small, or are the department's methods different? How can this training be best accomplished for the benefit of the entire department?

Although these questions seem difficult when considering the entire department, the answers are much simpler when only a few officers are involved. As the name implies, the DTO concept is based on the theory of training a few for the benefit of all. The concept involves selecting the best candidates in the department and training them in several disciplines so that they, in turn, can become the trainers.

The DTO system was used in the training of all police officers in Middlesex County, N.J., in a new criminal justice code. In this case, a small group of prosecutors and police officers trained one or two members from each police department in the county. DTO's were given instruction on the code, along with a minicourse in methods of instruction. These police officers or DTO's then went back to their departments to train the remaining officers.



After each department completed a block of training, the officers were tested. The results indicated that the system worked. Training material was able to flow from a small group to a larger group, and finally, to the entire department.

Any course can be handled the same way. Instead of attempting to send every officer to a narcotics course, the DTO's should be sent and should return to train the remainder of the department. The system is sound economically, and with quality DTO's, it is sound educationally.

The police administrator or staff officer responsible for training must recognize that the training process involves an indepth look into several areas. He must understand that training is an ongoing process in developing the entire department.

### **Needs of the Department**

The first problem that police administrators must address is the needs of the department. Is there a problem with manpower allocation? Is there a need for more crime prevention? Should the department specialize in narcotics or gambling? Is the organized crime problem being handled effectively? Are the criminal cases moving quickly? What is the conviction rate?

If it is determined that the department's requirements or needs are not lacking, specialized training is not needed. If, however, after careful evaluation, the chief and his staff determine that there are several departmental problems, the training program may be the answer in solving these problems. Steps should be taken to insure that the training process is considered a fluid, constantly evolving process, as opposed to isolated assignments.

---

## **“. . . the DTO concept is based on the theory of training a few for the benefit of all.”**

---

### **Selection of DTO's**

There must be a careful selection process to determine not only the best qualified candidate but a person who can institute programs, influence people, and prepare for any expansion. The DTO must be articulate and have the ability to generate interest in a given area. He must maintain credibility, or the trainees will not respond positively.

During the selection process, persons who can be trained in several disciplines should be considered. For example, a firearms instructor should not be selected as a DTO simply because he is a good shot. He should also be able to teach firearms justification and the use of deadly force. A DTO selected to teach white-collar crime investigation should have a wide range of knowledge in all phases of investigation.

Once a DTO is selected, the administrator must outline to the candidate why the training is needed and what is expected once the training is completed. The goals of the organization play an important role in training, and all training should be in direct relationship with these goals. It is imperative that the DTO believe in the goals of the organization and that these goals be reflected in his mode of instruction.

### **Debriefing the DTO**

After a DTO completes any training, the administrator must "reinterview" or "debrief" the officer. The administrator should know what the course actually covered in order to substantiate future inhouse training and determine how this training might affect the police operation. It should also be determined what, if any, departmental policy or procedure changes must be made. For example, if the DTO learns during a seminar that probable cause should be explained on all arrest warrant complaints, a new policy should be developed and training presented according to that policy.

Feedback to the administrator is essential in the training process. Too often, police officers are sent to school and return to their assignments without being asked about the course. It is the job of the administrator to ask whether there were any special problems and whether anything was covered that would assist the department.

After the debriefing, plans should be developed so that training can be implemented by the DTO. Remember, if there was a need to send the officer for training, there was a problem in the organization. The training program should correct or limit these problems.

### **Onduty Training**

When it has been determined what the DTO has learned, a plan or program must be implemented to use that training on a departmental level. These plans might include a new policy or procedure, a training bulletin on specific information or techniques, or the implementation of cross-training. Very often, police administrators overlook important expertise in the department or take for granted that a particular officer will always be there. It is imperative that what an officer learns during a course be taught to others. Administrators should constantly be concerned



with having "backup" people who have been cross-trained to insure the continued efficiency of the department.

Any change in policy or procedure should be explained in a teaching environment rather than simply being distributed on paper. This allows for thorough explanation on the need for the policy and an opportunity for the officers to "share" in its implementation. In essence, the procedure is instituted on a professional training basis, as opposed to a forced requirement.

### **Quality Control**

Most important in the DTO endeavor is quality control. It is critical for the administrator to evaluate periodically how the DTO is performing. Are all new policies or procedures clearly understood by all personnel? Has the DTO retained interest and dedication in training or should he be reinterviewed to instill added thrust in his performance? Are there any problems with the DTO program? Does the officer need advanced training to cover properly the assignment? All these questions and more can be answered through active communication between the administrator and the police officer during the quality control process.

The quality control process never ends. It is an ongoing process of evaluation and reevaluation which the administrator must recognize as part of his responsibilities in training. Quality control serves as a catalyst within the department to insure productive movement and keeps morale on an upward pitch. Without quality control, the entire process may be useless. Unless an administrator knows how things are progressing, departmental goals will continue to erode until they no longer exist.

---

## **"It is critical for the administrator to evaluate periodically how the DTO is performing."**

---

### **Scheduling**

When the DTO has completed the training and a program has been designed, the difficult task of scheduling begins. How can a maximum number of officers be trained at a minimum cost to the department? The best and most economical way is to conduct "minicourses" on a daily basis. To accomplish this, officers are taken "out of service" during their shifts. This scheduling is dependent on manpower allocation and other factors, such as shift, day of week, and time of day.

Emphasis should be placed on beginning training and increasing it slowly until it becomes an active part of the agency. The DTO and administrator should not be discouraged because only a few men can be released for training. If an overall commitment is made by all commands, this "one-on-one" training can be effective. The problem of some commanders "balking" at the request to release men from duty can be overcome by a total commitment from management.


If there are five or six operating divisions or sections within the department, the DTO should request one officer from each division or section. If possible, more officers may be requested, but it may be necessary to begin slowly to familiarize command personnel with the system.

Completing the training may be a lengthy process; however, this has certain advantages. First, the DTO becomes more proficient in teaching and knows the material well. Second, the

extended process gives the program time to solve any hidden problems. Although there should be extensive planning for a training program, it should also be remembered that there will be feedback from the street officer. The extended training cycle gives the DTO an opportunity to hear this feedback and adjust the training accordingly.

A solid training program involves more than just sending a police officer to school. It involves a sincere commitment, an in-depth look into needs, selection, briefing and debriefing, the on-duty training program, and continuous quality control. The DTO is not just a title or nameplate on the door—it is a position that requires dedication, ambition, and perseverance. If these qualities are met, the DTO program will save money and provide effective training for the department. **FBI**







# An Automated Police Photo Lab

By WILLIAM J. MIEDERHOFF

*Supervisor*


*Photography Services Section*

*St. Louis County Police Department*

*St. Louis, Mo.*







*Mr. Niederhoff*



*Gilbert H. Kleinknecht  
Superintendent*

Many tools are used as investigative aids in present day law enforcement efforts. One of these tools is photography, both for investigative purposes and documentation. This includes crime scene photography, mugshots, training slides and photos, suspect sketches, public relations, photomicrography for fingerprints and striation comparisons, aerials, identification photos, and lineups. In fact, thanks to technological advances, photography is so firmly established and so frequently used in law enforcement today that large camera and film manufacturers are designing new products specifically for this profession. And law enforcement photographers, once shunned by the professional associations, are now being recognized as experts in their field.

In practically every police department throughout the country, there is at least one individual, if not an entire unit, responsible for the photographic needs of the department. This could range from one person who loads and unloads the mugshot camera and then takes the film to the corner drugstore for processing to the full-service, in-house unit which processes film for an entire region through the use of automated photo processing equipment.

The St. Louis County Police Department Photography Services Section (PSS) is one such full-service lab. It is staffed entirely by civilians (four technicians and a supervisor) who are all members of the Professional Photographers of America. Besides routine darkroom duties, lab personnel are responsible for taking all I.D. photos of department members, video taping

and showing, crime scene photos, aerials, lineups, public relations, copy work, slide duplications, and any other in-house assignments, as requested. The services offered by the section are used not only by the police department but also by most of the departments of county government and Federal, State, and municipal agencies located within and surrounding the county. It is projected that in 1981, the photo section will complete approximately 600 special assignments like those listed above, excluding the taking of personnel I.D. photos.

### **History**

When the department was organized in 1955, the photography function rested on the detectives of the Identification Bureau. Besides their numerous other duties, each detective not only would take his own pictures of every case but would also process and print the film. With each 4 x 5 piece of black/white film processed individually, considerable time was spent in the darkroom, and quality control was practically nonexistent. Eventually, the workload demanded full-time commissioned photo technicians for darkroom work only. In 1973, the department made the transition to color photographs and basket-line color operation. At that time, civilian technicians replaced a portion of the commissioned staff. The use of color resulted in more accurate crime scene documentations and more professional products overall. The same was true for mugshots. Subtle differences in hair, eye, and complexion color became readily apparent. Other local agencies with similar background color on their mugshots used the mugshots produced by the PSS to complete their photo lineups.





*Prior to the installation of automated equipment, detectives would individually process their own crime scene photos.*

## Modernization

With the increasing demand for photographic services and a desire to make color processing available to all law enforcement agencies in the area, a Federal grant of \$152,000 was obtained through the Missouri Council on Criminal Justice, of which \$78,616 was for the expansion and modernization of the Photography Services Section.

When approached with the idea of converting from a basket-line operation to a fully automated line due to the increasing demand for photographic processing, the first considerations had to be what services were to be offered and what was the expected

volume/usage of the equipment. Color photos were well-established, both as investigative tools and court presentations. Black/white photos were still being used for Ident kits, enlargements of fingerprints, publication work, and some municipal investigative work. However, one in-house capability the lab did not have was the processing of transparencies or slides. Essentially, the services offered remained the same, color and black/white with the addition of slide processing.

## Selection of Equipment

The equipment purchased was carefully selected and was based on several factors. The physical size of the equipment had to be balanced with the desired output, i.e., color prints up

to 20 inches, the existing floor space of the lab, and the installation or relocation of plumbing. One vendor offered a processor that had to be completely disassembled in order to get it in the door. The choice between roller transport or leader-type processors posed another problem. With the roller transport processor, the film or paper is conveyed through the machine by a series of double rollers. A disadvantage to this process is that film or paper could wrap around one of the rollers, causing the machine to jam.





The other processor was the leader type, where film and paper is attached to a ribbon or string-like leader and pulled through the machine. A disadvantage here is that the leader might slip off or break. Due to the critical nature of the film to be processed and after consultation with several other labs, the roller transport processor was selected.

Unlike large commercial labs where several film and paper processors are in operation, when only one of each piece of equipment is available, long periods of downtime are not advantageous. Therefore, the reputation of the manufacturer and vendor had to be above-average. Training of technicians, not only to operate the equipment but to maintain it, is crucial and has to be provided by the vendor. The major cause of downtime with any type of photo equipment is poor maintenance.

Available floor space is another influential factor when choosing lab equipment. Arrangement of processors in the lab could affect several other operations. For example, a misjudgment could result in difficult maintenance procedures, wasted floor space, or the possibility of not being able to run more than one operation at a time. Under ideal conditions, each processor should be placed in its own room and be able to function without affecting another processor. Where individual areas cannot be divided with walls, floor-to-ceiling curtains can be used. What is important is the capability of all machines to operate at the same time, if necessary.

Another determining factor was operational economy. The miniprinter selected prints color or black/white and up to 300 prints per hour, whereas approximately 50 prints per hour could be turned out under the previous hand enlarger-produced method. Since the miniprinter uses roll paper, a savings of \$3,200 per year is realized over cut paper. Also the roller transport color

*In 1981, it is projected that more than 100,000 prints will be processed by the Photography Services Section.*



negative film processor is saving up to 38 percent on chemical costs and can process up to 88 rolls of 120-film per hour rather than the basket-line process previously used that produced only 14 rolls per hour dry to dry. Color prints are now processed at a dry-to-dry time of 15 minutes, as compared to the basket-line process that took up to 2 hours, including wash time.

Included in the new equipment were two additional machines for black/white film and paper that now occupy the space previously used for black/white paper alone. In addition, the new color transparency processor saves \$4.48 per roll of commercial processing costs. A combination of police and other government agencies' slides adds up to an average of 200 rolls per month now processed and mounted by the lab. It is anticipated that the resulting savings from the equipment in supplies and manpower will pay for the machines within 2 years.

### Operations

To operate efficiently, a photo lab must be able to offer quality products expeditiously. Turnaround time on investigative photos is critical. One recent homicide required nine rolls of film for adequate coverage. But with the automated equipment and full operation, the investigators were given two complete sets of photographs in less than 3 hours.

Assignment classifications are routine, urgent, and priority and are determined by the section supervisor by the nature of the request and need of the person requesting it. Routine requests are sorted by prints and nega-

---

## **"To operate efficiently, a photo lab must be able to offer quality products expeditiously."**

---

tive sizes required by the mini-printer. All 35 mm negatives to be printed on 3 1/2-inch paper are completed in one sitting. If there are 70 mm negatives to be printed, the 3 1/2-inch paper remains in the mini-printer and the negative carrier and transport board are changed. The same operation continues until all requests to be printed on 3 1/2-inch paper are completed. The process is then changed to 5-inch paper and started over again, the same with 8-inch paper. The urgent classification is used for requests when the product is needed within 8 to 12 hours. These requests are placed ahead of routine, but within the normal working pattern. Priority requests are those that are needed immediately. The normal work flow is stopped, and all effort is directed toward the completion of the request. A specially designed photo request form facilitates the sorting of requests.

### Disadvantages

As is usual, there are advantages and disadvantages to any type of operation. While the operating time of the lab has been minimized with the automated method, the staff is now handling more requests. Better quality photos, shorter turnaround time, and reduction in cost have caused the users to want more in the way of services rendered. In addition, because of the availability of color prints in large format and slides, the list of agencies served continues to grow.

Another disadvantage is the required maintenance of the machines, which was considered when the selection was made. Since each processor

is quite sophisticated, it must be cleaned and checked at least once a week in order to prevent breakdowns. All racks must be pulled out and thoroughly scrubbed, usually a two-person operation since some of the racks are large and heavy. Also, when the warranty of the machines expires, the replacement of broken, damaged, or nonworking parts can be expensive. Since the processors produce dry products, all must have built-in heat blowers, which not only produce heat but can also cause considerable noise. Yet, despite these disadvantages, the machines are worth the investment.

### Conclusion

With an in-house automated photo lab, the central processing lab for the police department and all county government agencies, a considerable savings of tax dollars, estimated at \$10,000 the first year alone, has been realized. This is accompanied with a turnaround time reduced from 72 hours to under 24 hours and consistent quality photographs. It is evident, therefore, that from its humble beginnings in 1955 to a full-service professional automated color lab in 1980, the Photography Services Section of the St. Louis County Police Department is meeting the demand for photography in law enforcement and government today.

**FBI**



# Suicide Prevention at the County Jail

By DENNIS G. DONAHUE, A.C.S.W.

*Director of Out-Patient Services  
Westmoreland Hospital  
Community Mental Health Center  
And*

HUGH E. CHAVERN, M.D.

*Director  
Westmoreland Hospital  
Community Mental Health Center  
Greensburg, Pa.*

Recent trends in most States toward highly restrictive involuntary commitment laws have markedly reduced the number of involuntary admissions to psychiatric hospitals and have left a group of individuals, who are suffering various forms of emotional illness but refuse treatment, outside the present system of psychiatric services.

One result of this development is that increasing numbers of individuals in need of treatment are now being detained in county jails on relatively minor charges due to bizarre or inappropriate behavior associated with mental illness. On occasion, magistrates will send mentally disordered persons to the county jail in hopes that a way can be found to obtain psychiatric treatment. In effect, there has been a shift of a large group of patients from a treatment environment to a jail environment. Some surveys indicate that as many as 20 percent of all prisoners in county jails are suffering from mental illness or alcoholism.<sup>1</sup>

County jails and detention centers are not constructed or staffed to deal with emotional illness. A jail environment emphasizes security and control of prisoners' movements and meets only the basic needs of prisoners. There is a rapid turnover in jail population, with most prisoners remaining at the jail for less than 10 days. Consequently, the jail staff is continually occupied with the admission and discharge of prisoners, feeding routines, and security maintenance. The opportunity for personal interchange is minimal, as is the provision for most medical services.





Mr. Donahue

---

**“Training the jail staff  
... in identifying  
prisoners with  
emotional illness and  
suicidal intentions has  
had a significant  
effect. . . .”**

---

In prisons, the psychiatric patient who is not disturbing others is easily overlooked and often neglected, particularly if he is withdrawn or socially isolated. The depressed prisoner with suicidal thoughts and feelings often becomes more despondent in this environment because of uncertainty about the future, isolation from ordinary sources of emotional support, and prolonged inactivity. The result can be a suicide attempt.

**Developing a Plan for Suicide Prevention**

In the fall of 1978, the warden at the Westmoreland County Prison requested assistance from the community mental health center to provide ongoing mental health services for prisoners and consultation to prison staff regarding prisoners who were difficult to manage or presented unusual problems. This followed a series of discussions with the warden and key jail staff regarding the increasing problems of managing mentally ill prisoners. The county jail, constructed in 1968, is a modern facility with a capacity of 62, including 4 females.

Initially, there were weekly 2- to 3-hour visits to the jail by personnel from the mental health center to consult with the jail staff, interview prisoners referred by the authorities for mental health services, and coordinate transfers to psychiatric hospitals or outpatient treatment. A crucial part of this service involved visits to the jail by a

psychiatrist, who provided psychiatric evaluations (usually on an emergency basis) and made specific suggestions to the jail physician regarding the type of treatment indicated for the prisoner being evaluated. Prisoners usually accepted recommendations made on their behalf for psychiatric intervention, and emergency transfers to hospitals were not unusual. In addition, many requests for services were received from the public defender, who represented most of the prisoners at the jail, and they were included in the followup consultations and reports.

Very quickly, the program evolved into an active service with four to six prisoners being seen weekly. It became standard practice to interview families of prisoners to obtain background information and determine what disturbances in the family were concurrent with the arrest of the prisoner. If it was evident that a family needed a family treatment approach, they were referred to the appropriate agency.

In the first 6 months of operation, more than 90 prisoners received mental health evaluation. Sixteen required immediate psychiatric hospitalization, 34 were treated within the jail setting for less severe forms of mental illness, and more than 45 prisoners and their families were referred for outpatient treatment of recurring alcoholism or family problems.

During this same period, there was a suicide by a prisoner who was not recognized by the staff as experiencing problems. This prisoner had many interactions with other people but had managed to conceal his suicidal urges.



Dr. Chavern



It appeared, therefore, that this approach was not going to deter significantly suicide in the jail population. It was a broad-based approach to the whole range of mental illness and alcoholism and did not specifically address the suicidal-prone individual. It was also decided that all jail personnel needed additional training so that they could recognize and refer prisoners with suicidal tendencies.

### The Suicidal Risk Inventory

A review of the literature and consultation with colleagues in the field revealed that there is general agreement on major indicators that can quickly identify prisoners who have high suicidal risk.<sup>2</sup> A checklist of symptoms and predisposing factors was developed from both these sources and collaboration between members of the treatment team involved in providing services at the jail. (See fig. 1.) This list serves as a guide to jail staff for interviewing and observing prisoners in order to identify individuals with suicidal tendencies. It gives considerable weight to previous psychiatric treatment and suicidal behavior, as well as the present emotional state of the prisoner in regard to suicidal thoughts and feelings. Also included are additional indicators which, when occurring in combination with observable symptoms, have been found to increase significantly suicidal risk, i.e., marital friction or loss of job.

After several training sessions with all levels of jail staff, the suicidal risk inventory was routinely administered to all incoming prisoners. Each booking officer, supervisor, and guard was familiar with suicidal symptoms and could question prisoners to determine the presence of suicidal tendencies.

If a prisoner demonstrating the characteristics outlined in the inventory was admitted to the jail, immediate steps could be taken to place him under precautionary observation. Arrangements for urgent psychiatric evaluation or emergency treatment could then be made.

**“ . . . the suicidal risk inventory . . . has enabled the jail staff to focus on the specific problems of emotionally disturbed individuals effectively and with confidence.”**

Figure 1

#### Symptoms

- 1) Previous suicidal gesture
- 2) History of psychiatric care
- 3) Presence of suicidal thoughts or plans
- 4) Feeling of hopelessness or despair
- 5) Voicing some type of self-destructive information
- 6) Unusual reaction to being confined
- 7) Emotional withdrawal or isolation

#### Predisposing Factors

- 1) Recent excessive drinking or drug intoxication
- 2) Recent loss of stabilizing resources, such as spouse, home, or job
- 3) Poor appetite, sleeplessness, or agitation
- 4) Chronic aggressive behavior
- 5) Over 45 years of age with progressive health problems

The enthusiasm on the part of jail staff and support by the warden for using the inventory as a routine part of admission procedures were essential to its use in evaluating every prisoner.

During the 16 months the inventory has been used at the jail, with prompt followup by the mental health team, the results have been encouraging and dramatic. There have been no suicides among prisoners admitted and interviewed using the inventory as a guide. Suicide was committed by a prisoner admitted to the jail but not assessed for suicidal potential because of the unavailability of a staff member assigned to perform this function when the prisoner was admitted. Procedures have now been strengthened to provide backup coverage to insure that each prisoner is interviewed to assess specifically suicidal risk.

Not surprisingly there has been an increase in the number of prisoners referred because of depression and suicidal thoughts or plans. There has not been a problem with prisoners “faking” suicidal tendencies to get special treatment or obtain transfers to the hospital.

Training the jail staff to ask the appropriate questions and make specific observations in identifying prisoners with emotional illness and suicidal intentions has had a significant effect in reducing suicides and obtaining prompt care for the emotionally disturbed prisoner. Using the suicidal risk inventory as a guide has enabled the jail staff to focus on the specific problems of emotionally distressed individuals effectively and with confidence.

FBI

#### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>John J. Gibbs, “Psychological and Behavioral Pathology in Jails” (Prepared for a special national workshop on mental health services in local jails, Baltimore, Md., September 27-29, 1978.)

<sup>2</sup>John Lion and Donald P. Kenefick, “Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual.” American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C., Task Force Report 8, July 1974, pp. 13-15.



# Search of Persons During Search Warrant Execution

(Part I)

By JOSEPH R. DAVIS

*Special Agent*

*Legal Counsel Division*

*Federal Bureau of Investigation*

*Washington, D.C.*

*Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law or are not permitted at all.*

Assume you have obtained a search warrant authorizing a search of premises in your community for the purpose of locating and seizing certain specified narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia. The warrant contains no language which purports to authorize a search of any person. Assume further that when you and your fellow officers arrive to execute this search warrant, there are three individuals present within the residence, and shortly after you begin the search, a fourth individual arrives.



**“... searches of persons for evidence or contraband, even in the context of execution of a search warrant, require *probable cause*, not *reasonable suspicion or belief*.”**

---



*Special Agent Davis*

Are you justified in searching any or all of the four individuals for the items named in the warrant? If a full search is not supportable, can you conduct a more limited “patdown” or “frisk”<sup>1</sup> of these persons, as a self-protective measure, to ascertain if they are armed? If in the course of a lawful frisk for weapons you feel an item which does not appear to be a weapon, but feels very much like the type of narcotics or paraphernalia named in the search warrant, are you justified in reaching into a pocket and seizing that item?

There are no easy answers to these questions, at least without the benefit of additional facts and circumstances. However, there are some established legal principles that assist in resolving them. It is important, therefore, to identify those principles and examine court decisions which have applied them to various fact situations.

Part I of the article examines the principal U.S. Supreme Court decision in this area of the law and considers the particular facts and circumstances under which an evidentiary search of persons present during execution of a search warrant may be undertaken. Part II (conclusion) will discuss the issue of when a less intrusive patdown or frisk of such individuals for weapons

may be legally supportable, the proper scope of a frisk, and whether information gained by an officer in such a frisk may constitute probable cause to make a more detailed evidentiary search of a person.

#### ***Ybarra v. Illinois***

In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court decided *Ybarra v. Illinois*,<sup>2</sup> a case which presented several of the questions raised above. Because *Ybarra* is the only U.S. Supreme Court decision which directly addresses the issue of the legality of a full search or a weapons frisk in the context of the execution of a search warrant for premises, it deserves careful consideration.<sup>3</sup>

In *Ybarra*, State officers applied for and obtained a search warrant authorizing them to search a tavern in Aurora, Ill., and also the person of the bartender, named in the warrant. The warrant authorized the police to search for specifically described narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia. The search warrant did not contain any language purporting to authorize search of any person other than the bartender. However, an Illinois State statute empowered officers, in executing a search warrant, to detain and search any person found on the premises, either to protect themselves from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything particularly described in the warrant.<sup>4</sup>

Upon arrival at the tavern, described as a rather drab one-room establishment, the officers found about a dozen or so patrons standing or sitting at the bar. The officers immediately announced their purpose and advised



everyone present they were going to conduct a "cursory search for weapons." One of the officers then proceeded to pat down each of the customers, while the other officers began a careful search of the premises for items named in the warrant.

The police officer who frisked the patrons found Ventura Ybarra standing by a pinball machine in front of the bar. The search of Ybarra was described by the Supreme Court as follows:

"In his first patdown of Ybarra, the officer felt what he described as 'a cigarette pack with objects in it.' He did not remove this pack from Ybarra's pocket. Instead, he moved on and proceeded to pat down other customers. After completing this process the officer returned to Ybarra and frisked him once again. This second search of Ybarra took place approximately 2 to 10 minutes after the first. The officer relocated and retrieved the cigarette pack from Ybarra's pants pocket. Inside the pack he found six tinfoil packets containing a brown powdery substance which later turned out to be heroin.<sup>5</sup>

Ybarra was charged with and later convicted of possession of the narcotics taken from him during the above-described search. Although Ybarra challenged the legality of the search of his person, both the trial court and State appellate court upheld the search based upon the Illinois statute. The Illinois Appellate Court acknowledged that the statute in question could not properly authorize the search of all persons present in a "large retail or commercial establishment," but that as applied in this case to "a one-room bar

where it was obvious from the complaint of the officers seeking the search warrant that heroin was being sold or dispensed," it was constitutional.<sup>6</sup> After the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the case, it was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In the Supreme Court the State advanced three distinct theories under which the search of Ybarra could be justified. To facilitate analysis, each of the alternative arguments and the Court's response to each is considered separately.

First, the State contended that the search warrant itself, read in conjunction with the Illinois statute, would justify the search of Ybarra. In response to this argument the Court noted that the standard of proof required to search a person present under such circumstances is *probable cause* to believe the person to be searched has items named in the warrant on his or her person.<sup>7</sup> The Court noted that the search warrant itself conferred no authority to search any of the tavern customers.<sup>8</sup> Although the Court stopped short of directly declaring the Illinois statute in question unconstitutional, it clearly indicated that neither this statute nor others like it may properly authorize a search of persons present for evidence or contraband in the absence of facts and circumstances amounting to probable cause to believe those persons are in possession of the items sought.<sup>9</sup>

The Court next considered whether in this case there was probable cause to believe that Ybarra, or any of the other patrons, was violating the law. The Court noted that the affidavit filed in support of issuance of the search warrant did not allege that the bar was frequented by persons illegally purchasing drugs or that any patron had ever been observed purchasing drugs from the bartender. Moreover, when the warrant was executed, probable cause was still lacking to believe any of the customers were committing or had committed any offense. The police did not recognize Ybarra and knew nothing at all about him except that he was present, along with several others, in a public tavern at the time the warrant was executed. The officers did not testify to any actions by him that were indicative of criminal conduct or of any movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, nor did he say anything of a suspicious nature to the officers. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Court, explained:

"It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed. But, a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person."<sup>10</sup> (Citation omitted)



**"The standard of proof necessary to justify a patdown or frisk of a person during execution of a search warrant is *reasonable suspicion or belief* that the person is armed and dangerous."**

---

Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that either the warrant or the statute in question justified the search.

The second argument advanced by the State was somewhat more complex. It was contended that even in the absence of probable cause, a more limited patdown or frisk of Ybarra for weapons was justified as a self-protective measure under the doctrine previously recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Terry v. Ohio*.<sup>11</sup> The State then argued that when the officer, in the course of the proper frisk, felt an object in Ybarra's pocket which was very similar physically to the items named in the warrant (narcotics), he possessed *probable cause* to support the second, more thorough search of the pocket which yielded the evidence.

Without commenting on the analytical soundness of this argument, the Supreme Court simply held it was not supported by the facts of this case. The Court explained that in order to take the first step of this approach, it is necessary to find the initial frisk or patdown was justified. Noting that it had "invariably" required a reasonable suspicion or belief that a person is armed and dangerous to justify such a procedure, the Court found no facts to support such a belief as to Ybarra.<sup>12</sup>

Reviewing the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court pointed out: 1) Ybarra was entirely unknown to the officers either by name or reputation, and 2) they had no particular reason to believe he might be inclined to assault them (his hands were empty, there were no threatening or furtive gestures). The Court summarized its view of the situation as follows:

"At the suppression hearing, the most Agent Johnson could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a ¾-length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be expected on almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March. In short, the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous. \* \* \* Nothing in *Terry* can be understood to allow a generalized 'cursory search for weapons' or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The 'narrow scope' of the *Terry* exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place."<sup>13</sup>

The third and last argument offered by the State was the most novel. It was suggested that because of the important governmental interest in controlling narcotics and the ease with which evidence of a narcotics violation may be concealed, the "reasonable belief or suspicion" standard, previously established in *Terry v. Ohio*<sup>14</sup> for a

brief stop and limited patdown for weapons, should be extended to allow searches for evidence of persons present on "compact" premises during execution of a search warrant.<sup>15</sup>

The Supreme Court flatly rejected this approach, stating that the long-prevailing probable cause standard embodies the best compromise between the competing interests of effective law enforcement and protection of citizens against unreasonable interferences with their privacy. In short, searches of persons for evidence or contraband, even in the context of execution of a search warrant, require *probable cause*, not *reasonable suspicion or belief*.

For the reasons explained above, the Supreme Court held that the search of Ybarra and the seizure of the narcotics from his pocket violated the 4th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution.<sup>16</sup>

#### **Principles Established by *Ybarra***

The general principles of law announced in *Ybarra* may be summarized as follows:

1) The presence of an individual at premises subject to search under a search warrant does not, standing alone, justify a search of that person for items named in the warrant.

2) The standard of proof necessary to justify a search of a person present during execution of a warrant for evidence or contraband is *probable*



cause to believe the person is in possession of such items. *Corollary:* A statute which purports to authorize search of all persons present for evidence or contraband in the absence of specific facts and circumstances amounting to probable cause is invalid.

3) The presence of a person at premises subject to search under a search warrant does not, standing alone, justify a patdown or frisk of that person for weapons.

4) The standard of proof necessary to justify a patdown or frisk of a person present during execution of a search warrant is *reasonable suspicion or belief* that the person is armed and dangerous. *Corollary:* A statute which purports to authorize a frisk for weapons of all persons present in absence of particular facts and circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion or belief the person is armed and dangerous is invalid.

#### Questions Not Answered by *Ybarra*

At this point it may be well to identify and briefly comment on some issues not addressed by the *Ybarra* decision. The case did not involve a search warrant which, by its language, authorized a search of "all persons present"; therefore, the Supreme Court specifically noted it was not passing upon the validity of such warrants.<sup>17</sup> This issue is also beyond the scope of this article.

The Court offered little guidance as to what specific facts and circumstances would justify a full search or a patdown during the execution of a search warrant. However, a review of State and lower Federal court decisions is helpful in identifying factors found persuasive. Several of these decisions will be examined in this article.

As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court also did not comment on the legal soundness of the two-step approach suggested in one of the State's arguments—that if, during a lawful frisk of a person for weapons, the officer feels an object he has probable cause to believe is evidence or contraband, he may undertake a more detailed search of the pocket. In *Ybarra* this reasoning was rejected because there was not a proper basis to undertake even the first limited patdown. However, several State and Federal decisions, which will be discussed later, have accepted this two-stage argument when the initial patdown was held proper.

Because *Ybarra* is a relatively recent decision (November 1979), the reported cases which directly rely upon it as authority are somewhat limited in number.<sup>18</sup> However, the principles announced in *Ybarra* were often recognized and applied correctly by State and Federal courts prior to the Supreme Court decision. Therefore, the following discussion includes several pre-*Ybarra* cases believed to be consistent with and illustrative of the principles recognized in *Ybarra*.

#### Full Search of Persons Present or Arriving During Searches

Two State appellate court cases decided prior to *Ybarra* illustrate the type of particularized probable cause which justifies a search of persons for items named in a search warrant.

In *Denson v. State*,<sup>19</sup> officers were executing a search warrant for narcotics at a private residence. The warrant was based upon reliable informant information that the owner of the residence was observed selling narcotics at the house within the previous 24 hours. The defendant (apparently the boyfriend of the owner) was upstairs shaving when officers arrived. He was not immediately searched, but was engaged in conversation by one of the officers who had talked with him on a previous occasion. The officer noticed: 1) He was speaking differently than he had before; 2) he spoke as if he was trying to hold his tongue stationary; and 3) he looked as if he was trying to force a swallow. The officer requested him to open his mouth, and when he did so, observed a small tinfoil packet. He ordered the defendant to spit it out. It contained heroin which was seized and later used against the defendant at trial. The court upheld the seizure, noting that the search was not authorized simply because of the defendant's presence at the premises to be searched, but because the officer's observations provided probable cause to believe the defendant was attempting to conceal items named in the warrant.



**“... informant information, if specific enough, may serve as the source for probable cause to search persons present.”**

---

In *Patton v. State*,<sup>20</sup> an officer's observations of specific actions again formed the basis for a search of a person present. When police entered the residence to execute a search warrant for narcotics, several individuals, including the defendant, were sitting around a coffee table on top of which were illegal drugs. After being frisked for weapons (the frisk was not an issue in the case), the defendant was seated in the living room. An officer assigned to watch him observed the defendant place his hand or thumb into his pocket, and upon noticing that the officer was observing him, quickly remove his hand and stare at the ceiling. The officer requested the defendant to empty his pocket. As a result, narcotics were discovered. The court upheld the officer's action, explaining that there was probable cause to believe the defendant was attempting to conceal items named in the warrant.

Other surrounding circumstances were held to justify the search in *Travis v. State*,<sup>21</sup> a post-*Ybarra* decision. In that case, officers were executing a search warrant for narcotics at a residence during the early morning hours. After knocking and announcing their identity and purpose approximately three times and receiving no response, officers heard “a ruckus going on in the back” of the house. After several attempts, one of the officers was able to successfully force open the front door. The defendant, who was stopped while attempting to depart through the back door, was searched and narcotics were found. The court correctly noted

that a search warrant does not authorize the search of all individuals who happen to be present on the premises. However, it held that because of the delay in entering and other circumstances (apparently the need to enter forcibly and the defendant's attempt to leave through the rear door), there was an opportunity for the defendant to conceal the items named in the warrant and probable cause to believe he had done so. Therefore, the search was justified.

A District of Columbia case<sup>22</sup> illustrates a somewhat different justification for the search of persons present. Officers obtained a search warrant for gambling money and paraphernalia believed to be located in a small delicatessen. Just prior to execution of the warrant, a reliable informant, who had also furnished much of the information upon which the search warrant was based, contacted one of the officers and advised him that the warrant should be served promptly as “the people were inside that had the numbers slips on them.”<sup>23</sup> The officers executed the warrant immediately and searched the five or six persons found on the premises. The court upheld the search of the defendant, noting that although generally “it could be argued that persons present in the customer

area of a store are presumptively customers, here the informant's report could reasonably be taken as meaning that the people inside were participants.”<sup>24</sup> Although this is a pre-*Ybarra* case and presents a close case because it, like *Ybarra*, involves a place open to the public, the case stands for the correct proposition that informant information, if specific enough, may serve as the source for probable cause to search persons present.

As a general rule, the facts and circumstances which give rise to probable cause to search individuals present and not named in the search warrant will have to arise at the time of the execution or shortly before. This is true because if the probable cause to search those present exists at the time the search warrant is applied for, a warrant authorizing the search of those persons as well as the premises should be obtained.

Although not dealt with in *Ybarra*, it appears the same standard, probable cause, applies to the search of a person who is not present when the search warrant is served, but arrives at the premises during the search. It is more difficult to establish probable cause in the case of an individual just arriving, because logically, it cannot be argued that he has concealed on his person items which were previously on the premises subject to the search warrant. However, where the search warrant describes a particular class of items, such as narcotics, and there is an ongoing criminal activity at the premises, there may be situations where probable cause can be established.<sup>25</sup>



Even prior to *Ybarra*, most courts recognized that a person arriving at a residence where a search was underway, even in the company of an occupant of the residence or of one named in the search warrant, could not be routinely searched for evidence or contraband.<sup>26</sup> Since *Ybarra*, courts are even more reluctant to approve evidentiary searches of persons arriving during execution, especially if their connection with the premises is not clearly known.<sup>27</sup>

Part II (conclusion) of this article will address the question of when a less intrusive patdown or frisk of persons present may properly be undertaken, the scope of such a search, and the related question of whether information gained in the course of a frisk may supply probable cause to support a more thorough search of the person for evidence or contraband.

(Continued next month)

#### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> The terms "patdown" or "frisk" are used interchangeably throughout the article. Both are used to denote a limited search of a person for weapons which generally requires a two-step procedure. The first step is the patdown of the exterior of the person's clothing to ascertain if the individual is carrying an object that feels like a weapon. The second step, which is only proper if the officer feels an item which he reasonably suspects or believes to be a weapon, is the reaching into the clothing to retrieve the suspicious item.

<sup>2</sup> 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (hereinafter referred to as *Ybarra*).

<sup>3</sup> In an earlier case, *United States v. Di Re*, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), the Supreme Court had considered the legality of a search of a passenger in an automobile where an officer was conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle for contraband. Inasmuch as that case involved a vehicle search rather than premises and was a warrantless search, it was not particularly helpful in resolving the questions raised in *Ybarra*.

<sup>4</sup> The statute in question was Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, Sections 108-9 (1975). The statute provides in full: "In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably detain to search any person in the place at the time: (a) To protect himself from attack, or (b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or thing particularly described in the warrant."

<sup>5</sup> *Ybarra*, *supra* note 2, at 88-89.

<sup>6</sup> *People v. Ybarra*, 373 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978).

<sup>7</sup> *Ybarra*, *supra* note 2, at 91.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at 92.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 96 and n.11.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 91.

<sup>11</sup> 392 U.S. 1 (1968). This was a landmark decision which created a carefully limited exception to the general rule of the fourth amendment that all searches and seizures be supported by probable cause. *Terry* permits a limited search for weapons, termed a "patdown" or "frisk," based upon "reasonable belief or suspicion" that the person the officer has detained is in possession of a weapon.

<sup>12</sup> *Ybarra*, *supra* note 2, at 92-93.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 93-94.

<sup>14</sup> *Supra* note 11.

<sup>15</sup> *Ybarra*, *supra* note 2, at 94.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 96. The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The 14th amendment provides, in pertinent part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."

<sup>17</sup> *Ybarra*, *supra* note 2, at 92 n.4.

<sup>18</sup> Review of standard legal citators in January 1981, disclosed only four cases citing *Ybarra* involving searches or frisks of persons in premises where a search warrant was executed.

<sup>19</sup> 375 So.2d 1275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), *writ denied*, 375 So.2d 1276 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1979).

<sup>20</sup> 252 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).

<sup>21</sup> 381 So.2d 97 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), *rehearing denied*, 381 So.2d 102 (1980), *writ denied*, 381 So.2d 102 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1980).

<sup>22</sup> *United States v. Graves*, 315 A.2d 559 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* at 559-560.

<sup>24</sup> *Id.* at 561.

<sup>25</sup> Professor LaFave makes this point well. See W. LaFave, *Search and Seizure—A Treatise on the 4th Amendment*, Vol. 2, Section 4.9 (1978).

<sup>26</sup> E.g., *Johantgen v. Commonwealth*, 571 S.W.2d 110 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), (Search of defendant held improper although he arrived at residence being searched under warrant in the company of a person named in the search warrant); *Smith v. State*, 227 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (Where defendant entered premises where search for narcotics was underway and officers knew nothing about him, a search of his person was not justified).

<sup>27</sup> *State v. Peters*, 611 P.2d 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (Search of defendant, who arrived at private residence during execution of a narcotics search warrant, held unlawful where he was not known to be the owner or occupant of premises). In *Peters* and in the following two cases, both of which involved individuals who arrived in the course of execution of search warrants, the courts refused to approve even a limited frisk for weapons. *United States v. Cole*, 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1980); *Bell v. State*, 608 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).



# WANTED BY THE FBI



Date photographs taken unknown.

## James Edward Allen, Jr.

James Edward Allen, Jr., also known as Bud Allen, Leroy Hudson, Edward Wayne, and "Little Bud."

## Wanted for:

Interstate Flight—Murder

## The Crime

Allen is being sought in connection with the brutal murder of a South Carolina merchant. The victim was robbed of \$5,000 and shot five times with a .22-caliber revolver.

A Federal warrant was issued on November 28, 1977, at Columbia, S.C.

## Description

Age .....23, born April 30, 1957, Allendale, S.C.  
 Height .....5'10".  
 Weight .....160 pounds.  
 Build .....Medium.  
 Hair .....Black.  
 Eyes .....Brown.  
 Complexion .....Medium.  
 Race .....Negro.  
 Nationality .....American.  
 Scars and Marks .....Tattoo on left arm.  
 Social Security Number Used .....250-11-5973.  
 FBI No. ....624 994 L5.

## Caution

Allen should be considered armed and dangerous.

## Notify the FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating this fugitive is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.

## Classification Data:

NCIC Classification:

03TT0415110752TT1206

Fingerprint Classification:

3 S 1 T 11 Ref: T U U  
 S 1 Rt T T R



Right middle fingerprint.



# Change of Address

Not an order form

# FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

Complete this form and return to:

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D.C. 20535

Name

Title

Address

City

State

Zip

## Deputy Attacked While Transporting Prisoner

A sheriff's deputy was severely injured while transporting a prisoner to jail. The subject was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a two-door sedan. Enroute to the jail, the subject unlatched the back of the driver's seat and pushed it forward, pinning the deputy against the steering wheel. He then kicked the deputy in the head, inflicting serious injury.



**U.S. Department of Justice**  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Official Business  
Penalty for Private Use \$300  
Address Correction Requested

Postage and Fees Paid  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
JUS-432

Controlled Circulation Rate



*Washington, D.C. 20535*



## Interesting Patterns

The patterns this month show an impression which had been scarred and the interesting changes which resulted.

The reproduction on the left shows a tented arch-type pattern. After having been scarred, the same pattern, as shown at right, now appears to be a loop with a ridge count of four.

