Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
J. Edgar Hoover, Director
CONTENTS

Statement of Director J. Edgar Hoover ............................................. 1

Feature Article:

Proper Precaution Saves Lives When Moving Prisoners, by Merle C.
Karnopp, Sheriff, Lancaster County Sheriff's Office, Lincoln,
Nebr. ............................................................................................... 3

FBI National Academy:

National Academy Graduates 97 Men in 64th Session ....................... 7

Communications and Records:

Effective Records Help Coordinate Police Functions, by Chief Henry
R. Salmans, Salina, Kans., Police Department ................................. 13

Techniques:

Techniques in Handling Jewel Theft Cases ...................................... 16

Other Topics:

The Badge of the Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department .................... 21
New Law Protects Federal Credit Unions ........................................ 15
Wanted by the FBI ......................................................................... 24

Identification:

Questionable Pattern ..................................................................... Back cover

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TO ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS:

The morals of America are besieged today by an unprincipled force which will spare no home or community in its quest for illicit profits.

I am speaking of the unquestionably base individuals who spread obscene literature across our land through the means of films, decks of playing cards, photographs, "comic" books, salacious magazines, paperbacked books and other pornographic products. These forms of obscenity indeed threaten the morality of our Nation and its richest treasure—our young people.

While our schools, churches and youth organizations conscientiously strive to improve the morals and thinking of our juvenile citizens, forces of evil are working on the other side of the fence to contaminate all that we hold decent. The most disgusting part of this assault is that our youth is subjected to lurid exhibitions of obscenity in many of the places where they seek clean entertainment.

Despite the splendid public service rendered daily by the overwhelming majority of advertising and entertainment executives, a small group of opportunists in these industries are degrading America and its youth. Our young people are literally bombarded with vulgar motion picture advertisements in some newspapers; certain movies have too often made good on the provocative promises in the advertisements; and profanity and rapacity are the main ingredients of more and more screen offerings. A few television producers, too, sometimes break through the veil of decency as if some of them were trying to see just how much the public will stand. Recently, we have seen considerable publicity concerning certain elements in this medium who have sacrificed scruples on the altar of monetary gain.

It is also a grievous fact that drugstores and "sweetshops," pleasant meeting places for past generations, now display publications which a few years ago would have a place in only the bawdiest of gathering places. These signs of moral decay, tolerated by adults, cannot help but debase the thinking of our impressionable teen-agers. Yet, while they are impressionable, American youths are remarkably wise in recognizing pseudo-piety in adults and the sham of a society which condones declining morality.
In 1957 there were nearly eight forcible rapes per 100,000 inhabitants in the United States. In 1958 this figure increased ten and one-half percent, a forcible rape occurring every 36 minutes! This truly shocking and shameful state of affairs is made even more deplorable by the knowledge that sex crimes and obscene and vulgar literature often go hand in hand.

The time for half-hearted, oblique action against dealers in depravity is past. Although their despicable trade reaps $500 million a year, this diabolical business is costing the Nation much more than money. It is robbing our country and particularly our younger generation of decency--it is a seedbed for delinquency among juveniles and depravity among all ages. If we are to survive morally, Americans must search within themselves for the answers to these questions: Have local governing authorities investigated to ensure that laws against smut salesmen in their communities are strong enough? Is the public outcry of sufficient strength to impress local judges with the need of defending morality by sentencing filth purveyors to maximum terms? Are community and civic groups cooperating with law enforcement authorities in fighting this debasing blight?

And--above all--are good citizens teaching their youngsters habits and beliefs which will be as armor against the tainted temptations of muck merchants?

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director
The location of Lancaster County in the southeast section of the State of Nebraska, in the heart of the Midwest, is centered in a highly agricultural community composed of approximately 35 square miles with a population in excess of 160,000 people. The county has 20 small villages outside the county seat at Lincoln ranging in population from 100 to 3,500. The sheriff’s office employs 18 deputies, including 4 jailers, 1 matron, and 3 secretaries.

The problems confronting the sheriff’s office in handling and transporting prisoners have been many and varied. In the past nine years, 4,860 prisoners, both male and female, have been successfully dealt with. Adding to the situation is the fact that within Lancaster County, on the outskirts of Lincoln, there are located the Nebraska State Penitentiary, the Nebraska State Reformatory and the Lincoln State Hospital, which themselves contribute largely to the number of prisoners handled by this department. This is a problem which many sheriffs’ offices do not have to face.

Deputies, upon assuming their duties within the sheriff’s office, are given instructions on the necessity of being alert at all times in the apprehension and handling of prisoners and the fact that at no time while a prisoner is in their custody can there be the slightest deviation from this policy. Officers must always assume that, although a prisoner has been placed in restraint after his arrest, he continues to be “dangerous” until he is incarcerated. To a large extent, a prisoner’s deliverance can be assured by the officer’s attitude or actions at the time of arrest; therefore, officers are instructed to be firm in their approach to this phase of their work and at no time take what could be considered by the prisoner as a lackadaisical attitude toward their job.

The sheriff’s office conducts a school 1 night a week for 2 hours, 9 months of the year, for the benefit of new personnel and as a refresher for deputies who have been in the department for a number of years. The phase of this training pertaining to handling and transporting prisoners is constantly brought to the attention of the deputies in the department, and instructions and new ideas pertaining to the responsibility of officers in conducting a thorough and adequate search of any person arrested are dwelt upon at great length. It is also emphasized that when time and circumstances allow, adequate personnel must be used in connection with apprehensions and the transporting of prisoners. In no instance should there be less than two officers for each prisoner.

In those instances where deputies are moving prisoners on foot, within the jail, on the street, or en route to court, the prisoner must at all times be facing away from and in front of the officer. Furthermore, the prisoner must be kept away from
the officer at sufficient distance to avoid any attempt at disarming the officer.

It is well known that there are a number of methods to restrain a prisoner. Only in those instances where it is necessary are "come along" holds employed, and then only as a temporary means of bringing the prisoner under control. The use of handcuffs is also only a temporary means of restraining a prisoner, for they may be used by him as a weapon in attempting to escape. Also, particular caution must be taken when transporting prisoners in "cuffs," especially for any period of time, as prisoners have been known to free themselves by picking the lock. As a guard against this, deputies are instructed to place the handcuffs on the prisoner with the key insert on the lock in an upward position so that any attempt to pick the lock can be observed by the officers.

With respect to the transportation of a dangerous prisoner, it is the policy of the sheriff's office to utilize a belt fastened around the waist of the prisoner with the buckle in the back and with the handcuffs inserted in a ring attached to the belt. In addition, leg irons are used.

It has been a policy of the sheriff's department to avoid transporting prisoners by public conveyance as transportation by automobile has been found to create fewer problems. The safety of the transporting officers is increased on a long trip since the prisoner may be placed in jail overnight, and the security of the prisoner is never in question.

In the past 8 years, 189 prisoners have been extradited from other States and brought back to Lincoln by the sheriff's department. No incident has arisen in connection with any of these extrajudgments. In all instances, two deputies are used in moving prisoners by automobile. The deputy assigned to ride with the prisoner in the rear seat sits on the left-hand side directly behind the driver and makes certain that his sidearm is located away from the prisoner. While making stops for refreshments, the prisoner is handcuffed to one deputy and restraint is not removed until the prisoner and the deputy have been seated in the restaurant in a booth with the prisoner on the inside.

In those instances where it is necessary to transport two prisoners with only two deputies, the prisoners are shackled together with leg irons and each is handcuffed in front with the use of the belt as previously described.

**Transporting Female Prisoners**

The sheriff's office does not transport female prisoners except in an extreme case of emergency unless there is a matron present. This is a precautionary measure to insure that no unjust accusation of molestation may be made against the officers. Furthermore, if a search of the female prisoner is necessary prior to her transportation, this, too, can be more readily handled by having the matron present.

**Transportation of Mental Patients**

In handling a mentally ill person we always have at least two deputies in attendance. The actions and behavior of a mentally disturbed person are unpredictable and test the alertness of an officer in every instance. The use of force in restraining a mental patient must be tempered with good judgment and should be used only to prevent the person from injuring himself or others.

Particular caution must be exercised by officers to prevent the patient from attempting to commit suicide by trying to jump from the officers' car. A mental patient is never allowed to ride in a car in a seat by himself. If the person is accompanied by a friend or relative, this party must sit in the front seat of the car while the patient rides in the back seat with an officer in the same manner as that employed when transporting a prisoner.

**Experiences**

To illustrate the problem recently presented to the sheriff's office in transporting a prisoner over a long
distance and for an extended period of time, the case of the mass killer, Charles Starkweather, who was responsible for the deaths of 11 victims, 10 in Nebraska and 1 in Wyoming, December 1957 through January 1958, is brought to mind. Starkweather, following his conviction for first degree murder in Lancaster County District Court in June 1958, was sentenced to death and executed in the electric chair at the Nebraska State Penitentiary on June 25, 1959, after five stays of execution were granted pending results of appeals to State and Federal Supreme Courts.

As Starkweather was apprehended in Douglas, Wyo., it was necessary to return him to Lincoln, Nebr., after he had waived extradition. The first leg of the trip was accomplished from Douglas, Wyo., to Gering, Nebr., on January 30, 1958, with the assistance of the sheriff of Converse County, Douglas, Wyo., two Nebraska safety patrolmen and myself. The prisoner was placed in restraint with use of handcuffs, belt and leg irons and placed in the center of the rear seat of the Wyoming sheriff's car with a patrolman on one side and myself on the other while the second patrolman rode in the front seat with the driver.

The prisoner was placed in solitary confinement with one guard in Scottsbluff County Jail at Gering, Nebr., during the night of January 30, 1958. On January 31, it was decided that a convoy of two Nebraska safety patrol cars, with two patrolmen each, and one Lancaster County patrol car, with three patrolmen and myself, would be utilized for the remainder of the trip to Lincoln; one State patrol car was to travel in front of the sheriff's car, while the second State patrol car was to follow behind the sheriff's car. The trip covered a distance of 550 miles. Upon the arrival of the prisoner in Lincoln, he was placed in solitary confinement at Nebraska State Penitentiary for safekeeping.

The prisoner was transported on three occasions from the penitentiary to the Lancaster County courthouse during the intervening period prior to his trial which commenced on May 5, 1958. On the morning of March 1, 1958, prior to preliminary hearing in Lancaster County Court, I received an anonymous telephone call informing me that a group of men from Bennet, Nebr., where Starkweather killed three of his victims, were planning on “getting” Starkweather at the courthouse. Upon receipt of this information, 12 deputies and 6 officers of the Lincoln Police Department were instructed to surround the sheriff's car upon its arrival at the courthouse from the penitentiary. The prisoner at this time was transported in the sheriff's car by myself and my chief deputy and accompanied by a State patrol car with two patrolmen. To avoid any confusion or intervention by spectators, the first-floor corridors of the courthouse were cleared before the prisoner's arrival.

A large crowd had gathered at the entrance to the courthouse before the prisoner was scheduled to arrive, and it was obvious that public feeling was running high. Had not precautionary measures been taken, it is very probable that an attempt would have been made to take the prisoner from the custody of the authorities.

Following the prisoner's preliminary hearing, the return trip to the State penitentiary was made with the use of the sheriff's car, accompanied by one State patrol car with two patrolmen and two deputy sheriffs in each of two sheriff's cars.

The Starkweather trial covered 3 weeks; therefore, it was necessary to transport the prisoner to and from the penitentiary on 15 consecutive days.
On another occasion, information was received through an anonymous telephone call that a group of teenage boys from various high schools within Lancaster County were planning to intercept the convoy transporting the prisoner to the courthouse.

In order to cope with the security problem throughout the trial, an additional 16 special deputies of the Lancaster County sheriff’s posse along with 6 uniformed policemen of the Lincoln Police Department were deployed within the courthouse and in the area surrounding the courthouse. To deter any attempt on the part of a citizen group to interfere in the transportation of the prisoner to and from court each day, an additional State patrolman and a car were added to the convoy used at the time the prisoner was taken for preliminary hearing. As an added precautionary measure, one armed deputy sheriff was stationed on the roof of the county jail adjacent to the courthouse in a position to observe the entire crowd and the progress of the prisoner each time he entered or left the courthouse.

The handling of the prisoner throughout the course of the trial was met with no open demonstration on the part of the public.

A serious problem still existed in view of the fact that it was quite apparent from the publicity given this case from its inception and general public feeling that a majority of the citizenry was convinced the prisoner should receive the death penalty. This feeling increased as the trial progressed, and it was necessary, therefore, to formulate plans to protect the prisoner should a verdict be returned asking for anything other than the supreme penalty. Plans were outlined whereby, should the prisoner receive a life sentence, he would be taken from the courthouse under the usual heavy guard by a basement exit on the opposite side of the courthouse from where the normal exit would be made. However, deputies and members of the State patrol and police department were stationed at the usual exit in the same manner used prior to this time during the trial, which would make it appear that the prisoner would be returned to the penitentiary in the same way as heretofore.

The case went to the jury late on May 23, 1958, and after 6½ hours’ deliberation it returned a sentence of guilty of murder in the first degree and recommended the death penalty. The prisoner was returned to the State penitentiary without any show of public demonstration.

**Foreign Trip**

The Lancaster County sheriff’s office in the spring of 1954 handled the return of a prisoner from Winnipeg, Canada, who had escaped from the Nebraska State Penitentiary in the fall of 1949. This prisoner had effected his escape while accompanied by penitentiary guards in downtown Lincoln where he had been taken for dental work. He was subsequently apprehended by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and by means of a Presidential warrant he was returned to Nebraska by myself and one deputy. The Canadian law at that time prohibited officers from the United States to travel within the country with firearms or to utilize a two-way radio. Therefore, it was necessary for two Royal Canadian Mounted Police to accompany me and my deputy with the prisoner from Winnipeg to the border.

**Summary**

It should be borne in mind that a prisoner should not be transported unless he is accompanied by at least two officers; also, that restraining measures such as handcuffs, “come along” holds, belts, and leg irons are strictly temporary. Caution must be exercised at all times by officers to keep their bodies and limbs away from their prisoners when restraining devices are being applied.

Alertness and caution are of prime importance in handling any prisoner. It is the responsibility of officers to protect the prisoner against self-destruction and to guard against any opportunity on the part of the prisoner to escape or injure other citizens or the officers themselves. Furthermore, it is the officers’ responsibility to avoid unreasonable treatment of a prisoner, to avoid any public display of force and to keep the prisoner away from the public.

Above everything else, it must be assumed at all times that a prisoner will try to escape, and precautions must be taken with this probability kept in mind.

**POISONINGS**

In acute poisonings the symptoms exhibited by an individual prior to death are indicative of the type of poison involved. This information may enable the toxicologist to determine rapidly and with minimum expense the actual poisonous substance causing death.
Graduation exercises were held in the Departmental Auditorium, Washington, D.C., on Wednesday, November 4, 1959, for the 64th class of law enforcement officers to attend the FBI National Academy. The 97 members in the class represented 42 States, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia. Upon graduation they brought the total number of FBI National Academy alumni to 3,819. Among the graduates of the class were Chiefs of Police from New York to California, a Deputy Chief of Police from Hawaii, and two officers from Alaska.

The Honorable Martin B. McKneally, National Commander of The American Legion, Newburgh, N.Y., and the Honorable John D. Randall, President of the American Bar Association, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, delivered the principal addresses. At the beginning of his remarks, Mr. Randall praised Mr. Hoover for his immeasurable contributions to the Nation’s strength and security in building the FBI and presented him a certificate of membership in the American Bar Association.

Dr. Edward L. R. Elson of the National Presbyterian Church, Washington, D.C., gave the invocation and the benediction for the exercises, which also featured a musical program by the U.S. Marine Band.

Mr. Guy F. Van Cleave, Chief of Police, Westminster, Colo., and president of the graduating class, addressed the assembly and expressed appreciation, on behalf of the class, for having had the opportunity to advance themselves in the pursuit of professional law enforcement knowledge and training. Diplomas were presented by Deputy Attorney General Lawrence E. Walsh. A list of the class members will be found at the end of this article.

The address of Mr. McKneally follows:

I count it a great privilege to take part in this morning’s program. I do not anticipate another opportunity during the remaining 11 months of my term of office to speak to so important an audience under such distinguished auspices.

To you graduates of the 64th FBI Academy and your loved ones who have helped make possible your achievement, The American Legion offers its sincere congratulations. And we are mindful, also, of those in your home organizations who sponsored your attendance here. For their faith in you and in the Academy, we are sincerely grateful.

In a society that seeks to govern itself by laws, the law enforcement officer occupies a highly strategic and sensitive position. He is not only the arm of the law; he is also its defender and its chief public image. The very nature of his power and responsibility requires that he observe standards of conduct more lofty and more binding than the law itself prescribes.

If this seems a harsh duty, as sometimes it must, it also entails a compensating privilege. For few Americans have the opportunity that is yours to participate personally and daily in the processes through which our great principles of justice and liberty and legal authority are practiced and perfected.

So I think you are to be commended today—and envied—not only for excelling in your work but for taking it up in the first place.

The training course you have completed calls to mind another fundamental characteristic of our American governmental system—and that is the division of authority among the Federal, State, and local governments. As you know, this did not come about by accident or even by evolution. One of the original amendments to the Constitution provides that all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the States. It was placed in the Constitution by our Founding Fathers who recognized that the power of governing belongs to the people and that this power is subject to the least abuse when it is controlled directly by the people. You gentlemen, in performing your duties within your respective State and local jurisdictions, are functioning precisely according to this constitutional design.

By the same token, the FBI Academy typifies the kind of Federal-State cooperation that makes our form of government work. Here you have observed and studied the investigative techniques of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with the result that you return home better prepared to discharge your responsibilities to your communities and States. I am sure you agree that among the historic contributions which have been made by Director J. Edgar Hoover to the cause of law enforcement, this FBI Academy will not be rated the least.

And let me say here that we of The American Legion admire and honor Mr. Hoover for many reasons. We honor him because he has demonstrated a devotion to America that is total—because in an age of qualified and apologetic Americanism, he has dared to profess his love
of country without limit. And we honor him in particular because he has provided constant and tremendously effective leadership in the battle against Communist subversion.

In this battle we all serve, whether we realize it or not. And if we do not realize it, then we are serving badly and, in all likelihood, to the enemy’s advantage.

Communism today represents the ultimate peril to our country. We are accustomed to saying this, to reading it, to hearing it from Mr. Hoover and others whose patriotism and sources of information are above question—and yet, how many of us really understand what is at stake? How many of us believe that the danger is personal—that the arch-conspiracy called communism seeks consciously and zealously to do away with the America we know, and that its target is not just somebody’s freedom but your freedom and mine?

The answer, gentlemen, is not enough of us. We seem unable for some reason to accept the most important fact of our lives—the fact that communism is as resolutely evil in its purpose and as inhuman in its means as the record proves it to be.

There are good, law-abiding Americans who deplore communism but reserve a certain amount of sympathy for the Communist. There are those who prefer to believe the peril remote—who cushion their concern with the soothing hope that communism can threaten us only when Communists crowd the streets. There are some, even now, who deem it unfair and un-American for anyone to expose and obstruct the efforts of the Communist Party to subvert our free institutions.

The curious tragedy of our times—the paradox that has smoothed the way for communism’s vast expansion in the last quarter of a century—is that we who possess liberty and the right of self-determination do not ourselves value these gifts so highly or utilize their power so wisely as do those who would take them from us. If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must acknowledge that the followers of Marx and Lenin have profited not so much from their own genius and zeal as from the ignorance and apathy of their opponents.

This is the weakness that the Kremlin has exploited in country after country in Europe and Asia. It is the weakness that is being exploited now, with concentrated energy and skill, in the 20 Latin American republics of our own hemisphere.

What is happening today in Cuba and its sister nations to the South is potentially more dangerous to the future of the free world than what is happening in the better advertised trouble centers of Berlin and Laos. We conceivably could suffer defeats in those places and still retain the capacity for effective leadership. We could not suffer the loss of Latin America to communism and retain either the capacity or the will to lead.

The people of Latin America do not want communism any more than we do—or, indeed, any more than the people of Czechoslovakia or Poland or China wanted it. But the more significant fact is that present conditions in much of Latin America make it especially vulnerable to Communist assault.

Communism thrives on the misfortunes of people—on public unrest and turmoil. Today, a great portion of Latin America is in political and economic ferment. During the past 7 years practically every nation in Central and South America has changed governments—in many cases to the accompaniment of violence. While it would be foolish to contend that all of this was inspired or instigated by Communists, it would be fatally foolish to deny that the resulting confusion and tension are made to order for Communist exploitation.

The fifth column, another basic element of Red subversion, is present and growing in numbers. Communist party members in Latin America are reliably estimated to number 250,000, and an additional 600,000 are estimated to be party sympathizers. In a continent of 200 million souls, the numerical strength would appear to be insignificantly small—but proportionately smaller cadres of party members have succeeded in delivering nations into Communist hands.

A third element that has become increasingly clear in the recent pattern of events in Latin America is the direction and coordination of the Red drive from Moscow. We need no crystal ball to discern the Kremlin’s objective: it is quite obviously to split the Americas in two—to smash the hemispheric unity which has withstood all pressures of outside forces since the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.

Under cover of diplomatic and cultural and trade exchanges, the Soviet Union today operates a shuttle service between Latin American countries and espionage training centers in Russia. The tempo of propaganda designed to introduce the people of Latin America to the achievements and blessings of Soviet society has picked up substantially. Soviet film festivals, previously unwitnessed in the area, recently were staged 10 times in 6 South American countries. And the Chinese Communists are participating directly in the offensive not only by exchanging student and trade groups but by openly advocating that their own seizure of power in China be used as a model for the coming “people’s revolution” in Latin America.

In all of this effort the one recurring and underlying theme is hatred for the United States. By every available means they seek to magnify the real and imagined grievances which the people feel toward their big neighbor to the north. They want Latin Americans to believe it is Yankee imperialism that has suppressed their aspirations for democratic government—and that they cannot be politically and economically independent until they reject U.S. influence and traditions.

As emotional appeals go, this is a rather effective one—for the truth is that we have not always played the part of the good neighbor that our Latin American policy proclaims us to be. To the extent that we have at times been indifferent to the economic problems of these countries and have failed to provide moral support for individuals who truly sought to serve the people, the present crisis is partially of our own making.

Ironically enough, the loudest and most listened-to propagandist for communism in Latin America today may or may not be a Communist. Fidel Castro assumed power in Cuba 10 months ago under circumstances that seemed to herald a new era of freedom for the long-suffering Cuban people. His leadership was unquestioned, his heroism was acknowledged, and his words stirred the hopes and faith of free men everywhere. By his deeds in the interval he has identified himself as nothing more than
a dictator with a maximum capacity for rabble-rousing and a minimum concern for human rights.

Mr. Castro may think he is playing his own game; the Communists are satisfied it is theirs. For what he has done by condemning the United States and by refusing to permit the establishment of democratic institutions in Cuba will be interpreted as a defeat for free men everywhere. At a time when all of Latin America appears to have gained in the struggle to rid itself of the tyranny of one-man rule, he is in effect directing attention to the collective tyranny of communism.

Whether or how long we should tolerate Dictator Castro's militant anti-Americanism is a question that deserves serious study. We can afford to have our motives impugned and our helping hand smacked down; we don't like it, but that's been going on all over the world for some years. We can rely upon the Cuban people to renew and eventually win their fight for freedom, provided the fight remains a national one. But I do not believe our national interest would permit us to stand idly by while Castro was made the instrument of the capture by communism of a country that is situated 90 miles off the coast of Florida.

We were among the first to recognize the Castro government. Perhaps we ought to suspend that recognition until such time as Mr. Castro sees fit to honor his original promise of free elections and of government by law rather than by firing squad.

There comes a time, in the field of international politics as in the field of local law enforcement, when the polite thing is not necessarily the proper thing. We do what we have to do in the light of our best judgment, our sense of moral duty, and our responsibility to those whom we serve. At the present stage of a Cold War which was thrust upon us and is being waged unmercifully by those who despise and would destroy our way of life, the only national policy we have a right to follow is the policy that conforms to the security and leadership responsibilities of America. In no other way can we turn back the challenge of communism; by no other standard can we hope to measure and assert the complete moral and material strength of the American people.

We have the power; we need but to use it. We have the truth; we need but to serve it. We have, in this burdensome, frustrating worldwide battle for the hearts and minds of human beings, an opportunity greater than was given our fathers to prove once and for all the validity of the American dream and the indestructibility of the American's belief in liberty and justice for all.

The text of Mr. Randall's address follows:

This is a great moment for the American Bar Association and for me as its president. Mr. Hoover, distinguished guests, members of the graduating class, ladies and gentlemen. The Association at this time is proud to welcome into its membership a truly great American, a distinguished lawyer and a public official whose services to our country have exemplified the highest ideals of the nation and of the legal profession. As a midwestern lawyer who has greatly admired J. Edgar Hoover for many years, it is a matter of personal gratification that the honor of presenting to him the certificate of membership in the American Bar Association has fallen to me. Among its six basic objectives, the American Bar Association considers to be among the most important these two: the preservation of representative government in the United States and the improvement of the administration of justice through the maintenance of high standards of judicial selection and administrative procedures. It would be difficult to find any single individual who has done more to further both of these objectives than J. Edgar Hoover. In his long career in the Government, going back to 1917 when he first came to the Department of Justice, and continuing through his 35 years as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he has made contributions to the Nation equaled by few men. In building up the vital agency of Government which he heads to its present standards of excellence, Mr. Hoover has contributed immeasurably to the Nation's strength and security. In so doing he has instilled in the American people confidence and respect for Federal authority and for the fairness and the integrity of its law enforcement processes.

People may not think of Mr. Hoover as a lawyer although he assuredly is. It may surprise some in this audience to know that he holds law degrees not from one law school but from a dozen. In fact, I think he holds about as many honorary doctor of laws degrees as anybody listed in "Who's Who." These are, of course, in addition to the degrees in law he received as a student here at The George Washington University. Indeed, J. Edgar Hoover and Agents of the FBI, so many of whom are lawyers, are shining examples of the advantages of legal training in Government service. It is a point of pride to those of us in the legal profession that so many lawyers are chosen to occupy high places in all branches of the Government. It is a mark of special pride that the Director and Agents of the FBI have reflected to such an outstanding degree the ideals of justice to which our legal system is dedicated. Mr. Hoover, in presenting you this certificate, I sincerely hope that you will take time from your busy duties to assist us in further advancing the administration of justice.

(At this point Mr. Randall presented Mr. Hoover with a certificate.)

I cannot tell you ladies and gentlemen what a thrill that gave me. I hope it gave Mr. Hoover the same thrill.

It gives me great pleasure to speak to you this morning and to bring you both my personal congratulations and the greetings of the American Bar. Your hard work at this West Point of law enforcement has earned you something more restful than a long speech by a lawyer. But mine is not the first speech by a lawyer that you have listened to and it is my hope that you will not find it the longest.

I am sure that it is with the feeling of pride that you contemplate the completion of this 12-week course. Shortly, you will be joining the ranks of the over 3,700 law enforcement officers from throughout the United States who have completed this course and returned to their sponsoring law enforcement agencies. More than 28 percent of the graduates, still on active duty, were at the end of the last fiscal year, the executive heads of their departments. It is apparent that you represent a select group of law enforcement officers, and will be the leaders in this field.
I count it a rare opportunity to be able to address so many present and future heads of our law enforcement agencies. This school, founded in 1935, is an excellent example of a fundamental American idea of government; central coordination, coupled with local responsibility. Here, you have been trained in such important areas of normal police activity as police administration and organization; laboratory aids; criminal investigations; firearms; training; fingerprints; identification; traffic control; arrests; searches; and the like. Of course, after you leave this Academy, I am sure you will continue to call on the FBI many times for assistance. But the primary responsibility for the enforcement of law will be with you and your local agency. Law enforcement is a cooperative effort between the states, the communities within the States, and the Federal Government. One does not tell the other what to do, but each stands ready to assist the other in whatever way it can.

It is in great measure due to the wisdom of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover that this fundamental separation has been respected. As you well know, from time to time there has been a movement toward the establishment of a Federal police system in the United States. Mr. Hoover has resisted this tendency, and I believe all Americans owe him a debt of gratitude for taking this stand.

I have mentioned that cooperation and not domination has been the key to the relationship between the enforcement agencies of the various jurisdictions. I should like now to extend this concept of cooperation to another area, that of cooperation between the units of a law enforcement group. By law enforcement group, I mean those other persons with whom you work in your communities. You, as the police officers of the community working with the State's attorney, the judiciary, probation personnel and the directors of the prison system, form what I think of as a law enforcement group. Now, even as law enforcement on the police level is the result of cooperation between police officers of different agencies, so too is it the result of cooperation between county sheriffs, agents of the Department of Internal Revenue, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and State police authorities, likewise, law enforcement cannot be effective unless and until there is complete cooperation and understanding between all those persons engaged in law enforcement.

There must be complete cooperation between all the agencies that make up the law enforcement group. Even as domination by one unit of government over another is not the solution to the law enforcement problem, domination by one activity over another is not the way to get effective law enforcement. Each unit has a role to play, and it can play its role well only if it is aware of the problems of the other agencies.

Unfortunately, too often this coordination is missing. For example, a policeman, after a long investigation, will apprehend a suspect and cause him to be charged with a serious crime, and turn the matter over to the State's attorney's office. The State's attorney, for reasons best known only unto himself, will reduce the charges. He may not advise the apprehending agency of the reasons for his decision and the police officer can only feel that his work is in vain, that political influence has played its part again, or that the prosecutor's office is lazy. Now the prosecutor may have good reasons for the decision. He knows the temper of the juries and the judges, and he knows the weight they will give to the evidence he has to offer. But unless these reasons are made clear to the apprehending officer, a morale problem will surely result.

The prosecutor, too, has his problems. If the parole and prison officials happen to be following a particularly liberal policy toward, let us say auto thieves, at the very moment when he is preparing a similar case for trial, one can picture his attitude. And add to this atmosphere the attitude of a criminal court judge who may be imposing sentences with the same lack of severity as an overly indulgent father and you can imagine how futile it might all seem.

Effective law enforcement is the result of group effort, understanding, and cooperation. In that respect the healthiest sign in our law enforcement picture today is that policemen are talking about law, and lawyers are studying and talking about practical police problems.

It is with this end in view that the American Bar Foundation has undertaken to conduct research on the administration of criminal justice in the United States. This project has two goals: First, to make possible the description of procedures of agencies in a particular law enforcement group for dealing with each other in their attempt to reach the common objective. Here, as elsewhere, we are concerned with the affirmative. We are most anxious to find satisfactory working arrangements between agencies. For example, we would like to know what arrangements the police and parole officials have for handling parolees who are suspected of the commission of a new offense; and what arrangements exist between the prosecuting attorney and the probation department for coordinating their recommendations as to sentence.

Second, this report will make information available to the agencies in a law enforcement group so that they might better harmonize their policies with the other agencies. It is essential that a person making a decision be aware of the way his decision will affect others engaged in law enforcement. In recent years courts have given increasing attention to such problems as the obtaining of confessions and unlawful searches and seizures. In doing so, too often courts have not been furnished with sufficient information as to the exact nature of problems confronting the police in that jurisdiction or the jurisdiction whose appellate decisions are cited as precedents. Legislatures have attempted the drafting of legislation with inadequate information as to the current practices within or outside their states.

The American Bar Foundation is not concerned with evaluating current decisions or practices. The Foundation believes that the likelihood of a right decision being made will be greatly enhanced if the person making that decision is aware of the problems faced by the other agencies.

There is another member of this law enforcement group, the defense counsel. Although he sits on the other side of the courtroom, cross-examines, and argues with the prosecutor, I do not hesitate to include him in the law enforcement group. He is there to see that laws are enforced too, specifically the rules of procedure, the law of evidence, and the law of the crime. He scrutinizes the confession because in the past coercion has been used to
obtain them. He objects to certain testimony because innocent men have been sentenced by a jury swayed by gossip. He is there to enforce the law.

The best way to avoid difficulty from the defense counsel is to make certain the law has been followed in your phase of the work, and follow the rules of evidence in your testimony. If you have seized real evidence, identify it properly and keep it in a secure place. In short, follow the rules you have learned here.

The law of evidence, of searches and seizures, is difficult and often changing. This is a good sign, I believe, for it shows that we are interested in improving it. I realize that as new decisions are being handed down, you might well wonder whether it is possible for law enforcement to be effective in a liberal democracy such as ours. But I am certain that in moments of reflection you would not have it any other way. And remember that in this work you do not stand alone. The lawyers of this country stand ready to help you.

In this regard, I can do no better than to repeat the suggestions made to the 62d graduating class by the Honorable Warren E. Burger, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. He recommended that the heads of law enforcement agencies contact the presidents of their local Bar Associations for help. They can appoint a group of lawyers to work with you and to help train police in those critical areas of the law where the law is changing and becoming more complex.

Remember, also, that even as the lawyers are inventive in the ways of absolving the innocent, they are equally imaginative in finding ways to convict the guilty. Thirty years ago no one imagined that the income tax law would be used to punish Al Capone. And even then, how many evaders thought they were secure because their sources of income were concealed. The ingenuity of the lawyers in developing the net worth method of establishing tax evasion is an example of the imagination of the lawyers in the service of law enforcement.

But imagination is not the exclusive property of the lawyers. Our investigative agencies have always displayed an ability to devise new methods for securing evidence. Because they know that police brutality has no place in the American system, they have established files of typewriter specimens and tire treads; because they want to go into court with clean hands, they arrange for the larcenist to get phosphorescent salts on his hands.

I am confident that with the creative imaginations of the lawyers and the investigators, we shall continue to develop methods of effective law enforcement within the framework of our constitutional liberties. This is a challenging work, worthy of the best in all of us. May we measure up to the task.

The members of the graduating class of the 64th Session of the National Academy are:

Elmer F. Adams, Baltimore County Police Bureau, Towson, Md.
William Bryan Allen, New Mexico State Police, Sante Fe, N. Mex.
Herbert M. Anderson, Sacramento County Sheriff's Office, Sacramento, Calif.
Earl Allen Ballengee, Beckley, W. Va., Police Department.
Russell Lee Baughan, Richmond, Va., Bureau of Police.
James G. Beck, Jr., Augusta, Ga., Police Department.
Marion Paul Beeley, Raytown, Mo., Police Department.
Merlin L. Bellamy, Ocean Drive Beach, S.C., Police Department.
John Michael Bergauer, St. Louis County Police Department, Clayton, Mo.
Joseph James Bevan, Jr., Wallingford, Conn., Police Department.
Martin Emil Breit, Beaver Falls, Pa., Police Department.
Donald A. Brown, Newark, N.Y., Police Department.
Robert Walter Burns, Wayne County Sheriff's Department, Lyons, N.Y.
Ralph T. Cannada, Durham, N.C., Police Department.
Louis Cataldo, Barnstable County Sheriff's Office, Barnstable, Mass.
Clinton Chafin, Atlanta, Ga., Police Department.
Thomas F. Clark, Houston, Tex., Police Department.
William David Cochran, Georgia State Patrol, Atlanta, Ga.
Dwight C. Coplien, Monroe, Wis., Police Department.
Robert H. Corder, Zion, Ill., Police Department.
Edward L. Cornett, Kentucky State Police, Frankfort, Ky.
John T. Costello, Auburn, N.Y., Police Department.
Deulon M. Cox, Little Rock, Ark., Police Department.
Charles Jerry Crabtree, Huntsville, Ala., Police Department.
George I. Crowell, Kauai County Police Department, Lihue, Kauai, Hawaii.
Charles R. Cutting, Bozeman, Mont., Police Department.
Leonard H. Dean, Duncan, Okla., Police Department.
Herbert Francis DeArmitt, Jr., Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, Riverhead, N.Y.
James Patrick Devaney, North Miami, Fla., Police Department.
Charles E. Dickens, Lansdale, Pa., Police Department.
Jesse W. Evans, Provo, Utah, Police Department.
James Raymond Fergerson, Lubbock, Tex., Police Department.
William B. Frazier, Dallas, Tex., Police Department.
Thomas Francis Ganley, Lynnfield, Mass., Police Department.
R. F. Hackstock, Ketchikan, Alaska, Police Department.
J. P. Hall, Jr., Clay County Sheriff's Office, Green Cove Springs, Fla.
Louis Walter Harper, Columbus, Miss., Police Department.
Harold E. Haught, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
Eugene Robert Henninger, Lincoln, Nebr., Police Department.
Jose E. Hernandez Rodriguez, Police of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R.
James O. Hinler, Indiana State Police, Indianapolis, Ind.
Samuel H. Hower, U.S. Park Police, Washington, D.C.
John T. Howland, Boston, Mass., Police Department.
Rex Lee Huntsman, Sevier County Sheriff's Office, Richfield, Utah.
Richard A. Jakmas, Ohio State Highway Patrol, Columbus, Ohio.
Walter J. Kendall, Jr., New York City Police Department.
The police and the investigator must always be alert for suspicious happenings and suspicious individuals. The experienced investigator, however, knows that corroborating facts and substantial evidence are the necessary elements in police work. Frequently circumstances are deceptive and the most skillful observations and techniques are necessary to detect and solve crimes.

For example, in a recent incident an individual in an eastern city was reported to have a strange habit. On one particular day of each week at a very early morning hour this man would stop his car in a suburban residential neighborhood. He would leave the automobile and proceed to search trash disposal cans set out on the curb in the vicinity of a residence housing a beauty shop. To some bewildered observers, it appeared that he either placed something in the trash cans or took something from them. The more regular his procedure became, the more mysterious it appeared to be. Finally one witness to this activity reported this information, and an investigation ensued. Contacted early one morning after his regular stop at the trash cans, it was discovered that this individual had in his possession a brown paper bag which contained what appeared to be pieces of human hair.

At this high pitch of the case, the mystery disappeared. This man, who worked at night, stopped by the trash cans near the beauty shop each week in order to collect discarded pieces of human hair. His purpose—to make a human hair mattress for the convenience and luxury of the pet dog of his young son.

**APPEARANCES DECEIVE**

**NICKNAME FILE**

Requests to search a nickname in FBI files should include all possible descriptive data.
Since the turn of the century police departments throughout the United States have been making efforts to better coordinate the activities of their organizations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, many universities of this country, as well as governmental agencies, both Federal and State, have attempted to develop methods for achieving a standard operational procedure to achieve a complete coordination of police activities.

Personal observations made during the past 18 years indicate that police organizations have many and varied types of reporting regulations. Some organizations process a voluminous amount of paper, and in many there is a definite indication of duplication of work in the various subdivisions. This in itself is frequently a bottleneck for efficient police work and, in large departments, decreases the effectiveness of the individual officer and the department.

On the other hand, in the smaller departments there may be a complete lack of recorded facts and information pertaining to the functional part of police work. Consequently, there must be some method developed and set up in police organizations to encourage a standard operational system which will not become so involved that it interferes with the purpose of a recording system. At the same time, it must not be so limited that it is worthless as a system for retaining investigative material so necessary to the police officer's work.

The development of a referral system with which it is possible to check back without having to examine a large number of reports is important. Secondly, there must be a system developed in which all subdivisions and each member of the police department are constantly and fully briefed on the activities of the department.

Receiving Initial Complaint

Let us discuss the recording of police activities starting with the complaint clerk or desk sergeant who initially receives the information. From the time the call is received from the citizen by the complaint clerk or desk sergeant it becomes a matter of police business. A complaint slip is then filled out by the desk sergeant, listing the following information: (1) the date, (2) disposition time, (3) time matter assigned for handling, (4) name of the desk sergeant handling the call, (5) name of the officer assigned to the case, (6) name of the complainant, if possible, (7) where committed, (8) the nature of complaint, and (9) a case number.

Upon receiving directions from the desk sergeant or dispatcher, the beat or patrol officer, on reaching the scene or contacting the complainant, records the information he gathers in a notebook containing a standard reporting form which is
supplied to him by the police department. The information recorded in his notebook is identical to that which is needed to complete the initial case card or case envelope which is the next step. The type of case envelope is determined by the kind of investigation being conducted—casualty or general. The casualty card or envelope should list the following: (1) kind of casualty, (2) classification, (3) victim and address, (4) extent of injury, (5) driver, (6) where committed, (7) when committed, (8) person making report and address, (9) time reported, and (10) how reported.

The general investigative case card or envelope should contain the following information: (1) crime, (2) classification, (3) victim and address, (4) where committed, (5) when committed, (6) reporting party and address, (7) time reported, (8) how reported, (9) beat, (10) detail, and (11) detailed report of how committed.

The case, having been opened and assigned a number, is directed to the records division where the information is recorded on the police bulletin. (This bulletin will be discussed later.) In the event there is additional information to be written by the officer assigned concerning the particular case, it is recorded as follows: A preliminary report is made by the beat officer or the first officer to the scene. This particular report covers the preliminary investigation and requires a carbon copy which is designated for the assigned detective or the division responsible for the particular type of activity. Information obtained by canvassing the neighborhood and the names of persons contacted will also be contained in this report. If an investigator is needed, his report will also be submitted and will be placed in the case envelope with the reports of any detective or followup officer assigned to the case. At this time the status of the case will be indicated—either pending or closed. The identities of any additional officers assigned to the case or any additional reports which come to the attention of the police department at a later date will be placed in the same case envelope after they have been submitted to the records division. Next, there is a consolidation of all reports, newspaper clippings or any additional information pertaining to the specific case which are all indexed and maintained in the records division. The information is briefly described and numbered in sequence on the front of the case card or case envelope just as all future reports are itemized.

The records division also prepares 3- by 5-inch cards indexing the names of all persons mentioned in police reports and recording the offense; the type of offense, using the uniform crime classification system; the location of the offense; and the date and time of the offense. Stops are set up concerning suspicious characters and unusual methods of transportation. In the event of a theft, a stop is made describing the material stolen. This is for future use in cross-checking the pawnshop file. Any lost and found items are cross-checked by the same index system.

The one exception to this system is when juveniles are mentioned in the case. Their names are listed in conformity with Kansas State law as confidential files, stamped as such and are used thereafter only after authorization has been received from the judge of juvenile court.

**Police Bulletin**

As mentioned above, the desk sergeant, after having received the case envelope or card completed by the officer assigned to the matter, briefly lists the information pertaining to the investigation on the police bulletin. The police bulletin is used to brief every officer on all police action since his last tour. It contains information concerning all important matters brought to the attention of the police department, plus general information, special orders, general orders, pickups, and any other pertinent information. The case number and the classification of the case are listed in the left margin of the bulletin. Next, the case heading and pertinent information are listed. In the right column of the bulletin are listed the names of officers and the division assigned to the case. The entire system is pointedly directed at keeping all officers from the youngest rookie to chief of police aware of all activity handled by the police department or coming to its attention.

Once a case is opened there must be a method developed to follow up and ultimately make a disposition on the case. An excellent method to insure these objectives and to designate investigative responsibility is to assign each matter to a specific officer or detective who has previously been designated to work certain types of cases. The uniform crime classification system is used as a basis for the different types of activities in which the particular officers or detectives will function. These particular divisions are such that an attempt
is made to assign a detective to a series of case classifications considering first of all the class one offenses and secondly the class two offenses; for example, one detective will be assigned to handle crimes of violence such as criminal homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, other assaults, sex offenses and offenses against the family. Next, a division is made to include burglary, suspicion, vagrancy, forgery and counterfeiting, embezzlement and fraud, and drunkenness, which are handled by another specific detective. Still another division would include auto theft, stolen property, larceny over and under $50, and weapons violations. Also, in smaller departments, pawnshop tickets and information are assigned to this particular detective for followup. Under still another detective are the narcotics and drug laws, liquor laws and beer ordinances, gambling, prostitution and other commercialized vice, disorderly conduct and all other offenses, including city license violations.

Close Followup Necessary

It is to be noted that in each of the assignments or subdivisions of the assignments, the detective appointed to handle the case or cases is responsible for the status of the case—whether it is pending or closed. This type of recording in followup information is also of great benefit to the other officers in the department as they, too, are advised of the identity of the detective who handles a particular type of case and he, of course, is responsible for maintaining current information regarding the particular cases assigned to him.

Even though certain detectives are assigned to certain types of offenses or cases, this does not absolve the other detectives or any other officer of the police department from attempting to gain additional information as it pertains to any type of police activities. It does guarantee there will be a person in the police department with whom each officer can work on the cases; for example, in the event there is a series of burglaries in any community and a number of cases are opened, a tremendous amount of merchandise being stolen and considerable evidence collected, there will be one officer or detective who can and is charged with the responsibility of coordinating all the activities pertaining to the cases. He is also responsible for following up on the case by every method available to the police department, such as contacting the various beat officers assigned to the particular area in which the burglaries were committed; the searching of files in the records division; the compiling of evidence and information on the cases; the development of spot maps; the more detailed briefing of those who report for assignment to various details; the writing of letters; and the requesting of and supplying of information to surrounding cities which might be faced with the same type of problem. He is also charged with the responsibility of contacting merchants, the credit bureau, and the various business associations in the city in order to obtain aid and information in clearing the particular kind of cases assigned to him.

When an individual is arrested, the officer or detective assigned to the case has the responsibility of seeing that complete information concerning all aspects of the matter under investigation is in the case file for the use of the prosecuting attorney and, last but not least, he aids and assists the prosecutor during the trial of the individual.

In considering this particular type of recording system, it is to be noted that the system is adaptable to any department whether large or small, regardless of the number of officers or the number of divisions a department may have. This system also guarantees a cross-checking of events, times, places and persons without working undue hardships on specific officers or increasing the number of persons needed to compile the material in the records division.

In effect, the entire procedure is a step-by-step process, encouraging each member of the police department to do first things first, while being current at all times.

NEW LAW PROTECTS FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS

The President has signed Public Law 86-354 captioned “An Act to Amend the Federal Credit Union Act.” This law effects a number of changes in the operation of Federal Credit Unions. Among its provisions, the law amends the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes Statute to include Federal Credit Unions.

Under the new law any act of robbery, embezzlement, burglary, etc., against a Federal Credit Union is within the purview of the Bank Robbery Statute and comes under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.
The problem presented by jewel thefts throughout the United States has as many facets as the gems that are stolen. Each police department, regardless of size or territorial jurisdiction, is faced with the problem to some degree. Necessarily, the investigative techniques will vary as the problem presented to the individual department necessitates.

The professional jewel thief operates on a nationwide scope. Naturally, he takes full advantage of seasonal opportunities in resort areas to pounce upon unwary or careless victims. In addition, he utilizes to the full those individuals in metropolitan areas who are not averse to making an illegal profit from stolen merchandise—that is, those individuals who make a living through “fencing” stolen property. Generally, in the realm of the jewel thief, the criminals involved are of long-standing experience in the world of crime. Nevertheless, the jewel thief is a far-ranging type of criminal—he uses the entire country for his operations and to make good his escape from justice.

In the past era the major concern with jewel thefts consisted in combating the safebreaker or “yeggman.” The safe operator was, in fact, a technician in crime. He had a tendency to employ techniques and exhibit habits which stamped a particular “job” as his specific handiwork. In this way the modus operandi of the safebreaker jewel thief frequently gave a clue to the perpetrator. The present-day jewel theft problem is more complicated. More highly skilled techniques have been devised. The jewel thief has become an accomplished artisan in the criminal world. In his activities he is adroit in fitting his operation to suit the circumstances of the occasion.

This article is limited to a discussion of the activities of jewel thieves. It should be readily realized, however, that an excellent way to curtail the success of these thieves is to thwart the activities of the jewel “fences.” These individuals constitute a most difficult investigative problem, inasmuch as many of them have a cover of some form of work in the jewelry field which enables them to rapidly remove all identifying data or marks from stolen jewelry and thereafter introduce it into legitimate channels. In all crime prevention plans to defeat the jewel thieves, law enforcement agencies must give consideration to known jewel “fences.”

For each law enforcement agency, the investigative techniques necessary to combat the problem of the jewel thief must be tailored to the scope of such operations within its particular jurisdiction. As a means of providing some informative data for law enforcement in this matter, this article will be devoted to setting out some of the efforts and experiences of the FBI in assisting local police agencies in solving the ever-increasing number of crimes involving jewel thefts.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s jurisdiction in these matters is based on the following portions of the U.S. Code, which state in part:

Title 18, Section 2314. Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

Title 18, Section 2315. Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more, or pledges or accepts as security for a loan any goods, wares, or merchandise, or securities, of the value of $500 or more, moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

Generally, in connection with jewel theft cases, two points can be assumed: (1) the thief or thieves will flee the scene of the crime with their loot; (2) action by the thief or thieves after the crime will occur rapidly, and developments in the case will be in swift sequence. It follows, therefore, that many of these cases will result in an interstate matter which might well come within the jurisdiction of the FBI. In order to have
the maximum opportunity for success in solving the theft, it is vitally necessary that all investigative attention be paid to the case, and all its angles, as soon after the commission of the crime as possible. For these reasons the FBI will frequently concern itself with the initial investigative steps in a jewel theft case so that if subsequent developments warrant, the FBI will be in an advantageous position to quickly and surely enter the case or furnish the greatest possible assistance to local law enforcement.

**Ready Recognition of Thieves**

Whenever known jewel thieves arrive in a locality, it is important that local law enforcement personnel are made aware of the identities and observe closely the activities of these individuals. The experiences of various law enforcement agencies and officers in dealing with known jewel thieves can be utilized extensively by other police agencies. The beneficial result of having the identity and activity of a known jewel thief widely disseminated can be seen in a recent FBI investigation.

Information was obtained that two thieves, known to specialize in thefts from jewelry salesmen, had suddenly departed from their home territory. An attempt was made to locate these thieves and establish their intended activities. It was subsequently learned that this effort failed because the thieves did not continue to travel, since one of them was hospitalized for one week. After his hospitalization, the one partner rejoined his accomplice and they proceeded to a certain railroad station where they seized a suitcase full of sample jewelry valued at $15,000 which a jewelry salesman had left on a porter's truck. Thereafter, the thieves traveled a considerable distance to a small town.

On the streets of this town, the two jewel thieves were recognized by an FBI Agent who was familiar with the photographs of experienced jewel thieves. Since the Agent was on foot, the thieves successfully escaped. However, an alert was sounded and the pair was arrested by local police officers for a traffic violation. A thorough search of the suspects' car did not uncover any jewelry; however, it is interesting to note that under a metal plate secured by screws in the trunk of the car, the officers found two guns.

Aware that a fundamental procedure of the jewel thief is to get the loot off of his person as quickly as possible, FBI Agents immediately contacted all railway express outlets in the vicinity where the thieves had been observed. As a result, an employee of a railway express agency recognized a photograph as one of two individuals who had presented a piece of luggage containing jewelry for shipment. This piece of luggage was then followed until the time it was delivered to a "fence," at which time arrests were made on the basis of a violation in connection with the receipt of over $5,000 worth of stolen jewelry which had been transported in interstate commerce.

The investigation was not yet completed. Additional work had to be done in order to get sufficient evidence on the thieves themselves in order to supplement the identification by the railway express employee. Subsequently, a warrant for both thieves was obtained and they were apprehended. The apprehension of one of them was made at a particularly advantageous time, in view of the fact that when he was arrested he was carrying $35,000 worth of stolen jewelry. This resulted in the solution of another major jewel theft.

In connection with the practice as described previously in this article of subjects' mailing loot or sending it by railway express, one instance was noted in which the thief mailed a package subsequently determined to be a dummy package. It is believed that this action was taken by the thief to determine whether or not a surveillance was in effect. On the basis of this information, it is suggested when such surveillances are being maintained to cover the possible transmission of stolen jewelry that they be continued for a period long enough to determine that the package mailed or sent by railway express is not a dummy.

It is highly desirable to have photographs and descriptive data of well-known jewel thieves readily available throughout the country. In this connection each field office of the FBI maintains an album containing the photographs and descriptions of individuals who are suspected of traveling throughout the country committing jewel thefts. When notorious jewel theft suspects come to the attention of local police, it would be advantageous to advise the local FBI office which can arrange to have photographs of the suspect distributed to other FBI offices. The primary purpose of these photographs is to have the necessary information available when the thieves travel by air or other rapid transportation.
Surveillances

One major problem in handling the professional jewel thief is conducting the necessary surveillances to cope with these criminals. Probably the best way to illustrate the problems encountered is to describe the actual events that occurred in connection with one FBI investigation.

Three known jewel thieves were known to be leaving a normal area of operations and there was a definite indication that they would be traveling to some prearranged spot for the purpose of committing a jewel robbery. They traveled by plane to their first destination—each sitting in a different part of the plane so that each one could observe the actions of other passengers for an indication of a surveillance.

The trio left the plane separately and proceeded to a large waiting room at the airport. There, for approximately 40 minutes, they sat in different sections of the station and again it was noted that they were evidently trying to determine if any one of the three was under surveillance. Thereafter they proceeded to a hotel, all in the same taxi. They made their entrance into the hotel individually and again in the lobby of the hotel they attempted to determine if a surveillance was in existence.

The three partners left the hotel and proceeded to a restaurant with approximately 20 to 25 feet between them, entered and sat in different sections of the restaurant and left by different doors. This procedure was continued whenever they left the hotel or dined out. As a further precautionary measure, they used the old criminal technique of going into a movie theater, moving around frequently and departing separately through different exits. They did not return to their hotel room but abandoned their luggage which was claimed at a later date.

Since the activities of these three men made it probable to assume that they would attempt a jewel theft, the local police authorities were notified. The fact that these thieves did not perpetrate a crime might have resulted from their fear that they were being surveilled or from some other factor such as the police attention paid to them.

In tracking down jewel thieves, FBI investigation and, necessarily, FBI surveillances frequently cross over state lines and sometimes extend the full width of the United States. In this connection, the “work car” frequently used by jewel thieves is a matter of grave concern to investigators conducting a surveillance. Regardless of the nature of its exterior appearance, the “work car” will be capable of speeds well in excess of 100 miles per hour. The use of such a “work car” on the part of the thieves makes it a necessary step in the surveillance that the vehicle be slowed down or that immediate steps be taken to keep law enforcement agencies along the projected route of travel properly advised. Utmost care must be maintained in keeping this contact until the destination of the thieves becomes obvious. Concerning the “work car,” it must be remembered that such vehicles frequently will carry guns and other weapons. It is noted that guns have been found hidden in such unlikely places in these cars as under ash trays and under plates screwed to the floor in the trunk. In addition, burglary tools have been secured in door panels which have been especially designed to hold this equipment.

A pair of known jewel thieves in a southern resort area were observed to move a “work car.” Immediately, intensive 24-hour coverage was given to this pair and, during the course of a surveillance of them, it was determined that they were following a jewelry salesman. Thereafter, the salesman parked his car containing his jewelry case and the parking place was kept under close observation. Subsequently, the two thieves were apprehended by the FBI in the process of stealing the jewelry case and they were turned over to the local police authorities, since there was no interstate transportation of the stolen property. The jewelry was sufficient in value to constitute grand larceny and the thieves were also charged with possession of burglary tools.

In localities and in haunts where jewel thieves congregate, it is known that these criminals make a practice of maintaining the license numbers of unmarked police cars and that they exchange these license numbers among themselves in order to facilitate detection of police surveillances. Another step in thwarting surveillances is the practice of veteran “fences” who set up outdoor meets with the thieves in areas where discreet observation and surveillance are practically impossible. In these cases, and in other instances that the surveillance-conscious thief can design, it is oftentimes necessary to use small aircraft, helicopters and every possible means of expedient communications.

At the initiation of any jewel theft report, it is important to determine and accumulate all avail-
able information concerning the crime as soon as possible. One of the initial steps should be to definitely establish the details of the report furnished by the victim. A recent case clearly demonstrates the importance of this technique. A wholesale jewelry salesman reported the loss of $15,000 worth of loose diamonds and rings. He stated that he had been accosted by three armed individuals. Allegedly, one of these bandits forced his way into the victim's car in the suburbs of a large city and made the salesman drive about 4 miles on a main road and then turn off into a relatively unused dirt road. According to the victim, he was then forced to walk along the road as the robbers escaped in a second car.

In the course of the crime scene search, it was ascertained that the road referred to by the victim was very dusty after a long dry spell. By actually walking down the road, the investigators proved that an individual so doing would certainly have road dust in his shoes, socks and on the lower portion of his trousers. Such was not the case with the victim. Due to the absence of such dust, the victim was questioned again. This particular condition of the road was specifically pointed out to him. At that time, the salesman admitted the hoax, explaining his attempt to set up an insurance fraud.

A very fruitful technique in jewel theft cases is a very thorough and detailed interview of each jewel thief apprehended. In practically every case, such an interview can develop additional intelligence and information in connection with jewel theft activities. Such items as new techniques in outfitting the thieves' "work car" are learned in this fashion. For instance, in one case, it was determined that the ash tray in the right armrest of the rear seat of a "work car" contained a cocked and loaded .25 caliber automatic pistol. Another fact of value is the use by these thieves of tire irons fitted with a rubber hose handle and sharpened at the point for use as "jimmies."

Jewel thieves are craftsmen in crime. They are continuously seeking advancements in their criminal occupations, improving on old techniques, and, by new ideas and the interchange of plans among themselves, are ever alert to perfecting their criminal skills. The best source of information concerning these tactics is the jewel thief himself and a most opportune occasion for obtaining this data is during the course of an interview with one of the thieves upon his apprehension.

As in all arrests, it is important to conduct a thorough search of the person when a jewel thief is taken into custody. For example, professional burglars frequently resort to the use of a piece of celluloid to open doors. Experts in this criminal field will carry this necessary strip of celluloid in the inside band of a hat and claim that the celluloid is part of the hat, thus attempting to avoid any charge of carrying burglary tools. A detailed and painstaking search of an arrested jewel thief can be very valuable in providing vital evidence in connection with the crime. In one case a ring found in the sock of a suspect led to the solution of a $400,000 jewel robbery and the recovery of all the jewelry.

**Negligence**

For investigators of jewel thievery, a very common complaint concerns the negligence and lack of security precautions taken by individuals owning or having responsibility for the handling of valuable jewelry. All too frequently, reports show that jewelry has been left unguarded for undue periods of time in open hotel rooms, unlocked car trunks or in storage compartments at railroad stations, air terminals and hotel lobbies.

In one case on record, a jewelry salesman left over $50,000 worth of jewelry in a sample case on the sidewalk in front of a jewelry store. The salesman drove 50 miles away before he missed the case. In another investigation, it was determined that a victimized owner had left over $55,000 worth of jewelry in a readily accessible place and had given no attention to security. In discussing the theft with investigating officers, the owner said the loss was a nuisance as he considered the jewelry as "junk."

Carelessness and negligence of this kind are primarily a problem for the protective agencies, insurance companies and individuals of similar organizations. However, it does hinder the work and efforts of investigating law enforcement officers, and it presents an obstacle to the successful investigation of jewel thefts.

The careless or negligent handling of jewelry by owners, custodians or salesmen plays a big part in the jewel theft problem. Individual police officers are in no position to make specific recommendations but, certainly, success in cutting down jewel thefts cannot be accomplished without the cooperation of persons owning and handling jewelry.

In one case, the victim of the theft left her
purse containing $25,850 in jewelry and $294 in cash on a bench in a dance hall. She left the area in which the purse was placed to take a dance lesson. She learned an expensive new step in that upon her return her bag containing the jewelry was missing.

In another instance, diamond rings worth $49,000 were left in a display case on the back seat of an automobile in a midwestern town. The owner left the case containing the diamonds unattended and the car unlocked while he went to obtain the proper change to operate the parking meter.

Another example, which was not believed until after a lie detector test confirmed the story, involved complete trust in a man's pants belt. The victim carried a package of diamonds valued at $67,000 inside his belt, relying on his belt to hold the package in place. He lost the diamonds when he stopped at a restroom on one of the major turnpikes.

A sample case containing $54,000 worth of jewelry was placed behind a hotel desk by a jewelry salesman who did not advise the hotel of the contents of the bag. After the victim went to his room, the desk clerk received a pretext phone call which caused him to leave the desk. Thereafter, two thieves entered and while one distracted the only bellhop on duty the other took the sample case.

**Training Aid Chart**

In conducting training courses for investigators handling jewel theft cases, it has been suggested that the investigator have a check sheet so that no important phase of the initial investigation would be overlooked. It is evident that any such general check sheet would vary considerably, dependent upon the scope and jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency preparing the form.

In connection with training programs for investigative personnel handling jewel theft investigations, it would serve as a valuable training aid to consider the formulation of a check sheet. One method would be to construct a practical problem and encourage suggestions as to step-by-step procedures from the officers in training. The pertinent suggestions could be formed into an outline which might be amended or supplemented in future classes.

As an example of one type of such a check sheet, the following basic outline is set forth, covering the initial phase of the investigation. It is realized that only the first phases can be itemized since, thereafter, investigation is predicated on leads resulting from the initial investigation.

**Thefts From Hotel Room**

A. Crime scene search, including examination for latent prints.
1. Consider search of neighboring rooms.
2. Identification and questioning of occupants of neighboring rooms should be considered.

B. A review of phone calls made by the victim. At this time it is important to know the reputation of victim.

C. Questioning of employees.
1. Bellhops, doormen, maids, elevator operators, garage attendants, etc.
2. Service personnel such as telephone men, laundrymen, etc., who, while not employed by the hotel, were present during the pertinent period, should not be overlooked.
3. Appropriate groups of photos should be utilized.

D. Informants should be immediately contacted.

E. Proceeds of the crime.
1. Circularization of data concerning items stolen.
2. Description of goods (sample cases, suitcases, etc.).
3. Alerting persons who might discover the discarded containers, such as street cleaners, highway department personnel, etc.
   (1) In alerting such persons make sure appropriate warning is issued so that latent fingerprints and other possible evidence will not be destroyed.
   (2) The weight or number of containers may be an indication as to the number of thieves, transportation or means of entry or exit.
4. Ascertain value and amount of insurance.

F. Victim.
1. Background.

(Continued on inside back cover)

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
In 1848, the Railroad Terminal called Marthasville, Ga., became the city of Atlanta. No organized police force existed at the time, and local law enforcement was handled by the county sheriff and town marshals. According to Chief Herbert T. Jenkins of the Atlanta Police Department, old records indicate that in 1861 there were 16 marshals, including deputies, policing the city of Atlanta.

Early photographs from this era indicate the town marshals wore civilian dress for the most part, and no detail concerning their badges was recorded.

The files of the Atlanta Police Department reflect this Department was formally organized under the City Charter in 1872. At this time the town marshal became a city policeman and was requested to wear a uniform. From 1881 to 1897, the Atlanta Police Department increased in size from 45 to 171 men as the city was developed and rebuilt after the Civil War.

The first known standard badge (fig. No. 1) was, according to the best information available, adopted between the period 1881 and 1897, according to Chief Jenkins.

During this period, the regular foot patrolman wore the helmet-type hat with an oval shield (fig. No. 2) on it and the regular badge on his uniform coat. Mounted or horse patrolmen wore the same uniform, but in addition wore a black Stetson hat bearing this oval shield. Bicycle officers wore a cap with the word "Police" in gold script.

The ranking officers, including the chief, during this early period wore caps with their rank shown in gold braid, according to the department's old photographs. This cap was similar to the one usually worn by bicycle officers.

Shortly after the formal organization of the Atlanta Police Department in 1872, a detective bureau was formed for the purpose of doing "certain secret work." This group was small at first, but at the end of the century had increased considerably. The early Atlanta detective wore a badge with a star in the center, identifying the officer as a city detective (fig. No. 3). The detective bureau changed from its original badge around 1910, adopting the badge shown in figure No. 4. Many detectives, however, continued to furnish their own badges, none of which were uni-
form in style. The ranking officers in the detective bureau were known to wear special badges containing jeweled settings early in the 1900's. The present detective badge, now standard, as shown in figure No. 5, was adopted around 1930 and has remained unchanged, according to records of the Atlanta Police Department.

In the early 1900 period, the style of the police uniform changed and the Atlanta Department adopted a larger and more modern type badge as shown in figure No. 6. This second badge was worn by the police until the late 1920's at which time the Department adopted its present badge as shown in figure No. 7. At the same time, the
Department adopted a modern badge to be worn on the cap which contained the great seal of the city of Atlanta as shown in figure No. 8.

**Figure No. 7.**

**Figure No. 8.**

**Plane Crash Victims Are Identified by FBI**

On the night of September 29, 1959, a commercial airplane crashed near Buffalo, Tex., while en route from Houston to Dallas. Thirty-four persons perished in the crash including 6 crew members and 2 young boys accompanying their mother on the flight.

Responding to an official request of the vice president in charge of operations of the airline, the Disaster Identification Squad of the FBI was dispatched to the scene of the crash for the purpose of identifying the victims with the aid of fingerprint cards taken from the files of the FBI's Identification Division.

Of the 32 adult victims, 25—or 78 percent—were positively identified through fingerprints by the FBI's Disaster Squad. Fingerprints were unobtainable from only 2 of the remaining adult victims.

The airplane struck the ground with such force that most of the bodies were badly mangled. Local authorities took the remains of the victims to a temporary morgue hurriedly set up in a school gymnasium.

Based on fingerprint comparisons, the FBI Identification Squad was able to point out to local authorities that, in the case of six different victims, parts of bodies (such as hands and arms, etc.) had been assembled with the wrong remains. In one instance, the upper half of a body was believed to have been placed with the wrong lower half found separately. The FBI Squad was able to prove that the fingerprints on the upper half of the body were those of the same person whose billfold was found in clothing on the lower half.

The Disaster Squad of the FBI stands ready at all times to respond to any emergency call to assist in the identification of victims of such disasters.

**CAMERA TRAPS THIEVES**

During recent months, merchants in a Georgia city suffered from the onslaughts of shoplifters. The detective bureau arrested several suspects and recovered a camera stolen from a local firm. Upon examination, the camera was found to be loaded, and when the film was developed, the identity of the suspects, as well as additional members of the gang, was established. It seems they had all posed together for the pictures.
WANTED BY THE FBI


Unlawful Flight To Avoid Prosecution (Burglary)

In the early morning hours of August 22, 1957, three individuals entered a restaurant in Baltimore, Md., through a third floor window and stole a safe from under the bar on the first floor. The burglars escaped through a window opening onto the alley adjoining the premises. The three individuals were pursued by officers of the Baltimore Police Department and abandoned the safe during the course of their flight. Two of the culprits were caught shortly after the incident. The third individual was later allegedly identified as Anthony Vytautas Adomavicius, whose record indicates that he has been in constant conflict with society since his teens.

Process

Adomavicius was charged as Vito Adamitas on September 19, 1957, with unlawful interstate flight to avoid prosecution for the crime of burglary, and a Federal warrant was issued that same day by a U.S. Commissioner at Baltimore, Md. He has since become the subject of a nationwide search by the FBI.

The Criminal

The perverted life this fugitive has led dates from his youth when he allegedly spent a good deal of time in reform schools. Since then he has been in and out of jail. He was sentenced to 6 years in prison in 1936 for the crime of larceny. In 1952 this criminal was sentenced to 5 years on a charge of burglary. His long arrest record consists mainly of offenses of larceny and burglary in addition to charges of breaking and entering, disorderly conduct and assault and perverted act.

He has been known to frequent low-class taverns, drinking wine and beer for the most part, but liquor when finances permit. Adomavicius has reportedly stated he felt that one of his problems was overindulgence in alcohol.

He is believed to spend a great deal of time in skid-row areas of large cities, acting like a “big shot.” He has refused to work on many occasions. However, during one of his incarcerations in the penitentiary, he worked in a sewing shop.

While incarcerated in an eastern penitentiary, he was admitted to a mental hospital for a short time. His case was diagnosed as a psychopathic personality with psychosis. He has been described as antisocial and a “loner.”

Caution

Adomavicius is reported to be mentally unstable. He should be considered extremely dangerous.

Description

Anthony Vytautas Adomavicius is described as follows:

Age--------------------------- 43, born November 4, 1916, Baltimore, Md.
Height------------------------- 5 feet 6½ inches to 5 feet 7½ inches.
Weight------------------------ 154 to 167 pounds.
Build-------------------------- Stocky.
Hair--------------------------- Dark brown.
Eyes-------------------------- Blue.
Complexion-------------------- Medium.
Race-------------------------- White.
Nationality------------------- American.
Occupations-------------------- Produce wholesaler, laborer, chauffeur, painter, salesman, dishwasher, cook, counterman.
Scars and marks--------------- Moles on face.
FBI number-------------------- 937,186.
Fingerprint classification----- 18 A R 8

Anthony Vytautas Adomavicius.
Notify FBI

Any person having information which may assist in locating this fugitive is requested to notify the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington 25, D.C., or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which is listed on the first page of local telephone directories.

“TALKING” SUITCASES

Jewelry thieves have generally operated by stealing salesmen’s sample cases from hotel lobbies, railroad stations, and baggage rooms either through subterfuge or by fast moving and sheer audacity. Now the Jewelers Security Alliance of New York City has announced a suitcase with a built-in tape recorder that announces to the world when it is being stolen. If the bag is picked up by someone not familiar with the deactivating device, the tape recorder punctuates the air with screams of “HELP! HELP! POLICE! THIS BAG IS BEING STOLEN!” It is anticipated that the thieves will forfeit the prize rather than stay around and debate ownership in such a bedlam.

JEWEL THEFTS

(Continued from page 20)

2. Reason for absence from scene of theft or detailed explanations of happenings. As previously mentioned, it is desirable to investigate all details of the above closely. However, such investigation must in many cases be conducted discreetly and tactfully.

3. The itinerary and stops of a victim should be ascertained in order to determine if thieves surveilled the victim prior to the crime.

4. Appropriate groups of photos should be utilized.

G. Dissemination of information. Advise other pertinent law enforcement departments of the modus operandi, description of loot, and all pertinent data that will enable them to be of assistance in the investigation.

Similar check sheets can be made up to cover other types of cases which occur in given jurisdictions. For example, in some localities thefts from hotel rooms will not be as prevalent as house burglaries, store burglaries or thefts from salesmen’s cars, each of which could be the subject of a separate training aid chart.

(Nationwide Criminal Activities Oct. 19, 1959)

Helpful Hints

FIREARMS

AMMUNITION KEPT BY POLICE OFFICERS OR KEPT IN STORAGE BY POLICE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE CHECKED REGULARLY INCASE MUCH AS OLD AMMUNITION IS UNCERTAIN AND UNSAFE.
Questionable Pattern

The questionable pattern shown here is made up of a combination of two different types of patterns with two deltas. The impression consists of a loop over an angular type tented arch. The deltas are found at $D^1$ and $D^2$. Thus, the pattern is classified as an accidental whorl with inner tracing. A reference search would be conducted as a loop with 11 ridge counts.