



FBI

January 1989

Law Enforcement Bulletin

Major Art Theft

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FBI

Law Enforcement Bulletin

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Washington, DC 20535

William S. Sessions, Director

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The FBI and the Challenges of the 21st Century

Editor's Note: *These remarks were presented by FBI Director William S. Sessions before the annual conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police held in Portland, OR, on October 17, 1988.*

I have had the opportunity to learn and experience so much since I became Director of the FBI in November of 1987. And I have grown to have a deep respect for the IACP and its police chiefs who have led this country's police agencies.

My eyes have certainly been opened to the responsibilities and tough decisions law enforcement executives like you face every day. Together, you and I will continue to face them in the future.

And this is my message: To confront the challenges of the 21st century, the FBI will continue to do what it can to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission of local law enforcement. I would like to touch on the challenges we face in law enforcement and then focus on the tools I believe we can use together to build a safer America.

It was on October 17, 1931, that gangster Al Capone was convicted and sent to prison. It's astonishing how much our world has changed since then and how the challenges of crime have changed.

Today's exploding international drug problem and frequent airline hijackings around the globe are just two examples of the inter-

nationalization of crime. Incredible advances in communication and transportation allow modern criminals to crisscross the globe every day.

Today, law enforcement is also challenged by the criminal use of technology. Unfortunately, our computers and communication networks continue to be vulnerable to abuse. For example, in a recent case, we seized 16 computers and software from the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang.

So today we are facing some tough challenges. And tomorrow won't be any easier. But I believe we can rise to meet these challenges with our own technology and the enhanced law enforcement communication and cooperation to make that technology work. This



The FBI recently seized approximately \$3 million in cash, computers, weapons, and other items from the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang.

strategy has already produced results. In August 1988, 30 nations pulled together in an international drug enforcement conference effort. It resulted in 1,200 arrests, the seizure of 11 tons of cocaine, and the torching of 244 tons of marijuana. The conference and its incoming president, Jack Lawn of the Drug Enforcement Administration, can take justifiable pride in that accomplishment.

What will be the FBI's role in the 21st century? I predict you will still see our FBI Agents in your squad rooms as we work on joint operational task forces. And I want to talk about our continuing cooperative role with your departments.

The FBI is pursuing many technical and procedural initia-

tives, but I want to focus on five: NCIC-2000, our automated identification system, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Uniform Crime Reporting, and the forensic analysis of DNA.

NCIC-2000

The NCIC-2000 study is the National Crime Information Center's plan to meet the changing needs of law enforcement. As you know, the current system has been serving law enforcement since 1967. Over 19 million records are located in our 12 automated files of criminal justice information. In its first year of operation, NCIC processed about 6 million requests. Last year, NCIC processed over 207 million transactions at a cost of less than a nickel

each. But the status quo won't do; improvements are necessary. Indeed, the NCIC-2000 study lists well over 60 planned upgrades, including two of the most exciting—artificial intelligence and image technology.

Artificial intelligence, or AI, will help detect related criminal activity in its early stages, help prevent erroneous information from entering the system, and detect misuse. AI will help us protect civil liberties and avoid making false arrests by helping to ensure our records are accurate and complete.

In addition to AI, image technology will improve our operations. The NCIC computer will instantly send a mug shot and a fingerprint image in response to an

officer's wanted persons file inquiry. Imagine how much an instant mug shot will benefit officers when they confront a potential fugitive on a dark, deserted highway. Ultimately, officers will be able to insert a suspect's finger into a small reader located next to the squad car radio, send the image to our computer in Washington, and receive identification information within minutes. It's not *Star Trek* fantasy. It's here. I've seen it work.

Identification

Before long, we hope to apply this technology in our identification division. I share your vision of the FBI eventually receiving, processing, and responding to electronic fingerprint images from State identification bureaus, thus eliminating the mailing of inked cards.

Some have criticized our progress in this direction as being too slow. But with the help of the Congress, we will be able to make the most efficient and timely use of our 20 million card data base.

We have a job to do. In 1924, Congress tasked us to maintain this national repository. The FBI accepted the responsibility then, and we continue to accept that responsibility today. Our duty is clear: We must serve our 62,000 users in the best way possible.

So we are improving our system. The automated identification system—AIS—is scheduled for completion early next year. The automated card beltway will cut card and document processing time from the current 3 weeks to under 24 hours.

Our automated latent system—ALS—will search latent fingerprints from violent crime scenes against our data base. It will be similar to California's "CAL-ID," but on a national scale, tied to the FBI's 20 million card data base.

Storing fingerprint images electronically in our automated image retrieval system—AIRS—will allow us to instantly compare an incoming inked print to one already on file. Also, the AIRS system will be the basis for the

future online, remote, fingerprint identifications that I mentioned earlier. Our AIRS inhouse pilot program will begin in 1989.

Last August, ident folks from around the country met at FBI Headquarters in Washington to give us recommendations for our future development. We're waiting on the final report now. I want you to know that the FBI is listening to your voices.

National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime

A third group of services we provide comes from the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime—NCAVC. This national resource center is available to the Nation's entire law enforcement community. It began in 1985 with the goal of reducing violent crime—homicide, rape, child molestation and abduction, and arson.

One part of the center's operation is the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program—VICAP—the national clearinghouse for unsolved murders, which will be

The FBI recently seized cash and a shipment of cocaine from a significant west coast Colombian drug trafficking organization.





During the past 2 years, numerous "VICAP Alerts" have appeared in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

expanded to include serial rape cases. VICAP's success can be witnessed right here in the Northwest—look at the "campground killing" case, the series of eight murders in Washington, Oregon, and Montana, all linked by the VICAP computer. A suspect is now in custody.

However, the VICAP computer—like any computer—is only as effective as the information put into it. Over 20,000 murders occur every year. I'm sorry to report that only about 1,100 were reported to VICAP. I encourage each chief to tell your officers that no homicide investigation is complete until the VICAP form is filled out. It could be the most important piece of paper they handle in the entire case.

Another investigative tool the NCAVC provides is criminal investigative analysis, or profiling. As you know, profiling provides psychological and physical descriptive data about an unknown criminal by analyzing the circumstances of the crime. Criminal pro-

filing coordinators are located in each of the FBI's 58 field offices. I encourage you to call them if you need assistance.

Uniform Crime Reporting

A fourth program, one which I know is of interest to you, is UCR, Uniform Crime Reporting. The IACP started UCR in 1930. Today, about 16,000 law enforcement agencies participate in the system.

As you know, UCR is undergoing tremendous change. The old summary statistics which were collected for 58 years are being replaced. With the new incident reporting system, agencies will submit data on *all* significant crimes occurring during an incident, not just the most serious crime. Also, additional facts about the crimes will be submitted, such as time of day, the relationship of the victim to the offender, and the weapons used.

So the new reports will give us much more than numbers. We will be able to analyze crime

trends, put our finger on exactly when and where different crimes are occurring, and develop strategies to combat them.

Where will all this information come from? Who will pay for it? The information will come from your existing police files; you won't have to collect more data, just dig out what you already have and send it in. Although the Department of Justice has seeded substantial funds over the past years for the conversion, you are encouraged to implement the new program when you can, when your budgets allow. Do it when you're renovating your existing records systems.

Also, I should mention the establishment of the new UCR data providers advisory policy board. Its 20 members, 9 of whom were nominated by the IACP, will provide the FBI with advice on UCR policy matters. Truly, we will still be in this together.

DNA Analysis

Now let me give you the sta-

"We must use our skills and the tools available ... to out-run, out-gun, and out-think the criminals."

tus on what I think is probably the most exciting, far-reaching technology we are working with today: The forensic analysis of human genetic material, DNA.

I am sure many of you believe this to be the most significant advance for forensics in this century. Scientists can identify a person by analyzing the unique patterns found in the genetic material gathered from a few drops of blood, body fluid, or a few hairs.

In our lab, we're working with scientists across the country, as well as Great Britain and Canada, on standards of DNA collection, entry, storage, and access. It is critical that all lab efforts be uniform and compatible. In


November 1988, our lab in Washington began accepting evidence for DNA analysis in selected cases.

In the courtroom, DNA evidence has been successfully introduced in over a dozen cases so far. Some of you may be familiar with the Spencer case in Virginia. Last July, Timothy Spencer was convicted of raping and strangling a woman to death in her townhouse. There were no witnesses. His conviction in Arlington was based primarily on genetic evidence collected on the scene.

Right now, the admissibility of DNA evidence is being determined on a case-by-case basis by the presiding judges. There has

been no ruling at the appellate level yet.

In training, our goal is to take the lead to share the knowledge with police labs across the Nation. We've already begun this through our visiting scientist program. Scientists from Kentucky, South Carolina, Arizona, and Florida are near completion of this 4-month course. Twelve other States will be enrolled by early spring. And we'll continue the training in our 1-month technical DNA training course at Quantico for State and local lab personnel. In January, 30 technicians will attend, and the second course will begin in July.



FBI Academy
Quantico, VA

Training

Earlier, I mentioned two things which will allow us to meet the law enforcement challenges of the next century. Technology was the first. The second is cooperation. Cooperation means training together and working together. That's how we will forge all these technical links together into one strong chain.

Of course, the heart of the FBI's training program is the FBI Academy on the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, VA. Nearly 22,000 law enforcement officers have graduated from the National Academy Program. I'm sure many of you in the audience this morning can attest to the NA program's contribution to your career.

But we have many other programs to train law enforcement; you know about the National Executive Institute—NEI. Since its creation in 1976, more than 300 police chiefs from large cities have participated in this program. And there's LEEDS—the Law Enforcement Executive Development Seminar. Since 1981, 480 chiefs from mid-sized agencies have graduated from this 2-week program.

While enrolled in these programs, many of you in this room have discussed—and I'm told argued about—the long-term political, social, and economic trends affecting the law enforcement community, such as the privatization of police forces.

Today, a lot is happening at Quantico. You may have heard about the new dormitory and the Hogan's Alley complex being

built. They provide us with more room for students and more realistic training facilities. You may be interested to know that in May 1988, a pistol and ammunition workshop was held on our range. About 30 firearms experts from Federal, State, and local law enforcement met. They hammered out specifications for standard-issue 9mm semi-automatic pistols to possibly replace our .357's.

But not all the training goes on at Quantico. The FBI's field police training program trained over 200,000 police officers throughout the United States last year in over 5,000 police schools.

"Law enforcement must prepare itself now for the challenges of tomorrow."

The regional seminars and workshops put on by the FBI National Academy Associates (NAA) are ways training is continued and cooperation is fostered. Really an extension of the National Academy Program, the NAA chapters reinforce communication and cooperation both here and abroad. The European chapter first met in 1983. In September 1988, I attended their latest conference, held in Oslo, Norway, which was very productive. In

addition to a European chapter, an Asian/Pacific chapter was organized in 1986 and a Latin American/Caribbean chapter in 1987.

Meeting, exchanging ideas, forming friendships, and solving problems: That's what cooperation and training are all about.

Conclusion

Today I want to conclude on a note of cautious hope. I believe in America, in our laws, and in our system of government.

But the 21st century is around the corner: Law enforcement must prepare itself *now* for the challenges of tomorrow. We must use our skills and the tools available to us right now to out-run, out-gun, and out-think the criminals.

Let us take the vision presented to us in all the speeches, meetings, and workshops during this conference and forge that vision into reality.

Allow me to close with the words of that beloved American writer and humorist Mark Twain, who wrote, "Thunder is good, thunder is impressive; but it is lightning that does the work."

Those words still ring true today, a half century after they were written. Let us each go back to our towns and cities across this great land and generate some lightning of our own. **FBI**

Computers in a Small Police Agency

"The computer is like no other piece of equipment in a police department's arsenal."

—An armed robbery occurs; a suspect is developed. His first name is believed to be "Sam," "Sammy," "Samuel," or "Sammy Boy." Police officers try to recall an accused person who has a similar first name and who matches the suspect's description. As the officers search their minds, another officer searches a computer file for any person arrested whose name starts with "SA" and who has personal statistics similar to the suspect. The computer produces a list of seven names, but only one stands out. This individual is the same age as the suspect, of the same race, was previously arrested for a similar crime, and has been released recently from prison on parole. Officers obtain his picture, which is identified by the victim.

—Once a month, a police department sends out "reminder" notices to those people who have not paid their fines. These notices,

similar to the bank reminder card, increase one department's collections by 20 percent.

These factual accounts come from small police departments that are now using computers. While not front-page news stories or particularly spectacular, these are examples of how many small agencies are improving skills and services by using a computer.

For years, many believed computers were advantageous for large police departments only. They were what made these police departments "high tech," with their computer technicians, computer systems managers, and other specialized personnel.¹

Today, things have changed; the computer revolution is not limited to large agencies. Microcomputers have made it possible for small police departments to become computerized with a minimal investment. Software is available which does not require

By

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Chief Birchler

computer programmers. It is within these smaller agencies where this computer revolution has a dramatic impact on officers and citizens.

Administrators of those agencies who have not yet adopted computer technology probably realize they will need to do so in the near future. They probably have hundreds of questions, concerns, and fears about computers and the process of computerization. Their major concerns can be broken down into three areas—hardware, software, and the process of computerization.

Hardware

Hardware is the computer, the machine, the equipment; it is the screen, printer, and the hard disk. The hardware is the “stuff,” as one police officer commented, “...that you can put your hands on, turn on and off, and look at.” This description of hardware, although in rough form, is basically correct.

The major question asked when a department is about to step into the world of computer technology is what brand should be purchased. The answer depends on the local vendor, since the vendor is as important as the computer itself. However, there are several other questions that should be asked. How long is the warranty? Is the vendor an authorized service dealer for the brand he is selling? What type of warranty will the dealer provide, in addition to the manufacturer's warranty?

One big mistake is to buy a computer by mail order. A local

vendor can provide technical assistance and act as a troubleshooter when problems arise. Mail order firms cannot. The few hundred dollars saved by a mail order purchase can be spent very quickly when the computer needs servicing and a computer technician must be called—at a going rate of \$50 to \$100 per hour.

What size computer does my department need? First, to answer this question, decide what data will be entered into the computer. Will it be used for offense reports, arrest reports, warrants, and jail logs? The Marianna, AR, Police Department uses its microcomputer for all reports, warrants, etc. This 12-man department will use 7 to 9 megabytes of information per year. How many years of information do you want entered into the computer you purchase? The Marianna Police Department is using a 40 megabyte system, which will hold 4 to 5 years of information.

Many administrators believe that the higher the price, the better the computer, which is simply not true. A 40 megabyte computer should not cost more than \$3,000. If the salesman submits a bid of \$5,000 or higher, get another bid.

Software

Software is the computer program, which can have several different names, depending on the programming company. A good program is more important than the computer or the hardware itself, since the program will only do what it is programmed to do and nothing more or less.

The software purchase requires more indepth research and study. Most companies will provide a sample disk or a demonstration. When this is done, look at the forms on the program. Are they similar to what you are using now or are they completely different? Many programs have complicated offense reports that are difficult to understand. Others are designed for large police departments and would be useless in a 10-, 20-, or 30-man agency.

Also consider search capabilities. Are there different ways to search for stolen property, names on warrants, and complainants? Can the software company provide a list of other police departments who use the program you are considering? You may want to contact

the forms will be similar to forms already used by the department. However, only experienced computer personnel should attempt to design a program; if an inexperienced officer tries to do so, he or she is undertaking a project that will surely cause a major headache.

The Process of Computerization

The computer is like no other piece of equipment in a police department's arsenal. Unlike the shotgun, radio, or squad car, the purchase of a computer requires a great deal of planning and research.

Many administrators believe that once they arrange for the purchase of a computer system, that system will be operational within

ators are instructed on the use of the computer. This is also the time when the "kinks" are worked out of the system. The end of the second year is the final stage when the system will be fully operational. This liberal time span allows for testing, trial, and training without causing a great deal of anxiety to officers and operators.

Many departments can reduce their computerization problems prior to purchasing a computer system. Having qualified typists can be very helpful. Once it is certain that computerization is in the future of a department, the administrator can start sending selected personnel to classes so that they can learn the program to be used. A gradual move, a slow change with liberal deadlines, can help the process of computerization and diminish the fear factor experienced by many officers, operators, and administrators.

Conclusion

Computerizing a police department can be a very exciting time. It can also be a very trying time, a time of problems, of uncertainty. When buying equipment, buy local and buy service. When buying software, talk with someone in law enforcement who has used the program. And, don't forget the 18-month theory. Remembering these points should ease the transition into computerization.

FBI

"... stages of computerization ... [allow] for testing, trial, and training without causing a great deal of anxiety to officers and operators."

the computer operator who runs the program in a few of these departments. Sometimes, it is very helpful to communicate with another "law enforcement professional" if you have any trouble and not the programmer or vendor.

The price of police software packages will vary from \$1,500 to \$10,000, although those costing over \$3,500 are overpriced. Some police programs also include a court clerk program and these are usually somewhat more expensive.

Many police departments are using shelf software. These packages usually cost around \$250. There are also programs on the market that allow the user to design his or her own files so that

30 days. This is simply a false expectation. Only after the computer hardware is installed and the software selected will the process of computerization begin. This period will take a minimum of 90 days and can extend into a year. One theory promotes the "18-month effect," the time it generally takes a user to grow from the learning stage to the more advanced stages of using a microcomputer.²

One police department that I have worked with has identified stages of computerization. The first stage is the purchase of the computer hardware and software. The second stage is the 1-year period in which officers and oper-

Footnotes

¹James Vandivers, "Coping with the Computer Revolution," *Police Chief*, April 1986, p. 42.

²Armand Hernandez, "Microcomputers in Police Administration," *Police Chief*, June 1987, p. 46.

The Serial Rapist

His Characteristics and Victims

(Part I)

BY

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


In early 1981, a husband and his wife celebrated their 15th wedding anniversary by going out to dinner. They hired a 13-year-old neighbor girl to babysit their two small children and left for the evening. Two hours later, a 29-year-old white male entered the residence and subdued the babysitter and her young wards. Using threats, he forced the young girl to fondle him and perform fellatio. Learning that the parents were due to return shortly, he decided to wait for their arrival. Upon their return, he displayed a gun and forced the wife to handcuff her husband's wrists, after which the perpetrator bound the woman's wrists behind her back. In the presence of the husband, he raped and brutalized the woman so severely she required hospitalization. This man raped more than 50 women before he was arrested.

In 1978, the FBI Behavioral Sciences Services formally began assisting law enforcement agencies across the country in their investigations of violent crimes. Through a detailed analysis of crime scene data and information obtained from the victim, characteristics and traits of the offender were developed and submitted to the investigating agency. The profiles, containing opinions on a variety of offender characteristics and behaviors (e.g., age, race, marital status, occupational level, military history, arrest history,

socioeconomic background, type and proximity of residence to victim, approximate age, and style of automobile, as well as certain personality characteristics), often proved instrumental in the identification of the offender. In a significant proportion of the cases, the criminal profiles focused investigatory activities, streamlined the costs inherent to them, and hastened the arrest of the offender prior to further violent activity.

The dynamics of crime analysis, as developed by the Behavioral Sciences Unit, reflect the experience of the Special Agents assigned to the unit and synthesizes years of investigatory experience with extensive behavioral science training and education. Complementing and contributing to this expertise is recent collaborative research undertaken by the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) located within the Behavioral Sciences Services.¹ This research which has focused on particularly virulent repeat offenders, i.e., the serial murderer,² serial rapist,³ sexual sadist, child abductor, arsonist, and bombers, has as its basis extensive direct contact with the offenders themselves. Through interviews lasting up to 12½ hours, efforts are made to "step into" the mind of the offender, and from this vantage point, fathom the motivations and behavior that characterize the development and execution of their criminal behavior.



The study of serial rape, funded by a grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, represented a collaborative effort of the NCAVC and Dr. Ann Wolbert Burgess of the University of Pennsylvania's School of Nursing. As reported elsewhere,⁴ the study included interviews with 41 incarcerated serial rapists who had raped at least 10 times and who, as a group, were responsible for 837 sexual assaults and more than 400 attempted rapes. The inclusion criterion of 10 rapes was established as it signified continuing success at eluding law enforcement, an aptitude that warranted further investigation. The study of multiple rapes by a single individual also allowed for an assessment of change over time on a number of important variables, i.e., whether there were changes in the amount of force used, the sexual activities enacted, the modus operandi used, etc.

Members of the NCAVC and other selected FBI Special Agents conducted each of the 41 interviews. Prior to conducting the

interviews, all available documentation, including police investigatory reports, victim statements, pre-sentence reports, medical and mental health records, and pertinent prison records, was reviewed. The interviews were open-ended and unstructured and ranged from 4½ to 12½ hours. They included discussion of family and demographic information, education,

SERIAL RAPIST DEMOGRAPHICS

Age

The sample consisted of 35 white males, 5 black males, and 1 Hispanic. At the time of the interview, the subjects' ages ranged from 23 to 55 years, with a mean age of 35.2 years. The mean age of the subjects at the time of their

“... the marital status of an individual, or the presence of consensual sexual relationships, is not directly related to whether a person commits rape.”

employment, military history, hobbies and pastimes, marital history, sexual development, pre-offense, offense and post-offense behavior, investigation and interrogation techniques, and rape prevention and confrontation. Following the interviews, a 70-page protocol was completed by the interviewers.

Who is the serial rapist? At what age does he begin to assault and how does he select his victims? What other types of deviant sexual activities does he practice? Drawing from these interviews, this article outlines for the reader information about the serial rapist and his victim. In assessing these data, it is important for the reader to remember that the data refer to a special category of serial rapist and may not be generalized to a more undifferentiated group of rapists.

first, middle, and last rape was 21.8 years, 25.8 years, and 29 years, respectively.

The youngest rapist interviewed also assaulted for the shortest period of time prior to his first arrest. That rapist, who will be referred to as “Jess,” was 20 years old when he was apprehended for a series of 12 rapes over a 3-month period.

Case 1:

Jess advised that he had never consciously thought about rape until 1 month before he began his crimes. On that occasion, he and a male friend were discussing the friend's disappointment with a date the previous evening which had not culminated in sexual relations. The friend stated that he was so angry, he considered raping the woman. Jess asked why he didn't, and the friend stated that he wasn't willing to go to jail for sex. Jess reported that

he thought about rape that evening and decided to commit one about a month later.

Although he was relatively young at the time, his method of obtaining victims was thoughtful in nature. He would go to singles bars and wait until a woman over 40 years of age entered the bar unaccompanied. His rationale for selecting a victim of that age was that women over 40 had been raised during a time when it was believed that women who went to bars alone were looking for sexual liaison. Jess was young and attractive, and therefore, the women were flattered when he approached them. After spending time with the woman, he would suggest that they go to his place. If she agreed, he would ask himself, “I wonder what her face will look like when I tell her I'm going to rape her?” After leaving the bar, he would drive to an isolated area, stop the car, and tell her to take her clothes off, saying, “I'm going to rape you.” The victim would be incredulous, and he would strike her face, force her to remove her clothing, rape her, and leave her stranded.

Jess had no previous history of criminal activity prior to his arrest for rape. He was raised in an advantaged socioeconomic environment, and from all accounts, his family was close-knit, and the parents were involved in their children's lives. He was an outstanding athlete in high school and had been voted most popular student and senior class president.

Employment

Twenty (54%) of 37 who responded described their employment history as "generally stable," 14 (38%) individuals stated that it was "unstable," and 3 (8%) characterized themselves as "chronically unemployed." The respondents reported that at the time of their most recent arrest, they had been employed at their last job for a mean of 2.4 years. They had held from 1 to 35 jobs, with a mean of 5.4 jobs since 1970 (i.e., approximately 15 years). Their reported annual income ranged from \$5,000 to \$52,000, with a mean of \$16,446 a year.

The types of employment held by the rapists included unskilled jobs (i.e., laborers), skilled positions (i.e., cardiovascular technicians), and white-collar occupations (i.e., business managers). Of particular interest is the fact that the majority of serial rapists were generally stable in their employment; only a small minority were chronically unemployed. With few exceptions, the serial rapists were employed at the time they were committing their assaults.

Marital History

Twenty-nine (71%) of 41 respondents had been married at least once, with 14 of these individuals (34%) having been married more than one time. These findings confirm earlier studies⁶ which suggest that the marital status of an individual, or the presence of consensual sexual relationships, is not directly related to whether a person commits rape. All but one of the rapists inter-

viewed had participated in consensual sexual activities.

One of the serial rapists, "Mike," commented on the irony of raping when a consensual partner is readily available.

Case 2:

Upon being released from prison after serving a sentence for rape, Mike obtained a job managing a business and moved back in with his wife of 7 years. Prior to leaving work late one evening, he called his wife, suggested an intimate dinner, and hinted at sexual activities to which she responded positively. While driving home, he observed a woman driving alone. Pulling in behind her, he flashed his lights, and the victim, believing him to be a police officer, pulled over. He walked to her car, asked for her driver's license and registration, and then requested that she accompany him back to his car. She did so, and he subdued and raped her.

After relating the details of

ranks. It is worth noting that the mean age of the men at the time of interview was 35.2, and therefore, eligible for the draft which ended in 1972. Future studies may include fewer veterans.

Of 20 veterans, 10 received honorable discharges and 10 received other than honorable discharges. Information was not available on one veteran.

Information on military performance was available for 18 veterans; 9 of them reported that they had encountered "occasional difficulties" in the military. Eight veterans indicated that they had been charged with a criminal offense while in the service.

The large number of other-than-honorable discharges and the high incidence of noncriminal and criminal problems experienced by the interviewees is in keeping with a general pattern of antisocial behavior observed in the serial rapists' background.

Intelligence

In 33 instances, formal intelligence test scores were available

"Formally measured intelligence may not always be the best indicator of one's ability to be a successful criminal."

the crime, Mike shook his head and said, "I mean, my God, there I was on my way home to have sex with my wife, and I ended up back here."

Military History

Twenty-one (51%) of the 41 rapists served in the Armed Forces. Of these, 18 were in the ground forces, and all were in the enlisted

for review. The serial rapists demonstrated an unusually high level of general intelligence. Only 4 (12%) scored below average, while 12 (36%) scored within the average range of intelligence. Seventeen (52%) scored above average (i.e., 9 (27%) scored "bright normal" and 8 (24%) "superior" or "very superior"). It is worth

noting that 88% of those tested scored average or better.

The educational level of the men ranged from 5 to 17 years, with a mean of 11.3 years of formal education. Twenty-five (61%) of the 41 respondents had obtained a GED or high school diploma and 9 (22%) held either an associate or bachelors degree.

"Ted" was one of the most intelligent rapists interviewed during the research. He had a measured Full Scale IQ of 139. Interestingly, he was the only individual who had never experienced a consensual sexual relationship.

Case 3:

Ted was steadily employed, salaried well over \$30,000, and considered himself to be socioeconomically advantaged. The manner in which he committed his crimes evidenced a great amount of forethought. In preparing for a series of rapes, he would drive a great distance from where he resided or worked and select a residential area into which he would easily blend. Through peeping activities, he would select a minimum of six females who lived alone and would begin observing their homes in order to ascertain their patterns of behavior. He explained that he always maintained a minimum of six potential victims, and after raping one, he would select another to replace her. He did this in the event he was, for one reason or another, unsuccessful in his first attempt. On some occasions, after successfully attempting a rape, he would subdue an alternate vic-

tim and rape her while the police were responding to the first victim's complaint.

Ted was a very ritualistic rapist. Prior to entering the victim's residence, he would dress in his "going in clothes," which consisted of work gloves, loose-fitting dark coveralls, oversized sneakers, and a ski mask. Using a glass cutter and a suction cup, he would noiselessly make entry through a patio door or window. After ensuring that the victim was asleep and alone, he would disconnect the telephone and light-emitting devices in her bedroom. He would then leave the residence, but prior to doing so, he would raise a window or leave the door ajar. Returning to his vehicle, he would change into his "rape clothes," which consisted of over-sized coveralls, tight-fitting surgical-like gloves, a differently sized pair of sneakers, and a ski mask. Upon approaching the home, he would check to see if the window or door had been closed. If it had, he would realize that the victim had awakened, and he would leave and go to another victim's home. If the

window or door had not been closed, he would go to the victim's bedside and count to 10 in increments of 1/2 (i.e., 1/2, 1, 1 1/2, 2, etc.). He would then leap upon the victim, rape her, and depart within 2 minutes.

When questioned as to the meaning of this ritual behavior, Ted explained that he "was putting off the rape" because "that was the least enjoyable part of the whole thing." When asked why he didn't leave if that was the case, he stated, "Pardon the pun, but after all I had gone through to get there, it would have been a crime not to rape her."

In assessing the intelligence of these offenders, it is important for researchers to remain aware of problems inherent in relying too heavily upon documented intelligence test scores. The first rapist interviewed had a documented test score of 108. During the interview, it became obvious that the score did not accurately reflect the intelligence of the rapist. Commenting on this, the rapist advised that when first imprisoned, he was advised by older inmates to score intentionally low on such tests so that the authorities would not expect too much of him. At the

OF THE 41 SERIAL RAPISTS INTERVIEWED ...

- 54% had generally stable employment
- 71% had been married at least once
- 51% had served in the Armed Forces
- 52% scored above average on intelligence tests
- 54% were raised in average or above-average socioeconomic environments
- 76% had been sexually abused as children
- 36% collected pornography

interviewers' request, he agreed to be retested and scored 128, a full 20 points higher.

Formally measured intelligence may not always be the best indicator of one's ability to be a successful criminal. While the vast majority of the individuals included in this study were average or above average in intelligence, some scored below average, and yet, were very successful in eluding law enforcement. "Street smarts," while not something that can be measured through standardized testing, is well-recognized by criminals and police. Perhaps it is best defined as the ability to survive by applying what has been learned through one's own experiences or the experiences of others.

Representative of this concept is the case of "Jack," an impulsive, serial rapist who harbored a sincere and earnest hatred of women. Jack's measured intelligence was only 79 (Full Scale); yet, he was a successful criminal because of his ability to anticipate and manipulate others.

Case 4:

One sunny afternoon, Jack was walking across a food store parking lot and observed a woman placing groceries in her car. He approached the woman, shoved her into the front seat of her car, raped her, and walked away. Following that crime, he left that city and traveled to his hometown. Aware that the FBI had a warrant for his arrest (under the Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution statute) and would surely be looking for him in his hometown, he entered a drug rehabilitation program. He did so knowing that these programs

are immune from having to divulge the identities of the participants to law enforcement or any member of the criminal justice system. Even though he had no drug problem, he knew enough about drug addiction to be able to evidence the necessary symptoms.

After 1 month in the program, he decided that he

present, he took a paper towel from the dispenser, printed "Out of Order" on it, and affixed it to the front of the restroom door. He then reentered the room and proceeded to assault the victim. Another female, ignoring the sign, entered the restroom, at which time the victim screamed. The second woman ran out of the

"The number of actual sexual assaults committed by the rapists ranged from 10 to 78."

"wanted a woman" and inquired as to when he would be allowed to leave the center unescorted. Upon learning he could not do so for at least 6 months, he stated, "I wasn't gonna wait no damn 6 months for a woman." He thought about it and decided to use a medical ploy to get away from the confines of the center. He feigned abdominal pains, knowing they were not easily diagnosed, and was taken to a hospital by a counselor. After being examined by a physician, he advised the counselor that he would have to take a series of tests, each test being on a different floor of the hospital. The counselor advised Jack that he would wait for him on the ground floor of the hospital.

Now on his own, Jack set out for the one location where he was guaranteed to find women—the restroom area. Observing a woman enter the lavatory, he followed her in, and seeing no one else was

room and yelled that a woman was being assaulted, and a crowd gathered outside the door. Jack grabbed the victim by her hair, opened the door, and yelled at her, "If I ever catch you screwing around again, I'm not only gonna kill him, I'm gonna kill you too." Believing that Jack and the victim were involved in a domestic argument, the crowd parted and Jack moved through them with the victim in tow. Fortunately for the woman, her doctor recognized her, and Jack ran down the stairwell and to his counselor. They returned to the treatment center, and Jack later fled to Canada.

Arrest History

The rapists reported diversified criminal histories, including a variety of property offenses, nuisance sexual offenses, and other sexual assaults. Only 1 rapist had no prior arrests when he was apprehended for his 3-month spree during which he had raped 12

women. (See Case 1). The majority of the rapists (24 or 58%) had been institutionalized either in a correctional center (46%) or in a mental facility (12%) at least once prior to their arrests for their most current offenses.

When asked about previous sexual assaults, the respondents reported they had been convicted of a mean of 7.6 sexual assaults, although they were, in fact, responsible for a mean of 27.8 assaults. Prior sexual offenses committed by 38 of the respondents included rape only (37%), sex nuisance offenses only (8%), a combination of rape and sexual nuisance offenses (42%), and "other" types of offenses (13%). The number of actual sexual assaults committed by the rapists ranged from 10 to 78. (According to the respondents, they also had been convicted of a mean of 1 sexual assault for which they were not guilty.) The most commonly reported nonsexual offenses included burglary and breaking and entering.

The rapists were asked how they responded to being confronted by an arresting officer. The majority surrendered without resistance, and when interrogated, close to one-half admitted fully to the offense. By the last offense, more than one-half of the respondents tried to deny their guilt. For the last offense, 30 (79%) out of 38 respondents reported surrendering without resistance, 3 (8%) attempted to escape, 1 (3%) resisted physically, and 4 (11%) reported some "other" type of response. Following their arrest, 21 (52%) out of 40 respondents denied committing the offense, 18

(46%) confessed to being responsible, while 1 (3%) qualified his admission by minimizing his guilt.

Residence

At the time of the first, middle, and last offense, most respondents were living in single family dwellings, although a significant minority also resided in

from the scene or to transport the victim. The type and ownership of vehicles used by the rapists in their assaults were examined. In no instance was a stolen vehicle involved. In the majority of the assaults (62%), the respondents used their own vehicles. In only 7 (8%) rapes did the offenders use the victim's vehicle, while in 6

"... findings ... contradict popular stereotypes which characterize the serial rapist as a lonely, isolated person who lives alone and has little or no contact with his family."

apartments. In a small number of instances, the offender was institutionalized at the time of the offense. The majority of the rapists were living with parents, spouses and/or children, or a roommate. During the first rape, only 9 (22%) out of 41 respondents were living alone, during the middle rape, 10 (24%) out of 41 respondents were living alone, and at the time of the last rape, 9 (22%) out of 39 respondents were residing alone.

These findings certainly contradict popular stereotypes which characterize the serial rapist as a lonely, isolated person who lives alone and has little or no contact with his family. Rather, in most cases, the rapist is living either with his parents or spouse at the time of the offense.

Vehicle

The serial rapists frequently used a vehicle in the commission of their crimes, either to get to and

(7%) instances a borrowed vehicle was used by the rapist.

Most frequently (46%), the body type of vehicles used was a sedan or hardtop. The next most frequently used vehicle was a pickup truck (19 crimes or 19%).

In only 14 (15%) assaults were the vehicles described as being in poor condition. At the time of the last assault, there were nine reports of the offenders' vehicles being equipped with a CB radio, police scanner, spotlight, or police antenna.

Personality Characteristics

The information presented here is based upon self-reported data and the observations of the interviewing FBI Agents. Not all serial rapists interviewed were represented by the descriptions set forth below.

The vast majority of the rapists could be described as neat and well-groomed men who obviously took pride in their personal ap-

pearance. They exhibited a range of emotions from "cold and aloof" to "agitated and tearful." The largest proportion of them, however, were observed to be expressive, though guarded and controlled. It was reported by the rapists, and quite obvious to the interviewers, that they were not trustful individuals. They were, however, able to hide their distrust when interacting with friends and associates.

They conversed in an articulate and conversational manner frequently punctuated with profanity. They spoke in a precise and concise manner in an attempt to ensure their thoughts were being conveyed and in order to maintain control.

When asked how their friends would have described them at the time they were committing the assaults, they responded with descriptions such as "average," "friendly," "a leader" and "will-

seemed to be having one type of problem or another.

They were perceived by others as being macho and they worked at maintaining this image through their dress, attitude, speech, and mode of transportation. They were intelligent and consequently tended to lead rather than follow.

While this was the image or "service personality" that others saw, many of the rapists related a sense of inadequacy, immaturity, and irresponsibility to the interviewers. As one rapist said, "I was expected to decide what my group was going to do or where we were going to go. I really didn't feel comfortable in that role and would have liked having someone else make the decision. I didn't see myself as others saw me."

Hobbies and Activities

Thirty-seven of the 41 rapists

models, reading, woodworking, coin/stamp collecting, chess, and antiques.

When asked what types of magazines, books, or other literature were preferred for reading, *Playboy*, *Penthouse*, other sex magazines, and crime novels were mentioned 14 times. Other types of novels, spy, science fiction, historical, biographical, psychological, and scientific books and magazines were reported 27 times. Newspapers, *Time Magazine*, *Readers Digest*, and entertainment magazines accounted for 10 responses, while comic books were reported by 4 of the men.

Having addressed the demographics of the serial rapist in part I of this article, part II will examine his developmental characteristics. It will also consider the victims of the serial rapists and summarize the findings of this detailed analysis. **FBI**

(Continued next month)

"... they tended to meet people easily, [and] eventually attempted to dominate the relationship."

ing to help out a friend." Further discussion brought out the fact that while they tended to meet people easily, they eventually attempted to dominate the relationship. They displayed a good sense of humor, but were manipulative and cunning. While able to convince people of their ability to achieve, they were impulsive and always

reported having pastimes or hobbies. Twenty-three of them reported "outdoor" activities, while 14 mentioned a variety of "indoor" interests. Of 35 pastimes reported, physically oriented activities included fishing (12), hunting (7), swimming (5), and baseball (5). Nonphysical types of activities included music, building

Footnotes

¹R. Ault, "NCAVC's Research and Development Program," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 55, No. 12, December 1986, pp. 6-8.

²R. Ressler and A. Burgess, "The Men Who Murdered," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 54, No. 8, August 1985, pp. 2-5.

³R. Hazelwood and A. Burgess, "An Introduction to the Serial Rapist: Research by the FBI," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 58, No. 9, September 1987, pp. 16-24.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Sample size often varies because of missing data.

⁶R. Rada, *Clinical Aspects of the Rapists* (Grune and Stratton, 1978).

Patrol

The Discretionary Patrol Unit *Future Forecasting*

By
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A recurring phenomenon, which impacts on many police agencies, is the wide fluctuation in demand for service that occurs by hour of day, seasons of the year, crime trends, changes in weather conditions, etc. Yet, in general, police agency personnel levels remain static in relation to overall changes in demand. Efforts to balance police resources against such vacillations require innovative management strategies which are both cost-effective and in concert with labor/management contractual obligations. But how can a police manager anticipate such changes and then deploy to meet this change?

One mechanism for addressing this issue is a system for distributing patrol units throughout the year that is sensitive to fluctuations in citizen calls for service. The heart of this concept uses a multiyear database to create a demand line from which to forecast future calls for service. This system further analyzes the average time lapse to handle each call, thus establishing an optimum or "service standard." In addition, the volume of multiple patrol unit dispatches (those requiring another patrol unit) are reviewed and factored into the equation.

Forecasted service/patrol unit data are produced monthly, by day of week and hour of day, resulting in a workload profile which notes changes in demand. This supply-and-demand concept attempts to

match the number of patrol units available to citizen demand for police service.

Officer Safety

The very concept of implementing a stated patrol plan would appear to be, in itself, a demonstrated concern for officer safety. A byproduct of allocating personnel in direct relation to the workload produces a more even distribution of resources relative to occupational hazards occurring throughout the day.

Simply stated, this patrol plan is designed to increase patrol presence as the workload (demand) increases. The result of this strategy creates a situation where additional patrol units are available during the times of high-service demand and high-hazard potential.

Just as the number of patrol units impact on police officer safety, some contend "two-officer" units to be a factor. Two-officer patrol units are usually deployed in those areas identified as possessing a high potential for officer injury due to some locally defined "hazard factor." In Cincinnati, a 1985 police officer task force study pinpointed these locations.

Results indicate that during the nighttime hours, approximately 20 percent of this city's police force is fielded in two-officer units assigned specifically to those geographical areas that have been identified as having a



Lieutenant Colonel Ammann



Officer Hey


high potential for officer injury. This operational strategy is closely monitored by district bureau commanders and shift supervisors who are held accountable for deployment. While some jurisdictions may actually field fewer two-officer patrol units than in earlier years, strategic deployment permits a more concentrated approach with no reduction in officer safety.

Discretionary Patrol Units

If an historical database analysis is the heart of the patrol plan, the concept of using discretionary units is the soul. Discretionary units or D-cars are designed to address specific problems as directed by field supervisors. At the same time, the overall patrol plan is sensitized to peaks and valleys in the demand for daily serv-

ice caused by the normal rotating off-day schedule, labor contractual obligations, and unscheduled absences of shift personnel, as well as the highs and lows of citizen perception toward police service. D-car personnel are those officers available for duty, in addition to those needed to staff each shift at established minimum patrol unit staffing levels.

Cincinnati Police Division
CALLS FOR POLICE SERVICE
1987



Key to the D-car concept is the policy that communications section personnel cannot dispatch a discretionary unit without prior authorization from a field supervisor, except in emergency situations. Further, D-cars are a deliberate attempt on the part of police management to insure officer safety. For example, D-cars are frequently assigned as "cover" cars in high-hazard locations, and because they cannot be dispatched out of the area, patrol supervisors can assign multiunit response to high-hazard calls and locations. Finally, D-cars are held in que to be deployed by on-duty shift supervisors to handle citizen calls for service when no patrol units are available, or when, in the opinion of that supervisor, D-car response is a more-efficient method of addressing a particular situation.

Productivity records and allocation of D-cars are monitored closely by district and bureau commanders. Consequently, this patrol plan not only manages resources more efficiently, but it also holds middle managers accountable for the use of expensive manpower resources.

Maintaining Minimum Staffing Levels

Shift commanders are directed to develop deployment strategies based on service demand, patrol unit needs, and time of day. Each shift plan is based on the premise that patrol unit needs identified through workload analysis (including two-officer units) provide citizens with a consistently high quality of standard police service. These service measures (for identification purposes only) are termed "adequate,

minimum, and inadequate." Each shift's manning level is reviewed daily by both district and bureau commanders to assure standards are being met. Patrol unit assignments and individual productivity, as well as assignment availability factors and efficiency/effectiveness of each shift, still remain the responsibility of the shift commander.

Critical to any patrol strategy is management's ability to allocate resources to demand. Obviously, periods of high-service demand require more working personnel, including supervisors. Therefore, district commanders must also insure that supervisory availability profiles service demands. A fluctuating starting time policy is but one alternative available to district commanders in an effort to accomplish this task.

D-CAR ACTIVITIES

- STAKEOUTS
- CRIMINAL ARRESTS—TARGET AREAS
- VICE ENFORCEMENT—TARGET AREAS
- LIQUOR INVESTIGATIONS—PROBLEM LOCATIONS
- TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
- AUTO LARCENY INVESTIGATION/PREVENTION
- D.U.I. ENFORCEMENT
- SPECIAL PARKING PROBLEMS AND VIOLATIONS
- WARRANT SERVICE
- SUBPOENA SERVICE
- FOOT PATROL
- FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORTS (FIR'S)
- SUPERVISOR-DIRECTED RADIO CALLS
- SELECTED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT
 - PEDESTRIAN
 - RADAR SPEED CONTROL

Control over the selection of vacations must also be monitored to ensure personnel availability. It would appear that a strong correlation exists between service demand and requests for vacation. Efforts should be made to schedule vacations throughout the year. Locally, vacation restriction begins in mid-May and continues through mid-September, ensuring that a minimum number of officers are on vacation from the same shift at the same time during this period.

Managing Off-day Assignments

Prior to establishing the current patrol plan, uniformed personnel were generally assigned according to seven rotating off-day groups. This system provides essentially the same level of manpower availability, regardless of

day of week with no consideration for workload fluctuations. As part of the D-car patrol plan, two alternative "off-day" structures are being used.

Some shifts schedule approximately 10 percent of the personnel with Sunday and Monday as "fixed off days" on a voluntary basis. This allows for additional personnel to be available for duty from Tuesday through Saturday, and consequently, addresses more accurately the workload profile within individual patrol areas.

On other shifts, the rotating method is used until the traditional off days fall on Monday and Tuesday. At this point, the officer's off days are moved back to Sunday and Monday, in effect exchanging Tuesday for Sunday and making Tuesday available approximately 50 percent more officers on Tuesday. While this plan does not directly address

the increase demand of Friday and Saturday, it does provide for a day of the week to be used for training and/or other administrative duties, which normally are handled on Tuesday. Since this off-day system provides field personnel with three of every six Sundays as a scheduled off day, it is a conscious effort on the part of administration to show its concern for the families of field personnel.

Summary

The Discretionary Patrol Plan has several specific objectives. Administratively, it removes a large portion of guess work from determining future manpower needs by applying proven formulas to a continually growing data base of calls for service. Shift commanders are now aware of manpower needs months in advance. Consequently, personnel

availability and the deployment of resources can be analyzed and planned for early.

This system eliminates both opinion and emotion from determining personnel requirements. In addition, it is one which most budget analysts can readily comprehend and support in terms of impact on manning levels of annual police budgets.


The era when indiscriminate use of police manpower and equipment went unnoticed and unchallenged has been replaced by a time of accountability. Shrinking city budgets, coupled with the ever-rising costs of providing service, have generated the need for more efficient and innovative use of both personnel and equipment. This plan successfully accomplishes that task.

FBI

Cane Knife

FBI Agents in Pittsburgh, PA, seized this weapon during a narcotics investigation.

Close examination of a commercially produced adjustable aluminum cane revealed a hidden double-edged knife blade. The blade, about 5 inches in length, was attached to the inside shaft with rivets and solder. The shaft was held in place by a spring-loaded mechanism and could be quickly and easily removed from the cane.



Lights, Camera, Action

Video Surveillance

and the Fourth Amendment

(Part 1)

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Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law or are not permitted at all.

In this era of high technology, police officers increasingly use the investigative technique of video surveillance through the use of sophisticated equipment, like miniaturized television cameras and video cassette recorders. Such devices allow criminal activity to be observed with little danger that the surveillance will be discovered by the subjects of the investigation. Video surveillance is often a valuable investigative tool that allows officers to record their observations on video tape, thereby perpetuating evidence of the observed criminal action which often constitutes overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt when replayed in court. Video surveillance may also help ensure the safety of officers and government informants who are working in an undercover capacity. For example, a narcotics transaction between a drug dealer and an undercover officer could be observed by officers who could promptly step in to neutralize a dangerous situation that might unexpectedly develop.

There are three relatively distinct situations in which television-aided surveillance might be used, each requiring a different constitutional analysis and application. First, officers might record activity that occurs in an area that is either viewable by the public or commonly accessible to the public, such as a public street or hallway of a public building. Second, officers might record activity with the consent of a participant in the viewed activity, such as an undercover officer's purchase of drugs in the officer's rented hotel room. Third, officers could nonconsensually enter a private area protected by the fourth amendment and install a video recording device which records the activities in that area.

It is the purpose of this two-part article to examine and analyze these three differing types of video surveillance activity in reference to fourth amendment guidelines. In this context, the article will review various court decisions to determine what procedures, if any, officers must follow to comply



Special Agent Fiatal

with fourth amendment standards. Part one addresses those situations where officers plan to use video surveillance to observe a publicly viewable or accessible area and situations where a party to the observed activity consents to the video surveillance of that activity. Part two analyzes those situations where the officer uses nonconsensual surreptitious video surveillance to observe activity in areas where one would reasonably expect privacy.

General Fourth Amendment Considerations

The fourth amendment by its expressed terms prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires that warrants both for arrest and search be issued upon a probable cause determination by an individual who is neutral and detached from law enforcement.² The warrant must also be obtained under oath or affirmation and particularly describe the place to be searched and the item or items to be seized. Video surveillance evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment requirements may fall prey to the exclusionary rule and may also lead to civil liability for the offending officer or department.

The Supreme Court, in the benchmark case of *Katz v. United States*,³ now over 20 years old, interpreted and defined that portion of the fourth amendment which prohibits unreasonable searches. In *Katz*, Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

suspected that Katz was making phone calls concerning interstate gambling from a certain public telephone booth and attached a microphone on top of and outside that booth to intercept his conversations. The Agents had not obtained prior judicial approval in the form of a search warrant, believing that the investigative activity did not constitute a search that implicated fourth amendment requirements.

In reversing its prior findings that a search only occurs when the government physically trespasses on an individual's property, the Court recognized that the purpose of the fourth amendment was to "protect people, not places."⁴ A search for fourth amendment purposes occurs whenever there is a governmental intrusion into an individual's justified or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.⁵ Applying that reasoning to the facts in *Katz*, the Supreme Court determined that Katz did have such a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in his telephone conversations made from within the telephone booth. The Agents therefore conducted a search when they intercepted Katz' conversations by use of the hidden microphone.

The Supreme Court has also determined that a search must generally be conducted pursuant to search warrant, unless it fits into one of the traditionally recognized exceptions to this warrant requirement, such as a search incident to arrest, consent, or emergency

searches. Since the search in *Katz* was conducted without a warrant and did not fall within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court ruled the search unreasonable and excluded the intercepted statements.

With respect to video surveillance, officers must comply with basic fourth amendment standards by either obtaining a search warrant or meeting one of the specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement when their planned video surveillance activity intrudes into a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, if the video surveillance does not infringe upon any protected privacy interests, the activity does not constitute a search requiring adherence to these fourth amendment requirements.

Video Surveillance of Publicly Viewable Areas

Use of a closed-circuit television camera to observe activity which is viewable by the public, either because members of the public can lawfully access the area where this activity occurs or can see the activity from a lawful vantage point, does not generally constitute an intrusion into a constitutionally protected privacy interest. An officer is normally not conducting a search when he views activities which are otherwise publicly viewable. Therefore, officers do not generally need to obtain prior judicial approval in the form of a search warrant to conduct that type of video surveillance. For example, a warrant is generally not required to visually record activities that occur in publicly accessible areas, such as public parks, sidewalks, streets, "open fields,"⁶ or other areas outside the curtilage of the home which are

commonly accessible to the public, like many apartment and hotel hallways.

The Supreme Court has stated that the fourth amendment "has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares."⁷ In that regard, officers may in most instances use video surveillance to assist them in observing certain areas, even when the areas are within the curtilage of one's home if others can observe these same areas from a place they are lawfully entitled to be, like the street or sidewalk or open fields area, and the officer likewise conducts the surveillance from a lawful van-

zoom lens on one of the cameras and was able to see the defendant while in a vehicle roll a cigarette and remove a gun from his waistband. Leaving the remote viewing post, the officer approached the car, ordered the defendant out, and arrested him. The officer searched the interior passenger compartment of the defendant's car incident to his arrest and found a gun, marijuana, and quaaludes.

The Florida State Court of Appeals determined that the police officer's use of video surveillance, including the zoom lens, was not an intrusion into any expectation of privacy, since one should reasonably expect heavy traffic in a hospital emergency room parking

"Video surveillance evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment requirements may fall prey to the exclusionary rule and may also lead to civil liability...."

tage point. This would most often include video surveillance of driveways, front doorways, and yards of businesses and houses.

A State court of appeals in Florida analyzed video surveillance of a publicly accessible and viewable area in *State v. Abislaiman*.⁸ In *Abislaiman*, a Miami police officer was able to view the parking lot of a hospital emergency room by means of television cameras perched on poles at various locations within the lot. The officer was therefore able to observe activities within the parking lot from a remote position. Observing the defendant and an accompanying female drive into the lot at 2:30 a.m. and park their vehicle for approximately 3-5 minutes, the officer activated the

lot, including the possible presence of police officers at 2:30 a.m. As the officer did not conduct a search by his use of television surveillance in a public area, he did not violate any fourth amendment standards, and the seized weapon and drugs were therefore admissible in the defendant's criminal prosecution.

Similarly, in *Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Department*,⁹ a Michigan State court reviewed the video surveillance activity of Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In *Sponick*, Agents videotaped activities within the Anchor Bar, a publicly accessible eating and drinking establishment, by placing a television camera in a hole in the common wall between the bar and FBI controlled space

(the FBI had rented facilities in the same building immediately next to the tavern). During this surveillance, the Agents videotaped a Detroit police officer entering the bar and associating with known criminals. Evidence of this surveillance was later offered at the officer's disciplinary proceedings.

The State court of appeals rejected the officer's argument that he was subjected to an unreasonable search by this video surveillance. The court reasoned that patrons of a publicly accessible bar fully expect to be viewed by other patrons, and therefore, do not have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in their presence in such an establishment.

therefore not constitutionally required.

This is not to say, however, that all public employees lack any legitimate expectation of privacy in their activities within governmental workspace.¹¹ They may have a recognizable and protected expectation of privacy under certain circumstances, which can only be determined on a case-by-case analysis. For example, if a government employee maintains an exclusive and closed office which is not accessible to others, he would likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his activities within that office. Video surveillance of an employee's activities within that type of office would be a search requiring prior

law enforcement's use of overhead cameras to observe illicit sexual activity occurring in the stalls of a publicly accessible restroom facility.¹² In both instances, the stalls were approximately 12 inches off the ground, extended to a height of about 6 feet, and had doors which could be closed and were the same height as the partitions. Those courts determined that under the circumstances, the stalls' "momentary occupants' expectations of privacy [were] recognized as reasonable,"¹³ requiring the officers to procure a search warrant to conduct the video surveillance from an overhead position. One of those courts further noted that even though the occupants of the stalls would have no expectation of privacy in their activities performed beneath the partitions which could be viewed by anyone using the common area of the restroom, they did have a reasonable expectation that they would not be viewed from overhead.¹⁴

"Use of a closed-circuit television camera to observe activity which is viewable by the public ... does not generally constitute an intrusion into a constitutionally protected privacy interest."

A Federal district court also determined that the video surveillance of publicly viewable areas did not entail an intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of the fourth amendment. In *United States v. Felder*,¹⁰ investigators observed the defendant by use of a concealed television camera in an area at his place of employment, which was both accessible and viewable by other employees during working hours. While conducting this video-assisted surveillance, they saw the defendant pilfer several government checks. The court determined that this surveillance technique did not intrude into any reasonable expectation of privacy and that a search warrant was

judicial approval.

Publicly Accessible or Viewable Areas Entitled to Fourth Amendment Protection

Video surveillance in public areas where one would reasonably expect his/her actions to be private must comply with fourth amendment standards. For this reason, officers should be cognizant that courts, in some instances, have found such video surveillance to be the equivalent of a search requiring a warrant, even when the surveillance is of an area which can, under some circumstances, be accessed or viewed by the public or others.

For example, appellate courts in Michigan have twice reviewed

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also recently found that Federal investigators had executed a search when they conducted extended video surveillance of the defendant's backyard area, which was within the curtilage of his residence.¹⁵ The investigators had placed a television camera atop a power pole overlooking the defendant's 10-foot privacy fence. The court determined that the 24-hour-a-day surveillance which lasted for 30 days was "not a one-time overhead flight or a glance over the fence by a passerby."¹⁶ The court therefore concluded that the defendant's "expectation of privacy to be free from this type of video surveillance in his backyard

is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable."¹⁷

Courts are also likely to conclude that a fourth amendment search has occurred if officers peer into the interior of a home through an open uncurtained window by using a television camera placed in a position not commonly accessible, such as the top of a utility pole, particularly if the video surveillance is for an uninterrupted, extended period of time, or if the officers are able to enhance their observations through a zoom lens on the camera.¹⁸ Although some courts have found that law enforcement's binocular-enhanced observations into the open uncurtained windows of a home or business from a lawful vantage point were not an intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy,¹⁹ most courts would agree that a continuous video surveillance into a residence from a location not commonly used by the general public, like the top of a telephone pole, is comparatively more intrusive and constitutes an intrusion into one's legitimate expectation of privacy. Officers should therefore consider obtaining judicial authority whenever they use video surveillance to observe activity occurring within one's home and they do not have consent to do so from a participant in the observed activity.

It is sometimes difficult to discern if the video surveillance to be conducted will intrude into a legitimate privacy interest, particularly when the area to be viewed is a commonly accessible interior rather than exterior area or within the curtilage of a home. Law enforcement officers should

therefore seek the opinion of a police legal adviser or prosecuting attorney prior to engaging in any television-assisted surveillance to make certain they are complying with the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches.

If a planned video surveillance does not constitute a fourth amendment search, officers must also be able to place and maintain the hidden television camera without violating someone's reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, officers may be able to conceal the camera in an area which is commonly accessible to the public, or in an area over which they maintain

Video Surveillance When Consenting Party is Present

Police officers will also frequently observe and record, by using video equipment, meetings between an undercover officer or cooperating witness and the subjects of the criminal investigation in private premises which are controlled in some manner by the officer or witness. In this way, officers can observe an undercover officer's purchase of stolen equipment at the edifice which houses an undercover fencing operation or an officer's purchase of narcotics at his rented motel room. In this type of situation, the observed subjects voluntarily expose their actions to a participant in the

"... if the video surveillance does not infringe upon any protected privacy interests, the activity does not constitute a search requiring adherence to these fourth amendment requirements."

exclusive control, like an apartment rented as a surveillance site or a surveillance van, or in an area where they have obtained consent to make the installation from an individual who has a legitimate possessory interest in that location, such as the resident of the dwelling where the camera is to be located. If, however, they must make a nonconsensual entry to place the camera into an area where there is some justified expectation of privacy on the part of any individual, they should first obtain prior judicial approval for the entry and installation, even if they only plan to observe publicly viewable areas through the television camera.

observed activity, that being the undercover officer or cooperating witness, who in turn consents to the video monitoring. Officers are thus able to provide security for the undercover officer, as well as perpetuate the observed illegal activity through video recording.

When analyzing consensual video surveillance under fourth amendment standards, one can draw an analogy to the similar investigative technique of consensual audio surveillance. In consensual audio surveillance, a participant to an oral conversation consents to the transmission of the exchange to surveillance officers,

or the recording of the conversation, or both, by use of a microphone secreted upon the consensor's person or within the consensor's premises.

The Supreme Court considered the application of the fourth amendment to consensual or participant audio monitoring in the post-Katz decision of *United States v. White*.²⁰ In *White*, law enforcement officers were able to overhear a conversation between the defendant and a government informant through a microphone and transmitter worn by the informant. These officers later related the contents of that overheard at trial. The Supreme Court determined that under these circumstances, the defendant forfeited any expectation of privacy in his conversation when he voluntarily confided the information to the government agent, despite the defendant's misplaced belief that the information would not be revealed. In short, the government did not search or intrude into the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy when the defendant voluntarily engaged in the exchange with the informant. The informant was therefore free to repeat the conversation.

Mr. Justice White, however, writing for a plurality of the Court, further reasoned:

"If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversation made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking

and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks."²¹

Accordingly, the fourth amendment did not bar the admission of the tape-recorded overheard conversation.

Courts have reached the same conclusion when a participant in the viewed activity consents to video monitoring and recording. For example, in *State v. Jennings*,²² police officers with the consent of an undercover officer observed and videotaped through a two-way mirror the defendant delivering heroin to the undercover officer in that officer's rented motel room. They were also able to simultaneously record the defendant's and officer's conversations by a microphone concealed in the door jamb of the

testify as to physical actions of the defendant. The videotapes, just like the sound recordings, simply produce the most reliable evidence of the actual transaction, and there is no apparent reason why a sound recording should be admissible and a videotape inadmissible ... the defendant's expectation of privacy was that [the undercover officer] would not tell the police of the transaction; just as that expectation is not constitutionally protectable, so there is no constitutional prohibition against admission of the tape where [the undercover officer] consented to the filming."²³

Similarly, a Federal district court determined that officers operating an undercover "fenc-

**"... officers should be careful to limit
consensual video monitoring to those instances
when the consenting party is present
at the time of the viewing."**

room. That State supreme court stated:

"...[W]e can see no reason why a person's justifiable expectation of privacy would be greater where videotapes are made than where just sound recordings are made. It is not the nature of the recording that is at issue but whether the defendant has an expectation of privacy such that any recording would violate the Fourth Amendment. The defendant is relying on the discretion of the person to whom he is talking, and just as that person can testify as to statements made by the defendant, ... so he can

ing" business did not violate any fourth amendment standards when they videotaped the defendant selling stolen property to an undercover officer with that officer's consent.²⁴

A reviewing court also approved of video surveillance with the consent of the victim and without benefit of warrant in the interesting factual situation of *Avery v. State*.²⁵ In that case, an individual who had complained of a previous sexual assault by her physician consented to the police placing a closed-circuit television camera in her apartment, which enabled them to monitor the doctor's next

house call. Using the hidden camera, the police were able to observe the doctor sedate and thereafter sexually molest the victim within her apartment. The court of appeals for the State of Maryland found this surveillance technique to be no different than consensual monitoring by microphone and that it did not constitute a fourth amendment violation.²⁶

Accordingly, law enforcement officers may through television surveillance observe, without benefit of warrant, activity which is normally associated with some expectation of privacy, such as that which occurs inside private premises, if they first obtain the consent of a party who is a participant in the observed activity. However, officers should be care-

ful to limit consensual video monitoring to those instances when the consenting party is present at the time of the viewing. If, for example, the officers conducting the video surveillance determine that the consenting undercover officer has left the officer's rented motel room which is being observed, and the subject of the investigation remains in the room, they should discontinue their video monitoring and recording until the officer returns to the room.

Additionally, the ability to conduct warrantless consensual video surveillance presupposes law enforcement's control over the place where the camera is se-

creted. Suppose officers do not control the room or building where the camera is placed and do not have permission to do so from someone with a legitimate possessory interest in that place. If officers must make a nonconsensual trespassory entry to surreptitiously plant the television camera, they should first seek judicial permission to make that entry, even if they only plan to activate the camera when a consenting party to the viewed activity is present.

When conducting consensual video surveillance, officers should be prepared to prove that the consent is voluntary and not the product of police coercion.²⁷ For this reason, officers conducting con-

course must obtain prior judicial authority in the form of a search warrant in order to comply with basic fourth amendment standards. Numerous courts, both Federal and State, have determined that these video surveillance warrants must satisfy certain conditions not normally associated with the typical fourth amendment search warrant. Part two of this article will address those ordinary and extraordinary requirements law enforcement officers must meet to properly obtain and execute the warrants allowing nonconsensual surreptitious video surveillance.

FBI

(Continued next month)

"When conducting consensual video surveillance, officers should be prepared to prove that the consent is voluntary and not the product of police coercion."

FOOTNOTES

¹It is not the purpose of this article to analyze the use of video surveillance in terms of other legal issues sometimes associated with undercover investigations or surveillance activities, such as sixth amendment right to counsel considerations, entrapment concerns, and questions of authenticity of evidence.

²*See, Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); *Connally v. Georgia*, 429 U.S. 245 (1977).

³389 U.S. 347 (1967).

⁴*Id.* at 351.

⁵*See, United States v. Knotts*, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); *Oliver v. United States*, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); *California v. Ciraolo*, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986); *United States v. Dunn*, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987); *California v. Greenwood*, 107 S.Ct. 3260 (1988). For a more-detailed discussion of what is, or is not, a reasonable expectation of privacy, see Kingston, Kimberly A., "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Cases Revive Traditional Investigative Techniques," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 57, No. 11, November 1988, pp. 22-29.

⁶*See, Oliver v. United States*, *supra* note 5; *United States v. Dunn*, *supra* note 5.

⁷*California v. Ciraolo*, *supra* note 5, at 1812.

⁸437 So.2d 181 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).

⁹211 N.W.2d 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).

¹⁰572 F.Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1983).

¹¹*See, O'Connor v. Ortega*, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987). For a more-detailed discussion of searches of public employee workspace, see Schofield, Daniel L., "Fourth Amendment Rights of Law Enforcement Employees

Against Searches of Their Workplace," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 56, No. 7, July 1987, pp. 24-30.

¹²*People v. Kalchick*, 407 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); *People v. Dezek*, 368 N.W.2d 652 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

¹³*People v. Dezek*, *id.* at 655.

¹⁴*See, e.g., People v. Diaz*, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975) (visual surveillance of closed fitting room is intrusion into reasonable expectation of privacy).

¹⁵*United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez*, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987).

¹⁶*Id.* at 251. The court of appeals was referring to the recent Supreme Court decision of *California v. Ciraolo*, *supra* note 5, wherein the Supreme Court deemed that aerial surveillance by the naked eye from navigable airspace was not an intrusion into a constitutionally protected privacy interest.

¹⁷*Id.* at 251.

¹⁸*See, e.g., United States v. Tabora*, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980) (any enhanced viewing of the interior of a home impairs a legitimate expectation of privacy).

¹⁹*Commonwealth v. Hernley*, 263 A.2d 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970); *People v. Hicks*, 364 N.E.2d 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); *People v. Ferguson*, 365 N.E.2d 77 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977); *Commonwealth v. Williams*, 396 A.2d 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); *but see United States v. Tabora*, *supra* note 18. For a thorough analysis of law enforcement's enhanced observations into premises, see McGuiness, Robert L., "In the Katz Eye - Use of Binoculars and Telescopes," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 50, Nos. 6-7, June-July 1981, pp. 26-31, pp. 27-31.

²⁰401 U.S. 745 (1971).

²¹*Id.* at 751. *See also Hoffa v. United States*, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); *Lopez v. United States*, 373 U.S. 426 (1963); *On Lee v. United States*, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).

²²611 P.2d 1050 (Id. Sup. Ct. 1980).

²³*Id.* at 1053. *See also Hoback v. State*, 689 S.W.2d 569 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1985) (informant consented to videotaping of drug exchange).

²⁴*United States v. Allen*, 513 F.Supp. 547 (W.D. Okla. 1981). *See also United States v. Myers*, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) (video surveillance of undercover agent bribing public official); *Wasserman v. Low*, 691 P.2d 716 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (videotaped consenting party and person being interviewed). *Contra State v. Soltis*, 693 P.2d 519 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1984) (reasonable expectation of privacy that secret visual monitoring not taking place in face-to-face encounters).

²⁵292 A.2d 728 (Md. App. Ct. 1972)

²⁶*Contra State v. Lo*, 675 P.2d 754 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1983) (pursuant to State constitutional standards, physician called to room by patient is entitled to privacy).

²⁷*See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

The National Stolen Coin File

The National Stolen Coin File (NSCF) has been established as an investigative resource available to all law enforcement agencies. It is now operational in the FBI Laboratory.

Valuable coins and coin collections are often taken in burglaries and other thefts, but have traditionally posed problems in indexing and recordkeeping for law enforcement, because the absence of serial numbers or other commonly used identifiers prevents an NCIC type of approach. The NSCF is a computer-reliant system having as its database both descriptions and electronically recorded images of the coins.

The success of NSCF will rely on accurate data entry of specific descriptive features, and when possible, photographs of the coins. To make this possible, a special data sheet, form FD-763, has been devised. *This form may be obtained from any FBI field office, or from the FBI Laboratory, and may be reproduced as needed.*

At least 1 valuable coin *must* be fully described from each theft of collections, but up to 10 coins can be listed on each form. The minimum value of coins for entry into the file is \$2,000. Care in describing imperfections or other unique defects in the coins enhance efficiency, and photographs further enhance chances for identification. Send NSCF entries or inquiries to:

Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Laboratory Division,
ATTN: National Stolen Coin
File,
10th and Pennsylvania, Ave.,
NW,
Washington, DC 20535
Telephone #: (202) 324-4434



WANTED BY THE FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating these fugitives is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.

Because of the time factor in printing the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, there is the possibility that these fugitives have already been apprehended. The nearest office of the FBI will have current information on the fugitives' status.



Photographs taken 1980

Wardell David Ford,

also known as David Ford, Wardell D. Ford. B; brn 5-10-56; Detroit, MI; 5'9"; 150 lbs; med bld; blk hair; brn eyes; med comp; occ-construction laborer; remarks: Wears prescription glasses and may be clean shaven.

Wanted by FBI for INTERSTATE FLIGHT-MURDER

NCIC Classification:

150911PO121209101312

Fingerprint Classification:


15	M	9	U	IOO	12
	M	1	U	III	

I.O. 5015

Social Security Number Used: 369-64-7878
FBI No. 452 646 R6

Caution

Ford is being sought in connection with robbery and subsequent murder of a Purolator armored car service guard. He may be armed with a .22-caliber revolver and should be considered armed and dangerous.



Left middle fingerprint



Photograph taken 1981

Harry M. Bolding

also known as H.M. Bolding, Harry MacClenton Bolding, Harry MacClinton Bolding, Harry MacClinton. W; born 4-5-32; Gallatin, TN; 6'; 210 lbs; med bld; brn hair; brn eyes; ruddy comp; occ-construction superintendent; remarks: May be wearing a salt-and-pepper goatee. He was reportedly trained in various unspecified weapon systems while serving in the military. He is a gun collector and a self-described weapons enthusiast and expert; scars and marks: 1/2-inch scar on back of right hand; pox scars on forehead.

Wanted by FBI for BANK ROBBERY CONSPIRACY

NCIC Classification:

10040512071201041608

Fingerprint Classification:

16	M	1	U	III	7
	M	1	U	IIO	

I.O. 5025

Social Security Number Used: 569-40-4961
FBI No. 417 193 E

Caution

Bolding, known to own several weapons, is being sought in connection with the theft of over \$600,000 from the Armored Car Dispatch, Incorporated, Company in Kennewick, WA. He should be considered armed and dangerous.



Right little fingerprint



Photographs taken 1979 and 1981

Gregory Tarkenton,

B; born 7-30-60; Philadelphia, PA; 5'7" to 5'11"; 150 lbs; med bld; blk hair; brn eyes; med comp; occ-store clerk, business manager; remarks: Tarkenton is reported to be a devout Muslim; scars and marks: Scar on corner of left eye.

Wanted by FBI for INTERSTATE FLIGHT-MURDER; ESCAPE

NCIC Classification:

09121010070810101009

Fingerprint Classification:

9	S	1	U	OII	7
	S	1	U	OII	

I.O. 5021

Social Security Number Used: 163-54-0825
FBI No. 915 266 T8

Caution

Tarkenton, who is being sought as a prison escapee, was at the time of escape serving a life sentence for murder, wherein the victim was decapitated with a machete. Tarkenton should be considered armed, extremely dangerous, and an escape risk. Narcotics user.



Left thumb print

WANTED BY THE FBI



Photographs taken 1984

Glyde Earl Meek,

also known as Daniel M. Burton, D. Mike Daniels, Daniel Mikel Daniels, Michael Kelley, Carl E. Meek, Clyde E. Meek, Clyde Earl Meek, Earl C. Meek, Mike G. Meek, "Shorty," and others.

W; born 7-22-35 (true date of birth), 7-22-37; Pasco, WA; 5'10"; 185 lbs; stocky bld; brn-grey (balding) hair; blue eyes; ruddy comp; occ-carpenter, salesman, sign painter, truck driver, vehicle reposessor, wood carver; remarks: Known to wear a hair piece. Reportedly wears large silver belt buckle and a silver and turquoise ring on left hand. Meek may be accompanied by Page Jennings, white female, date of birth 1-2-64 (JENNINGS IS NOT WANTED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES); scars and marks: Scar upper chest, tattoo of roses on upper right arm, cast gold inlay on right incisor tooth. Wanted by FBI for INTERSTATE FLIGHT-MURDER

NCIC Classification:

POTT010709DI62050809

Fingerprint Classification:

1	O	5	T	II	9
I	17	R	OII		

I.O. 5007

Social Security Numbers Used:

527-59-5297; 536-30-4342

FBI No. 732 602 B

Caution

Meek is being sought in connection with multiple murders in which the victims were bound, gagged, and stabbed multiple times. He is reportedly in possession of a shotgun. Consider armed and dangerous, escape risk, suicidal tendencies.



Right ring fingerprint



Photograph taken 1982

John William Farr,

also known as Herbert Cameron, Jay Dowell, Benjamin Grens, Clyde Hase, Clide Jack Price, Elmer Reicke, Robert G. Richardson, Charles W. Schultz, Frank Sterart, Reggie Stewart, and others.

W; born 4-16-20 (true date of birth); 4-16-16; Detroit, MI; 5'8"; 150 lbs; med bld, gray hair; blue eyes; fair comp; occ-dry wall contractor, pressman, pilot, movie projectionist, painter, roofer; remarks: Farr is reportedly required to wear prescription lenses. He is known to be a heavy smoker and allegedly has emphysema; scars and marks: Scar on upper left forearm; tattoos: tattoo of a woman's head on inside of right forearm; possible tattoo of a woman's head on outside of upper left arm.

Wanted by FBI for BANK ROBBERY

NCIC Classification:

PO131118200913141419

Fingerprint Classification:

13	O	1	U	OOO	20
S	17	U	OOO		

I.O. 5026

Social Security Numbers Used:

463-56-8753; 463-56-8735

FBI No. 1 045 346

Caution

Farr is being sought for a series of bank robberies for which he disguised himself with masks and wigs. Farr has been armed with a handgun in the past and should be considered armed, extremely dangerous, and an escape risk.



Right thumb print



Photographs taken 1983

Salvatore Michael Caruana,

also known as Mike Bolero, Michael Carey, Salvatore Michael Caruano, Mike Cassidy, Michael Cavanaugh, T.W. Chapman, John Hurley, Mike Hurley, "Face," "Sonny," and others.

W; born 9-30-38; Malden, MA (true place of birth); Boston, MA; 6'; 175 lbs; med bld; blk (graying) hair; brn eyes; dark comp; occ-pilot, ice hockey arena owner/operator, burglar alarm and electronic intrusion device specialist, sport shop manager, automobile salesman; remarks: He is reportedly an accomplished fixed-wing aircraft pilot with multiengine and instrument ratings. He is reportedly extremely outgoing and personable and is an electronics buff with particular expertise in burglar alarms and electronic surveillance devices; scars and marks: scar on left jaw; 2-inch scar back right side of neck, 3-inch vertical surgical scar lower spine.

Wanted by FBI for OPERATING A CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE; FAILURE TO APPEAR

NCIC Classification:

14540912071453091212

Fingerprint Classification:

14	M	1	R	III	7	Ref:	T
	M	1	R	III			R

I.O. 5033

Social Security Number Used: 012-28-0393

FBI No. 816 171 B

Caution

Caruana, who is allegedly involved in narcotics trafficking, is being sought for failure to appear after being indicted on charges of marijuana smuggling. He is reportedly heavily armed, in possession of automatic weapons, and should be consider extremely dangerous and an escape risk.



Right little fingerprint

Major Art Theft

On July 2, 1986, the painting *Still Life of Roses in a Basket on a Table*, by Johan Laurents Jensen, was discovered missing from an interstate shipment. The estimated value of the painting is \$24,095. Any information concerning its whereabouts should be directed to the FBI, Los Angeles, CA, telephone (213) 477-6565. Refer to their file number 15B-25794. You may also contact the National Stolen Art File, FBI Laboratory, Washington, DC, telephone (202) 324-4434.

Johan Laurents Jensen, Still Life of Roses in a Basket on a Table, oil, 39.4 x 45.7 centimeters



On November 13, 1987, numerous pieces of artwork were stolen at gunpoint from an art gallery in Coral Gables, FL. The value of the stolen artwork is \$1,000,000. The stolen artwork included the following:

Untitled drawing of three persons at a table, by Pablo Picasso, approximately 80 x 80 centimeters
Three Nudes by Pablo Picasso, 60 x 40 centimeters
Nude Woman and Animals by

Pablo Picasso, 50 x 40 centimeters

Female Figure by Wilfredo Lam, 110 x 85 centimeters

Faces by Wilfredo Lam, 110 x 80 centimeters

Female Figure by Wilfredo Lam, 80 x 80 centimeters

Beaked Figure by Wilfredo Lam, 50 x 50 centimeters

Male Nudes by Luiz Caballero, 100 x 80 centimeters

Nude by Luiz Caballero, 96 x 66 centimeters

Twenty signed prints by Luiz Caballero

Any information concerning this theft should be directed to the FBI, Miami, FL, telephone (305) 944-9101. Refer to their file number 87A-43382. You may also contact the National Stolen Art File, FBI Laboratory, Washington, DC, telephone (202) 324-4434.



Pablo Picasso, untitled drawing of three persons at a table, approximately 80 x 80 centimeters

Washington, D.C. 20535

Official Business
Penalty for Private Use \$300
Address Correction Requested

The Bulletin Notes

On August 31, 1988, Cpl. Larry Wood of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Department of Public Safety was on duty when a Boeing 727 carrying 108 passengers crashed on takeoff. When Officer Wood arrived on the scene, he was advised by a surviving passenger that the flight crew was still in the cockpit. Although the plane was still smoldering, Officer Wood found a narrow opening into the cockpit. Upon entering the cockpit, he found the pilot, co-pilot, and engineer still in their seats, trapped by debris. Officer Wood

freed the engineer and led him to safety. Twice more, Officer Wood entered the burning wreckage of the plane to help free the co-pilot and the injured pilot. All three crew members survived the crash thanks to Officer Wood.

The *Bulletin* is pleased to join Officer Wood's superiors in recognizing his heroic actions.



Corporal Wood