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J. Edgar Hoover, Director

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

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The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* is issued monthly to law-enforcement agencies throughout the United States. Much of the data appearing herein is of a confidential nature and its circulation should be restricted to law enforcement officers; therefore, material contained in this Bulletin may not be reprinted without prior authorization by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.





United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

July 1, 1952

TO ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS:

Arrest records being received by the FBI reflect a marked increase in the participation of women in crime. This increase is clearly indicated in the nationwide statistics for 1951 and also in those for the first three months of this year. The arrests of women during the past year were more than eleven per cent greater than during the previous year and nearly three times the increase of male arrests during the same period. Among the more significant increases were arrests of women charged with violation of the narcotic drug laws, liquor laws and driving while intoxicated.

The participation of women in lawlessness, of course, is no innovation in police experience. The part women have played in the past, however, has always been comparatively small in relation to that of men. Any increase in crime is most serious and particularly so when it involves women because of the position they have in the home and their relationship to the younger generation.

This new trend warrants our close attention. If the condition indicated by the present figures continues for such a period that it clearly becomes more than a temporary fluctuation, we will find ourselves confronted with a new problem in law enforcement and a dangerous weakness in the moral fiber of this nation.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



FEATURE ARTICLE

Colorado Springs Turns Hot Rodders Into Cam Winders

A "hot rod" club sponsored by Police Chief I. B. (Dad) Bruce has done a great deal toward solving the "fast car" problem in the Pike's Peak region.

The club, known as the "Cam Winders," gives the "hot rod" drivers an opportunity to carry on their hobby "inside" the law, Chief Bruce points out.

The Cam Winders came into being in August 1951, through the efforts of two Colorado Springs traffic patrolmen, Herb Tinsley and Richard Sayles. The two officers had noted a substantial increase in the number of "hot rods" on the streets of the city and could see a major problem in control shaping up. They talked to many of the "hot rod" drivers and found that the drivers themselves were interested in the formation of a club. The idea was put before Chief Bruce and he gave his immediate approval.

The club now has 105 members and a 1.2-mile drag strip for speed runs.

Bylaws of the club cover a wide variety of subjects, from mechanical specifications of cars to insignia and safety measures. Included in the bylaws is a provision that any member who is fined for a traffic offense must in addition pay to the club

a sum equal to one-third of the court fine. In other words, a member fined \$30 for speeding in a court of law faces a further \$10 assessment to the club.

Sayles reports that only seven members of the club have been arrested and fined for traffic violations since the formation of the club, and only one of the seven was a major offense. The major offender was ousted from the club.

Theo Castenida is president of the Cam Winders. Castenida himself is quick to admit that before he became interested in the club he was "a headache once in a while to the traffic officers."

The club meets twice monthly in the municipal courtroom at City Hall. Weather permitting, the members run their cars one day a week at the drag strip.

In addition to speed runs at the drag strip, members stage regular reliability runs. The last such run, through the city of Colorado Springs where contestants were watched closely for any traffic law violations or bad driving habits, was won by the lone female member of the club, Mary Werner.

Roy Pring, prominent El Paso county rancher, has given the club the land for the drag strip, and initial work on leveling the area was done by the local unit of the reserve Navy Seabees. Other work on the strip has been done by city and county road department crews.

So that members can work on their "hot rods" without extensive expense, the club maintains a garage in which all members can work on their cars. The garage is well supplied with tools and equipment.

Members in good standing carry a special plate on their cars, signifying that they are members of the Cam Winders. Traffic patrolmen say that "very seldom" do they see a car with a Cam Winder plate getting "out of line" on the streets of the city.

"With the marked increase in 'hot rod' activity here, we were well aware that we might be facing quite a problem in controlling them," Chief Bruce said. "Some other parts of the country have had a great deal of trouble from the 'hot rodders.'"



Two hot rods start a speed run at the Cam Winder strip. The car on the left is classified as a roadster. Car on the right is a "chopped and channeled" pickup. The roadster shown here was at 85 miles an hour within one-quarter of a mile.

Through the work of the Cam Winders we have virtually eliminated such trouble here."

Following are the articles governing the Cam Winders organization:

ARTICLE I. Name and Insignia—Section 1.—This organization shall be known as the Cam Winders. **Section 2.**—The organization shall have such official insignia as the membership may determine.

ARTICLE II. Object—Section 1.—To promote interest in various types of hot rod activities and to create an attitude of good sportsmanship and good citizenship among all its members.

ARTICLE III. Membership—Section 1.—Any person of good character interested in hot rod activities is eligible for membership in this organization with full privileges thereof. **Section 2.**—All applications for membership must be accompanied by initiation fee and dues in advance for the first month. **Section 3.**—Any member may be reprimanded or expelled for violating the rules, by club officers and the Board of Directors. **Section 4.**—Any member may withdraw his membership by submitting a written request stating his reasons for withdrawal. He may be reinstated at his request by paying his dues upon return, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors.

ARTICLE IV.—Initiation Fee and Dues—Section 1.—The initiation fee for application for membership shall be 5 dollars. **Section 2.**—The annual dues for members of this organization shall be 12 dollars per year or \$1 per month for a period of 12 months. **Section 3.**—The monthly dues for members of this organization are due and payable on or before the first day of each month or if paid annually due first day of August yearly. **Section 4.**—Any member whose dues are not paid by the 10th of each month shall automatically be suspended from membership. Notice of dues owing shall be given members by the treasurer not less than 30 days before date payable.

ARTICLE V. Government—Section 1.—The Government of this organization shall be vested in a Board of Directors consisting of five (5) members plus the club officers and an honorary Advisory Board consisting of nine (9) members. (In case of large membership, above 40, should include 1 director for each 10 members of the membership, but in no case to exceed 11 directors.) **Section 2.**—The Board of Directors shall have control and management of the property and management of the organization subject to the will of the membership. Funds of the organization shall be withdrawn from the bank or banks, with the joint signature of the president and the treasurer. **Section 3.**—Vacancies in the Board of Directors or in any office shall be filled by vote of the Board of Directors. Such appointees to serve for the duration of the term of the individual being replaced or until the next regular election. **Section 4.**—The officers and directors of this organization shall be elected in the manner presented in these bylaws and shall hold office for a period of 1 year or until successors are duly elected and qualified. **Section 5.**—A majority of the membership in good standing shall constitute a quorum.

ARTICLE VI. Election of Officers and Directors—Section 1.—Election of officers and directors shall be held at the first regular meeting after August first each year. **Section**




Chief I. B. Bruce

2.—Voting for election of officers and directors shall be by open vote. **Section 3.**—Nominations for office shall be made from the floor and each officer elected in turn before continuing the nominations and balloting. **Section 4.**—Nomination and balloting on members of the Board of Directors shall follow election of officers. **Section 5.**—New officers shall take office at the first regular meeting following elections. **Section 6.**—Nominees shall be a member in good standing for at least 90 days.

ARTICLE VII. Meetings—Section 1.—Regular meetings shall be held once per month or oftener, as determined by the membership. **Section 2.**—Date, time, and place shall be determined by the membership. **Section 3.**—Meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held on prearranged dates selected by the Board of Directors or at the call of the president. At all meetings of the Board of Directors members shall constitute a quorum. **Section 4.**—Special meetings of the membership shall be called by the president or secretary at the request of at least five directors.

ARTICLE VIII. Duties of Officers—Section 1.—The president as chief executive officer of the organization shall supervise the organization's affairs. **Section 2.**—The vice-president shall preside at membership and Board of Directors meetings in the absence of the president and shall also work with the president on such internal affairs of organization as membership, finances, and public relations. He shall also work on external affairs including project and committee activity. **Section 3.**—The secretary shall give notice of all regular and special meetings and shall keep a permanent record of the minutes of such meetings. He shall be custodian of all records of the organization



Cam Winders Richard DeMark (left) and Robert Beck working on a motor.

and shall handle correspondence as directed by the Board of Directors. *Section 4.*—The treasurer shall issue notices of dues payable and shall be responsible for collection thereof, keep the books of the organization, disburse funds at the direction of the Board of Directors and the membership, and shall report in detail at least semiannually and at such other times as directed on the financial condition of the organization.

ARTICLE IX. Committees—Section 1.—The Board of Directors shall determine the committees deemed proper and necessary to fulfill the object and purpose of the organization. *Section 2.*—All committee chairmen, vice chairmen, and members shall be appointed by the president, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors. *Section 3.*—The president and vice president shall be ex-officio members of all committees.

ARTICLE X. Rules of Order—Section 1.—Standard rules of order shall govern the proceedings of all meetings of the organization and its constituent parts except as provided in these bylaws.

ARTICLE XI. Delegations—Section 1.—Delegations or special committees shall be appointed by the president subject to the approval of the Board of Directors to represent the organization at any convention, meeting, or assembly as may be necessary. Such delegations or committees shall exercise only those powers specifically vested in them by the Board of Directors.

ARTICLE XII. Amendments—Section 1.—The bylaws may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting, provided written notice of the proposed action has been given each member at his last known address at least 5 days prior thereto by mail.

ARTICLE XIII. Suspensions—Section 1.—Any member issued a summons for any traffic violation shall be subject to following disciplinary action—shall be fined one-third of fine to club as fined in any court of law. Suspension shall be as follows: first offense, 30 days; second, 60 days; third, 90 days, fourth, total suspension including the turning in of membership card and car plate. Muffler violation will be fined one-third of fine to club as fined in court and no suspension on the first offense. On the second and following offenses the fine shall be one-third of court fine and 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, and the fourth, total suspension.

ARTICLE XIV. Rules for Drag Strip—Section 1.—At no time shall anyone cross the track, and all spectators who enter the pit area must enter through the pit gate entrance behind the starting line. *Section 2.*—All cars participating must obey the flagman, and if a run is made against the red flag the guilty person is ruled from the track for the balance of the day. *Section 3.*—The back stretch or return strip to pit area is for one way traffic only, and a maximum speed of 15 miles per hour is permitted. In the pit area itself, the speed limit is 5 miles per hour. *Section 4.*—In elimination runs, the car on the left has pole position and acts as pace car during the starting roll. Car on the right must maintain an even position until green flag is received. *Section 5.*—At no time is any vehicle allowed to start from a dead stop. *Section 6.*—During eliminations, all vehicles are required to run in their respective classes. *Section 7.*—During eliminations, if a vehicle turns off the course between the start and the timer, he is automatically eliminated. *Section 8.*—All drivers must wear approved type safety helmets and windproof goggles while running their cars on the course.

ARTICLE XV. Operations of the Track and Personnel Attached.—Two men as admission takers at entrance gate, two men for directors at parking area. At pit entrance two men stationed. One is a qualified mechanic who governs the safety inspection of all racing vehicles; this inspection includes construction of vehicle, brakes, steering apparatus, and tire conditions. His assistant collects the entry fee, has applicant sign entry blank and issues elimination tag. Three flagmen. One, the starting flagman, having a green and red flag stationed at the starting line. The second flagman stationed 200 feet down from the starting line. The starting flagman is controller of the track and will see that the track is all clear. All posts are ready and until everything is secure the red flag is up. When clearance is assured he waves flags in a come-on gesture, indicating that the on-line vehicles should start their roll. When the vehicles are 10 feet from the starting line and the flagman is sure of an even start, the green flag is waved and the race is on. If, however, when the vehicles reach the starting and it will not be an even start, the red flag is dropped after the cars are passed and the second flagman waves his red flag at the on-coming vehicles indicating that it is no start and cars are to return to the starting line for restart. The third flagman stationed at the finish line on course will have a black and white checkered flag. The finish flagman will determine the winner of each heat and collect elimination tags from drivers of vehicles and record on each the driver's times. These tags will be kept

by flagman and times sent to starting line via power or field phones. All times at starting line will be posted on a blackboard and upon returning to pits the drivers may observe their official time.

No car will run in other than its designated engine class. Engines equipped with superchargers will automatically advance into next higher engine class of competition.

ARTICLE XVI. Bodies.—Classes shall be divided into six body styles as follows: *Section 1.*—Roadsters: Cars competing in the roadster class must be equipped with American Roadster bodies of 1928 manufacture or later unaltered in height, width or contour. Bodies must be mounted in a conventional manner on a stock frame which may be "Z" ironed in the rear with a maximum drop not to exceed six (6) inches. They must be equipped with production type radiator and shell which shall not be dimensionally smaller than that of a 1928 stock Ford. Pickups may be run as a roadster, under the above conditions, provided they are equipped with a cargo bed which is 36 inches or more in length and of standard width and height. Tarps will not be allowed on pickups. Wheel coverings will not be allowed. *Section 2.*—Modified Roadsters: Cars competing in the modified roadster class must be equipped with American Roadster bodies 1928 manufacture or earlier, unaltered in height, width or contour, similar bodies of later manufacture which have been channeled, belly panned or fitted with added streamlining ahead of the firewall. Pickups run under the above provisions must be equipped with cargo beds which are 36 or more inches in length and of standard width or height. Tarps on pickup beds will be permitted in this class of competition. Wheel coverings will not be allowed. *Section 3.*—Coupes: Cars competing in the coupe class will be cars with American manufacture coupe bodies, unaltered in height, width, or contour. Frames may be "Z" ironed in the rear with a maximum drop not to exceed six (6) inches. Coupes must be equipped with production type radiator and shell which must not be dimensionally smaller than that of the original body model. Bodies as well as the engine must be mounted in a conventional manner, the body being mounted atop the frame and neither channeled nor belly panned. No streamlining may be added to the chassis in this class. All coupes must be equipped with a clutch and full transmission. No fenders allowed. *Section 4.*—Modified Coupes: Cars competing in the modified coupe class must be equipped with American manufacture coupe bodies, belly panned, or fitted with added streamlining ahead of the firewall. Tops may be chopped. Windshields must measure at least 5 inches in vertical height. No fenders allowed. *Section 5.*—Lakesters: Cars competing in the lakester class may have any special constructed body that does not exceed 36 inches maximum width. Wheel coverings will not be allowed. *Section 6.*—Streamliners: Open competition. Wheels must be covered.

ARTICLE XVII. Protests and Penalties—Section 1.—Any car in competition may be protested against by any club member or club for a protest fee of \$15. The car will be inspected by the contest board and one (1) member of the protesting club. In the event that the protested car is found acceptable, the car owner shall receive the protest fee. If the car is not acceptable, the entry will be dis-



Mary Werner, only female member of the Cam Winders, attaches the club's official identification plate to her automobile. Miss Werner won the last reliability run the club staged.

qualified and the fee will be refunded to the protesting member or club. Any member found willfully violating any cubic inch regulation shall be cause for the forfeiting of all personal points and all points his club may have earned at that particular meeting.

ARTICLE XVIII. Trial Runs—Section 1.—Each car entered in competition shall be entitled to at least four "starts" from the starting line and the fastest time of the total completed runs will be accepted as official. Any car failing to complete a run through the course will automatically forfeit that run. However, in the event of a time being missed through fault of the timer or personnel, a rerun shall be authorized. No "turnouts" will be recognized unless the driver has been officially signaled off the course.

ARTICLE XIX. Points Awards—Section 1.—Points awarded for qualifying speeds will be as follows:

First fastest.....	200
Second fastest.....	190
Third fastest.....	180
Fourth fastest.....	170
Fifth fastest.....	160
Sixth fastest.....	150
Seventh fastest.....	140
Eighth fastest.....	130
Ninth fastest.....	120
Tenth fastest.....	110
Eleventh fastest.....	100

Twelfth fastest.....	90
Thirteenth fastest.....	80
Fourteenth fastest.....	70
Fifteenth fastest.....	70

Section 2.—Duplicate points will be awarded in case of ties to the winning clubs as to winning entrants. *Section 3.*—No points will be awarded to entrants who are disqualified for infraction of rules at any time during any race meet.

ARTICLE XX. Competition—Section 1.—Any member may enter more than one car at a meet provided they are legally his property and may receive points for each car, but these cannot be combined for a total. No engine or chassis will be allowed to run under more than one entry or in more than one class at any one meet. *Section 2.*—Points awarded to joint entries will be figured as a team and not divided between or awarded to either of the entrants. In case of interclub transfers of members, club points will remain with the club to which the member belonged at the time they were won.

ARTICLE XXI. Trophies—Section 1.—Trophies will be awarded for the three fastest cars in each competition class at each meet provided their speeds are eligible for points awards. Trophies will be awarded to the season's championship entry and to the championship club, as well as to the season's ten highest winners. Trophies will be awarded for records set during a season and held at the end of the same season. *Section 2.*—Presentation of awards shall be determined by Board of Directors.

ARTICLE XXII. Eligibility—Section 1.—No person will be allowed to participate in racing events sponsored by this association unless he is a member in good standing with no financial obligations to the association outstanding. No one will be allowed to compete who has not been a bona fide member of his current club for a period of at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of the racing event.

ARTICLE XXIII. Guest—Section 1.—A limited number of guest entry blanks may be issued to desirable nonassociation members. These shall not, however, be eligible for competition trophies, points or hospital fund benefits. There will be no post entries.


Article XXIV. Credentials—Section 1.—Each driver of a competition car must present his motor vehicle operator's license and his "Cam Winder" membership card on the starting line before being permitted to participate in any association event.

ARTICLE XXV. Minors—Section 1.—Any driver under 21 years of age must have the parent's or guardian's notarized consent on file with the association secretary's office.

ARTICLE XXVI. Car Occupants—Section 1.—Only one person will be allowed in cars taking part in any association event.

ARTICLE XXVII. Helmets and Goggles—Section 1.—All drivers must wear approved type safety helmets and windproof goggles while running the course.

ARTICLE XXVIII. Temperance—Section 1.—Any participant in an association event who shows signs of



Officers of the Cam Winders talk over problems with two of the police advisors. Left to right: Patrolman Richard Sayles; Patrolman Paul Moyer; Jerry Deits, vice president; Doug Cimino, secretary; Theo Castenida, president; Dave Brown, treasurer.

intoxication will be immediately disqualified from taking part in that event, and the matter will be reported to the contest board and the Board of Directors for possible further action.

ARTICLE XXIX. Forfeit of Fees—Section 1.—Owners of cars disqualified for any reason will forfeit their entry fees. Also, owners who enter cars for the time trial but fail to be on hand when the trials are run will forfeit their entry fee.

ARTICLE XXX. Numbers—Section 1.—All entrants in competition must have their correct assigned numbers plainly visible on both sides of the car. Numbers assigned by the clubs are permanent through the season. Numerals must be 12 inches high in contrasting colors.

ARTICLE XXXI. Appeals—Section 1.—Any ruling by a member of the technical committee may be appealed to the contest board, and the board's decision will be final in all cases.

ARTICLE XXXII. Starter—Section 1.—The official starter may bar a car from the course by refusing to start it, even though the car may have passed the inspection by the technical committee. The starter does not, however, have the authority to reverse a decision made by the contest board.

The Cam Winders also have the following Technical and Safety Regulations:

ARTICLE I. Inspection—Section 1.—Each car must satisfactorily pass the inspection of the technical committee before it will be allowed to participate in any association event.

ARTICLE II. Safety Belt—Section 1.—Each car in competition must be equipped with an approved type safety belt over the driver's seat, which must be firmly attached to the frame or a suitable reinforced cross-member.

ARTICLE III. Fire Extinguisher—Section 1.—Each car entered in the time trials must be equipped with a suitable loaded fire extinguisher, attached within easy reach of the driver while on the course.

ARTICLE IV. Windshields and Headlights—Section 1.—No glass windshields will be permitted. Nonshatterable windscreens of Lucite, Plexiglas or other transparent plastic are permissible. Glass headlight lenses are permissible providing they are suitably taped.

ARTICLE V. Tarpaulins—Section 1.—Tarps may be used to cover the open cockpit on stock body cars, but they must be securely in place and arranged so that they do not obstruct the steering wheel and/or restrict or limit the driver's use of the controls. They must be so constructed that the driver can get into or get out of the car without having to undo snaps, fasteners or zippers. **Section 2.**—Tarps used as covers over rear engine compartments must be made of fireproof material.

ARTICLE VI. Exhaust Systems—Section 1.—All cars must be equipped with suitable exhaust collectors or stacks which must be installed in such a way that the exhaust cannot stir up dust from the course, and so that it is directed past or away from the driver, fuel tank and tires.

ARTICLE VII. Hoods—Section 1.—All cars must be equipped with metal engine hoods extending from the firewall to a firmly attached radiator shell and across the top to the beginning of the vertical hood side. Vertical hood side-panels may be omitted. All hoods must be securely fastened in place.



The stock-car hot rods start a speed trial run on the Cam Winders' drag strip. Note the number of spectators parked to watch the speed runs.

ARTICLE VIII. Floor Boards—Section 1.—All cars must be equipped with a suitable floor board or belly pans. Floor boards must be well-fitted and securely fastened in place with no unnecessary holes left open.

ARTICLE IX. Belly Pans—Section 1.—Metal belly pans are permitted, but they must be provided with suitable vents or drainage holes located so as to prevent fuel or oil from collecting in the pan. No belly pans made of canvas, wood or other inflammable materials are permitted.

ARTICLE X. Firewalls—Section 1.—All cars must be equipped with full firewalls to provide an effective seal between engine and driver. Firewalls must extend down and meet floor boards or belly pans. All unnecessary holes must be sealed, including areas around pedals and steering column.

ARTICLE XI. Bumpers—Section 1.—All cars not capable of being started under their own power must be equipped with bumpers or bumper height pushing attachments. No towed starts will be permitted from the starting line.

ARTICLE XII. Hub Caps—Section 1.—All hub caps will be removed for the technical committee's inspection for cracked wheels, loose rivets, loose lugs, etc. Caps may be replaced after inspection.

ARTICLE XIII. Foot Throttles—Section 1.—All cars must be equipped with a foot throttle. Hand throttles will not be permitted.

ARTICLE XIV. Roll Bars—Section 1.—All cars entered in competition must be equipped with suitable roll bars, which must be so constructed that they will afford adequate protection for the driver's compartment. Roll bars will be subject to acceptance or rejection by the technical committee.

ARTICLE XV. Wheels—Section 1.—Minimum wheel size will be 15 inches. No motorcycle wheels will be allowed.

ARTICLE XVI. Miscellaneous—Section 1.—All tires, brakes, steering mechanism, welding and construction methods, as well as controls and equipment are subject to inspection by the technical committee. Any car may be barred from the course at their discretion.

Photographs courtesy of Mr. Floyd Baker, Denver Post representative in Colorado Springs.

SCIENTIFIC AIDS

SECOND OF A SERIES

They

Write

Their Own Sentences

FBI LABORATORY'S DOCUMENT SECTION

The Check Passer

During the past year the Document Section of the FBI Laboratory examined almost 16,000 fraudulent checks, totaling over 2½ million dollars. Considering these figures, check-passing would seem to be a profitable "business" from the point of view of the passer. However, the money obtained from such activity generally proves to be hardly worth the time, trouble and anxiety involved, especially since the habitual check passer usually ends up in jail. One of the more active check passers, recently rearrested after a short period of uneasy freedom, has spent a large part of the past 50 years in jail, yet the money he realized from his checks has hardly been enough for more than a moderate style of living.

In spite of these drawbacks, check-passing has a

strong appeal for a certain type of person, who often prides himself on being among the "aristocracy" of the criminal world. The professional passer usually travels around the country stopping at one city just long enough to pass a check or two before moving on to the next city. It may be several days before the victim discovers that the check is bad, and by that time the passer may be hundreds of miles away, and the investigating officer has only a cold trail to follow. A typical example of this sort of operation is the case of a man recently apprehended in Missouri. He had stolen 150 blank company checks, and for 4 months had traveled from New York to California, cashing over \$4,000 in bad checks. One of the first checks passed was sent to the FBI Laboratory, where it

was identified with the signature on a fingerprint card in the files of the FBI's Identification Division, thus establishing the identity of the passer. After a chase which led halfway across the country, he was finally caught. He surrendered quietly, cheerfully admitted his guilt, and turned over to the arresting officers two publications he had been reading, *Tales of Amazing Frauds* and the *Kefauver Crime Report*.

The National Fraudulent Check File

Because of the widespread activity of fraudulent check passers, the FBI believed that a centralization of information about such criminals would be of assistance to investigating officers all over the country in their efforts to identify and locate these persons. Therefore, in 1936 the National Fraudulent Check File, a central reference collection of bad checks, was established as a part of the FBI Laboratory's Document Section. Representative photographs of checks in every case sent to the Laboratory for examination are added to this file, regardless of whether the case is a local matter or involves a Federal violation, and as current checks are received they are compared with material in this file.

When fraudulent checks are sent to the Laboratory, the signatures on these checks are first compared with similar names in the National Fraudulent Check File's collection of approximately 52,000 photographs of signatures used on checks previously submitted. If no identification is made in this manner, a search of other pertinent sections of the National Fraudulent Check File is made. By this method, nearly 70 percent of the checks submitted are identified as the work of persons who have passed checks previously examined by the Laboratory.

The value of the National Fraudulent Check File is shown by a recent case in which 75 checks, involving over 30 different aliases, were tied together by means of this file. These checks had been submitted to the Laboratory by 35 different police departments and sheriffs' offices located in States all the way from Maine to California. Information regarding these checks was sent to all interested departments, along with the photograph and identification record of a suspect, thus furnishing valuable investigative leads which would not have been available without such a central file.

Examination of Checks

The primary purpose of the examination of a check is, as a rule, to attempt to identify the person responsible for its preparation. If such identity cannot be determined by means of the National Fraudulent Check File, many times an identification can be made through a comparison of the questioned signatures and endorsements on the check with signatures on fingerprint cards in the FBI's Identification Division of persons who have used similar names. In some cases, when a suspect has been located, a comparison of the questioned handwriting on the check with the known handwriting of the suspect is essential. Because of the limited nature of the handwriting on a check, which sometimes consists only of a signature, the proper obtaining of known handwriting specimens by the investigating officer is extremely important. Unless comparable specimens are submitted to the Laboratory, the document examiner may find it impossible to reach a definite conclusion either as to identity or nonidentity. The procedure for obtaining known specimens would be substantially as follows:

1. The suspect should not be allowed to see the questioned check before giving known handwriting specimens, in order to avoid the chance of influencing his manner of writing these specimens and to forestall any possible claim that he unconsciously copied the questioned handwriting.
2. Specimens should be written on blank check forms. If these are not immediately available, pieces of paper cut to the size of the questioned check and ruled with lines for writing corresponding to those on the fraudulent check may be used.
3. No instructions as to spelling, method of filling out the check forms, etc., should be given. The suspect should merely be told the date, payee, amount, signer and endorser (or any other questioned handwriting) on the check, and then be instructed to fill in the blank checks in a corresponding manner. This point is most important, as there are almost as many different ways of filling in checks as there are people who write them, and the professional check passer may develop habits in his manner of completing the various parts of a check which are often as characteristic as the handwriting itself. As an illustration of how the small sections of the whole check may be completed in distinctively different ways, figures 1 and 2 are photographs of actual checks showing three out




Figure 1.

of many ways the "Dollars" and "Date" lines may be filled in.

4. The same type of writing instrument (nib pen, ball-point pen, pencil, etc.) should be used to write the known specimens as that used for the questioned check, since the difference in writing quality between a smooth lead pencil point and a flexible broad nib pen, for example, may tend to influence certain characteristics in the handwriting. This point is especially important when the problem of disguise or forgery must be considered, because of the importance of line quality in such an examination.

5. As each check form is completed, it should be removed from the suspect's sight before the next one is written. In this connection, it is advisable to obtain numerous specimens in order to lessen the chance of attempted disguise, because the possibility of a suspect's being able consistently to alter his normal manner of writing decreases materially as he continues to write. Also, it is a good idea to obtain a few specimens written with the hand other than that normally used, especially if the questioned handwriting appears to be disguised.

6. If the known writing is of a different slant (forehand, vertical or backhand) or size from the questioned writing, the suspect should be instructed, *after* he has written several specimens without any instructions, to change the size or slant of his writing to correspond more nearly to

that of the writing on the questioned check.

7. If any part of the check is handprinted, handprinting specimens should be obtained in both upper case and lower case handprinting in the exact wording of the questioned printing, since a comparison of handwriting with handprinting is for all practical purposes impossible.

8. For the purpose of introducing known specimens as evidence in court, the reverse side of each specimen should be dated and initialed by the witnessing officer, and a statement voluntarily given and signed by the suspect should be obtained to the effect that he has been advised of his constitutional rights, that the specimens are given freely and voluntarily and may be used in a court of law against him.

For the information of the document examiner, the letter to the FBI Laboratory transmitting known handwriting specimens should set out the manner of taking them and the instructions (if any) given to the suspect.

Other Specimens

If a suspect refuses to give handwriting specimens, any undictated known handwriting which can be located by the investigating officer may be of value. This undictated handwriting as a rule will not be as good for comparison purposes as dictated handwriting, because it will usually not contain wording similar to that on the questioned check, but if enough can be found containing certain letters and letter combinations in common with the questioned handwriting, it may be sufficient for a definite conclusion. School records, employment applications, automobile registrations, legitimate checks, personal letters, various types of business papers, etc., are possible sources of undictated handwriting. The more of such handwriting the document examiner has at his disposal, the better are the chances of his reaching a conclusion. When locating these specimens, the investigating




Figure 2.

officer should keep in mind the problem of proving the authenticity of such handwriting in court.

The identification of the handwriting on a check with the known handwriting of a suspect is, of course, of great value in the prosecution of a case, and such testimony by an expert document examiner in court is frequently enough to convince a jury of the subject's guilt. For this reason, the possibility of a handwriting identification should be kept in mind even if the investigation of a case is an extended one. For example, in November of 1947 a payroll check of an Arkansas mining company was stolen from an employee of the company, endorsed by the thief, and cashed. During the next 3 years investigation continued, and a suspect was finally developed. However, he refused to admit his guilt, counting on the long lapse of time since the passing of the check to protect him. Numerous known specimens of his method of writing the questioned endorsement were submitted to the Laboratory, and, in spite of the 3 years between the writings, a positive identification was made. When confronted with the results of this handwriting examination, the suspect admitted his guilt. Figure 3 shows the questioned endorsement, and figure 4 shows one of the known signatures written 3 years later.

The value of handwriting examinations in eliminating as well as identifying suspects should also be considered during the course of an investigation. Sometimes such an examination will even disclose evidence seemingly contrary to facts, but which later proves to be true. Such a case occurred several months ago in the Midwest, where in a State court a man was convicted of passing bad checks on the testimony of five "eye witnesses" who identified the man as the person passing the checks. However, a document examination of the checks by the FBI Laboratory showed that he could not have written them. Additional investigation established the fact that the convicted man was actually in another State on the day the checks were passed. The Governor of the State in which the man was convicted, upon learning of these facts, granted a full pardon.

Forgery of Genuine Signature

The question of forgery of a genuine signature may sometimes enter into a fraudulent check investigation. A recent case began with the marriage of a 40-year-old woman to her fifth husband,

82 years old and wealthy. Two days after they married she disappeared, along with \$11,500 in bank drafts and checks belonging to her husband. He swore out a warrant, and a few days later she was located and arrested. She insisted that he had given her the checks, but when they were found in a Florida bank where she had cashed them, they were sent to the FBI Laboratory, and an examination revealed that his signatures on the checks had been traced directly from one of his genuine signatures. The woman was convicted and given a sentence of 5 years. Figure 5 is a photograph of one of the questioned forgeries, and figure 6 is the known signature.

In this particular case the forgeries were proved not only by the fact that all the usual signs of forgery (uneven line quality, wavering strokes, etc.) were present, but also by the fact that the questioned signatures could be directly superimposed over the known signature. This proved conclusively that they were *traced* forgeries, and this conclusion was later supported by a statement from the woman's son that he had seen her place the questioned checks over the genuine signature on top of a strong light and trace the signatures directly on the checks. Because of the complicated and varied movements made by the hand in writing such a habitual thing as a signature, it is impossible to duplicate these movements exactly. Therefore, no two genuine signatures can be directly superimposed even though the basic handwriting characteristics themselves are constant.

Even when the particular known signature from which a questioned forgery was traced cannot be located, evidence of this type of forgery may still be shown by a document examination. Microscopic examinations and infrared photography may reveal unnatural indentations along the lines of writing, or faint pencil lines or deposits from carbon paper under the ink lines, all of which may be indications of a traced forgery.

Another type of forgery is the *copied* forgery, a




Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.




Figure 6.

more-or-less "free-hand" simulation of a genuine signature. When comparing a copied forgery with a known signature it is usually possible by means of a microscopic examination of line quality, flow of ink, smoothness of writing, retouching of lines, breaks in the writing, retracing of lines and other factors, to show that the questioned signature is actually a forgery—that is, an imitation of the true signature. However, as is also true of a traced forgery, since it is an imitation it may not contain sufficient normal handwriting characteristics of the actual writer to enable it to be identified as the work of a particular person. For this reason, when submitting suspected forged signatures to the Laboratory for examination, the investigating officer should also submit genuine signatures of the person whose signature was forged.

The names and signatures appearing in this article are shown only because they are among those which have at some time been forged or used as aliases by check passers. No unfavorable reference is intended to any person using any of these names legitimately.

* * *

The next in this series of articles on the Document Section will discuss fraudulent checks prepared with a check protector, typewriter, or other mechanical means. (To be continued in an early issue.)

★

Game Wardens Use Laboratory Evidence

The following item of interest to officers investigating violations of Federal and State game laws is reprinted from the January 25, 1952, issue of the *Weekly Newsletter* published by the Department of Game and Fish, Santa Fe, N. Mex., where it appeared under the title "Modern Science Nabs Violators."

Department fieldmen recently reconstructed and successfully prosecuted two refuge hunting and one game killing case where all evidence was circumstantial and the guilty parties did their utmost to impede the investigation.

The case involved three men who hunted and killed at least one deer on a refuge. They were intercepted at their car, parked close to the refuge boundary, by Volunteer Deputy Warden Tracey Neal of Fort Bayard during the recent big game season. Although outwardly everything seemed in order, the deputy suspected the deer they had in their possession had been killed on the refuge, but the burden of proof was his.

Neal called in District Warden Jewel Butler and several other Game Department fieldmen and they began an intensive investigation. First, they managed to backtrack each of the three men into the refuge and by so doing, located the empty cartridge cases left behind where they had fired their rifles in different locations.

They found empty cases which matched each of the three guns in the party, but it was impossible to determine which hunter had actually killed the deer they brought out.

The hunters later surrendered their rifles for examination and the guns, the cartridge cases and the bullet that was dug out of the deer were all forwarded to the FBI Laboratory in Washington. Unbeknownst to the investigators, one hunter had intentionally tampered with his gun in an effort to defy identification. As he later admitted, he had filed the firing pin to alter its punchmark on the cartridge and he had deeply scored the rifle barrel to change the scratches on the bullet passing through.

When the FBI made their report on the evidence, the wardens knew they had a case; laboratory analysis proved that the three rifles had each fired the corresponding caliber cartridges found at the scene of the killing. The case went to court and the men were found guilty and fined (the one who killed the deer paid \$125 and the other two paid \$60 each for hunting on a refuge).

One of the offenders expressed amazement that the wardens had been able to build up a successful case. He could not understand how they found every empty cartridge case he had fired, nor how they had been able to reconstruct his every move and identify his gun.

Modern science, coupled with old-fashioned woodsmanship, is a tough combination to beat.

IDENTIFICATION

In this issue of the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, a review of the whorl type patterns and the necessity for referencing fingerprint patterns will be discussed.

Plain Whorl

The plain whorl consists of two deltas and at least one ridge making a complete circuit which may be spiral, oval, circular, or any variant of a circle. An imaginary line drawn between the two deltas must cut or touch at least one recurring ridge within the inner pattern area. This test is made by placing the fingerprint magnifier on the pattern so that the red line on the reticule joins the left and right deltas. The ridges in the plain whorl differ from the ridge formation of the loops inasmuch as they are of a circular type.

Figure 1 is an example of a plain whorl.

Central Pocket Loop

There are two types of patterns which fall into the central pocket loop classification. The first, the recurving type, is the type of pattern which has the same general appearance and requirements as the plain whorl. The difference in these two types of patterns is that when the imaginary line joins the two deltas in the central pocket loop no ridge which recurves in front of the inner delta is cut or touched.

The second type of central pocket loop is called the obstruction type. In this particular pattern an obstruction at right angles to the line of flow is used in lieu of the recurve in front of the inner delta. The obstruction type central pocket loop is rare as compared to the other types of whorls.

Figure 2 is an example of the central pocket loop.

Double Loop

The double loop is also in the whorl classification and consists of two separate loop formations with

Whorl Patterns in Fingerprint Classification

two separate and distinct sets of shoulders and two deltas. The ridges in a double loop pattern must recurve, but do not necessarily have to flow out or tend to flow out the same side from which they entered. The term "separate" eliminates the "S" type core, interlocking loops, and the patterns having one loop inside another from consideration as a double loop. The double loop, unlike the plain loop, does not require a ridge count. However, the appendage rule for double loops is the same as that used for plain loops.

Figure 3 is an example of a double loop.

The Accidental

The accidental whorl is the fourth and last type of whorl. It consists of a combination of two different types of patterns with the exception of the plain arch, with two or more deltas, or a pattern which possesses some of the requirements for two or more different types, or a pattern which conforms to none of the definitions. This type of fingerprint pattern ordinarily contains unusual ridge detail and unusual ridge formations. As the name implies, this pattern is not so common as other types of whorl and in most instances is very readily recognized.



Figure 1.




Figure 2.



Figure 4.

It should be noted that the plain arch is specifically excluded from any consideration in the classification of an accidental whorl. Plain arch ridges run from one side to the other, below and above every pattern. Therefore, if the plain arch were not excluded all patterns except the plain arch would have to be classified as accidental whorls.

Double loops are excluded from classification as accidental whorls since the definition states that accidental whorls consist of a combination of two different types of patterns.

Figure 4 is an example of an accidental type whorl. This pattern is a combination of a loop over a plain whorl and in addition has three deltas.

Numerical values are assigned to each finger block in which whorl type patterns appear, and

these values are used in deriving the primary for the classification formula. All whorls are indicated by a "W" directly underneath each individual finger block. Whorl patterns are identified by the type of whorl only when a superextension is used to extend the files.

Figure 5 illustrates the manner in which whorls are indicated on the fingerprint card. This figure also shows the method of indicating the types of whorls when the WCDX superextension is used.

Whorl Tracing

The whorl type patterns, unlike the loop patterns, are traced. The tracing starts on the left delta and continues to a point as close as possible or directly opposite the extreme right delta. If there are two or less ridges between the stopping point




Figure 3.

Name _____				
LEAVE ABOVE SPACE BLANK				
SURNAME		GIVEN NAME (Print type or print plainly)		MIDDLE NAME
Classification			Reference	
Alias _____				
No. _____ Color _____ Sex _____				
RIGHT HAND				
1. Thumb	2. Index finger	3. Middle finger	4. Ring finger	5. Little finger
C	D	W	C	d
W	W	W	W	W
LEFT HAND				
6. Thumb	7. Index finger	8. Middle finger	9. Ring finger	10. Little finger
d	C	X	W	C
W	W	W	W	W
Impressions taken by: _____ (Signature of official taking prints)		Note amputations _____		Signature of person fingerprinted: _____
Date Impressions taken _____		Four fingers taken simultaneously _____		
Left Hand		Left thumb	Right thumb	Right Hand

Figure 5.




Figure 6.

on the ridge and the right delta, the tracing is meeting—indicated by the letter “M.” When there are more than two ridges in between the tracing ridge and the extreme right delta, and the tracing ridge is inside or to the left of the right delta, the tracing is inner and is indicated by the letter “I.” If there are more than two ridges between the tracing ridge and the right delta and the tracing ridge is outside or below the right delta, the tracing is considered to be outer and is indicated by




Figure 7.




Figure 8.

the letter “O.” It should be emphasized that the tracing always starts on the left delta and that the stopping point on the tracing ridge is the point closest to or directly opposite the extreme right delta. If the left delta is a dot, the classifier should drop to the ridge below and continue tracing. When a tracing ridge is an ending ridge, drop to the ridge immediately below and continue tracing. In case the tracing ridge bifurcates, follow the lower arm, or fork, of the bifurcation.

Name				
LEAVE ABOVE SPACE BLANK				
SURNAME		GIVEN NAME (Please type or print clearly)		MIDDLE NAME
Classification			Reference	
Aliases		Reference		
No.	Color	Sex		
RIGHT HAND				
1. Thumb	2. Index finger	3. Middle finger	4. Ring finger	5. Little finger
<i>W</i>	<i>A?T</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>A?T</i>	<i>W</i>
LEFT HAND				
6. Thumb	7. Index finger	8. Middle finger	9. Ring finger	10. Little finger
<i>W?/</i>	<i>R?T</i>	<i>W?/</i>	<i>W?/</i>	<i>W?/</i>
Finger impressions by:		Note acquisitions		Signature of person fingerprinted:
Date: _____		Date: _____		Date: _____
Finger impressions taken by:		Finger impressions taken by:		Finger impressions taken by:
Date: _____		Date: _____		Date: _____
Left Hand		Left thumb	Right thumb	Right Hand

PLEASE DO NOT FOLD THIS CARD

Figure 9.

Improper inking or a temporary skin condition sometimes causes a ridge to appear to end when actually it is a continuous ridge. When there is doubt in the classifier's mind, examine the surrounding ridges. If similar breaks occur, the break is assumed to be an unnatural condition of the ridge and the break is disregarded. The ridge is traced through the break. Appropriate referencing of the tracing is necessary in all doubtful instances.

When tracing double loops or accidental whorls, the problem sometimes arises as to where to stop tracing. This occurs when the tracing ridge flows over a lower loop or whorl. The problem is whether to continue over and around the recurve, or whether to stop at the first point opposite the right delta. In order to obtain a uniform classification of this particular type tracing, the rule is that where the tracing ridge passes inside of the right delta, stop at the nearest point to the right delta on the upthrusting ridge. If the tracing ridge does not go upward, continue tracing around the recurve until the point opposite the right delta or the delta itself is reached.

Figure 6 is a plain whorl with a meeting tracing. In this particular pattern, the tracing ridge meets the right delta. The left delta is indicated by D1 and the right delta by D2.

Figure 7 is a double loop with an inner tracing. The stopping point on the tracing ridge is indicated by the letter "S."

Figure 8 is a central pocket loop with an outer tracing.

Referencing

It is sometimes necessary to cross reference tented arches and plain arches. Such referencing is often necessary because of difference in inking or in pressure when the fingerprint impression is taken. For example, there may be a question as to whether a very short ridge should be interpreted as an upthrust or as a dot. Also, heavy inking or extra pressure may cause an angular type tented arch ridge to appear as a smooth plain arch ridge.

It is frequently necessary to cross reference tented arches and loops. The loop type tented arch (the pattern which has two of the basic characteristics of the loop) is the type which is referenced to a loop. The appendage spoiling the recurve of a loop which has only a single looping ridge may appear to be connected at right angles

in one impression. The next time that finger is printed the appendage may appear to flow off the recurve smoothly, due to the difference in pressure applied to the finger when being rolled.

It is also necessary to reference some patterns where the delta is a dot and there is some question as to whether the dot is an actual ridge or whether it is caused by foreign substance between the ridges.

Whorl Appendage Rule

Loops and whorls also have to be referenced. One factor which causes references of this nature is the whorl appendage rule. It must be determined whether or not the appendage is connected to the recurve in the line of flow. There is also the possibility that a pattern with a single recurve in front of the inner delta may be questionable in view of the fact that the recurve may not appear smooth. A double loop may need to be referenced to a plain loop when one of the loops could be spoiled by an appendage.

Some accidental whorls have to be referenced to loops, as in the case of a loop over a tented arch when the tented arch is not definite.

Referencing of ridge counts may be necessary because of questionable deltas, questionable cores, fragmentary ridges and scars. There may also be doubt as to whether the imaginary line from delta to core touches an ending ridge, or whether the imaginary line crosses a bifurcation causing both arms of the bifurcation to be counted.

Whorl Tracings

Whorl tracings may be referenced due to questionable deltas, improper inking, scars, temporary skin conditions, and differences of opinion concerning very close tracings.

In addition to the above enumerated reasons, some patterns may be referenced because of their unusual nature. A scar on a finger would cause the pattern to be referenced to any pattern the finger could have been before it was scarred.

Figure 9 illustrates the manner in which reference patterns are indicated on a fingerprint card.

In all cases of patterns to be referenced, the classifier should use his good judgment in order to have the fingerprint card filed in the preferred classification.



OTHER TOPICS

Bank robbery continued to follow an upward trend during 1951. The 107 robberies reported to the FBI during that calendar year were greater by 7 than the 100 such crimes reported during 1950 and nearly 5 times the number (22) reported during 1943, the lowest year of the past 2 decades. None of these figures include burglaries and larcenies.

Despite the upward trend, the 1951 figures do not describe a "crime wave" when compared to bank robbery statistics compiled during the early 1930's. In 1934 there were 606. Those were the times of Dillinger, et al.

Federal Statute

The Federal Bank Robbery Statute covers any member bank of the Federal Reserve System, member banks of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and any bank organized or operated under the laws of the United States. Also included are Federal savings and loan associations and any banking institution insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.

The penalty prescribed by the statute for bank robbery is a maximum fine of \$5,000 or a maximum sentence of 20 years, or both. If an assault is committed as a part of the robbery or the life of any person put in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, the maximum fine becomes \$10,000 and the maximum sentence 25 years. If the bank robber kills or kidnaps any person as a part of the robbery the minimum sentence becomes 10 years and the maximum is death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct. These latter provisions stem from a once common practice of taking a bank employee or other person as a hostage to guarantee a safe getaway.

The Federal Bank Robbery Statute also provides penalties for burglaries and larcenies committed against the banking institutions specified in the statute. Penalties differ according to whether the property taken is valued at more than \$100, or less. The special penalties in those cases

Bank Robbery— Continuing Problem in Law Enforcement

involving assault, killing, or kidnaping also apply to burglary and larceny violations.

One section of the statute makes it a Federal crime to receive property from a bank robbery, burglary, or larceny when the receiver has knowledge of the stolen character of the property.

What Makes a Bank Robber?

It is perhaps not possible to furnish a rational reason as to why individuals rob banks. One confirmed bank robber put it this way: "When you want a hat, you go to a hat store. When you want a loaf of bread, you go to a bakery, and when you want money, you go to a bank—that's where the money is."

Few conclusions can be drawn from the types of persons who have participated in bank robberies in the past. The only characteristic they have in common is the desire to obtain money without working for it. Bank robbers have come from all walks of life, and certainly previous respectability is no bar. One of the best examples, perhaps, might be that of a former Royal Air Force flyer and ex-United States Army captain who robbed a west coast bank of more than \$1,600. This individual entered the bank alone, held up a teller by simulating a gun in his right jacket pocket, and obtained the currency. He then fled from the bank in a stolen truck, abandoning it approximately eight blocks from the bank. He returned to the home of friends with whom he had been residing. He was apprehended only a few hours after the robbery.

In still another instance three young college students robbed two midwestern banks of more than \$50,000. None of these young men had any previous criminal record but had attended school together and decided upon a career of crime for the purpose of obtaining a large sum of money, after which they hoped to retire to legitimate enterprise.

Age is certainly no criterion in predicting offenses against banks. Probably the youngest bank

burglars in the annals of police history were taken into custody in a midwestern city when police officials heard the ringing of an alarm bell in the late afternoon and hurried to the bank, arriving just in time to capture two 8-year-old lads, one of whom had already gained entrance to the bank through a broken window. A third accomplice, age 6, eluded apprehension at the time but was brought to the police station the following morning by his mother.

One unusually young bank robber merely walked into a bank in a west coast town during the lunch hour and helped himself to a money bag from the night depository. This 10-year-old lad obtained more than \$1,000 with which he bought himself a complete outfit of clothing, a suitcase, and a bus ticket. He was apprehended in the cafeteria of a depot while waiting for his bus.

A "Man's Job"?

It has been ably demonstrated in the past that bank robbery is not solely a "man's job." There have been bank robberies perpetrated entirely by women. A bank in St. Louis, Mo., and another in Des Moines, Iowa, were victimized by a dark-haired, attractive mother of two. She operated so quietly and smoothly that many of the patrons of the bank did not even know a robbery was in progress.

Members of the "weaker sex" have been involved in various capacities in other robberies—sometimes as the driver of the getaway car, other times as lookout. Frequently the bank robbers will station a female accomplice at some distance from the scene of the robbery with a second car which the robbers will later switch to after abandoning the original getaway car.

The recent activities of a gang of four in Wisconsin is typical of the various parts played by women in the robbery of banks. This gang consisted of a mother, her 24-year-old son, 14-year-old daughter, and another individual. The mother, armed with a double-barreled shotgun, drove the getaway car and remained outside the bank as lookout during the robbery while the two men and the 14-year-old girl, armed and wearing masks, entered the bank. During the robbery, the three robbers who went inside the bank forced the bank employees to lie on the floor and at gunpoint took nearly \$12,000 in currency.

The professional bank robber seldom picks a

bank at random. A study of the *modus operandi* in hundreds of cases investigated indicates that the bank robber often makes his plans with the care of a field general. He considers the physical characteristics and location of the bank, the movement of bank personnel, local police patrols, protective features employed, and the number of guards. One notorious bank robber of the early thirties made use of "The Bankers' Directory," a publication which contains considerable information about banks, their officers and personnel, in planning a robbery. By his own admission he often spent days and even weeks in "casing" a bank.

More recently, a bank robber in a southern State posed as a salesman of aluminum screens, thereby gaining access to the bank premises. Investigation of this robbery revealed that a stranger had entered the bank shortly before noon and asked to see the vice president. The stranger identified himself as a salesman of aluminum screens, representing a southern lumber firm. The stranger and the vice president together surveyed the entire bank, discussing the needs of the bank for screens. After inquiring about the closing time of the bank, the stranger departed and returned about 3 p. m. At this time a contract for the screens was drawn up and signed by the bank official. As it was then about closing time, the bank official gathered up the cash and took it to the vault for storage until the next day. The salesman followed the official into the vault, pulled out a pistol and informed the latter that it was a stickup. The salesman then scooped up approximately \$17,000 in cash and fled the bank. His success was short-lived, however, for just 4½ hours after the robbery he had been apprehended.

Valuable leads have been developed in some bank robbery cases by interview with witnesses who have no knowledge of the robbery but remember the appearance and activities of persons who apparently were doing the "casing" in preparation for the robbery. Investigation of the robbery of the southern bank by the pseudo-salesman was aided materially by a curious citizen who had closely examined the robber's "big city car" while he was in the bank and observed that someone had written in the dust on both right doors of the car.

Loitering outside the bank is one point to be covered. Bank employees may also remember a stranger who came in to cash a check, make a small deposit, change currency or take some other action

which gave him an opportunity to briefly study the bank and its operations from the inside.

The Unconvincing Bank Robber

Other robbers are not quite so successful in their plans. One tried twice without success. On the first occasion he entered a bank in St. Louis, Mo., and pushed a note across the counter to the teller indicating that he would blow everyone up with nitroglycerine unless the teller gave him \$500. Unabashed, the teller replied that he could do as he pleased and thereupon dropped out of sight behind the teller's partition. Moments later when the teller raised his head for a look the robber had disappeared. Exactly one year later, to the very day, this same individual appeared in a New Orleans, La., bank. The note which he presented the teller this time indicated he had a gun and if the teller would give him \$500 no one would be hurt. Apparently the robber just could not convince anyone he meant business since this time the teller called a guard who took the robber into custody.

Timing Is Important

One of the most important elements in a bank robber's plans is "time." He may want to know when the bank opens and closes or when the bank personnel arrive and depart. Many bank robbers prefer the early morning hours when a bank is just being opened. It is a simple matter to overpower or surprise a lone employee opening the bank and then quietly and smoothly subdue each additional employee as he arrives for work.

Shortly before 8 a. m. on October 10, 1951, the cashier of a Kansas City, Mo., bank was hurrying to work when suddenly a stranger appeared a few steps from the side entrance and forced the cashier to open the vault. The robber took over \$4,000 in currency. A safe inside the vault had a time lock so the bandit decided to wait until it could be opened. As each employee reported for work, the bandit informed him that a holdup was in progress. He lined the employees up at the rear of the bank and when he believed all were present except one he herded them into a vault used for supplies, leaving the door open. However, as one of the last persons entered, the cashier dashed out and gave a verbal alarm. The bandit departed immediately, without waiting for the safe to be opened.

The more brazen and perhaps less cautious bank robber may pick a later time of day when he will have not only the employees to contend with but also possible customers of the bank. Even this type of robbery may, however, be conducted without the knowledge of other occupants of the bank.

A woman teller in a bank in a small town in Texas was approached by a young man wearing a bright yellow baseball cap and a large tan colored baseball glove on his left hand. He produced a blank check on which he had scrawled: "I need money. Count till I say stop. Gun is in glove." The glove, which concealed a realistic appearing toy pistol, was pointed directly at her and she saw no alternative but to comply. She counted out a little over \$1,000 and the young man scooped up the pile of currency in his right hand and casually walked out of the bank. No one else was aware of the robbery until the young woman excitedly told a bank official she had been robbed.

Messenger Robberies

Often robbers will not enter the bank itself in committing the crime but will waylay bank messengers in some partially isolated spot, thus hoping to lessen the danger of apprehension or identification. This type of bank robber seldom works alone, and these robberies are quite as well planned as those within the bank itself.

One of the biggest robberies in the history of the west coast occurred in 1945 in California when two bank messengers en route to a check-cashing agency located near a local manufacturing plant with approximately \$111,000 were stopped by a man dressed in the uniform of a military policeman. The messengers were then abducted and left tied hand and foot. Subsequent investigation developed that the bandit dressed as a military policeman and his accomplice had enrolled in the State university in order to furnish themselves with an alibi. Within 2 months of the robbery both individuals had been apprehended and the money was subsequently recovered from a cemetery where the robbers had hidden it.

Messenger robberies are generally carefully planned by the bandits after observing the daily routine of the messenger. Therefore, this type of holdup may often be prevented if deliveries of cash and securities by messenger are not according to any particular schedule or routine.

Frequently bank robbers will wear disguises in

an attempt to make their identification more difficult. A Minnesota bank was robbed by an individual clad in the black robes of a priest. A bank robber in Los Angeles, Calif., disguised himself with material described as ochre-colored paste. His neck was covered with a black substance, and he evidently had some talent as a makeup artist in that he further disguised himself by painting a livid red scar from his upper lip to the lobe of his ear.

In another case a bank robber in South Dakota wore dark-colored glasses. A cotton gauze bandage held in place by four pieces of adhesive tape covered his nose and the upper portion of his mouth, and in his mouth he held an unlighted cigar butt which assisted in holding the cotton gauze bandage in place. This bank robber got away with over \$5,000 but was apprehended less than a week after the robbery, and within 2 weeks he was on his way to a Federal institution to serve 25 years.

When a bandage or facial disguise is used by a holdup man, there exists the possibility that he is a local individual and may have identifying facial scars and characteristics.

A favorite ruse of some bank robbers is to wear clothing of one type over another set of clothing and then remove the outer garments shortly after the robbery.

The Getaway

Not the least of a bank robber's carefully laid plans are those for a subsequent getaway. Various methods have been employed in the departure, and this phase of the robbery has often proved the undoing of the subject. Perhaps in the majority of cases, a stolen automobile is used, and, naturally, the solution of this theft will go hand in hand with the solution of the bank robbery.

Driving their personally owned automobile, two young men entered a small town in Ohio on the morning of April 3, 1951, where one of them "cased" the local bank. That night they proceeded across the State line where they stole an automobile by jumping the ignition. Returning to Ohio the following morning, they parked the personally owned automobile several miles from the vicinity of the bank and both transferred to the stolen automobile. After thoroughly casing their getaway route in the immediate vicinity of the bank, they had the stolen automobile filled with gasoline at a small place 2 miles west of the bank.

At approximately 2:30 p. m., they entered the bank, obtaining nearly \$5,000 in currency. Leaving the bank employees securely bound and gagged, the two robbers departed in the stolen "getaway" car which they abandoned near the place they had earlier left their own automobile. The following day their own automobile was traded for a newer one, part of the loot from the robbery being used in the purchase. Latent fingerprints found on the rear view mirror of the abandoned getaway car were identified in the FBI Identification Division files, and further investigation on the basis of the evidence obtained resulted in the apprehension and subsequent conviction of the two bank robbers.

Early in February 1951, an Illinois bank was robbed of approximately \$8,900 by three armed men who, not content with the money to be found in the bank, also rifled a customer's purse. The bank bandits utilized three cars, all stolen prior to the robbery, in making their getaway. Two of the cars had been planted at some distance from the bank. In order to hinder any possible pursuit, the robbers strewed the road behind them with galvanized roofing nails.

Bank Robber Held Up

The 18-year-old robber of a Los Angeles, Calif., bank in November 1950, was beset with bad luck. This young bank robber appropriated a car which had been left parked in front of the owner's place of business with the keys still in it. However, he later parked in front of the bank and since he was taking up a good bit of space a young woman office employee politely requested him to move his car either backward or forward in order that she might have room to park. The man rudely ignored her request which resulted in the young lady remembering him later.

Inside the bank the man obtained slightly more than \$500 and in running from the bank he fell, dropping some of the money. He hastily scooped up the money, getting all but \$5, and then leaped into the stolen automobile and hurriedly departed. His troubles were not over, however. As he was preparing to abandon the getaway car less than three blocks from the bank, he was approached by three men and a woman who relieved him of half of the money he had just stolen. They had seen him fall while running from the bank and realized he had robbed the bank. All were subsequently apprehended, and a total of 36 years imprison-

ment and \$2,160 in fines was imposed on those involved.

Other bank robbers in recent years have made their getaway from the crime scene in rented cars, taxicabs, trucks and, in some few instances, in personally owned automobiles. On occasions, the robbers make their getaway by foot, though this is not a popular method.

Rented Getaway Car

At 11 a. m., on a quiet Saturday morning in November 1946, at Carlisle, Iowa, the vice president of the local bank had just completed a banking transaction and his customer had left the bank when two young men entered announcing that it was a "stick-up." One of the robbers fired a burst from a submachine gun, wounding a woman bank employee in the arm. The other vaulted the counter into the cashier's cage and began scooping up money. Upon his request the bandit with the machine gun tossed a barracks bag to the bandit behind the cashier's cage. The bandits got approximately \$4,500 and two revolvers, property of the bank.

One of the bank clerks followed the bandits when they left the bank and saw them run to a dark green Plymouth parked around the corner. The bank clerk gave chase in his car but the robbers soon outdistanced him; however, the clerk noted that the car bore no license plates and that it was traveling toward Des Moines. The next evening police in Des Moines observed a Plymouth resembling the getaway car described by witnesses. Investigation developed that the car was licensed to a rent-a-car agency. Further investigation revealed that the automobile had been checked out at 9:42 a. m. on the date of the robbery and returned at 12:15 p. m., on the same date. The physical description of the young man who rented the car tallied closely with that of one of the bandits. Both men were subsequently apprehended and sentenced to a total of 30 years for a crime which took but 5 minutes to commit.

Weapons Used Vary

Among the varied types of weapons which have been ordinarily utilized by bank robbers are pistols, rifles, shotguns, and machine guns. One west coast bank robber achieved notoriety of a sort when he teamed up with "Susie," a bomb enclosed in a black leather case approximately 12 inches

long, 9 inches wide, and 3 inches deep, containing sticks of dynamite. This case was fitted with a shoulder strap and was affectionately referred to as "Susie" by its owner.

An east coast gang of robbers stole \$500 in dimes from a bank teller when he was returning from the post office where he obtained the shipment for delivery to the bank. These robbers exhibited no weapons, but apparently none were needed since the pepper they threw into the teller's eyes kept him busy while they grabbed the money bag and escaped in an automobile which two others had driven to the curb.

Success or Failure

The history of law enforcement has demonstrated that swift apprehension and certain punishment are time-proven deterrents to crime. Whenever a bank is successfully robbed, whether it be a preventable robbery or not, it increases the confidence and boldness of the bank robbing element and earmarks some other bank for robbery at a future date. Success is as potent a weapon in the underworld as it is in normal life.

In the late afternoon of October 19, 1951, two men wearing black gloves, maroon mesh hoods, and carrying guns entered the front doors of a loan association in an eastern city and announced a hold-up. A clerical employee of the bank passing in a corridor at the rear heard a shuffling noise from the front and noticed that conversation had ceased. Becoming suspicious, she pressed an alarm button. In the meantime, the bandits had forced the customers and employees to the rear of the public area of the bank and ordered them to lie on the floor. One employee was pressed into service to unlock several of the tellers' tills which he did, including one he knew to be wired to send in an alarm when opened. Two detectives and a uniformed officer arrived shortly thereafter. As the uniformed officer entered the bank one of the bandits struck him over the head and shot him in the leg. The plain-clothes men returned his fire, killing him instantly. The other bandit attempted to flee but was captured in the basement of the bank building. It was subsequently learned that these two, with an accomplice, were responsible for other similar crimes in the area.

In another instance two brothers attempting to rob a west coast bank were apprehended before they could leave the premises. Although they had

huddled all the employees and occupants of the bank together, the bank manager, prior to leaving his desk, succeeded in tripping an alarm which was wired directly to the sheriff's office. The two robbers submitted without a struggle when a deputy sheriff appeared just as they were preparing to leave the bank.

All too frequently the robber is successful to the point of fleeing the premises following the actual robbery of the bank itself. But that is not absolute success. Recently a bank in the Pacific Northwest was robbed of approximately \$2,000 by a lone bandit. As soon as the robber left the scene a call was put through to the local law-enforcement agency advising that the bank had been robbed and that the robber had been driving a 1947 green Buick. Approximately 5 minutes after the crime occurred a patrolman heard a radio broadcast by the sheriff's office concerning the bank robbery, including a description of the getaway car. At about the same time a car answering this description passed him going in the opposite direction. The patrolman turned his car around and pursued the suspect car. When the suspect car was stopped, the robber immediately identified himself and readily admitted that he had robbed the bank.

Prompt reporting and alertness on the part of the chief of police were instrumental in the solution of the robbery of a bank in a small southern town. The chief of police, upon learning of the bank robbery, recalled seeing earlier that morning a maroon Buick with three men in it who were strangers. Within 10 minutes after the report of the robbery, the chief notified the nearest FBI office. An FBI agent left at once for the scene of the crime but on the way he saw a maroon Buick approaching. The agent turned his car and followed the Buick. Shortly after he began to follow the Buick, it pulled into a filling station and the agent blocked the entrance to the highway. When the agent identified himself the three robbers surrendered and were taken into custody.

Immediate Investigation Important

In the investigation of bank robbery cases it is essential that a thorough and immediate search be instituted at the crime scene in order to preserve all available evidence and to locate persons who may have observed the robbery or the getaway. It is also most essential that the premises be protected after the robbery. Employees and cus-

tomers should be prevented from handling articles which may have been touched by the bandits.

Shortly before closing time recently, an employee of a west coast bank who was drawing the blinds preparatory to closing the bank heard a deep harsh voice behind him say, "You might as well close the drapes too." The bank employee turned and saw a tall, sun-tanned, well-dressed individual, wearing dark-tinted glasses and holding a German Luger pistol. After ordering four other employees of the bank into a vault in the rear, the stranger furnished the first employee with a brown paper bag demanding he put the money in it. As the bandit noticed the bank employee eyeing him carefully, he said, "Take a good look. On second thought, write your name on one of these." With this statement, the robber seized a handful of advertising circulars of the bank which were on a table in the lobby and threw them to the employee. The bank employee wrote a fictitious name on one of the pamphlets and returned it to the bandit who thrust it into his pocket.

Following the robber's departure, the FBI was immediately called in to investigate the robbery. Photographs from the FBI bank robbery album were shown to the witnesses and a positive identification was made. Although witnesses stated that the bandit had been careful not to touch anything on which he might leave his fingerprints, processing of the handful of pamphlets he had tossed at the bank employee developed a latent fingerprint which, upon comparison with fingerprints in the Identification Division of the FBI, proved to be identical with those of the individual identified in the bank robbery album. Through this evidence, developed at the scene of the crime, the bank robber was subsequently identified and convicted.

Frequently identification of bank robbery subjects can be effected through the tracing of loot obtained in the robbery. Recently three youthful robbers of two midwestern banks were apprehended when law enforcement officers were successful in tracing down the passer of several travelers' checks—checks which had been part of the loot of the two bank robberies.

Cooperation Solves Bank Robberies

The most effective deterrent to the increasing bank robberies prevalent in the Nation today is the continued cooperative functioning of all law enforcement agencies. The local law enforcement agency

frequently receives the first report of the bank robbery but in the majority of cases the robbers themselves move so swiftly that in a short time they are out of the jurisdiction of the local authorities.

Close cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law enforcement officers in the lengthy and vigorous investigation of two bank robberies in a large eastern city was instrumental in the successful solution of the case and the subsequent apprehension of all the participants.

The first of the two robberies occurred in February of 1950 when two armed bandits entered a bank shortly before noon and fled with more than \$28,000 in cash. An immediate investigation was initiated by the FBI and the local police department. Bank employees furnished descriptive information concerning the bandits and their modus operandi. Investigation was conducted in the immediate area of the bank for the purpose of locating any persons who may have seen the bandits or strangers in that vicinity. Bank customers on the morning of the robbery were located and interviewed. Photographs of possible subjects were exhibited. Witnesses selected photographs of numerous persons who in some manner or other resembled one or the other of the bandits. By painstaking and extensive investigation which spread to various sections of the United States, these persons were eliminated one by one.

The investigation continued and then in December a second bank in the same area was robbed of approximately \$35,000 by three armed bandits. Again, an extensive investigation was begun by agents of the FBI and the officers of the local police department who were still working for the solution of the bank robbery of the previous February. Within a few minutes, officers and agents were on the scene and all logical leads were receiving prompt attention. Within a short while, similarities in the two robberies began to be noted. Less than 1 week after the second bank robbery the three bank robbers were taken into custody and more than \$33,000 of the total loot taken was recovered.

While it would be wishful thinking to feel that we can prevent all bank robberies, we can make it so hard to rob a bank successfully that the majority of bank robbers might decide it is not worth the chance. The apprehension and conviction of one bandit or gang for a single offense is the best preventive action we can accomplish, for bank robbers are often hardened criminals who will not

cease their criminal activity after one successful robbery; they will continue to victimize banking institutions until apprehended. The success enjoyed today in combating the bank robber can be credited, to a large degree, to cooperation among local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies. The combined efforts of all law enforcement agencies will aid materially in checking these crimes.

Supreme Court Decision on Confessions

Harvey L. Carignan was charged in the district court for the Territory of Alaska with killing a woman in attempting to rape her and upon his conviction, the jury having returned an unqualified verdict, he was sentenced to death.

The evidence showed that at about 9 o'clock on the evening of July 31, 1949, in Anchorage, Alaska, a man named Keith, while on his way home, noticed a man and a woman lying in tall grass at the side of the road. As Keith passed by, while the woman lay motionless, the man arose and ordered him to go on. His suspicions aroused, upon passing this location the next morning, Keith discovered the body of a seminude woman and informed the police. Upon investigation, the police learned the name of the victim and that a number of the personal effects found near the body were hers. A hat discovered at the scene was later identified as identical with one worn by Carignan on the night of the murder.

The police in their investigation placed in a line-up several individuals and permitted a second woman, who was the victim of an assault on September 14, 1949, and Keith to see this line-up. Both identified Harvey L. Carignan as the individual whom they had seen.

Carignan was indicted under the Code of Alaska for the rape of the second woman and was convicted.

Carignan had been arrested as soon as the victim had identified him as the man who had raped her and a complaint was immediately filed against him charging him with rape. He had an appearance before the commissioner immediately upon the filing of the complaint, all of which transpired within a short time after the identification of Carignan.

Bail was set on the rape charge and, failing to make same, Carignan was lodged in the custody of the United States marshal.

(Continued on inside back cover)

WANTED BY THE FBI

ISAIE ALDY BEAUSOLEIL, with aliases: Albert C. Amos, Aldie Beausoleil, Aldie Isaic Beausoleil, Aldie Beausoliel, Aldie Isaie Beausoliel, Aldie Isale Beausoliel, Aldie Isis Beausoliel, Antoine Beausoliel, Charlie Beausoliel, G. Martin, "Al," "Frenchy."

Unlawful Flight To Avoid Prosecution (Murder)



Isaie Aldy Beausoleil.

Around noon on August 17, 1949, the body of a woman was found in a ditch near a culvert in London Township, Monroe County, Mich. She had been murdered—her head caved in from the blows of a blunt instrument, apparently a hammer. Examination indicated that she had been dead from 8 to 12 hours.

The victim could not be immediately identified. Her clothing contained no clues. Apparently, from marks on the nose and temples, she had worn glasses, and from skin indentations on the left wrist, a watch.

The FBI Identification Division, after receipt of the dead woman's fingerprints, identified her as a former resident of the State of Connecticut.

Investigation reflected that at about 11:15 p. m. on August 16, 1949, an automobile was seen parked at the exact spot where the body was later found. The car reportedly left the scene in a hurry. Moreover, it was learned that the victim, during the period just prior to the murder, had been in the company of Isaie Aldy Beausoleil, often known by the nickname "Frenchy." A few days later, a car of the same make, year and body style

as the vehicle noted at the murder scene, belonging to Beausoleil, was found abandoned in Boston, Mass.

On August 31, 1949, a State warrant charging Beausoleil with first degree murder was issued in Monroe, Mich. An indictment was returned by a Federal Grand Jury at Detroit, Mich., on September 13, 1949, charging Beausoleil with a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1073, in that he fled from the State of Michigan to avoid prosecution for the crime of murder.

Previous Record

Beausoleil has a long arrest record. In May 1929, he was sentenced in New York City to from 5 to 10 years at Sing Sing Prison after he pleaded guilty to the charge of attempted robbery. He was received at Sing Sing Prison on May 27, 1929, and transferred to Attica Prison, Attica, New York, on June 22, 1931, escaping in September of the same year. He was arrested by the Providence, R. I., Police Department on February 26, 1932, for assault and robbery and was sentenced to 20 years at the Rhode Island State Prison. In September 1940, he was returned to the Attica Prison and on November 15, 1943, was released on parole to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation as an alien. He was deported to Canada that day for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.

The New York State Division of Parole on September 1, 1949, issued a parole violator's warrant against Beausoleil.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is co-operating with the FBI in the attempt to locate the fugitive.

Beausoleil was born April 21, 1902, in Simcoe County, Ontario, Canada. However, as a young man he came to the United States and lived in Woonsocket, R. I. He worked in a garage and a textile mill, and reportedly was engaged as a runner in the bootlegging racket. In this capacity, he is said to have become familiar with the terrain of the American-Canadian border. In addition, he has worked as a store clerk, salesman, and was employed as a hospital attendant in Massachusetts.

Beausoleil has been described as a "lone wolf" type of individual, being very close-mouthed. He has been known to secrete a gun on the lower left fender of a car or in the glove compartment, and reportedly will use it without hesitancy.

Beausoleil likes to roller skate and play Chinese checkers. He has been described as a neat dresser and particular about his personal appearance. He likes cats and in 1949, for example, had a white kitten known as "Fluffy." He has also talked about the possibility of obtaining a patent on a locking device for a tire or hubcap. Beausoleil writes legibly with flourishes in his styling, and gives evidence of being an expert penman.

Beausoleil is considered extremely dangerous, and reportedly always carries a gun.

Beausoleil is described as follows:

Age.....	50.
Born.....	April 21, 1902, at Simcoe County, Ontario, Canada.
Height.....	5 feet 10 inches.
Weight.....	170 pounds.
Build.....	Medium.
Hair.....	Dark brown.
Eyes.....	Brown.
Complexion.....	Dark.
Race.....	White.
Nationality.....	Canadian.
Occupations.....	Store clerk, auto mechanic.
Scars and marks.....	Deep dimple in point of chin, diagonal scar at first joint of left little finger.
FBI No.....	215, 345.
Fingerprint classification.	25 L 17 W OIO 17 L 3 W IOO

Notify FBI

Any person having information which may assist in locating this individual is requested to immediately notify the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C., or the Special Agent in Charge of the division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation which is nearest his city.

CONFESSIONS

(Continued from page 23)

While Carignan was in the custody of the marshal, he was interviewed by that official and orally and in writing confessed first to the rape of the victim and subsequently to the murder in the commission of rape of the other woman.

Carignan was indicted for the murder in the commission of rape. At his trial, both the oral and the written confessions which had been ob-

tained from him were offered in evidence and were received over the objection of Carignan.

The trial judge found that the confession to murder in the commission of rape was voluntary and was admissible.

Carignan appealed his conviction to the court of appeals for the ninth circuit contending that since the confession to the murder in the commission of rape was obtained from him while he was in custody but prior to an appearance before the United States commissioner on the charge of murder in commission of rape, the confession was inadmissible. Carignan relied on the decisions in the McNabb and Upshaw cases. The court of appeals for the ninth circuit in ruling on Carignan's contentions reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. The Government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which the Supreme Court granted.

The Supreme Court decided that the confession to murder in commission of rape was not inadmissible because it had been obtained while Carignan was in lawful custody prior to an appearance before a commissioner on that charge.




Beans and a Shoestring

A 100-pound bag of dried beans stolen from a railway car was recovered. The bag, containing approximately 60 pounds of beans when recovered, was found to have been repaired, evidently by the thief, by being laced shut with a brown shoestring. A suspect, who allegedly had tried to sell the bag of beans to several persons, was arrested by local officers. Beans were found in the man's pockets and in his shoes. At the same time, officers discovered that the string from the suspect's left shoe was missing. All pertinent evidence was forwarded to the FBI Laboratory for examination.

Subsequently, during the suspect's trial, an FBI Laboratory examiner testified that the shoestring used to repair the bag containing the stolen beans and the single shoestring in the pair of shoes worn by the defendant were constructed in the same manner, had been exposed to approximately the same amount of wear, and the plastic end covers of each had been crimped by the same tool. Both the beans recovered from the clothing of the defendant and those in the stolen bag were navy beans. The suspect subsequently was found guilty.

Interesting Pattern

FINGERPRINTS



This pattern is not questionable but it is unusual in formation. Although loop formation A is very short, it has sufficient length to form

definite shoulders and is separate from the other loop formation. All the requirements for the double loop whorl are present.