






FBI

February 1991

Law Enforcement Bulletin



NYPD's APPL Program



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
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The Cover: The NYPD's APPL Program formed a close working relationship between local police and private security. See article p. 1. Photos for this article are courtesy M. Danza and John Palubinskas.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20535

William S. Sessions, Director

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
The Attorney General has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of the Department of Justice. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Editor—Stephen D. Gladis, D.A.Ed.
Managing Editor—Kathryn E. Sulewski
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Production Manager—Andrew DiRosa
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The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20535. Second-Class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. 20535.



NYPD's APPL Program A New Partnership

By
ANTHONY M. VOELKER



A man claiming to represent a reputable delivery service appeared at the office of a theater service group and asked to collect c.o.d. charges for a package addressed to a well-known actress. The organization's alert security supervisor told the man to come back later for payment, and when he returned, the police arrested him for perpetrating a delivery scam. (The package contained only an empty box.) The Special Frauds Squad of the New York Police Department (NYPD) had received 20 complaints of these c.o.d. cases, with losses averaging from \$100 to \$500.

A security guard observed a scam in progress. The victim was shown an envelope containing individually wrapped coins. A physician's name, phone number, and address were on the envelope. The victim was asked to call the "doctor," who said there was a reward for the coins. The coins were sold to the victim, who soon discovered that they were worthless. The security guard observing this scam called local detectives, who arrested the suspect. The team had operated in midtown for about 18 months. This systematic, ongoing conduct amounted to a "scheme to defraud," and a felony charge and conviction followed.



In 1985, women were being attacked in elevators and staircases of office buildings. In just over a month, the suspect raped and robbed nine women. The case generated intense media coverage, and as the police attempted to identify the suspect, a former NYPD detective, employed as a security agent for a large corporation, realized that the assailant's modus operandi fit that of a rapist he had previously arrested. Local detectives pulled the case file to show the suspect's picture to the victims, and the "midtown rapist" was positively identified and arrested.

The common denominator in these incidents was the quick, professional action taken by private security personnel who had systems in place to notify local police when they observed unusual activity. Were it not for their quick actions, these cases would probably remain unsolved.

An Untapped Resource is Recognized

In the past decade, both law enforcement and private security professionals have arrived at the same conclusion: The police cannot provide all the protection and enforcement necessary to maintain safe and orderly communities.

There are increasingly fewer police resources to handle an ever-increasing demand for services. For example, in New York City in 1989, there were 8.3 million calls to the emergency 911 number. The Hallcrest Report,¹ which gives the results of a 30-month research project on the respective roles of private security and public law enforcement, highlighted a growing phenomenon: While the private security sector is continually growing in size, public law enforcement remains stable, at best, and in some areas, is being reduced. The report estimated that in 1990, private security expenditures will reach \$22 billion (a figure recently revised to \$26 billion) and will involve almost 700,000 guards, investigators, and other private security employees. By comparison, outlays for local, State, and Federal law enforcement will be under \$14 billion, with approximately 600,000 personnel. These facts underscore the tremendous importance of a stronger al-

liance between the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the private security community. There have been many long-standing informal relationships between public law enforcement officers and private security officers, often only on an investigation or incident basis. However, only recently have department officials tapped this valuable resource.

The APPL Program

In November 1985, the NYPD commissioner met with four former NYPD chiefs, who had become leaders in the private security community, to discuss ways of increasing the extent of collaboration between the groups. The end result was the Police-Private Security Liaison Committee. This committee, in turn, formed the Area Police-Private Security Liaison Program (APPL). Because APPL operated in Manhattan's central business district, the initial operation was aptly named "Midtown APPL."

The lifeblood of the Midtown APPL program is the close working relationship between local police officers and private security personnel. The police keep security directors informed about local crime trends and patterns, wanted persons, and lost or stolen property. This information, often initially received from the private security sector, is then passed on by the security directors to their corporate networks. In return, private security directors inform the police of internal crimes, share their knowledge of plant/personnel protection, and advise the police of other relevant on-site observations.

The APPL program encourages personal contact, at each level of the chain of command, between the police and private security. Police commanders and security directors meet monthly on a formal basis, and more frequently on an informal basis, to discuss mutual concerns. In addition, police supervisors and officers interact on a daily basis with security supervisors and guards. By doing this, each gains a better understanding of the others' roles, functions, problems, and goals.

In addition to the monthly meetings, quarterly regional meetings are held on a division level (combining several precincts) between managers in both public and private security. These meetings give managers an opportunity to discuss current situations and share their expertise. Presentations by guest speakers are made at these quarterly meetings on topics such as drugs in the workplace, sexual harassment, emergency medical responses, and how to deal with



Mr. Voelker is Chief of Organized Crime Control Bureau, New York City Police Department.

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***...the public benefits
when an alliance is forged
between public law
enforcement and private
security agencies.***
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suspicious packages and devices. Virtually anything that will enhance performance is deemed an appropriate subject for lectures and discussions.

Bridging the Gap

Deep-rooted negative feelings can hinder a successful merger between police and private security. For years, police officers viewed private security officers as little more than uneducated, ill-trained guards assigned to watch buildings and construction sites. Private security officers, in turn, rejected police authority because they resented being treated as less than professional law enforcement officers. To bridge this credibility gap, the APPL program began as an effort to inform the police community about the key role that private security plays in our society and the level of professionalism to which this industry and its members have risen.

To illustrate, NYPD Police Academy administrators revised its training curriculum to include a private security awareness discussion for incoming recruits. Police officers, supervisors, and middle managers received the same information through regular inservice training, pre-promotion training, and workshops. In addition, as part of the executive development program (for the rank of captain and above), the department arranged for panel discussions with high-level private security executives who retired from the department at the chief level.

With the same objectives in mind—improved understanding and respect—groups of police of-



“...considerable progress has been made in bridging the credibility and trust gap between public and private policing....”

ficers and supervisors on patrol have been invited to visit private security organizations. They meet with security directors and managers to discuss common street occurrences and problems and to get a close-up view of security facilities, technology, and internal procedures.

In yet another effort to maintain open lines of communication, the department published a registry of private security organizations to provide members of both police and security units with the means for direct contact. This allowed members of the department and private security to exchange information, locate experts, or give details of incidents observed that would help APPL members perform their duties more effectively. This registry also serves as a mailing list to disseminate information bulletins and wanted posters to APPL members on a regular basis. These bulletins and posters contain suspect descrip-

tions, sketches or photos of wanted persons or property, and details of methods being employed by local criminals. Many of these posters and bulletins have led to the arrest of locally active criminals, including the three cited in the beginning of this article.

The APPL program also includes a course taught by instructors at the police academy that is specially designed to meet the needs of private security first-line supervisors. The 1-day course features basic police science and social science subjects, as well as a description of the legal responsibilities of private security. When they complete the course, the private security supervisors share the information with their subordinates. In the last 3 years, more than 450 security supervisors have attended the class, and all have attested to the usefulness of the training when they make security decisions.

Expansion of APPL

When the APPL program was first implemented, it was limited to the central business district in Manhattan. The initial Midtown APPL program has since grown from a dedicated group of 30 private security associations in three patrol precincts to four programs located throughout the city. The program now includes more than 350 private security organizations that employ over 12,000 security personnel in more than 500 buildings. Current plans are to establish an APPL program in every part of the city that has private security organizations. Until that time, each precinct commander is encouraged to establish working relationships with private security personnel working within their areas.

APPL's Key Ingredients

After 4 years, considerable progress has been made in bridging the credibility and trust gap between public and private policing and in

encouraging a spirit of cooperation. This could not, however, have been accomplished if it were not for a blending of key ingredients.

First, the enthusiastic support of department officials and influential members of the private security community provided a substantial foundation upon which to build this program. The constant attention, direction, commitment, and unflinching involvement of these two factions set a positive tone and encouraged both action and change.

Second, the face-to-face contact between police and security personnel forced initial dialogue, and formalized networking resulted in a recognition of each other's problems and needs. With accurate information came better understanding, which led to more productive relationships.

Finally, there is the requirement that police managers submit regular reports to the commissioner on their involvement with the private security sector. These

reports include current cooperative efforts and the results of new initiatives that encourage police commanders to interact with private security.

Conclusion

There is no question that the public benefits when an alliance is forged between public law enforcement and private security agencies. Initial feedback strongly suggests that the APPL program has the NYPD moving in the right direction. Distrust seems to be waning, and acceptance of private security's place in law enforcement appears improved. The efforts of APPL participants have borne the fruits of improved understanding and greater tolerance of each other's roles and needs within the scope of the law.

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Footnote


¹ William C. Cunningham and Todd H. Taylor, *Private Security and Police in America: The Hallcrest Report* (Chancellor Press: 1985).

Unusual Weapon

Ninja Key Chain

National Park Service Rangers confiscated this weapon during the arrest of an individual at the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial in St. Louis, Missouri. The "key chain" is easily concealed in the palm of the hand when held along side the body. Unfortunately, the assailant inflicted numerous injuries to the arresting ranger before the weapon was taken from him. The "Ninja" key chain can be purchased through several mail order catalogs and through martial arts supply stores.

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Day Reporting Centers

Day reporting centers (DRCs) for detainees or convicted offenders have emerged as an intermediate program in American corrections. Specifically, they serve as an option to relieve prison and jail overcrowding, while providing enhanced supervision and services. An *Issues and Practices* report by the National Institute of Justice, entitled *Day Reporting Centers for Criminal Offenders—A Descriptive Analysis of Existing Programs*, provides background information on this innovation in order to help policymakers and correctional officials analyze the concept.

The report begins with a description of day reporting centers and programs and then addresses key issues in program development and operations. It also describes the supervision and services offered by day reporting centers and the impact they have on prisons and jails, as well as the costs involved. The report concludes with guidelines for the future of day reporting centers.

Copies of the report can be obtained by writing the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850, or calling 1-800-851-3420. For those in the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area, the number is 1-301-251-5500.

Crime Figures Remain Stable

The volume of crime known to law enforcement showed virtually no change for the first 6 months of 1990 as compared to the same period of the previous year. This is according to statistics compiled by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program.

However, while overall crime remained stable, violent offenses increased by 10 percent during January-June 1990. And, among the reported violent crimes, both forcible rape and aggravated assault showed 10-percent increases, robbery rose 9 percent, and murder was up 8 percent.

In contrast to violent crimes, property crimes declined 1 percent. In the property crime category, burglary declined 5 percent, arson decreased 3 percent,

and larceny-theft was down 1 percent. Motor vehicle theft was the only property offense to show an increase, one of 6 percent.

Geographically, the semiannual Crime Index total was up 3 percent in the Northeast and 1 percent in the Midwest, while both the South and West registered 1-percent declines. All regions recorded violent crime increases.

The Crime Index total declined 3 percent in the Nation's rural areas and was up 1 percent in both the suburban areas and cities outside metropolitan areas. Cities with populations over 50,000 experienced no change.

(Source: Press release, Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.)

The Bulletin Reports, a collection of criminal justice studies, reports, and project findings, is written by Kathy Sulewski. Send your material for consideration to: *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Room 7262, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 10th & Penn. Ave., NW, Washington D.C. 20535.

(NOTE: The material presented in this section is intended to be strictly an information source and should not be considered as an endorsement by the FBI for any product or service.)



Public Services Consolidation ***The Answer To Your Community's Needs***

By
ROBERT L. SOBBA

The consolidation of police and fire services is not a new concept. In fact, the first account of combining public service functions dates back to 27 B.C. Then, the Roman Emperor Augustus formed the Vigiles, a group of men armed with batons and short swords who were responsible for keeping the order and fighting fires.¹ In the United States, the first public safety department can be traced back to 1911 in Grosse Pointe,

Michigan.² Yet, even though consolidation of public service functions has a solid historical base, the concept has not been readily accepted by police officers and firefighters alike.

This article considers the levels of consolidation that can be implemented within a community. It then examines the issues, options, and concerns involved in the consolidation of police and fire services. But, in the final analysis,

whether consolidation can meet the needs of the community and the expectation of its citizens rests with the individual municipality. Only its administrators can decide if consolidation can work for them.

LEVELS OF CONSOLIDATION

There are five levels of consolidation—full, partial, selected area, functional, and nominal.³



Each has been adopted by individual municipalities throughout the United States as a means to provide police and fire services to the residents of the community.⁴

When public services are *fully consolidated*, police and firefighting duties are combined under a single agency. Sworn personnel, who are commonly referred to as public safety officers, perform both law enforcement and firefighting functions.

With *partial consolidation*, the two public service functions remain separate, except for a designated cadre of public safety officers who are trained to perform both law enforcement and firefighting duties. When engaged in police work, these personnel serve under the command of the police administrator; when acting as firefighters, they are supervised by the fire chief.

Selected consolidation occurs when only a certain portion of a community is serviced by public safety officers. This level of consolidation usually takes place in areas newly annexed to the municipality. Except in this limited geographic area, the police and fire departments remain separate.

Functional consolidation is practiced when separate departments are maintained, but some duties usually performed by one department are assigned to another. For example, fire personnel may help in administering police work or police officers may assist firefighters at the scene by reading gauges or by hooking up hoses.⁵

With *nominal consolidation*, the police and fire departments operate under the administration of a single director, though the two departments remain completely separate. The public safety director maintains full authority over all police and fire services.

There are no nationwide figures that reflect the current number of each level of consolidation in operation. The various municipalities across the country that have adopted some form of consolidation selected the level best suited for them. In essence, con-

solidation varies from community to community.

CONSOLIDATION FACTORS

Issues To Be Addressed

The first issue of consolidation concerns efficiency and productivity. Many city managers believe consolidation to be a more-productive and efficient way to manage employees. For example, in Morgantown, North Carolina, city leaders conducted a study to determine if the creation of a public safety department would benefit their city. As a result of this study, they discovered that less than 2% of firefighters' time is spent fighting fires and that 60% of their time was considered unproductive. In addition, 49% of the calls to the fire department were either false alarms, nonfire rescues, or to alert firefighters to stand by. Only 15 of the 285 calls involving actual fires represented losses of more than \$500, and 4 of these calls were for car fires.⁶

Another issue involved in the consolidation concept is saving money, although this is a much-debated point. Opponents often claim that any anticipated or realized savings are actually used to pay for increased training and equipment costs. With consolidation, a public service candidate officer must not only complete training at the police academy but also the training necessary to be certified as a firefighter.⁷

For proponents of consolidation, the issue becomes one of cost avoidance, or more specifically, that consolidation avoids future costs.

An example would be projected city growth figures that show a city may need five more police officers and five more firefighters over the next 5 years. By cross-training personnel in both police and fire duties, the city may need only seven more employees, thus avoiding the continuing expense of three more employees on the city's payroll.⁸ This same theory can be applied to equipment and maintenance.

An article entitled "Managing with Less: What Managers Can Expect" perhaps best sums up the reasons for looking at consolidation. This article states that city managers faced with continuing, if not increasing, fiscal constraints can expect the future to include the following:

- 1) Unchanged/increased demands for services by the public
- 2) Calls for hiring freezes from decisionmakers

3) Requests or demands for more specific performance indicators on what is done

4) Calls for innovative and creative ways for providing traditional savings.⁹

Yet, whatever the reasons, administrators need to address many options and concerns before making a final consolidation decision. Then, before such a program is implemented, they must weigh them against the advantages and disadvantages that would be realized. Nevertheless, for cities faced with increased demands for service, but with dwindling funds to meet those demands, consolidation may be the appropriate course of action.¹⁰

Options To Consider

There is more to consolidation than merely merging two public service functions. In fact, there are a wide range of options. For example, what will be the level of consolida-


tion? Will it entail administrative consolidation only, or will it combine administrative and support functions, while keeping command and line support personnel separate? Then, there is the option of partial consolidation, in which command personnel are integrated and line personnel are cross-trained, but specialists are not. Or, all full-time personnel are cross-trained and responsible for a full range of police-fire duties. The extent of consolidation depends entirely on the needs of the particular community involved.

Concerns

With the various consolidation options come independent concerns. First, and foremost, is the extent of training that must be provided. Then, there are the perceptions of the public and department personnel. Acceptance of consolidation by police and fire personnel, which affects morale and performance, can affect the viability of the concept before implementation.

Proponents of consolidation contend that consolidation can have a significant positive impact on the community. Consolidation can lead to better response time if fire personnel could act on crimes observed instead of reporting the crime to the police and then waiting for them to arrive at the scene.¹¹ In other words, with consolidation, "police presence" increases.

The same holds true with police officers trained to fight fires and to perform rescue activities. If the police are the first to respond to a fire scene and take appropriate action to contain the blaze, the



Chief Sobba heads the Caldwell, Idaho, Police Department.

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There is more to consolidation than merely merging two public service functions.
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devastation to property and the extent of injury to victims could be lessened.¹²

In addition to quicker response times, consolidation prevents duplication of support services, such as communication, maintenance, and recordkeeping. It is also a means to eliminate competition between both public services, promoting a team effort and cooperation.

The funding issue also comes into play when consolidation is considered, because both services vie for city funding. Under the public safety concept, the director is responsible for both the police and firefighters, and much of the traditional debate over which service gets the most monies can be averted.

On the other hand, opponents of consolidation cite the increased training costs of one person as a major reason for maintaining two distinct service departments. Consolidation requires an extended time period to recoup the costs of training an individual to be both a police officer and a firefighter.

Many contend that consolidation destroys the camaraderie developed within each service. Public service officers display mixed loyalties, and their allegiance is to neither service, instead of to one or the other. Other areas that must be addressed are start-up equipment costs, the effect consolidation would have on police and fire volunteers, and the acceptance of or resistance to consolidation by professional associations and unions.

The pay issue plays a major role in the consolidation efforts.

Police PSO Rescues Three From Fire



A woman in Orem, Utah, decided to kill herself and her four children by setting their house on fire. One of the older children realized what was happening and escaped to call for help. A police Public Safety Officer (PSO) patrolling near the scene responded to the call. Donning the fire gear and self-breathing apparatus that are kept in patrol cars, he entered the burning house and rescued the remaining three children. It would have been too late to save them by the time the fire department responded. Instead, by being properly trained and equipped, he saved three lives. However, without the training and equipment, the officer probably would have been the fourth victim if he had tried to enter the burning house.

Obviously, the salaries must be equitable. One department determined that at the current rate, it would have to pay an entry-level police public safety officer \$2,723 more a year to make the salary equal to that of a first-year firefighter.¹³

Esai Berenbaum, former Public Safety Director of Durham, North Carolina, summed up the resistance in these words:

“Much of the local opposition to a program represents sincere concern on the part of many that services will deteriorate, and as a result, lives and property may be lost. The traditional organized opposition will use these fears to their advantage and exaggerate the potential danger. They will report the often-heard

fallacies that those programs are from small towns only, for suburban communities only, or as a temporary provision for newly annexed areas. They will emphasize programs that have failed. They will contend that 'one man can't do two jobs.'¹⁴

Efforts to Consolidate

The many factors involved in consolidation must be given serious attention before any steps are taken to convert to public safety. The concept must be well thought out and discussed among city administrators and fire and police officials. They should thoroughly analyze the community's police and fire needs and determine if consolidation is really necessary to meet these needs.

After determining the overall mission of the public safety concept, administrators should complete a detailed task analysis to take into consideration what needs to be done, the amount of time needed to complete the transition, and who will be involved in the consolidation process. Then, the immediate expense of the consolidation effort has to be considered.

Many times, while the idea of consolidation appears to be the solution, administrators fail to recognize what is really involved in the move toward consolidation. Few look at the cost of uniforms, weapons, salaries, building remodeling, instructor development, and recruiting, which may make the effort cost prohibitive.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that public safety programs have opponents.

The concept creates feelings of apprehension on the part of affected employees and the citizens of the community. In fact, consolidation efforts have failed in several communities.

“

The public safety concept does work when carefully planned and efficiently administered.

”

At the same time, support for public service consolidation exists, and this concept has answered the needs of many communities. The public safety concept does work when carefully planned and efficiently administered. It is traditional, yet new, depending on the particular community involved. And, it may be the wave of the future as more cities face growing demands for service but less funds to meet those demands. Only time will tell.

LEB

Footnotes

¹ Richard S. Rubin, "Consolidation of Police and Fire Services," *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, vol. 12, 1984, p. 221.

² Esai Berebaum, *Municipal Public Safety* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1977), p. 3.

³ Ronald G. Lynch and Vivian Lord, "Public Safety Programs: Consolidating Police and Fire Services," *Popular Government*, Summer 1979, p. 2.

⁴ A few cities that have consolidated public service functions are Twin Falls, Idaho (personal interview with Tom Courtney, city administrator); Orem, Utah (personal interview with Ted Peacock, Director of Public Safety); and Texarkana, Arkansas (Bobby Mixon, "Texarkana's Public Safety Program," *FBI*

Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 1979, pp. 24-27).

⁵ Supra note 3.

⁶ Douglas O. Bean, "A Small City Adopts the Public Safety Concept: Morgantown, North Carolina—A Case Study," *Popular Government*, Summer 1979, p. 16.

⁷ Recruits in the Public Safety Department in Sunnyvale, California, must attend an 18-week police academy, then a 12-week fire academy, followed by a field training program (personal interview with Capt. Regan Williams, Sunnyvale, California, Public Safety Department).

⁸ When the consolidation effort was completed in Kalamazoo, Michigan, there were 36 fewer positions within the Public Safety Department than there were when the fire and police functions were separate (Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, *The Development and Administration of Consolidated Fire-Police Departments*, Okemos, Michigan, 1985, p. 3).

⁹ Daniel E. O'Toole, "Managing With Less: What Managers Can Expect," *Public Management*, June 1984, p. 20.

¹⁰ Based on projections for maintaining and improving the fire and police departments in Kalamazoo, Michigan, the project committee anticipated the city would save \$2 million a year by starting a consolidated department (Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, *The Development and Administration of Consolidated Fire-Police Departments*, Okemos, Michigan, 1985, p. 4).

¹¹ Prior to the Public Safety Officer (PSO) Program in Texarkana, Arkansas, the city employed 50 policemen and 40 firemen and had an average of 3 patrol vehicles on duty. Both police and fire response time was about 6 minutes. The city now employs 73 PSOs and has, on the average, 10 patrol cars available for patrol duties. Response time is down to 2.8 minutes for police calls and 1.5 minutes for fire calls. The city also reports a decline in both crime and fire losses over the years (Bobby C. Mixon, "Texarkana's Public Safety Program," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, September 1979, p. 26).

¹² In Oak Park, Michigan, patrolling public safety officers have extinguished 171 fires without the aid of regular fire apparatus during a recent 4-year period (Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, *The Development and Administration of Consolidated Fire-Police Departments*, Okemos, Michigan, 1985, p. 93).

¹³ In Kalamazoo, Michigan, public safety officers were given pay increases that amounted to over 10 percent for police and 23 percent for firefighters (Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, *The Development and Administration of Consolidated Fire-Police Departments*, Okemos, Michigan, p. 4).

¹⁴ Supra note 2, p. 29.


Survey Results: Driver License Suspension Programs

Editor's note: As used here, administrative driver license suspension programs are those wherein an offender's license is suspended on the basis of an administrative finding that the person drove a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration at or above the lawful limit.

A recent survey of State police, licensing officials, court administrators, and local police chiefs in 22 States with driver license suspension programs in place reveals widespread support for this procedure. The survey was intended to update and expand the results of a 1986 survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), which also reflected overwhelming support for suspension programs by both State and local police managers.

A total of 132 questionnaires were distributed. In addition to one being sent to each State police superintendent, driver licensing agency, and court administrator in each of the 22 States employing a license suspension program (at the time of the survey), three local police chiefs in each of the participating States were also solicited for their views. Only States having a program in place for at least 12 months were surveyed.

The survey form consisted of only four questions and was designed to allow the respondents latitude in answering. The questions elicited detailed responses and were intended to gauge the level of support for suspension programs by each agency.



Results

Fifteen responses were received from State Police, 19 from driver licensing officials, 10 from State court administrators, and 44 from local police chiefs, for a return rate of 64 percent. The three functions surveyed (police, licensing, and courts) gave strong approval to the suspension concept. In fact, from the 88 questionnaires returned, only two negative responses were given. These were by local chiefs

who expressed concern about the cost to police departments for providing testimony at an administrative hearing and then again at trial in criminal court.

Since prompt licensing sanctions are generally believed to encourage guilty pleas, and therefore, reduce court backlogs, responses from court administrators were of special interest. Seven of the 10 court administrators who responded noted that the procedures provide a quick and certain response to a serious traffic offense, remove a major burden from the courts, and provide a uniform policy for driver license suspension or revocation. The responding court officials also stated that the program appears to be working well in each of their own States.

All responses from State licensing officials and State police superintendents were favorable and revealed strong support for the suspension programs employed in their respective States. Except for the two negative comments noted above, the response from local police chiefs was also overwhelmingly favorable.


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Information for this column was submitted by James Latchaw (retired), formerly of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Computer Crimes

An Escalating Crime Trend

By
WILLIAM S. SESSIONS



Editor's note: This article is based on a speech given by FBI Director William S. Sessions.

Artificial intelligence, laptops, PCs, vaxclusters, local area networks, cobol, bits, bytes, viruses, and worms. Most people recognize these words as computer terms. As computers have become a vital part of the American way of life, computer terminology has crept into the vernacular. There is no doubt that computers touch

every aspect of our lives. Well over 80 percent of daily financial transactions nationwide take place via electronic funds transfers. However, many computer systems are highly vulnerable to criminal attack. In fact, computer-related crime costs American companies as much as \$5 billion per year.

When Clifford Stoll, an astrophysicist with an interest in computers, described computer crime, he likened computer networks to neighborhoods and small

communities. He said cities and towns are tied together by streets, roads, highways, and interstates. Likewise, communities of computers are linked through local, regional, and national networks. Rather than transport food and equipment like highways do, computer networks move ideas and information.

Unfortunately, just as American communities are threatened with drugs and violent crime, this Nation's computer networks are

threatened as well. They are threatened by thieves robbing banks electronically; they are threatened by vandals spreading computer viruses; and they are even threatened by spies breaking into U.S. military systems.

White-collar crimes in general—and computer crime in particular—are often difficult to detect and even more difficult to prosecute because many times they leave no witnesses to question and no physical evidence to analyze. And, because computer technology is such a rapidly evolving field, law enforcement has not yet developed a clear-cut definition of computer crime. Nevertheless, two manifestations of computer crime are obvious: The first is crime in which the computer is the vehicle or tool of the criminal, and second, crime in which the computer and the information stored in it are the targets of the criminal.

Computers as Crime Tools

When criminals use computers as their tools, the crimes they engineer are essentially traditional crimes, such as embezzlement, fraud, and theft, perpetrated by non-traditional means. The criminal uses a computer as an instrument, like the forger's pen or the terrorist's bomb.

The vast majority of computer-related crimes that the FBI investigates falls into the category of using the computer as a tool. For instance, if a team of FBI Agents in one of its 56 field offices uncovers information that a disgruntled employee is tapping into a bank's computer to transfer funds illegally,

those Agents will probably open up a bank fraud and embezzlement case and proceed from there.

Computers as Crime Targets

But what about the emerging crime trend that is unique to computers—in which the computer is the target? This type of crime occurs when a computer and the information it stores are the targets of a criminal act committed either internally by employees or externally by criminals. The external threat usually involves the use of telecommunications to gain unauthorized access to the computer system.


In its investigations, the FBI has determined three groups of individuals involved in the external threat. The first, and the largest, group consists of individuals who break into a computer just to see if they can do it—without stealing or destroying data. The next group breaks into computer systems to

destroy, disrupt, alter, or interrupt the system. Their actions amount to malicious mischief because they do not attack the system for financial gain, which is the motive of the last group. This group constitutes a serious threat to businesses and national security for these individuals are professionals who use specialized skills to steal information, manipulate data, or cause loss of service to the computer system.

Measures Taken Against Computer Crime

Offenses committed through the use of computers include thefts, destruction of property, embezzlement, larceny, and malicious mischief, to name a few. For the most part, offenders have been prosecuted under Federal statutes¹ to address those particular crimes. However, to investigate and prosecute computer crimes not adequately covered by existing

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FBI Director Sessions

U.S. Federal laws, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was passed. One aspect of that act made it a crime for an unauthorized person—the hacker—to access a computer system.

In 1986, this law was amended and expanded in scope and appears on the books as Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1030. This statute contains essentially five parts—computer espionage, theft of financial information, trespass into U.S. Government computers, trespass into “Federal interest computers”² with intent to defraud, and trespass into a Federal interest computer to alter or destroy information. Both the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service have joint jurisdiction to enforce this statute. However, the statutes in the new computer fraud and abuse cases have seldom been interpreted by the courts. In fact, only 74 FBI cases with the computer as the target of the crime were identified between August 1987, and December 1989.

Case Study

One particular case that captured much media attention demonstrated how complex and elusive computer crimes and computer criminals can be. In November 1988, a Cornell University graduate student designed the “Internet worm,” a malicious code that spread to several hundred computers and affected the operations of several thousand U.S. Government, military, education, and commercial computer systems. This “worm” did not destroy data but caused massive disruption to the Defense Department’s Advanced Research

Project Agency Network and the computers connected to it.

Investigators from several FBI field offices identified the man responsible for the attack, which attracted attention when it overloaded the system’s capacity in numerous locations. This student was charged with devising and executing a computer attack on approximately 6,200 computers connected to the Defense Data Network. On July 26, 1989, he was indicted for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a felony that carries a sentence of up to 5 years in prison. On January 22, 1990, a jury in the Northern District of New York returned a verdict of

“...new strategies must be adopted when needed in order to keep current with the computer crime trends of the future.”

guilty. The student was ultimately sentenced to 3 years’ probation, 400 hours of community service, and a \$10,000 fine.

This particular case raised many questions regarding the long-range impact of “malicious code.” Malicious code is the general term for computer software designed to deliberately circumvent established security mechanisms or to take advantage of inadequate system policies or procedures. It is often difficult to trace and is frequently

not discovered until it is too late to prevent the intended harm.

Computer viruses and computer worms are malicious codes most frequently introduced into computer systems. Although some viruses have been known to carry benign code, more often they will have devastating effects, such as destroying files or corrupting data.

Effects of Computer Crime

Computer hacking and the unleashing of viruses are not harmless pranks. These products of computer criminal action have the potential for great harm, not only to large financial institutions but also to all citizens. Criminals who hack into a computer storing a doctor’s patient and prescription information could, by electronically altering the drugs and dosages, inflict serious harm on patients. Criminals who hack into defense computers could compromise valuable intelligence information and possibly alter the world’s balance of power. And, a fanatical terrorist could inflict devastating damage with a virus.

These are very real possibilities. And the increase in the number of criminals who have the knowledge and capabilities to access computers are the reasons why this emerging crime trend is among the FBI’s top priorities.

Investigating Computer Crime

Solving crimes that involve computers demands special investigative strategies, training, and skills. To conduct successful investigations in computer crime, the FBI

uses a team approach. In most of the investigations that involve computers, the FBI Agent plays the role of the team leader, assisted by a computer technician—often drawn from the FBI support personnel ranks—when necessary. In addition, the FBI draws on knowledge from other government agencies, private sector computer firms, and universities to augment the level of expertise brought to these sometimes very complex investigations.

Computer Crime Training

In order to fight the computer criminals of the next century, the FBI is providing investigators with the necessary training and expert support services to ensure that their efforts are well directed. For example, computer crime training classes for FBI Agents and National Academy students at the Bureau's facility at Quantico, Virginia, began in 1976. The FBI training philosophy is: To be a computer crimes investigator, you first must be a computer user.

Specifically, the FBI offers two computer courses to FBI Agents and police investigators. In the 2-week basic computer course, students learn to use computers and become familiar with the various databases so they can recognize aberrations and crimes when they occur. In short, they are made computer literate.

Another course is a 1-week advanced investigative course that zeroes in on viruses and other tricks of the trade. This course also covers searches and seizures of crime evidence found within computers.

Investigative Support

Not only are FBI Agents and police investigators trained in computer operations, but they are also supported with CASIAT—the FBI's computer-assisted security and investigative analysis tool. CASIAT is not a computer but a

"...just as American communities are threatened with drugs and violent crime, this Nation's computer networks are threatened as well."

group of experts—members of the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime—who analyze computer crime patterns and develop profiles of computer criminals to assist investigators. For instance, as a result of their research, it has been determined that computer hackers are motivated by a variety of emotions—including revenge, retaliation, vandalism, and malicious mischief. The CASIAT experts are also establishing a national repository of malicious software or viruses. In addition, they are studying the methods used by various computer criminals in order to deal with crimes committed by these individuals.

Conclusion

In the continuing fight against computer crime, law enforcement

must continue to strengthen its investigations, training, and support services. The education of prosecutors and investigators is necessary for them to know and to understand the elements of criminal conduct in computer crime. These crimes will be dealt with by using traditional laws and investigative techniques when possible, but new strategies must be adopted when needed in order to keep current with the computer crime trends of the future.

However, the greatest point of control is removing the opportunity to commit computer crime. Computer security is first and foremost the responsibility of the system owner. Therefore, corporations must bring the issues of computer security to the management levels and create policies that establish security standards and response strategies to computer crimes. Cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors will prevent the computer criminal from causing serious damage in our Nation.

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Footnotes

¹ 18 U.S.C. sec. 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986); 18 U.S.C. sec. 2701 (unlawful access to stored communications); 18 U.S.C. sec. 1362 (malicious mischief); 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314 (interstate transportation of stolen property); 18 U.S.C. sec. 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. sec. 641 (theft of government property); 18 U.S.C. sec. 793 (espionage).

² A "Federal interest computer" is defined as either a computer used by the Federal Government or financial institutions, or affecting the use for the Government or institution, or a computer "which is one of two or more computers used in committing the offense, not all of which are located in the same state."

The Patrol Function

By
PATRICK V. MURPHY



American policing has improved substantially since a Presidential crime commission in 1967 identified a number of fundamental weaknesses. Officers today are better educated, departments are more representative of the populations they serve, and there is more restraint in the use of force. Yet, serious flaws remain.

Specifically, there is much room for improvement in most departments with regard to organization, management, planning, policy, and effectiveness. The courage and dedication of hun-

dreds of thousands of officers, as well as the professionalism of police administrators, cannot overcome the organizational flaws that weaken the police, especially with regard to their contribution to crime control and order maintenance.

Crime Control

In a democratic society, the responsibility for peace keeping and law observance rests with the community, not with the police. Well-trained police are required, but their role is to supplement and

aid community efforts, not to supplant them. Unfortunately, urban police departments consistently have accepted a disproportionate share of the responsibility for maintaining social control. And, relying on police wisdom, the people have reacted by "not getting involved." However, it is officer-citizen teamwork that is the basic building block of crime control.

Prevention is, by far, the largest component of crime control, and most crime prevention should be done by the people. Therefore, the efforts of the people need to be coordinated, planned, and well-directed. The challenge for the police administrator, then, is to structure a police department, with all of its responsibilities and complexities, to assist the people in exercising social control and protecting themselves.

Lessons Learned

British research found more than 30 years ago that crime rates were lowest in villages with a single constable. When one officer had exclusive responsibility for protecting fewer than 1,000 people, the essential partnership of people and police was ideally formed. Police responsibility was clearly fixed in one individual rather than shared among many. The constable, who had full authority and discretion, became a respected leader. Results of initiatives taken by the police were easily observed and appreciated by a grateful community. In turn, the

constable could enjoy the satisfaction of a job well done.

Unfortunately, most U.S. police departments have drifted away from the organizational structure that allows patrol officers time for community interaction. Instead, the patrol car, radio, telephone, computerized dispatch, and unrealistic expectations for rapid response have made responding to calls for service the major component of patrol work, not managing crime prevention as it should be.

A high-ranking official of a large city police department recently revealed that 90% of patrol officers' time is devoted to calls for service. And research findings indicate that a small percentage of such calls involve life-threatening situations or crimes in progress. What results is insufficient time on the part of the patrol officer to assist the people to protect themselves. Therefore, police administrators need to organize patrol personnel so that they can mobilize citizens into a force that controls crime and enforces established community values.

Reorganizing Patrol

No aspect of reorganization is more important than properly structuring the patrol function. This should begin with a clear understanding of the purpose of patrol personnel, which is to provide the leadership to help people protect themselves, their homes, and their neighborhoods. For the most part, citizens should be the workers that the police depend on to get the job done. And, nothing

less than the involvement of every generalist patrol officer (GPO) can generate sufficient participation of the people.

In addition, a state-of-the-art program of "differential police response" (DPR) to calls, according to pre-established priorities, should recapture a large portion of the valuable time of officers to devote to their fundamental purpose. Differential police response involves screening calls by carefully trained operators. Few of these calls require an immediate dispatch. Most can be satisfactorily resolved by telephone, delayed dispatch, written information mailed to a citizen, or a written report mailed from a citizen. A comprehensive public education program is necessary to assure the people that the change will not diminish response to actual emergencies.

The Generalist Patrol Officer

The most important position in a police department is the generalist patrol officer. GPOs manage the contributions of residents to crime prevention and social control and are the catalysts that generate citizen volunteer hours for every hour of officer duty time. They should be information processors, coordinators, planners, and leaders, because they can make a critical difference in reducing the anonymity of urban life that facilitates the success of criminals.

Every rank, specialization, and position within a department should exist to support the GPO. In the past, law enforcement's

efforts to specialize police functions reduced the number of patrol officers, which detracted from crime prevention and helped criminals take control of neighborhoods. Instead, the move should be for GPOs to get to know their communities.

This can be accomplished by dividing a city into as many sub-beats as there are generalist patrol officers. In doing so, the protection of a small population (in the range of 1,000 residents per GPO depending upon crime rate) can be made the individual responsibility of each. It obviously is easier for residents to interact with one rather than five officers. Close officer-citizen teamwork is then facilitated, and maximum participation of the people working together with their "own" officer strengthens social control. For urgent matters, when their



Mr. Murphy, a former police commissioner of New York City, is currently the Director of the Police Policy Board for The United States Conference of Mayors in Washington, DC.



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“own” officer is not on duty, a beat team colleague can assist residents.

Beat Teams

Officers assigned to a beat should be members of a team headed by a sergeant, the “neighborhood chief of police.” This sergeant should have maximum flexibility in directing and scheduling personnel within the constraints of providing continuous patrol car service as required by department, area, or precinct policy. Ideally, the beat team will include a civilian collator/assistant to receive, evaluate, and disseminate

nate, information—the lifeblood of police work.

Since citizens are dependent on the police to exchange information with them about crime patterns, drug pushers, and known criminals, officers should have the responsibility to obtain reports of crime, suspicious activity, and the behavior of parolees/probationers and other intelligence from citizens on their beats. That information must be analyzed and disseminated to the people. A well-informed neighborhood community will be better prepared to protect itself and feed back useful intelligence to the beat team.

Conclusion

Most police work is performed by patrol officers, who are critical to law enforcement’s role in ensuring a free society. Patrolling is a complex, truly professional level of work. Properly organizing it within a large department, especially in areas with high rates of poverty, unemployment, school dropout, teenage parents, racial discrimination and the other root causes of crime, is challenging even for the most capable administrators.

Mobilizing and assisting the people is the key to crime control, and prevention is the first priority. Law enforcement should be a fail-safe, but rarely used, device that kicks into effect only after prevention has failed.

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***Perspective** is a periodic column written by criminal justice authorities on current law enforcement issues.*

Dial-the-Bulletin



The *Bulletin* is available via a computer dial-up service offered by Search Group, Inc. This service is available to those with any personal computer and a telephone modem. Users can call up current issues of the *Bulletin* by dialing (916)392-4640. In addition, users can print any article from the *Bulletin* in their homes or offices—free of charge. Currently, the *Bulletin* is the most frequently accessed item in the Search network. To access the system properly, users need the following information:

- Telephone Number:
(916) 392-4640
- Communication Parameters:
8 databits, 1 stopbit,
no parity
- Authorized Users:
Criminal justice practitioners and related professionals

MISSING CHILDREN

The Law Enforcement Response

Edited by
MARTIN L. FROST

Missing Children: The Law Enforcement Response, edited by Martin L. Frost, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1990.

Missing Children: The Law Enforcement Response is the first textbook for and about law enforcement professionals in the field of missing children. It is also the first text in over 5 years that addresses the larger issues of updating revisions in law and current social policy. It provides comprehensive coverage of the basic and continually evolving criminal justice systems in which law enforcement agencies operate in missing children cases.

The discussions and insights offered are meaningful and useful to the practitioner who must always cope with difficult definitions and soft numbers. Although several chapters, including those concerning legal framework and the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, offer only limited solutions, the majority of the text provides viable suggestions for improving aspects of the criminal justice system with respect to the prosecution of missing children cases.

Chapters authored by practitioners in the field bring a realism and practicality that is both informative and challenging.

While the book reflects an over-concentration of west coast programs and concerns (over two-thirds of the chapter authors are from western States), the scope of the text is generally broad enough to be of assistance to law enforcement agencies across the Nation.


From the information presented, the reader is driven to two inescapably sound conclusions. First, a multidisciplinary approach, including at the very least police and social workers, is no longer innovative; this approach should be standard practice. Second, the complex legal and social policy arena of missing children investigations requires skilled, dedicated professionals who are willing to invest many hours of research and investigation for each case. The proactive approaches and techniques offered in the text are creatively concrete and worthy of study and discussion across the country.

In all, the wealth of information, background data, and innovative programming presented in the text make it a valuable addition to any police department or law library. It is a normative resource for social policymakers to use as a guide through the complex maze of issues making up the law enforcement response to the problem of missing children. By understanding these issues, more rational law enforcement policies and procedures can be formulated to better protect our Nation's children.

Reviewed by
John B. Rabun, Jr.
Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer,
National Center for Missing
& Exploited Children
Arlington, Virginia

Preparing for School Crises

By
DAVID NICHOLS, Ph.D.



Shootings, hostage-takings, stabbings, gang-related crimes, rapes, and other acts of violence are no longer confined to the streets or to urban neighborhoods. Neither do the perpetrators of such shocking crimes always lurk in dark alleys and target predictable victims. The fact is that all of these crimes are becoming increasingly common in elementary and secondary schools throughout

the country. Violence has moved from the streets onto school campuses, causing parents, school officials, and the public to become alarmed about the safety of school children. No school—small or large, rural or urban, public or private—is immune.

Witness what has occurred on schools grounds just within the past 3 years. In September 1988, an elementary school in Greenwood,

South Carolina, was the scene of the worst possible scenario of a school disaster. A gunman entered the school building through the front door, walking from room to room firing at will. He killed two children and wounded two teachers and seven more children before he was apprehended. In that same year, an armed Vietnam veteran entered the grounds of a Chicago school, killing four and wounding two before being

shot by police. And just recently, in September 1990, a heavily armed 17-year-old Forsyth County student held classmates hostage for 5 hours until Georgia law enforcement officials were successful in ending the siege.

Compounding the incidents of violence in schools are reports of disasters, such as fatal school bus accidents, devastating weather conditions, and fires. For instance, in Montgomery County, New York, a schoolhouse wall collapsed during a severe storm in 1989, seriously injuring a number of elementary students. In September 1989, a school bus accident in Alton, Texas, cost the lives of 21 children when the bus plunged into a water-filled pit.

These incidents represent but a few of the school crises that have occurred within recent years, and the list goes on. Unfortunately, such incidents are steadily becoming trends that show acts of violence and disasters occurring on school grounds are on the increase.

For the most part, school officials are ill-prepared to handle such incidents and the panic, trauma, and confusion that usually follows. Even so, many schools still have no comprehensive, effective plan to deal with these unpredictable circumstances. In fact, a study conducted by the author in 1987 of Alabama's 129 public school systems found that only 24 percent of the responding school superintendents indicated they had any written plans or guidelines for safety and security measures.

With the absence of written plans or guidelines, most school administrators rely on a reactionary

approach. This usually results in confusion, miscommunications, poor decisionmaking, and even unnecessary injuries and complications during a crisis. Furthermore, many school officials are reluctant to address unforeseen circumstances, preferring to deal with what is at hand. Some have the attitude that "it won't happen to us at our school."

The apparent absence of a meaningful disaster plan usually means a lack of effective communication between school administrators and local police officials and other public safety agencies. Consequently, when emergencies do arise, neither the police nor school officials are adequately prepared to respond effectively.

Police Preparedness

While school authorities must accept their responsibility to have a plan, it is essential for police officials themselves to ensure preparedness for school-related crises.

Despite police training, readiness, and specialization, often no plan exists that deals exclusively with school disasters, in spite of the fact that school emergencies require special consideration for a proper police response, i.e., ages of students, parental reactions, the school facility, etc.

For these reasons, assiduous police administrators should initiate the development of a school emergency plan. However, this plan should not be solely a product of the police department but should be a comprehensive one involving the input from all appropriate organizations and constituencies. This calls for improved communications and relations between police officials and school administrators, as well as personnel from other public safety agencies.


The Planning Process

Since the planning process itself requires commitment and cooperation, a planning team should

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Preparedness is the key word in planning the police response to school crises.

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Dr. Nichols is the Director of Public Safety at Jacksonville State University in Alabama.

be the first order of business for the police executive. Representatives from key agencies, including the police department, fire department, emergency medical department, hospital, school, news media, and utilities, should comprise the team.

Once organized, the team should develop a mission statement that addresses the plan's objectives. Then, the team should take the appropriate steps to develop an emergency response plan for schools.

Emergency Response Plan

When developing a plan to deal with school crises, it is important to include the essential components of any good planning process, thus reducing the likelihood of confusion, lack of communication, and incongruence. Basically, the elements of a good plan are: 1) A mission statement and objectives; 2) assessment; 3) viable options;

problems, available resources, facility constraints, and other strategic considerations. Following this step, the planning team should look at several optional plans, perhaps by reviewing similar plans in other communities. Next, the primary task is to select the direction the planning team wants to take to develop an approach suitable for that particular community's unique circumstances. Once the plan is developed, it should be implemented in terms of approval by appropriate governing authorities and disseminated to all pertinent agencies. Finally, an evaluation of the plan should be conducted at least annually to determine if some modifications are necessary.

Developing a plan for police response to school emergencies requires strategic considerations throughout the process. These considerations are important at virtually

procedures, key personnel, coordination, and recovery.

Effective Communications

It is of major importance to ensure that effective communications are established with the police response plan. Effective communications include equipment requirements, emergency operating procedures, and good working relationships among all key personnel. The planning team should determine equipment needs, such as two-way radios, special radio frequencies, mobile telephones, bull horns, and paging devices, to name a few. Contingency plans should also be made for circumstances that may require special communications arrangements.

Emergency Operating Procedures

Emergency operating procedures must be designed to meet most every conceivable emergency that could occur on a school campus, yet be flexible enough to adjust to the unexpected. The emergency operating procedures of all agencies and units that would respond during crises should be reviewed and structured to allow for maximum coordination. Conflict and confusion during crises can be disastrous.

It is essential to ensure that the master emergency operating procedures be shared with all participating agencies so that all personnel can be oriented and trained in the procedures. In particular, school officials should always be included in the dissemination and familiarization of public safety and police procedures so that they understand their

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Progressive police managers must provide the leadership needed for any type of crisis that could occur in our schools.

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4) selection and development of a plan; 5) implementation; and 6) evaluation.

To begin, the planning team needs to determine specifically what is the mission of this plan and the objectives to be met. Then, a comprehensive assessment should be conducted to determine “what is” with regard to potential

every stage of the process, but especially in the assessment and plan development stages. The progressive police executive will carefully anticipate all contingencies and develop strategies for those unpredictable circumstances. When developing a plan, considerations should be given to effective communications, emerging operation

own roles within the emergency response.

A good relationship among all agencies and their officials is a key component for the successful response to school crises. The police response to violence, hostage-taking, or any number of criminal incidents must be predicated on a standing relationship with school officials, other public safety authorities, the news media, and all other key personnel who may be involved. Such relationships should be developed on an on-going basis, hopefully long before a crisis is at hand. Visits to schools and meetings with the heads of all participating agencies are important.

Key Personnel

Key personnel should be a major consideration for developing the police emergency response plan. One approach to identifying and involving key people, and at the same time, maintaining an effective plan with a "ready" status is to form a Mutual Emergency Response Team (MERT), which would be called to the scene in the event of a school crisis to assist in coordination efforts. This team would be comprised of key representatives of all potential responding agencies, as well as other strategic community, government, and business personnel. The MERT should meet two or three times each year to review the master emergency response plan. Members of the original planning team may serve on the MERT.

In addition to the MERT, police executives should ensure that all key players know and understand their roles and responsibilities. Assignment of functions and duties

reduces confusion and controversy at the scene of the crisis. In some instances, such as a fire or explosion, the police may assume a support role rather than the primary role.

Coordination

During a major school crisis, such as a hostage situation or a gunman within the school, a number of police agencies may respond, cutting across jurisdictional boundaries. In addition, other public safety services will likely be called upon, e.g., emergency medical technicians. Consequently, it is necessary to include coordination and command control in an emergency response plan.

Each incident dictates who is in charge, where the command post should be set up, who should be

called upon for assistance, and the coordination of the entire operation. Every potential task should be viewed in terms of assignment to include traffic control, crowd control, and even routine service details.

One important concern is how to deal with the news media. Experience by those who have responded to school crises reveals that this is an area that deserves special attention. Working closely with the news media facilitates the dissemination of accurate information to the community.

Recovery

The experienced police administrator knows that as with any major crisis, the job is not necessarily completed when the exigent circumstances are over. The recovery



"Developing a plan for police response to school emergencies requires strategic considerations throughout the process."

Police Practices

aspects of a major school crisis should be given serious consideration. Notification procedures, followup investigations, reports, statements to the media, and crisis evaluation are all very important in successfully completing the police role and responsibilities following a school crisis. In some circumstances, i.e., gang violence, continued police presence may be required as part of the recovery to ensure the peace and the safety of the students so that the academic program can resume. In addition, specially trained police personnel may be able to assist students and faculty in meeting emotional and psychological needs brought on by trauma.


Conclusion

Preparedness is the key word in planning the police response to school crises. Police executives can no longer rely on a reactionary approach to major emergencies and disasters. A well-developed, comprehensive plan should be a top priority for every police department in this country that has even one school within its jurisdiction.

Certainly, most disasters and crises cannot be prevented by law enforcement officials. Yet, tough decisions made during crisis situations can be based on months of thorough preparation and sound planning. Police administrators should not depend on school officials or other public safety officials to develop crises planning for them. Progressive police managers must provide the leadership needed for any type of crisis that could occur in our schools.

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Computer-aided Drafting For Law Enforcement



Today, computers are used extensively in police work. Current computer programs accommodate practically every police function—records management, dispatching, personnel scheduling, and supply maintenance, to name only a few applications. But, are departments using computers to their fullest potential? In many instances, the answer is “No!”

One area often overlooked involves installing computer-aided drafting (CAD) software into computers. With CAD software, the computer is used to assist with a drawing or a design.

Most people would ask why a police department would need a CAD program; after all, cops don't design or draw anything. However, the value of this software package becomes obvious considering the reoccurring need of police officers to reconstruct crime

scenes or to diagram scenes of traffic accidents. In these types of investigations, a drawing shows what occurred and reinforces the narrative of the report.

Uses of CAD

In a traffic accident report, the details included are most likely proportional to the seriousness of the incident. Usually, a minor “fender-bender” only qualifies for a few terse lines telling what happened and a very simple diagram. On the other hand, a multivehicle accident involving serious injuries or fatalities dictates a more comprehensive investigation, one that includes a detailed narrative and a scale drawing of the accident site.

Once filed, reports on minor traffic accidents with no injuries are often forgotten, never to be seen again. But, this is not the case with reports on major acci-

dent investigations. Insurance claims adjusters, lawyers, and perhaps even a judge and jury will scrutinize these reports should cases go to litigation. In these instances, it is important that the diagram of the accident scene be as detailed and precise as possible.

The same holds true for accounts of crime scenes. In their reports, investigators must show an entire overview of the crime scene, as well as specific areas crucial to the case. This usually requires more than one drawing. The position of the victim, the location of the weapon and other pertinent evidence, and entrances and exits to the crime scene are factors in the investigation and prosecution that must be carefully noted. And, in many instances, the precision and detail of the report reflect the quality of the investigation and credibility of the investigators.

The Workings of a CAD Program

Reconstructing an accident or crime scene requires the investigator to show exactly what transpired, who was involved, and the position of the objects involved. All this is facilitated with a CAD program, because it contains pre-drawn intersections and roadways, or buildings and rooms, onto which information can be entered.

For example, in figure 1, the investigator positioned the vehicles involved in a traffic accident, showed the direction in which the vehicles were traveling, and indicated tire marks, visual

obstructions, traffic signs, and the scale of the diagram in feet. For a crime scene investigation, a CAD program can be used to draw a general view of the area and then to "zoom in" to a specific room. (See figure 2.)

CAD programs also offer a variety of fonts and styles of letters to show differentiations in the diagram and to give the finished product a professional appearance. Some CAD programs allow for letters and numbers to be indicated at

Figure 1





Figure 2



any angle and at any scale. CAD programs normally include a library of symbols, such as vehicles, traffic signs, etc., to be used for reconstruction purposes. And, once familiar with the program, users can create their own symbols and store them to be retrieved for future application.

Advantages of CAD Programs

Using a CAD program for accident or crime scene reconstruction offers many benefits. First, there is the professional appearance of the diagram. A CAD program allows the investigator to add to the diagram at any time, and the diagram can be enlarged and reduced at any time. Once a diagram is created, it can be resized to fit available space on a preprinted report form. With a plotter, the same drawing can also be made large enough for a courtroom exhibit. The finished product is clean and free of corrections. Sloppy drawings oftentimes reflect poorly on the quality of the investigation. With CAD programs, there is no mess; erasures or corrections simply do not show up on the finished product.

CAD programs prevent duplication of effort, because only one drawing needs to be made. Then with a few keystrokes on the computer, sections can be shown from different angles.

Many departments contract with draftsmen or engineers to produce scale drawings. This can be quite expensive and time consuming, which may result in a backlog of projects. Also, addi-

tional meetings with investigators may be required to decipher notes or measurements.

There is also the time factor to consider. Some detailed scale drawings consume considerable workhours before they are completed. Then, if an error is detected, the entire project might have to be redone. With a computer and a CAD program, alterations are generally simple and the

"With a CAD program, police departments, regardless of size, can increase their efficiency and expand the potential of their computer systems."

time required to do them is minimal. Enlargements or reductions, which would mean additional hours at the drawing table, are produced in a matter of seconds.

Storing or filing scale drawings also poses problems. A large-scale drawing on a big sheet of poster board is difficult to store since it doesn't fit in filing cabinets. As a result, the drawing is placed wherever there is room—

behind a desk, in a storage room, next to a filing cabinet. If it is moved for one reason or another, it may never be found. And, the more the drawing is used in presentations, the more "worn" it becomes.

Oftentimes, additional copies of drawings need to be made for defense attorneys and prosecutors. Large drawings are not photocopied easily, and photographs take too long to process and do not show details clearly. With a CAD program, making multiple copies is a simple matter.

Conclusion


There are CAD programs on the market that have been developed specifically for accident and crime scene reconstructions. Most of the programs are inexpensive and cost-effective, and the funds spent for them are quickly recouped in workhours saved. With a CAD program, police departments, regardless of size, can increase their efficiency and expand the potential of their computer systems.

LEB

Information for this column was submitted by Joseph E. Badger, a retired Indiana State police sergeant.

Police Practices serves as an information source for unique or noteworthy methods, techniques, or operations of law enforcement agencies. Submissions should be no more than 750 words (3 pages, double spaced and typed) and should be directed to Kathy Sulewski, Managing Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Room 7262, 10th & Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20535.

Trash Inspections And The Fourth Amendment



By
THOMAS V. KUKURA, J.D.

Law enforcement officers have learned that trash inspections are a worthwhile investigative technique that often reveal useful incriminating evidence. Therefore, officers contemplating a trash inspection must be cognizant of fourth amendment requirements to ensure the subsequent admissibility of any evidence obtained. Trash inspections that do not implicate fourth amendment privacy interests can be

conducted without either a search warrant or any constitutionally required factual predicate. Conversely, trash inspections that intrude into a reasonable expectation of privacy must generally be conducted pursuant to a search warrant supported by probable cause.

This article begins with a discussion of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding a warrantless trash inspection. It then examines some recent lower court

cases that delineate several important factors law enforcement officers should consider in deciding whether a particular trash inspection is lawful under the fourth amendment.

SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS WARRANTLESS TRASH INSPECTION

In *California v. Greenwood*,¹ the Laguna Beach, California, police received information regard-



Special Agent Kukura, Drug Enforcement Administration, is assigned to the Legal Instruction Unit at the FBI Academy.

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The most compelling factor in determining the constitutionality of a warrantless trash inspection is the location of the trash.
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ing possible drug trafficking activity at the residence of Billy Greenwood. After some investigation and surveillance of the Greenwood residence, an officer asked the regular trash collector to pick up the garbage that had been left on the curb in front of the *Greenwood* home and to turn it over to the police without commingling it with trash from other houses. The trash collector complied, and a subsequent warrantless inspection of the trash bags by the officer revealed evidence of drug use, which formed the basis for a search warrant for Greenwood's residence and his later arrest on felony drug charges.

On the authority of an earlier California Supreme Court ruling, which held that warrantless trash inspections violate the fourth amendment,² the California courts in *Greenwood* concluded that the probable cause for the search of Greenwood's residence would not

have existed without the evidence obtained from the illegal trash inspections, and that accordingly, all the evidence seized from the residence should be suppressed and all charges against Greenwood dismissed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California court decision.

No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Publicly Accessible Trash

The Supreme Court held that a warrantless inspection of garbage left at the curb for collection does not constitute a fourth amendment search that intrudes into a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court determined that even though Greenwood may have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in his trash, that expectation was not objectively reasonable and not one that society is willing to protect.³

The Court relied on two factors in concluding there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left at the curb for collection. First, the Court noted that “[I]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public”⁴ and that it is well established that “[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”⁵

Finding that Greenwood exposed his garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat his claim to fourth amendment protection, the Court stated that the fourth amendment has never required law enforcement officers to shield their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could be observed by any member of the public.⁶ Here, Greenwood's trash was placed outside the curtilage⁷ of his residence in an area particularly suited for public inspection and where any person in the neighborhood had access to the trash.

Assumption of the Risk Rationale

A second factor relied on by the Court was the fact Greenwood placed his trash at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a *third party*, the trash collector, who might have sorted through the trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. In that regard, the Court has consistently held that an individual has no reasonable expect-

tation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties, even where the information is disclosed with the belief that it will be used only for a limited purpose, and even where it is assumed the third parties will not betray the confidence placed in them.⁸

Individuals assume the risk that information they voluntarily reveal to a third party may be conveyed by that person to law enforcement officials. By voluntarily conveying his trash to the regular trash collector for routine pickup, Greenwood assumed the risk that the trash collector might convey the contents of that trash to a law enforcement officer. This assumption of the risk rationale applies even if Greenwood believed the garbage would be taken to the dump and destroyed and even if Greenwood believed the confidence he placed in the collector to destroy the trash would not be betrayed.⁹

DETERMINATIVE FACTORS IN THE LEGALITY OF TRASH INSPECTIONS

Although the Supreme Court in *Greenwood* clearly held that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash contained in plastic bags placed outside the curtilage for regular pickup, Greenwood does not hold that *all* trash inspections conducted by the police are beyond fourth amendment constraints. Lower court decisions since *Greenwood* have addressed the following four questions that are relevant in determining the constitutionality of trash inspections as a law enforcement investigative technique:

1) Since Greenwood's trash was in plastic bags, is the type of trash container a significant factor in determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy?

2) Since Greenwood's trash was placed outside the curtilage, is location of the trash a significant factor in assessing a privacy claim; and are warrantless trash inspections permitted on publicly accessible areas of curtilage?

3) Do police need a warrant to enter private areas of curtilage to conduct trash inspections?

4) Can trash collected from private areas of the curtilage during a routine trash collection be delivered to the police for their inspection?

Type of Container Not Significant in Privacy Analysis

Lower court cases since *Greenwood* clearly hold that the placement of trash in a garbage can or dumpster, as opposed to plastic bags, does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, in *United States v. Trice*,¹⁰ Special Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration obtained a search warrant based, in part, on evidence obtained from a warrantless inspection of a trash can placed near the curb of the defendant's residence. The court rejected the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy claim because, while a trash can is less accessible than a garbage bag, a trash can placed at the curb is still readily accessible to other members of the public.¹¹

Similarly, court decisions since *Greenwood* have denied

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the curb for collection does not constitute
a fourth amendment search....**

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Law enforcement officers contemplating a particular trash inspection need to be knowledgeable of how courts have answered these questions to ensure that trash inspections are in conformity with the requirements of the fourth amendment.

fourth amendment protection to trash placed in a communal dumpster.¹² While trash placed in a communal dumpster is normally intermingled with the trash of others, such trash is still accessible and others can easily rummage through the dumpster's contents. Because

courts conclude that it is not reasonable for a person to believe that trash is safe from inspection when it is placed in a communal dumpster, law enforcement officers in these cases have not been re-

home to conduct the search, the legality of trash inspections is more problematic where police make a warrantless entry into curtilage to retrieve and inspect trash, or where trash collectors enter private areas

trash was technically on the defendant's private property and within his curtilage, the court held that no fourth amendment search had occurred because the garbage was: (1) In a location that was in public view; (2) easily accessible to pedestrians; and (3) placed near the curb for the express purpose of turning it over to the trash collector.¹⁴

In *State v. Trahan*,¹⁵ the Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld an officer's warrantless inspection of trash left for collection 4 feet from a trailer. Noting factual similarities to *Greenwood*, the court held that the public accessibility of the trash and its placement for collection at a designated location were determinative factors in concluding that the officer's entry onto the curtilage and inspection of the trash was not a search that implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy.¹⁶

In *Commonwealth v. Perdue*,¹⁷ officers investigating the extensive vandalization of a church observed a garbage can underneath the porch of an adjoining parsonage and conducted a warrantless inspection of the trash that revealed incriminating evidence. The defendant argued the warrantless trash inspection violated his reasonable expectation of privacy because the garbage can was within the curtilage of the parsonage where he resided. The Court disagreed and held as follows:

"... property rights are only one consideration in determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists.... Being next to a church, the public has easy access to the parsonage

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...a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage once it is placed outside the curtilage for collection....

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quired to obtain a search warrant to inspect trash placed in such dumpsters. These cases suggest that the type of container a person uses to discard trash has little bearing on the extent of fourth amendment protection against police inspection of that trash.

Location of the Trash is the Most Determinative Factor

The most compelling factor in determining the constitutionality of a warrantless trash inspection is the location of the trash. In *Greenwood*, the Court held that the warrantless retrieval and subsequent inspection of trash placed for collection *outside the curtilage* does not constitute a fourth amendment search or seizure because the trash was *accessible to the public*. While it is clear that an inspection of a trash bag located under a person's kitchen sink would generally require a search warrant authorizing police entry into the

of curtilage to retrieve trash and then turn that trash over to police for inspection.

Warrantless trash inspections permitted on publicly accessible areas of curtilage

Several courts since *Greenwood* have held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed for collection *inside the curtilage*, if the location is readily accessible to the public. Courts assess the constitutionality of a warrantless entry onto curtilage by examining the public accessibility of the area entered to determine whether the entry implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy.

In *Trice*,¹³ an officer without a search warrant removed a garbage bag from a trash can located in the curtilage near the street curb of the defendant's residence. Although the

and the surrounding area.... As a result, the parsonage and its surroundings are subject to public access. Thus like the garbage left for collection in...*Greenwood*, the garbage in the instant case was subject to public inspection. Consequently, no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy existed.”¹⁸

These cases suggest that garbage put out for collection in an area of curtilage accessible to the public may be subject to warrantless police inspections. As a general rule, the fourth amendment does not prohibit warrantless police entry into publicly accessible walkways implicitly open to the public, or into areas of curtilage close to a public street that are otherwise expressly or implicitly open to the public.¹⁹ Thus, where solicited and unsolicited visitors are invited to enter publicly accessible areas of private property where trash has been placed for collection, it may be constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement to also enter onto that property for the purpose of inspecting the trash.

Warrant required for police entry into curtilage not accessible to the public

Law enforcement officers should understand that the fourth amendment is implicated when they enter an area of curtilage not accessible to the public. Entry by officers into such areas to retrieve trash put out for collection is a search under the fourth amendment that requires a search warrant based on probable cause.

For example, in *United States v. Certain Real Property Located at*

987 Fisher Road,²⁰ the court held that an officer could not retrieve without a search warrant the defendant's trash bags, which were placed for collection against the back wall of the home and hidden from the view of ordinary pedestrians. The court held that the officer's entry into the area of the backyard immediately abutting the rear of the home constituted an intrusion into the defendant's

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reasonable expectation of privacy because the trash was not readily accessible to the public and the officer intentionally trespassed with the express purpose of obtaining the garbage.²¹

The limited authority given to trash collectors to enter the curtilage area near the back wall of the home did not also authorize law enforcement officers to enter that area.²² Thus, where trash is placed for collection in an area of curtilage not

immediately accessible to the public, a search warrant is generally required to authorize police entry into that area to remove and inspect trash.

Routine Trash Collection Can Be Delivered To Police

Courts have suggested that another lawful method for obtaining trash for inspection would be for law enforcement officers to ask the regular trash collector to deliver the trash bags to them after the bags have been removed from the curtilage during a routine trash collection.²³ For example, in a case decided before *Greenwood*, a trash collector's routine pickup required him to enter into a private area of curtilage through a gate of a fence enclosing the defendant's backyard.²⁴ In response to an officer's request not to dump the defendant's trash into his truck, the trash collector turned the collected trash over to the police for inspection. The court held the defendant impliedly consented to entry upon his premises by the trash collector and to the removal of the trash to a publicly accessible area where the trash collector could allow the police or anyone else to examine the trash.²⁵ In essence, the court reasoned that the trash collector did precisely what the defendant contemplated by coming onto the private curtilage and taking the trash.

While an individual may not contemplate that a trash collector will not “commingle” his trash and take it to the dump, *Greenwood* holds that an individual assumes the risk that trash turned over to a collector may be conveyed by that third

party to law enforcement officials.²⁶ Thus, a person does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash once it leaves the curtilage. A trash collector who enters the curtilage to collect trash subsequently turned over to police is considered a private actor for fourth amendment purposes when acting in the scope of a routine trash collection.

Law enforcement officers who request assistance from trash collectors should ensure that they do nothing that exceeds the routine performance of their duties. Trash placed for routine collection in private areas of curtilage can constitutionally be turned over to the police after its routine removal from the curtilage by the trash collector. However, law enforcement officers contemplating this method of obtaining trash for inspection should consult with a competent legal adviser to determine whether a search warrant would be a more prudent method of obtaining the trash.

CONCLUSION

The cases discussed in this article suggest that law enforcement officers can, without a search warrant, constitutionally retrieve and inspect trash that is placed for collection in a publicly accessible area. Conversely, entry by law enforcement officers into private areas of curtilage constitutes a search that generally requires a search warrant based on probable cause. Trash left for routine collection within a private area of curtilage can be inspected without a search warrant by police after the trash collector has retrieved and transported the trash off the private property. Of-

ficers contemplating a warrantless trash inspection should be thoroughly familiar with State law, as well as the Federal constitutional principles discussed in this article, because State courts may impose more restrictive rules under State law.²⁷

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”**

Footnotes

¹ 108 S.Ct. 1625 (1988).

² See, *People v. Krivada*, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971). The *Krivada* Court, presented with facts similar to those in *Greenwood*, held the defendant continued to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash concealed in paper bags, even after the trash had been placed into the well of the refuse truck.

³ 108 S.Ct. at 1629. *Greenwood* declared that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the inspected garbage because of the following factors: (1) The trash was placed for collection at a fixed time; (2) it was contained in opaque plastic bags; (3) the collector was expected to pick up the trash and mingle it with other trash and deposit it at the dump; and (4) the trash was on the street for a short time and there was very little chance the trash would be inspected by anyone.

⁴ *Id.* at 1628-29.

⁵ *Id.* at 1629.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ Curtilage is generally defined as the area immediately surrounding a residence in which the intimate activities related to private domestic life are associated. For a more comprehensive discussion of curtilage, see Sauls, "Curtilage—The Fourth Amendment in the Garden," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, May 1990.

⁸ See, e.g., *United States v. Maryland*, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979) and *United States v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

⁹ 108 S.Ct. at 1629.

¹⁰ 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988).

¹¹ *Id.* at 1424.

¹² See, e.g., *United States v. Dunkel*, 900 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1990) and *United States v. Young*, 862 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1988).

¹³ 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988).

¹⁴ *Id.* at 1423.

¹⁵ 428 N.W.2d 619 (1988), *cert. denied*, 109 S.Ct. 561 (1988).

¹⁶ *Id.* at 623.

¹⁷ 564 A.2d 489 (Pa. Super. 1989).

¹⁸ *Id.* at 493.

¹⁹ See, *People v. Shorty*, 731 P.2d 679, 682 (Colo. 1987).

²⁰ 719 F.Supp. 1396 (E.D. Mich. 1989).

²¹ *Id.* at 1404-5.

²² *Id.*

²³ *Id.* at 1407, n.8.

²⁴ *Crocker v. State*, 477 P.2d 122 (Wyo. 1970).

²⁵ *Id.* at 125.

²⁶ 108 S.Ct. at 1629.

²⁷ See, e.g., *State v. Hempele*, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1990) and *State v. Boland*, 48 CrL 1205 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1990). The Washington Supreme Court rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in *Greenwood* and held that under their own State constitution, citizens do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash set out for pickup and a warrant is required before State law enforcement officers can inspect that trash.

Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in this article should consult their legal adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law or are not permitted at all.


The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face each challenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actions warrant special attention from their respective departments. The *Bulletin* also wants to recognize their exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.




While off duty, Officer Willie James of the Metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia, Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) observed smoke coming from a residence. Without hesitation, he entered the burning house and located two elderly women who were unable to escape the blaze. Officer James carried both women, one of whom was blind, to safety.

Officer James



Deputy Cecil D. Watson of the Ellis County, Texas, Sheriff's Department stopped a vehicle occupied by three subjects who had just robbed a nearby bank. Immediately after being stopped, the occupants of the vehicle began to fire at Deputy Watson. He returned fire, killing one subject and seriously wounding another. The third gunman escaped but was captured a short time later.

Deputy Watson



Officer Miller

Nominations to this department should be based on one of the following: 1) Rescue of one or more citizens, 2) arrest(s) at the risk to officer, or 3) unique service to the public or outstanding contribution to the profession. Submissions should include a short write-up (maximum of 250 words), a black-and-white photo of nominee, and a letter from the department's ranking officer endorsing the nomination. Submissions should be sent to the Production Manager, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Room 7262, 10th and Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20535.

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