

FBI

Law Enforcement Bulletin

JULY 1976

WORN UPON



WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS TO BE SELF-EVIDENT: THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL, THAT THEY ARE ENDOWED BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN INALIENABLE RIGHTS, AMONG THESE ARE LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS, THAT TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS GOVERNMENTS ARE INSTITUTE AMONG MEN. WE... SOLEMNLY PUBLISH AND DECLARE, THAT THESE COLONIES ARE AND OF RIGHT OUGHT TO BE FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES...AND FOR THE SUPPORT OF THIS DECLARATION, WITH A FIRM RELIANCE ON THE PROTECTION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE, WE MUTUALLY PLEDGE OUR LIVES, OUR FORTUNES AND OUR SACRED HONOUR.

THOMAS HENRY CLAY
1797-1852



FBI

Law Enforcement Bulletin

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MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR

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
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
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THE COVER

U.S. Park Police officers at the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C., symbolize law enforcement's dedication to ideals upon which our Nation was founded. See Mr. Kelley's comments on facing page.



Message from the Director . . .



ON JULY 4, 1776, AMERICAN COLONISTS BOLDLY PROCLAIMED their political freedom and convictions in an extraordinary document of profound and continuing influence.

The ideals that distinguish the Declaration of Independence sparked not only the revolutionary zeal of these early patriots but have since illuminated our way as a Nation. The *truths* expressed in the Declaration, “. . . that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their Just Powers from the Consent of the Governed . . .,” remain today an enduring foundation of this Government and the measure of our democratic birthright.

As we join in the Bicentennial commemoration of the stirring events and aspirations that created a new Nation, let us take the occasion to also reaffirm the vital importance of idealism in the practice of law enforcement.

It is indeed our dedication to these ideals that in large measure today safeguards the basic rights and freedoms extolled on Independence Day so long ago.

Law enforcement is a public trust of the highest order. The awesome obligations that it carries cannot be fully met without a strong commitment to professional ideals. The challenge is total. The challenge is unrelenting.

Law enforcement has certainly made praiseworthy progress in a great many areas of technical competency and performance. Without question, these commendable advances have significantly improved police capabilities, and the results have been most impressive. It is, however, recognized that our pursuit of excellence can never falter—that the imperatives for constant progress in these areas cannot be evaded.

It should also be well recognized that knowledge, skill, and material resources alone will not enable the officer to fulfill his difficult role in a free and just society. Advanced training and sophisticated equipment are of little value to our profession and to the public we are sworn to serve if the individual officer lacks a sufficient commitment to essential spiritual qualities.

In attitude, conduct, and performance, devotion to high principles distinguishes the truly professional police officer. In the very best sense of the term, he practices *idealism*. His steady dedication to ideals of service is the wellspring of police integrity and effectiveness. As a profession and as a Nation, we may take considerable pride and assurance in the knowledge that the overwhelming majority of our police officers strive to match this standard.

Those seeking employment in law enforcement should be highly motivated toward a career of selfless and principled service. Certainly a high degree of professional idealism cannot be

MESSAGE

engendered too early in a law enforcement career. By training, example, and encouragement, every possible effort should be undertaken to further inspire and foster this commitment throughout our ranks, from the youngest recruit to the most veteran command officer.

Two centuries ago, a courageous, determined

group of Americans, *acting upon principle*, succeeded in freeing this country from political bondage. We are today beset by a most tenacious and formidable oppressor of freedom: crime. In the desperate struggle against this adversary, an increased devotion to the highest ideals of our profession is imperative.

JULY 1, 1976


CLARENCE M. KELLEY
Director

CORNERSTONES OF EXCELLENCE*

By

SIR ROBERT MARK, QPM

Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis
London, England

One of the most frequent comments by visitors to Great Britain is that our policemen are wonderful. It has, perhaps, become less common of late because policemen everywhere are being looked at more critically as their role in free societies becomes more difficult. But in my country at least, that sentiment continues to be expressed from time to time and not always by visitors from abroad. Three independent public opinion polls in the last 18 months suggest that the police enjoy more confidence and respect than any other British institution. Oddly enough, most of those who make approving comments about the police would not, if pressed, be able to find convincing reasons for their view. I think most of them would rely on the general impression of a comparatively orderly society, the fact



that police do not carry firearms as a routine measure and seem able to control political demonstrations and industrial disputes without using any special weapons or equipment and not least our constant and frequently seen readiness to help anyone in distress or to respond to public need in any kind

of emergency. These factors undoubtedly make a deep impression on public opinion but they are really only superficial indications of a relationship determined by much more significant realities, of which the predominant are firstly the limitation of police powers, secondly our high degree of

*The following is taken from an address delivered by Sir Robert Mark on April 13, 1976, in Washington, D.C., before the Executive Forum on Upgrading the Police which was sponsored by the Police Foundation.


accountability for our actions, and thirdly our freedom from political interference in operational matters at any level, central or local.

It is these factors above all which determine public confidence because they insure that the police reflect society as a whole. We discharge the communal will, not that of any government minister, mayor, or other public official, or that of any political party, whilst remaining fully accountable to the community for what we do or fail to do. And our constitutional freedom facilitates the discharge of the most important of our many duties, the preservation of individual freedom under the law, including the freedom of minorities to express views likely to provoke active public dissent.

There is a fourth factor, more general but no less important, which necessarily governs our effectiveness and reputation; namely, the acceptability of the laws we are required to enforce. But I will deal with that later.

It is often said that the liberties of which Englishmen are rightly proud are rooted in the supremacy of Parliament and the independence of the courts from the Executive or Government. Perfectly true. But those roots would not go very deep without a police force willing and determined to insure that the rulings of Parliament and the courts are observed; a task sometimes requiring courage, both moral and physical. Before the establishment of professional police forces in the 19th century, those rulings were sometimes treated with scant respect.

It is perhaps ironical that of all public services in Great Britain, we are the most taken for granted and the least understood. I doubt whether 1 in 1,000 Englishmen could give you even a vague outline of our organization, accountability or method of control. This is a pity because the English police system, reconciling as it does the conflicting aims of preserving individ-



Sir Robert Mark

ual freedom with the duty of the State to protect itself and its citizens, is undoubtedly one of the most sophisticated and successful institutions to emerge from the English way of life.

There are about 107,000 policemen and women in England and Wales, roughly 1 for every 400 citizens. We are unarmed, although firearms are available to a comparatively small number of specially trained men in emergencies. It needs only a little reflection on those numbers to appreciate that to some extent the term "police force" is misleading, since our tradition is to achieve our objectives by the avoidance of force, if at all possible. The use of force by policemen in Great Britain is necessarily qualified by the need for its approval or acceptance by the people and by the courts. If that acceptance is not forthcoming, the use of force must rebound upon the police themselves, both personally and collectively, because individually we are answerable to the law just like any other citizen. If we exceed our powers, we can be prosecuted or sued and, if a citizen suffers wrong from a policeman who cannot be identified, his chief officer can be found liable for that wrongdoing. We are taught at the outset of our police careers that obedience to orders affords no defense for wrong-

doing or misuse of authority.

In theory, responsibility for enforcing the law in Great Britain has always been local. Apart from a brief period under Oliver Cromwell, there has never been a national organization charged with that responsibility. Each citizen is still in theory responsible for enforcing the laws made by his elected representatives in Parliament. He can himself institute prosecutions in England and Wales, though not in Scotland, and he must respond to a call for assistance by a police officer. But, of course, in practice it does not work like that. One of the requirements of an overcrowded, industrialized society is for professional, highly trained policemen to discharge that duty on behalf of their fellow citizens. But it will be of particular interest to you that, but for a few exceptions determined by Parliament, the individual police officer in England and Wales still retains the inherent right of every citizen to initiate proceedings against anyone. This is in contrast to the position in Scotland, where authority to prosecute is not exercised by police but by public prosecutors known as procurators fiscal—a system not unlike yours, except that the fiscals are nonelective.

The 107,000 police officers in England and Wales clearly cannot operate effectively in isolation from each other. There is a clear need for organization, administration, and control. The achievement of this without violation of the basic principle of personal responsibility for law enforcement is a classic example of the English genius for compromise. Since the middle of the 19th century, the police have been attached, for administrative and financial purposes only, to the system of local government, the Central Government paying half the cost in return for compliance with regulations designed to insure uniformity in every aspect of police organization and administration. This means, in effect, that the

responsibility for policing Great Britain rests upon a threefold partnership between Central Government, local government, and the police themselves. The result is a system which looks like a national service but which, in fact, comprises 43 separate, autonomous but closely related forces governed by identical conditions of service including common rates of pay and pension and sharing many common services to achieve greater efficiency. Let us now look briefly at the division of responsibility between the three partners.

The forces outside London vary in size from roughly 700 to 7,000. Each is commanded by a chief officer, a professional policeman chosen by the Police Authority, a term which I will explain in a moment. The chief officer is the promotion and disciplinary authority for all but the most senior ranks and he exercises the right of appointment to the force. His control of the force is, however, subject to the

regulations I mentioned. These are made by the Home Secretary who is a senior Government Minister, after consultation with the Police Council, a national body on which police authorities and the police themselves are all represented. The regulations govern almost every aspect of police administration, for example, pay, promotion, discipline, and pensions; and compliance with them is a condition of a Government contribution of half of the cost of the force initially borne by the local taxpayer.

The Police Authority for the metropolitan police is the Home Secretary. In the other forces it is a committee of elected local government representatives and magistrates in the proportion of 2 to 1. The duties of the Police Authority include appointing the chief officer, his deputy and assistants and, if necessary, calling upon them to retire in the interests of efficiency, fixing the establishment of the force, and paying for its upkeep

out of local taxes and providing buildings and equipment. Individual members of police authorities have no responsibility for the enforcement of law in particular cases, but they have an overall, if rather tenuous, responsibility for the efficiency of the force and for satisfying themselves about the number of complaints against the police and the manner in which they are dealt with.

The Home Secretary has wide powers over both chief officers and police authorities. Appointments to senior posts are subject to his approval and appeals against disciplinary punishments lie to him. He is empowered to demand reports from chief officers on any matter, and he can institute inquiries into the administration of a police force by any person he chooses. He can require a police authority to retire its chief officer and on his satisfaction with the efficiency of the force depends the annual refund by the Government of half its expenditure.

In fact, however, coercive powers are rarely, if ever, used. The 43 forces operate harmoniously under the threefold partnership of the police, police authorities, and the Home Office. There are three police staff associations or unions which meet regularly to discuss professional and domestic matters, the police authorities having similar arrangements. All three, police, police authorities, and Home Office, are represented on joint negotiating bodies on whose advice the Home Secretary issues the regulations governing the administration of the service and which, amongst other things, require forces to aid each other in emergencies.

The achievement of uniform standards of organization and efficiency by financial inducement has made it possible to transform the police service in England and Wales from a rather mixed collection of some 200 forces, as recently as 1945, many of them inward looking and subject to improper

Mounted policeman at ceremony before Buckingham Palace.



local influence, to the present network of 43 forces, all enjoying the exclusive right of law enforcement within their own areas but observing common standards democratically negotiated and thus presenting the appearance of a national force whilst retaining the advantages of local autonomy, flexibility, and accountability. This has facilitated the emergence of what we call common services, or activities which we can better undertake jointly than separately. The training of recruits, for example, is done at a small number of district training centers each serving a number of forces by which they are administered.

Regional crime squads provide a

national detective network directed against target criminals and working in close collaboration with the police forces from which their members are drawn and to which they will return after temporary secondment for a few years. Forensic science laboratories and regional wireless depots similarly serve the whole country under the aegis of the Home Office, which is also developing computerization on a national scale. One of the most important common services is the National Police College at Bramshill. This was established in 1948 to raise the standards of efficiency throughout the police service and to provide the future leaders of the service.

It was Sir Robert Peel's intention that the police service should find its own leaders, but between 1829, when the metropolitan force was established, and 1948, it had shown itself largely incapable of doing so. About a quarter of appointments to the highest rank had been made from outside the police, in particular from the Armed Forces. The purpose of the college was primarily, therefore, to enable the police service to afford higher training facilities for all forces, to identify and develop the young officer with exceptional intellectual and command potential, to improve and spread professional knowledge, and not least important, to broaden the experience



Officers of the
Metropolitan Police.

and outlook of those destined for intermediate and senior command.

The college is controlled by a board of governors consisting of senior civil servants, chief officers of police and representatives from local government, and the police staff associations or unions.

There is an ascending scale of courses. At the lowest level, the special course of 1 year trains young constables of outstanding promise who have been selected by an extended interview on a national basis. It is possible for an officer to qualify for this course before the end of his third year of service. Standards for admission are very high and each year only 30 to 40 applicants are accepted. Successful completion assures immediate promotion to sergeant and after 1 year's satisfactory service in that rank, further promotion to inspector.

The largest course is that for recently promoted inspectors. It lasts 3 months. Selection is made by chief officers according to a quota of places based on the strength of each force and 140 inspectors from the 43 forces are in training at any one time.

Four overseas command courses, each of 3 months, are held each year. These are designed to train senior officers of overseas police forces for the responsibilities of assistant commissioner and above. Generally speaking the students are drawn from countries who are members of the British Commonwealth.

At the upper end of the scale, command training for senior officers is undertaken in two parts. The first provides training for 45 superintendents on four 3-month courses to equip them for divisional or departmental command and is an essential preliminary to the second part which is designed to equip even more senior officers for ultimate command.

The content of all college courses includes a substantial element of liberal studies. The college has never

been restricted to the narrow professional field of criminal law and police procedure. It was felt essential that police officers should understand and be able to communicate with and to manage their fellowmen; that they should be able to enforce the law and still maintain a human relationship with the public. A wide range of academic studies is, therefore, provided by 17 full-time tutors who are graduates in philosophy, politics, economics, English, psychology, sociology, and management studies.

At command course level some emphasis is laid on acquiring an understanding of modern managerial attitudes and methods and some familiarity with scientific and technological apparatus, particularly computers which are increasingly being brought into use not only for administrative purposes but for command and control of operational deployment. To counter any danger of insularity, students spend a week in other European countries examining preselected problems in the fields of crime, traffic, and public order. A further valuable contribution to the extension of their experience is the presence on the course of a number of officers from other countries. These have included officers from the United States, including the FBI, Europe, West Indies, the Middle East, and Australia.

In 1964, a scheme to produce our own university graduates from within the service by sending the most able students from the special and inspectors' courses to university was introduced to counter the apparent lack of attraction of a police career for university graduates generally.

This scheme, in which the college nominates candidates for scholarships to universities subject to the approval of their chief officers and police authorities, enables officers usually of the rank of inspector to take a degree of their choice, usually in law, social sciences, psychology, administrative

sciences, and combined subjects. During their 3 years at university they receive their full pay and allowances and no conditions are imposed about their future service with the police.

The Bramshill scholars' success in university examinations and their participation in university life have been impressive. The great majority achieve good honors degrees and wastage is very small. This scheme provides an unequaled opportunity for contact between some of the best young officers of the service and those who will eventually occupy influential positions in the community.

Perhaps the most important effect of the college has been the emergence of a unity of philosophy and purpose within the service. The bringing together of officers of varied professional backgrounds to learn, to discuss, and to exchange experience has been instrumental not only in forging valuable, personal interforce links but in the acceptance of the concept of a police service by those whose horizons have hitherto been restricted to their own force boundaries.

The authority of each police officer extends to the whole of England and Wales. Interchange between the 43 forces, with retention of pay and pension rights, is common and, for those aspiring to the highest ranks, obligatory. Every chief officer must, therefore, have served in two or more forces before being appointed. Graduation from the senior command course at the college is inevitably and rightly coming to be regarded as an essential qualification for those aiming at chief officer rank.

The cumulative effect of the amalgamation of police forces into fewer and more efficient units, of steadily increasing uniformity of organization, methods, and standards, the increasing extent of common services including computerization, and perhaps most important of all, the enlightening and uplifting role of the

National Police College is the emergence of the British police as a unified service having a stabilizing and reassuring influence in an inevitably changing and uncertain society. . . . We are now the bastion to which people at every level look for reassurance and comfort.

The emergence of a unified yet local service enjoying a high degree of public confidence is encouraging, but it is not enough. You will recall that I mentioned a fourth factor determining our relationship with the people—the acceptability of the laws we are required to enforce. No matter how efficient and accountable the police, we are only one part of the process that

we call criminal justice. The making of laws, the rules for investigating wrongdoing and trying offenders, the treatment of the accused and the guilty, all these are part of that process, and widespread public ignorance tends to lay upon the police the blame for the failure of any one of them. If laws are unenforceable or only enforceable sporadically, and therefore unfairly, people blame the police, not the legislature. If the balance of the criminal process is weighted too heavily on the side of the suspected or accused person the police cannot be effective.

In a free society, people find that it attracts more votes or popularity to

challenge the validity of a conviction or the denial of bail than to question the acquittal of the guilty, which is no less a miscarriage of justice, or to analyse the effects of too liberal bail procedures. It is important also to understand that no one but the police sees collectively the failure of the criminal process. We alone know the numbers of crimes not followed by prosecution of the offender, of crimes committed on bail, of acquittals of those who are only too obviously not innocent. We alone experience the collective effect of the difference between the theory of criminal justice and its defects in practice, which undermines its efficiency and lessens public confi-

The British National Police College at Bramshill, England.



dence in it. In Britain, the police are coming to realize that the public interest requires us to gather and make known information of this kind to the public itself rather than to those who have vested interests in the making or practice of law. There are, of course, great difficulties. The laws of libel, of privilege and contempt prevent us from exposing the worst failures of the criminal process, but gradually we are acquiring the technique of drawing public attention to evidence showing systematic weaknesses or failure, rather than of individual instances of malpractice or injustice. By this means we persuaded the Government in 1967 to abandon unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials and to require also the pretrial disclosure of alibi defences. One in every 8 of 9 findings of guilt these days is by a majority of not less than 10 to 2. The enormous saving in time and money by the avoidance of retrials has not been countered by any expression of public or judicial disquiet or dissatisfaction.

We hope before the end of this century, if not this decade, to persuade the Government to abolish the caution against self-incrimination and to require the accused to enter the witness box to speak or remain silent, as he pleases, the intention being, of course, that the credibility of the accused should relate at least to some extent to his spontaneity rather than to the period of silence between arrest and trial which has produced, and continues to produce, some of the most predictable, ingenious, and highly paid fiction of our time.

There is, I think, a price that we in Great Britain must pay for public acceptance of changes of this kind. We must first accept that no punishment by criminal process should be irrevocable. In other words, the death penalty should not be restored. Second, we must be willing to accept a high degree of supervision of and ac-

countability for our own handling of criminal cases and of complaints. This willingness must extend to the establishment of machinery and procedures for dealing effectively with complaints of police wrongdoing and corruption, coupled with continuing revision of administrative selection and promotion procedures, so as to make wrongdoing less likely and more certain of detection and punishment if and when it does occur. We have made extensive progress along these lines during the last few years in London, and are presently discussing with the Government a review of our complaints procedure.

As a professional policeman in my 39th year of service, I believe that the best deterrent to deliberate and, therefore, preventable crime is not the severity of punishment unlikely to be applied, but the probability of detection, or being caught, followed by the near certainty of conviction of the guilty. I do not, of course, imply that the protection of society may not require the imposition of imprisonment for life, but certainly in my country the number of cases involving that requirement is comparatively small. The cornerstone of my belief is that the purpose of criminal justice should not, as at present, be the establishment of technical guilt as a prerequisite to punishment, but the discovery of the truth, without which it seems to me unreasonable to expect justice to be effective or to command public confidence. Some of you may think that as policemen it is improper for you to comment in general terms on the process of justice, that your purpose should be confined to administering a system devised by others. That was certainly so in my country, but we have come to realize that the police have a duty to contribute from their experience to public discussion of the purposes and procedures of criminal justice. We know as much about it as anyone, and exclusion from public debate about its strengths and weaknesses must inevit-

ably detract from our status and discourage recruitment and retention of the sort of men necessary to create and maintain the kind of service that both police and public really want. Whatever you may hear or read about the economic or other problems of Great Britain, I am happy to tell you that in the sphere of policing we regard ourselves as being in excellent health and likely to be widely regarded in the fairly near future as one of the most important and beneficial influences upon English social life. Our problems, like yours, are great, but our morale and, I like to think, our reputation have never been higher.

(FBI)


AN EXPLOSIVE CONTACT

In the October 1973 issue of the BULLETIN, a filler item warned of the danger of police officers carrying loose revolver ammunition in the same pocket with two-way radios. Many of the radios have lifetime batteries, as well as exposed or slightly recessed recharging studs. Should the ammunition come in contact with these recharging studs in a manner which would create electrical continuity with the battery, an explosion could result.

Recently, it has come to the BULLETIN's attention that a police officer in the Midwest had a strobe light battery in his coat pocket along with a .30 caliber cartridge. The round exploded, propelling the bullet into the officer's coat. It is suspected that the current generated by the battery caused the resultant explosion.

Luckily, in this case, there were no injuries.

Proper Procedures For Taking Major Case Prints



The availability of readable major case prints of suspects and others is often critical in establishing the identity of a person leaving latent prints at the scene of a major crime or on related evidence. It is, therefore, imperative that proper procedures be followed in taking major case prints so that accurate and complete comparisons may be made in such instances.

Definition

Major case prints consist of recordings of all the friction ridge detail present on the palmar surfaces of the hands and the inner surfaces of the fingers. This includes the extreme sides of the palms and the extreme tips, sides, and lower joints of the fingers.

Purpose of Major Case Prints

Major case prints are utilized to make accurate and conclusive comparisons with all latent prints obtained during an investigation—usually a major case.

“The inking of the individual’s hand for recording the palm print is accomplished by firmly rolling a thin, even film of ink over the entire palmar area of the hand.”

Often, numerous latent prints developed at crime scenes are of ridge areas of the palms or fingers that do not appear for comparison purposes on a routinely rolled set of inked fingerprints. Major case prints are,

therefore, frequently needed to adequately compare all latent prints developed in a case.

The taking of major case prints should not be restricted to suspects only. Major case prints for elimination purposes should be obtained from all persons who may have legitimately or inadvertently touched areas or items associated with the crime scene.

Equipment and Materials


The following items are necessary for recording major case prints:

An ordinary inking stand for taking regular rolled fingerprints.

A roller for spreading ink.

A tube of black printer’s ink.

Figure 1.



A cylindrical object 3 inches or more in diameter for rolling palm prints. (An 8- to 10-inch section of the cardboard tube from a roll of wrapping paper, a large can, or other object of this nature will suffice.)

A Criminal Fingerprint Card (FD-249). (Elimination impressions should be recorded on other than the Criminal Fingerprint Card.)

At least four 8- by 8-inch plain white cards for recording palm prints and prints of the lower joints, tips, and sides of the fingers.

Denatured alcohol or cleaning fluids, along with necessary cloths for cleaning the fingers, hands, inking plate, and roller.

This necessary equipment is illustrated in figure 1. (Note: Rubber bands should also be on hand.)

Procedures

Caution: Before taking fingerprints or major case prints of a suspect, the officer taking the prints should give his weapon to a fellow officer to hold, or place it in a secure

area completely out of the reach and sight of the suspect.

The correct procedures for record-

ing a set of major case prints are as follows:

First, record a complete set of rolled

Figure 2.

LEAVE BLANK		TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK				FBI LEAVE BLANK	
STATE USAGE		LAST NAME <u>NAM</u>		FIRST NAME		MIDDLE NAME	
		Doe,		John		Joseph	
SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED		ALIASES		CONTRIBUTOR		ORI	
<i>John J. Doe</i>		Johnny		VAFBIQ90Z			
THIS DATA MAY BE CONFIDENTIAL IN LOCAL, STATE AND NATIONAL FILES		DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED		SEX		RACE	
DATE <u>1-7-76</u>		DOA		M		W	
SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS		YOUR NO.		HGT.		WGT.	
<i>John J. Doe</i>		OCA		67"		250	
CHARGE		FBI NO.		EYES		HAIR	
Burglary		76-23		Bro		Bro	
		271-175B		Anytown, USA		DOB	
FINAL DISPOSITION		SOC. SEC. NO.		CLASS.		PLACE OF BIRTH	
		7234612B		REF.		POB	
		482-26-5505				9-6-1930	
		CAUTION		NCIC CLASS - FPC			
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
1. R. THUMB		2. R. INDEX		3. R. MIDDLE		4. R. RING	
5. R. LITTLE		6. L. THUMB		7. L. INDEX		8. L. MIDDLE	
9. L. RING		10. L. LITTLE		11. L. PALM		12. L. SIDE	
13. L. BACK		14. L. FINGER		15. L. FINGER		16. L. FINGER	
17. L. FINGER		18. L. FINGER		19. L. FINGER		20. L. FINGER	
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25. L. FINGER		26. L. FINGER		27. L. FINGER		28. L. FINGER	
29. L. FINGER		30. L. FINGER		31. L. FINGER		32. L. FINGER	
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


Figure 3.


fingerprints, as shown in figure 2. (A previous article in the February 1976 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin entitled "Techniques For Taking Good

Fingerprints" sets forth this procedure.)

The second step is to record the entire friction ridge area of the 10 fingers. This is accomplished by utilizing at least two 8- by 8-inch plain white cards. Prints should be recorded on one side only, and as many cards as necessary to obtain satisfactory impressions may be used. For best results, the fingers should be inked with the roller instead of the inking plate. The roller allows the ink to be applied to all friction ridge areas of the fingers. (See fig. 3.) A plain 8- by 8-inch white card should be fastened firmly to the extreme edge of a table so as to allow no movement.

The prints should be recorded in the same sequence as the fingers appear on the fingerprint card, beginning at the lower left corner of the card with the right thumb. With a roller, apply ink to the entire friction ridge area of the right thumb. Holding the thumb horizontally, but at a 45° angle, firmly press left side of thumb onto plain white card. Firm pressure must be applied to assure that the areas between the joint make contact with the white card. When the left portion of the thumb, at a 45° angle, has been firmly placed on the

Figure 4a.



card, it is removed by lifting up from the palm all the way to the nail. This should assure the complete recording of the left side of the thumb and tip areas of the thumb. The next step is to place the center portion of the thumb to the right of the previously recorded left side. Again press down firmly and raise from the palm to the nail. This will record the center portion of the thumb and the center portion of the extreme tip area.

Next, place the right side of the thumb at a 45° angle on the white card to the right of the center portion. Apply firm pressure and again raise the thumb from palm to nail. This will record the right side of the thumb and the right side tip area. Now, place the left tip side of the thumb at a 45° angle and roll completely from one side to the other ending at a 45° angle on the right side. At this time, four separate prints will be present—left side with tip area, center portion with tip area, right side with tip area, and a rolled impression of the tip of the finger.

Care must be taken to assure that the sides of the fingers are placed at approximately a 45° angle. Many individuals have a tendency to place fingers at a 90° angle for recording the sides. This will *not* result in an overlapping of the ridge detail of the other ridged sections of the finger, which is necessary.

This print should be labeled “number 1” or “right thumb.” This process is now repeated with the remaining 9 fingers, in the same order as on the fingerprint card, thus completing the major case printing of the 10 fingers. (See figs. 4a and 4b.)

Recording Palm Prints

The inking of the individual's hand for recording the palm print is accomplished by firmly rolling a thin, even film of ink over the entire palmar area of the hand. (See fig. 5.) This should

include the extreme sides of the palm.

For recording palm prints, a white

“Major case prints consist of recordings of all the friction ridge detail present on the palmar surfaces of the hands and the inner surfaces of the fingers.”

8- by 8-inch card should be positioned around a cylindrical object and held in place with a rubber band around each end, as shown in figure 6. This cylinder with the attached white card should be placed well away from the edge of the table. The heel (wrist end) of the right palm is now placed on the upper edge of the white card with the fingers together and pointed straight ahead. The person taking the prints should merely lay his right hand

over the palm of the individual being printed, utilizing sufficient pressure to insure firm contact of the palmar surface with the card. (See fig. 7.)

The cylinder is now rolled backwards toward the person being printed until the tip areas of the fingers are recorded. (See fig. 8.) The hand is kept in a horizontal position so that, as the areas of the palm and fingers are recorded, it is automatically removed from the card. This is done to prevent smudging of the print. The white card is now removed from the cylindrical object and fastened to the edge of the table. At this time, the right side of the right palm is placed at a 45° angle to the right of the previously printed palm and pressed onto the white card. This will record the extreme right edge of the palm. Next, the left side or thumb area of the right

Figure 4b.






Figure 5.




Figure 6.

Figure 7.



Figure 8.






Figure 9a.

Figure 9b.



palm is placed to the left of the main palm print and impressed there, thereby recording the entire ridged area of the palm. This three-step process is now repeated with the entire ridged area of the left palm, thus, completing the recording of the palm prints. (See figs. 9a and 9b for examples of results achieved by this process.)

Signatures Necessary

All cards must be signed and dated by the officer recording the prints. The name and signature of the per-

"Clear and completely recorded major case prints can be a key asset in solving an important case."

son who was printed must also appear on all cards.

This completes the recording of the major case prints. The individual taking the impressions will have a minimum of five cards: one fingerprint card; two cards with the lower joint areas, sides, and tips of the fingers; and two palm print cards.

A Key Asset

Clear and completely recorded major case prints can be a key asset in solving an important case. In addition to comparison with latent prints developed in a recent investigation, they can also be searched through the appropriate sections of an unidentified latent print file. By so doing, one set of clearly recorded major case prints could lead to the solution of several crimes.

Following these procedures carefully in taking major case prints can ultimately save considerable time and effort in bringing criminals before the bar of justice. Time thus saved can be invested in pursuing the solution of other major crimes. (FBI)

Naval Investigative Service: Case Management on a Global Basis

By

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Director

and

SPECIAL AGENT CLYDE J. ROACH

Special Assistant

Policy and Performance

Naval Investigative Service

Alexandria, Va.

To the young man waiting to board at Honolulu International Airport the immediate concern was luggage. Had he packed the right things? More to the point, did he even own the right things to pack?

Seven days and some 20,000 miles later he would have the answer (no, to both) and a better understanding of the complexities involved in meeting the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) mission.

Special Agent Marretta's normal assignment was at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Part of the NIS Resident Agency there, most requests for his assistance came from Navy and Ma-

rine Corps activities close at hand. But the geography of the Pacific dictates a far wider area of responsibility, and at the Navy Detachment in Christchurch, New Zealand, Marretta was soon exchanging aloha shirts for extreme weather gear. The final leg was completed after refueling at McMurdo Sound at Antarctica. For the bottom of the world it was the "summering in" season, but at Amundsen-Scott Station he stepped from the plane to face a wind-chill factor of 85° below. Welcome to the South Pole!

The NIS Mission

Agent Marretta's experience was unusual, but not unique. The NIS mis-

*Editor's Note: Captain Martin coauthored this article prior to his retirement from active service in May, 1976.





sion sets a clear task—to provide an investigative and counterintelligence capability to commands where located—but prescribes no boundaries. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps frequently change operational locations in response to national or strategic imperatives, and the Naval Investigative Service has to maintain a mobile base to assure a uniform level of support. During the Vietnam conflict, special agents served both in Vietnam and with the Seventh Fleet offshore on Yankee Station; today NIS agents are posted to some 142 offices throughout the world.

In practice, NIS efforts are focused on two areas: the investigation of major offenses committed by naval personnel—generally acts punishable by confinement for more than 1 year—and counterintelligence matters. The latter includes espionage, terrorism, and subversion directed against the Navy. Because of this dual task and the fact that a criminal inquiry may frequently surface counterintelligence considerations, the Service is under the command of the Director of Naval Intelligence. In this way, key information is directly available to support the Navy's overall intelligence mission.

The immediate responsibility of all NIS units, however, is to the commands they support. They represent a professional tool available to the commanding officer in fulfilling responsibilities in the areas of law enforcement and security. Virtually all investigations are begun as a result of a command contacting the nearest NIS office and seeking assistance, but each

case has the backup support of the worldwide organization.


Centralized direction is the heart of the system. Agent Marretta's trip, for example, was scarcely a solo venture. It was only one step in a series of inquiries that had already involved NIS offices in Washington, D.C., New Orleans, La., Corpus Christi, Tex., St. Louis, Mo., and Long Beach, Calif.

The Navy situation is in many ways unique. Its population profile, for one, is predominately male, consisting of personnel between the ages of 18 and 50. Protective responsibilities extend not only to conventional property but apply to the full arsenal of armaments, from nuclear weaponry to warships and aircraft. Varying State, local, Federal, or foreign law enforcement jurisdictions may exist on a single base, depending upon how the land was acquired.


In investigative situations, even the *corpus delicti* may not always stay put. A ship in port may request the investigative services of the local special agent, and thereafter, on short notice, receive a change of sailing orders. The crime scene, evidence, and witnesses all are suddenly afloat and remote on the high seas. In such an instance, the entire investigation would be transferred to the NIS office at the ship's next port of call. Or, depending upon the urgency, agents from alternate points could be brought on board en route.

NIS Organization

To understand the management of our investigations, a system perhaps



Special Agent Roach



Captain Martin

unique to the Navy, it is helpful to look at the background leading to the establishment of the present system.

The Navy's investigative arm has undergone many changes in its history. Until World War I, investigations were not a formal enterprise of a separate support service. When an investigation was necessary, it was handled on an individual basis by the commander concerned, using whatever assets happened to be at hand. In 1917, the Office of Naval Intelligence undertook the first unified effort to establish a separate service for this function. "Aides for Information" were established in the various naval districts, and small cadres of investigators were available at each.

The concept was refined over the years, evolving into what became closely coordinated District Intelligence Offices. Some problems of flexibility remained, however. Finally, in 1965, then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordered that a centrally directed service be established, and in February of the following year NIS became an entity.

From this point on, the Navy's approach has been to manage operations directly from its Washington, D.C., area headquarters to the field, without the intermediate levels often found in

Government. The organization has been accused of being too lean, with less than 600 special agents worldwide, but therein may lie its strength, as it has proven a durable and efficient mechanism.

In its fundamental structure, NIS headquarters consists of a directorate and two departments, operations and administration. Ten regional components (Naval Investigative Service Offices) exist, and each has a commanding officer and a small professional staff. The field units (resident agencies) are the next subunit and they may range in strength from 1 to 20 or more agents. These resident agencies are seeded throughout Europe, the United States, and the Pacific area. It is here that investigative management begins.

The Case Cycle

In the civilian community, the first report of a criminal offense having occurred usually comes to a uniformed police officer. The naval service receives notification through similar means, relying on civilian guard and security forces, base police, masters at arms, and the Provost Marshal Corps on the Marine installations for such reports. But the responsibility of each is limited to the base or ship

a coordinated effort beyond these limits, NIS is chartered by the Secretary of the Navy to provide centralized investigative support across the board. Commands have a responsibility to promptly refer any incidents which fall within NIS jurisdiction. Upon receipt of information indicating action on a matter within NIS jurisdiction is necessary, it is assigned by the senior resident agent to one or more of the special agents at hand.

In remote offices the procedure varies slightly. At an office such as Bermuda, the agent is based at the Naval Air Station and serves as the Navy's investigative intermediary with island government, responding directly to case requirements. Operational support is drawn from the parent unit in the Washington, D.C., area. Similarly, a special agent afloat deploys on the aircraft carrier to which he is assigned and is available to all ships in the task group. He is backstopped, however, by the NIS office in whatever theater he is operating.

The Agent Afloat Program is unique to the Navy, and a word of explanation is in order. NIS differs from other military investigative agencies as its special agent corps is predominantly civilian.¹ Within the professional ranks, the average agent may expect some six or more assignment transfers during the course of his career with at least one of these being as an Agent Afloat. The Navy's combat readiness capability is represented by the fleet, and to do its job NIS must be integral to the operating forces. Although they continue as civilians, agents serve essentially as part of the ship's complement on all carriers whether in port or at sea. Although serving on independent duty, each agent still has the full resources of the NIS organization behind him.

Given the widespread dispersal of personnel, communications is obviously a major factor in case manage-

ment. The NIS Operations Control Center in Alexandria, Va., is the central coordination point. It is manned on a 24-hour-a-day basis and serves as the access terminal to the National Crime Information Center and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, as well as to the several Navy and Marine Corps record systems.

All NIS offices in the United States and overseas are linked by a communications network operating through the Center's computer-switching and relay capability. Although a number of technical considerations are involved, the system works surprisingly well. A police department, for example, seeking to locate a Navy witness would query the Center directly or contact the local NIS office, which would then pass on the requirement. The Operations Control Center

determines the individual's duty station and reports the information back to the original inquirer.

When the matter is urgent, the Center also serves as a pivot point. NIS representatives at San Diego, Calif., for example, may learn of a Marine fugitive en route by airplane to Savannah, Ga. On receipt of the alert, the Center confirms issuance of a DD553 (absentee wanted by the Armed Forces) and requests the assistance of the Savannah Police Department. The nearest NIS office, in this instance the one at Parris Island, S.C., is simultaneously contacted in order to coordinate transfer of custody from civilian authorities to the military.

But the bulk of electrical traffic concerns routine case reporting and the relaying of investigative leads. Supervisory overview is exercised by the

Naval Investigative Offices and NIS headquarters with an eye to gauging workloads, monitoring trends, and facilitating assistance, if needed. Some 3,000 investigations are in progress at any given time, so NIS headquarters is aware of developments in a broad range of offenses. It also serves as the office of record for investigative files and for cases whose complexity or ramifications may involve a number of other agencies outside NIS. A recent inquiry into a fraudulent enlistment matter, for example, led to the discovery that the suspect had perpetrated multiple frauds for 10 years, and had netted over \$600,000 from reenlistment bonuses and other payments. As the case expanded, it became a matter of interest to several agencies throughout the country and to the various military services.

Maintaining a close working relationship with all of law enforcement is a basic tenet of the NIS philosophy. A relatively small organization, NIS simply could not operate without a high degree of mutual cooperation with, and assistance from, other agencies. Reciprocal servicing is a matter of course between NIS, the Army's Criminal Investigations Command, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. To the extent permitted by law and international agreement, NIS also works closely with foreign and domestic police and security agencies on a regular basis in pursuing jurisdictional matters.

NIS also maintains a close relationship, mutually beneficial, with the FBI. Statutory responsibilities and various common interests produce a daily exchange of information on such diverse matters as following prosecutive actions, handling Privacy Act requests from the public, and coordinating some matters relating to security. FBI Special Agents provide instruction as an integral part of the NIS training cycle as do experts in various specialties from other civilian and

NIS headquarters at Alexandria, Va., near the Nation's Capital, serves as the 24-hour communications nerve center for the worldwide system.





View from the bottom—a
NIS agent on assignment at
the South Pole.

military agencies. Their participation touches on the three main categories of NIS operational involvement—investigations, initiative operations, and security responsibilities. (Initiative operations are nonreactive endeavors undertaken to deter crime and assure the security of sensitive Navy operations, material, and information.) Case management is geared to the interrelationships of these enterprises, and experience has shown that rarely does one undertaking remain in total isolation from the others.

NIS Operations

When does an intelligence-type inquiry or investigative action change to an active criminal investigation?

The Operations Director for NIS acknowledges "It depends on the time of day," meaning numerous variables can produce this development at any time.

This experience is common to police agencies and no less so to the Naval Investigative Service. Criminal intelligence operations for the Navy are attempts to stay ahead of potential problems by identifying trouble spots and neutralizing planned criminal activity before it can be put into motion. It is done in a number of ways. The Navy Material System, for example, does billions of dollars worth of business every year. NIS Fraud Survey teams are continually in operation in this area, seeking to detect criminal manipulation and to identify areas of potential vulnerability.

The point at which intelligence collection shifts to an active investigation depends on the individual case, and often the two may proceed simultaneously. Fallout from initial criminal investigative operations may frequently have security connotations as well. Discovery of the theft, loss, or compromise of classified documents is

a situation where this commonly occurs.

Narcotics Abuse

Narcotics intelligence is another field of substantial agent investment. Primary reliance is on confidential sources developed to identify Navy traffickers and distribution networks. Emphasis is also placed on uncovering shipboard use of narcotics, as narcotics abuse can be a particular hazard to the safety of crewmembers. In overseas areas, these units work closely with local narcotics suppression authorities and frequently accompany ships to foreign ports to assist in identification of narcotics sellers and naval personnel involved with them.

Port Brief Program

The Port Brief Program is another significant operation. Each special

agent who calls at a foreign port that receives Navy ship visits collects information on criminal and security conditions. Such data may include the presence of hostile intelligence services known to target Navy and Marine Corps personnel, the effectiveness of police and security agencies, and areas or situations that should be avoided by Navy personnel on liberty. Relevant facts in this regard are compiled at NIS headquarters and provided fleetwide to assist commanding officers in their planning. Afloat Agents are normally a part of advance landing parties of ships and handle liaison with onshore law enforcement and security officials. This program is a continuing one and is augmented by

predeployment briefings to key staffs of all the numbered fleets.

NIS Training

As is evident, the special agent's job is a multifaceted one, and training is vital to efficient management of NIS. Applicants come from a wide range of backgrounds in the arts and sciences, and this diversity is a dimension which has proven invaluable. New agents receive a thorough grounding in constitutional and criminal law at the NIS Academy in Alexandria, in addition to the normal investigative syllabus. Periodic attendance at inservice seminars is an ongoing requirement throughout an agent's career cycle, and there is regu-

lar programming of technical training in protective service operations, investigative photography, and other areas. One or more tours in a specialized field, such as one requiring extensive use of the polygraph, are not uncommon, and NIS regularly sponsors candidates to the Armed Forces

"The overall NIS goal is to develop its special agents as generalists who are at ease in a number of disciplines."

Institute of Pathology, the National War College, and private institutions, for further development of personnel.

The NIS mission includes providing direct support to both the Marine Corps and the Navy. Special agents are located at all major Marine bases.





NIS agent (at left)
functioning as NIS's
"man in Bermuda."

The overall NIS goal is to develop its special agents as generalists who are at ease in a number of disciplines. The approach is twofold: to provide opportunities and training in order to fine-tune investigative skills so that there is uniform versatility throughout the system, and to program assignments so as to prepare agents for varied supervisory positions of increasing responsibility.

Within any organization, a large part of individual growth comes from a diversity of experiences and opportunities to exchange experiences in dialogue with others. NIS is fortunate in this regard since its rotational agent base permits a great deal of interchange. A special agent fresh from assignment to Morocco can share insights and investigative approaches with agents in the United States or, perhaps, the Philippines, or elsewhere, that are as totally different as the areas of their assignment.

NIS has a special trust to assure that maximum proficiency is main-

tained by selected Marine Corps personnel who would have counterintelligence and criminal investigative responsibilities in combat zones in the event of an armed conflict. Some Marines serve in NIS offices throughout the world and participate in all phases of NIS investigations and counterintelligence operations. The high qualifications and expert knowledge of military matters these assigned Marines possess have made for a valuable and mutually rewarding association.

The Navy Experience

Contrasting crime trends in the Navy with those in the public sector is extremely difficult. There are no unemployment pockets in the Navy, and crime-conducive conditions prevalent in civilian communities may be lacking in Navy environments. A naval installation does not have the number of very young and very old people that are factors in analyzing crime or making crime comparisons

between the Navy and national trends. On the other hand, the median age of Navy personnel is one that is most susceptible to criminal involvement.

“. . . the naval establishment . . . is troubled by many of the same types of offenses as those found in civilian communities.”

Although accurate comparisons cannot be made, the naval establishment has experienced an increase in criminal activity and is troubled by many of the same types of offenses as those found in civilian communities.

Illegal use of narcotics is the single most proliferating case category, and not surprisingly, involvement in such matters is primarily by young sailors and Marines on their first term of enlistment. The volume of robberies has steadily increased over the past several years, as have incidents of arson, wrongful destruction, and burglary. Statistics have to be approached with

care, and the NIS data base shows only the measure of incidents wherein commands have requested assistance. It does not show offenses involving Navy personnel or installations committed by persons outside the military or processed by civil courts. And the data it does contain is not always limited to confirmed offenses. Investigation of a suspected arson, for example, may establish no human involvement at all.

A frequently asked question is "How much crime is acceptable to the Navy?" Obviously it is one that defies an answer. One NIS official expresses a pragmatic view: "The present rate is unacceptable," he says, "but more law enforcement alone is not going to cure it."

Considerable attention has been given to this problem in recent years,

however. One result has been a substantial strengthening of the NIS posture. A number of innovative approaches are being tried to identify elements that can produce crime deterrence. For the Navy, the measure of success is directly related to its operational readiness. Impairment of its

"For the Navy, the measure of success is directly related to its operational readiness."

readiness posture may not only occur through a crime such as a malcontent disabling a ship by placing a wrench in its reduction gears. The ability of the Navy to fulfill its mission is dependent on the morale, discipline, and proficiency of its personnel. To the extent that these qualities are eroded

by crimes against Navy personnel or property, its reactive capability is similarly diminished.

Although small in numbers, NIS has a large role in protecting this capability. The key to success is its ability to stay abreast of changing challenges. The management mechanisms touched on are only a part of the process. The strength of the organization lies in observing the principle of cooperative law enforcement at all levels. And for NIS and cooperating U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, more than mutual self-interest is a factor—it is an investment by all involved in guarding the Nation's security and assuring its future.

FOOTNOTE

¹ Some Navy and Marine Corps active duty military personnel also serve rotational tours with NIS. They carry NIS credentials and operate on an equal footing with civilian special agents.



The Navy gives top priority to any criminal incident that affects operational readiness.



TARGETING ON THE CAREER CRIMINAL

By

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The St. Louis County, Mo., Police Department has created a new, highly specialized unit within its criminal investigation element, a unit with the career or professional criminal as its target. The new Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI) is one of several organizational changes designed to direct the department's resources and manpower to a greater "crime fighting" effort.

Problem


The career criminal presents a formidable problem to St. Louis County due to several circumstances. These include the fact that St. Louis County covers an area of 500 square miles and has almost 1 million inhabitants. Also, within the county, there are 93 municipalities, with 70

"The county police force has reevaluated its goals and achievements and placed the career criminal and crime fighting as its number one priority."

providing police service through their own local police departments. The county police department provides complete police service to the unincorporated areas, as well as many auxiliary services to the entire county, previously under the sheriff. In addition, the county police provide several centralized services, such as helicopter patrol, communications, centralized police records, crime laboratory, and recruit training.

The effect of multijurisdictional police services is that all too often a *known* criminal in one municipality becomes *unknown* by simply changing his geographical area of operation. The Bureau of Special Investigations is helping to alleviate this problem by coordinating the efforts of the county and municipal police in this regard, thereby improving the percentage of successful investigations, resulting in a higher conviction rate, of the career or professional criminals operating within the St. Louis County area.

The concept of special investigative units is not unique, as special programs of this type are being utilized by Federal law enforcement agencies in their crime fighting efforts. For example, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms has initiated a



Mr. Harlan



Mr. Kleinknecht

"Significant Criminal Program" which will be targeted at the professional criminals dealing in stolen firearms, explosives, etc.

Several States are forming similar units—called "strike forces"—to combat thriving crime syndicates. A recent survey by the National Association of Attorneys General showed that an increasing number of States are establishing strike force teams, usually under the direction of the State attorney general. Twenty-three States and Puerto Rico now have special teams of investigators and prosecu-

tors for organized crime.¹

Objectives


The St. Louis County Police, which is a relatively young department (founded 1955), spent many of its early years in improving its physical operation while providing a better quality of basic services. In the 1960's, following the national trend, it shifted emphasis toward improving its record and public image through community relations efforts. Numerous programs were initiated to get the

citizens involved in crime prevention; however, the crime rate continued to escalate despite the combined efforts of the police and the citizens. The county police force has reevaluated its goals and achievements and placed the career criminal and crime fighting as its number one priority. The Bureau of Special Investigations is the newest medium seeking to identify and convict career criminals through a specific effort.

At its authorized strength, the BSI has been staffed with one supervisor and six detectives, each chosen for his specific knowledge of search and seizure laws, interview techniques, and the collection and preservation of evidence. Special emphasis was placed on experienced detectives who have the inherent advantage of being familiar with the identity of local career criminals and their particular methods of operation.

The basic purpose of the BSI is to reduce illegal activities of career or professional criminals operating in the county. The BSI hopes to accomplish this goal through the use of two methods: (1) by providing timely followup investigative assistance to the patrol officer when the officer encounters or arrests a career criminal, and (2) by working with the prosecuting officials and other members of the criminal justice system in an effort to increase the successful prosecution/conviction rate for the career criminal.

Fingerprint technician obtaining data from criminal history files.



Bureau Operations

Initially, the Bureau of Special Investigations developed a "working list" of known career criminals operating in the area. The number of names on the list was limited to those whose activities met certain criteria, i.e., felony convictions for certain serious crimes, current criminal activity, etc. The working list is periodically revised and is limited to 50

names at any one time. The BSI developed the career criminal list by various methods including periodically canvassing patrol officers and surrounding police agencies for names of those meeting the established criteria. A criminal history folder was developed for each career criminal, indicating his specialties, modus operandi, and other necessary descriptive data.

Once listed, the career criminals are brought to the attention of area patrol officers by name as individuals currently the subject of a "special investigation." Patrol officers are requested to notify the BSI immediately when any of the career criminals identified are encountered in connection with an actual or suspected transgression of the law. Additionally, the central police records repository, operated by the county police, will identify the criminal history files and fingerprint cards of the career criminals so that whenever a patrol officer finds himself in a situation, as men-


tioned above, he will be advised that the investigation or arrest should be afforded special handling. The records center will also notify the BSI detectives immediately whenever one of these files is checked or when a patrol officer has arrested a career criminal for any offense. This arrangement will permit the BSI detectives to respond directly to the location where the subject is being detained, or to the county jail, if the individual is being booked, in order to assist the patrol officer with a comprehensive investigation.

In the past, career criminals have repeatedly come into contact with local police for actual or suspected violations of misdemeanor and traffic ordinances. An example of this is illustrated in a recent case in St. Louis County where a well-known career criminal was stopped by a police officer because the vehicle he was driving was observed weaving in and out across traffic lanes. The patrol investigation revealed that the driver was

intoxicated, resulting in his arrest. However, the arresting officer was unaware that the individual was a career criminal. In a subsequent search of the interior of the arrestee's vehicle, a loaded weapon was found under the front seat. The arrestee was charged with "Carrying a Concealed Weapon," but was not later convicted on this latter charge due to a technical

"The BSI detectives are on call 24 hours a day and respond when notified that a career criminal has been arrested, regardless of the type of arrest (traffic violation, bad check, shoplifting, common assault, armed robbery, etc.)."

error made by the arresting officer. Had the BSI program been in operation, the police officer would have been informed that the individual stopped was considered a career criminal and that the officer's investigation and/or arrest should be han-



Simulated interview jointly conducted by the BSI detective and arresting patrol officer.

Career criminals are often stopped for routine traffic violations. In a situation such as the one simulated here, the BSI would be promptly alerted if a career criminal was involved.



dled most carefully. Additionally, the BSI would have been notified immediately and would have responded directly to the location to assist with the investigation and to build a solid case. The result could have been a felony conviction.

Specific Duties

The BSI detectives are on call 24 hours a day and respond when notified that a career criminal has been arrested, regardless of the type of arrest (traffic violation, bad check, shoplifting, common assault, armed robbery, etc.). Trained assistance and expertise provided by the detectives at the time and location of any arrest will be of significant benefit to the arresting officer in insuring successful prosecution. Equally important, the BSI detectives do not assume the arresting officer's responsibility for the preliminary and followup investigations. The BSI function is limited to assisting the police officer in building a quality case against the career criminal and avoiding any procedural or technical error in the process.

Specific duties performed by the BSI detectives in assisting in an investigation by the patrol officer are noted as:

Conferring with the arresting officer to ascertain if all facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest are recorded and investigated (probable cause, action taken, immediate statements of arrestee, etc.);

Conducting a legal search, when arrested, of the career criminal and his surroundings (vehicle, residence, etc.). This would include application for a search warrant, when appropriate, to locate instrumentalities of a crime, stolen property, etc. Technical assistance in this area can have a significant effect on reducing the possibility of minor procedural errors which could be subject to later exploitation by a defense attorney;

Interviewing the career criminal in reference to the offense committed;

Locating additional witnesses, as well as encouraging their as-

sistance in prosecution and arranging for protection measures for such witnesses, if needed;

Accompanying the arresting officer and/or victim to the prosecuting attorney, as well as advising the prosecuting attorney of the importance of the case (career criminal involved); and

Attending any court proceedings with the arresting officer in the event additional specific testimony is needed.

Conclusion

The Bureau of Special Investigations detectives will also closely follow the career criminal as he progresses through the criminal justice system, from the time of the arrest to the date of sentencing. The long-range goal is to convict a greater number of the career criminals, thereby deterring illegal activities by them. Ultimately, we hope to make the career of crime an unprofitable profession in St. Louis County.

FOOTNOTE

¹ *Crime Control Digest*, Oct. 6, 1975, pp. 2-3.



PROBABLE CAUSE: The Officer's Shield to Suits Under the Federal Civil Rights Act

By

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Introduction

The ever-increasing possibility of being sued for action taken during the performance of their duties is of great interest among law enforcement officers.¹ The legal theories upon which a plaintiff may institute litigation against an officer are as varied as the activities engaged in by the officer. Such suits have run the gamut of simple negligence through violation of one's civil rights.² One aspect of this overall problem is considered in this article, that is, possible officer liability under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871.³

The situation to be considered is one in which an officer makes a warrantless arrest and that arrest does not meet the constitutional requirement of probable cause.⁴ We will take a brief look at what is meant by probable cause in the constitutional sense, examine the Civil Rights Act, and scruti-

nize some of the Federal court decisions which have made it clear that an allegation of unlawful arrest may be successfully overcome by a showing of probable cause and good faith.

Probable Cause—The Constitutional Sense

The term probable cause has its roots in the fourth amendment to the

Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal advisor. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law, or are not permitted at all.

U.S. Constitution which provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . ." It is defined as those facts and circumstances known to a reasonable prudent police officer which would lead him to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it.⁵ In short, it is the amount of evidence needed to uphold the legality of the arrest. If this constitutional standard is not met, prosecution of the defendant may be severely hampered since evidence gathered pursuant to the arrest may be excluded during later court proceedings. For example, if an arrest is based on less information than is required by the fourth amendment, evidence found on the person of the defendant by the officer after the arrest is subject to exclusion at the trial.⁶

In addition to the loss of evidence suffered by the State, the officer may find himself named as a defendant in

a civil suit. If this suit were brought in the State court, it would allege that the officer violated certain well-established common law rules when he engaged in wrongful or tortious conduct, namely, false arrest. However, a suit based on the same facts pursued in Federal District Court under the Civil Rights Act would allege that the act complained of was done under color of law, causing a deprivation of rights secured to the plaintiff under the U.S. Constitution.⁷

Where there is a warrantless arrest, the following questions are raised:

Was the arrest lawful? Did the officer have that amount of evidence which is required to comply with the fourth amendment standard of probable cause?

If the arrest does not meet the constitutional standard, is the officer defenseless in a suit against him under the Civil Rights Act?

To determine liability under the Civil Rights Act, what is the standard by which an officer's conduct is judged?

The Civil Rights Act

The Civil Rights Act, which is codified as Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, was enacted in 1871, in the wake of the Civil War to protect citizens from the arbitrary exercise of power by State officials. It provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

When an arrest is made on less than the quantum evidence needed to sustain it under the constitutional standard of probable cause, a deprivation of a secured right takes place, thereby, providing the arrestee with a cause of action.⁸

To establish a *prima facie* case,⁹ the plaintiff must show that the arrest was made without probable cause. This is not to be determined from the point of view of the arrestee but from the vantage of the officer making the arrest.¹⁰ On the other hand, the plaintiff does not have a valid cause of action merely because he is subsequently found innocent of the charges against him, since probable cause does not require that a person be arrested on evidence sufficient to convict.¹¹

When a plaintiff pleads a *prima facie* case, a court may grant the relief sought if the allegations remain unanswered. However, there is a substantive defense available to the defendant officer, the proof of which will deny recovery to the plaintiff. This defense is commonly referred to as the defense of good faith and probable cause. As we shall see, the term probable cause as used to describe a defense to these suits is not the same standard which is applied in determining the sufficiency of facts leading to an arrest.

Supreme Court Decisions

In the 1961 Supreme Court decision of *Monroe v. Pape*,¹² the Court addressed the question of whether an individual could assert a cause of action against police officers under the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff alleged that police officers broke into his home in the early morning hours, routed him from bed, made him stand naked in the living room, and ransacked his house. He was taken to the

station, booked on "open charges," and later released without criminal charges being lodged against him. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, upheld the rights of persons to sue police officers under the Civil Rights Act. The decision also alluded to those standards for judging the conduct of police officers in similar situations. The Court stated that the plaintiff need not allege or prove that the officer had a specific intent to deprive a person of a Federal right, but that the act of the officer "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."¹³

In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of *Pierson v. Ray*.¹⁴ In *Pierson*, the plaintiffs, while attempting to use segregated facilities at a bus terminal, were arrested on charges of violating the breach-of-peace statute, which was later declared unconstitutional. The Court held that "the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under Section 1983."¹⁵

More importantly, the Court held that "if the jury found that the officers reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in fact unconstitutional."¹⁶

Reasonableness—Probable Cause and Good Faith in the Bivens Decision

A frequently cited case in the field of police liability was not brought under the Civil Rights Act. *Biven v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics* involved a lawsuit against Federal agents which could not be instituted under the Civil Rights Act, since it applies solely to

alleged wrongdoing perpetrated under the color of State law or custom.¹⁷

In *Bivens*, plaintiff claimed that agents entered his apartment and arrested him for an alleged narcotics violation. Allegedly, agents manacled him in front of his wife and children and threatened to arrest the entire family. It was claimed that Bivens was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Bivens alleged, among other things, that the arrest was made without probable cause and sought relief in the amount of \$15,000 from each defendant.

In 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action, thereby recognizing the right of an aggrieved party to sue Federal agents in Federal court for damages caused by violation of their fourth amendment rights.¹⁸ The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to consider, among other things, the standard by which judges and juries are to decide the issue of officers' liability.

On remand,¹⁹ the appellate court made it clear that, although this was not a suit predicated on the Civil Rights Act, its opinion would be analogous to the rules of law developed in decisions rendered in such actions. The court recognized the desirability of formulating rules which apply on equal terms to both State and Federal officers.²⁰

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the conflicting interests presented here. It recognized that "the numerous dissents, concurrences and reversals, especially in the last decade, indicate that even learned and experienced jurists have had difficulty in defining the rules that govern a determination of probable cause, with or without a warrant [citations omitted]. As he tries to find his way in this thicket, the police officer must not be held to act at his peril."²¹

On the other hand, the court perceived the right of "citizens to be free

from unlawful arrests and searches, and arrests and searches carried out in an unreasonable manner."²²

In striking a balance between these basic considerations, the court ruled that *it is a defense that the officer acted in good faith and that he was reasonable in his belief that the arrest and search were lawful and reasonable*. The court stated that this is similar to the defense held applicable to cases arising under the Civil Rights Act, citing *Pierson v. Ray*.²³

Recent Decisions

The case of *Hill v. Rowland*²⁴ presented a situation where the police learned from an informant that a certain tavern was selling lottery tickets and a surveillance of the tavern was instituted. Hill was observed stopping her cab, going into the tavern, and exiting within a few minutes. A week later, a search warrant was obtained and officers were in the process of executing it when Hill arrived. She was arrested; however, due to the inability of the State to establish probable cause, the criminal charges were dismissed. She instituted a civil suit against the officers under the Civil Rights Act. After the evidence was presented, the judge was requested by the defendant police officers to instruct the jury that if they found the officers acted in good faith and were reasonable in their belief that they had probable cause for the arrest, this would amount to a complete defense.²⁵ The trial court refused to so charge the jury.²⁶ On appeal, the court's ruling was reversed. The appellate court found that the lower court erred when it instructed the jury that in order for the officers to defend the suit they must establish that they acted with probable cause in the constitutional sense.²⁷

*Richardson v. Snow*²⁸ presented a situation in which the defendant officer was provided information by an informant relating to Richardson's

complicity in one or more armed robberies. The officer subsequently attempted to detain and arrest Richardson, and in so doing, fired shots fatally wounding Richardson. The district court ruled that one of the questions to be decided at trial was whether the defendant acted in good faith and with reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest.²⁹

What is evident from the *Bivens*, *Hill*, and *Richardson* decisions is that probable cause as a defense to a civil rights action is not probable cause in the constitutional sense.³⁰ The civil liability of the police officer does not turn on whether the arrest was in fact legal, but whether he reasonably believed the arrest to be legal, an obviously lesser standard. The higher standard upon which probable cause in the constitutional sense is determined is necessitated by the fact that what is at stake in the criminal prosecution is the individual's freedom. This concept conforms to the higher procedural and evidentiary standards required during the prosecution of a criminal case. For instance, while conviction of the accused is based on a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in civil suits, factual questions are resolved by a preponderance of the evidence. The tests in many suits arising out of alleged wrongful or tortious conduct is whether the reasonable prudent man would have conducted himself in a manner similar to that of the person accused of acting wrongfully. If the defendant is found to have acted in a reasonable manner, a verdict will be returned in his favor. Therefore, the reasonableness of the police officer's conduct in unlawful arrest situations is consonant with liability standards found in other areas of the civil law.

Good Faith—Police Motivation

Generally, if an officer is found by objective standards to have acted rea-

sonably under the assumption that the arrest was legal, then he will also, by implication, be found to have had the requisite subjective good faith belief in the reasonableness of his action. It is difficult to imagine a situation where a court would find that the officer acted reasonably and also find that the officer did not believe his actions to be reasonable.

However, the officers' *personal* belief in the legitimacy of his action may be outweighed by circumstances surrounding the arrest which are probative of improper police motivation. The case of *Lykken v. Vavreck*³¹ presented a fact situation to a Federal court in which the motivation and, hence, good faith of the arresting officers was in issue. The plaintiff hosted a well-advertised antiwar rally at his home. A handbill, obtained by the police, stated that there would be a cash bar. Knowing that no liquor license had been obtained, the police arrested the plaintiff and his guests and conducted an extensive search of the entire house. Later, all charges were dismissed for want of probable cause. The Court adopted the rule of *Pierson* and *Bivens*, holding that the policeman is protected from civil liability even in the absence of probable cause, so long as the officer had a good faith belief in the existence of probable cause.³² It held the officer liable, noting that good faith includes proper police motivation. The Court stated: "The conclusion is inescapable that the arrests here in question were improperly motivated, undertaken not in furtherance of good faith law enforcement but for the purpose of harassing those at the gathering because of their political beliefs . . . the police were interested not in good faith law enforcement but in using the arrests as a pretext for seizing any and all potentially damning evidence of any possible law violation that might serendipitously be turned up."³³ After hearing the evidence,

the judge found that good faith was not shown and awarded plaintiffs both compensatory and punitive damages.³⁴

Conclusion

State and other local law enforcement officers act under the color of local law within the meaning of the Federal Civil Rights Act and may be sued under that statute.

For a cause of action to arise under the Civil Rights Act, the officer (defendant) must have deprived the plaintiff of a right secured to him under Federal law.

Such a deprivation takes place when an arrest is executed on less evidence than is required under the Constitution, that is, failure to establish probable cause.

An officer named as a defendant in a civil suit alleging that the plaintiff was arrested without probable cause may interpose the defense of good faith and probable cause.

Probable cause in this context has been interpreted to be a lesser standard than that required by the Constitution. The question is not whether the officer had probable cause in the constitutional sense, but whether he reasonably believed his action to be lawful.

Where there is an arrest on less than constitutional probable cause and an ulterior police motive is found, a court may hold that the requisite good faith has not been established, and hold the officer civilly liable.

FOOTNOTES

¹ For a statistical analysis of the problem of civil litigation against law enforcement officers, see "Americans For Effective Law Enforcement (AELE), Survey of Police Misconduct Litigation 1967-1971," AELE, Evanston, Ill., 1974.

² For overview of police liability, see Blalock, "Civil Liability of Law Enforcement Officers," Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Ill., 1974.

³ 42 U.S.C. 1983.

⁴ Law enforcement officers who act properly under a warrant or other lawful process, which is regular on its face, and which has been issued by a court possessing proper jurisdiction, are protected from civil liability. *Ellenburg v. Shepherd*, 304 F. Supp. 1059 (E. D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd 406 F. 2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1087 (1969); *Rhodes*

v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb. 1962), aff'd 309 F. 2d 959 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. den. 372 U.S. 909 (1963).

⁵ *Brinegar v. United States*, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); *Henry v. United States*, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).

⁶ *Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).

⁷ *Cohen v. Cahill*, 281 F. 2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).

⁸ *Monroe v. Pape*, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

⁹ A *prima facie* case is established when the plaintiff alleges sufficient facts which, if they remain uncontradicted or disregarded, would support a finding in plaintiff's favor. (See, *Blacks Law Dictionary*, 1353, 4th ed. 1951.)

¹⁰ *Martin v. Duffie*, 327 F. Supp. 960 (D. N.M. 1971).

¹¹ *Beauregard v. Wingard*, 362 F. 2d 901 (9th Cir. 1966). (Certain police activity after a lawful arrest could provide the basis for other [CRA] suits. Excessive force, assault, and battery allegations are examples. That aspect of civil rights suits is not within the scope of this discussion. However, the point should be noted that the mere fact that the arrest is made with legal justification does not preclude a suit based upon post-arrest activity. See *Williams v. Liberty*, 461 F. 2d 325 (7th Cir. 1972).)

¹² See note 8, *supra*.

¹³ *Id.* at 187.

¹⁴ 386 U.S. 547.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 557.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Suit against Federal officers under [CRA] improper. *Sheridan v. Williams*, 333 F. 2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964).

¹⁸ 403 U.S. 388.

¹⁹ 456 F. 2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).

²⁰ *Id.* at 1346.

²¹ *Id.* at 1348.

²² *Id.* at 1347.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ 474 F. 2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973).

²⁵ *Id.* at 1376.

²⁶ The District Court instructed the jury that in order to find the officers civilly faultless, they must find that they acted with probable cause. The court felt that the *Pierson* decision "is not pertinent authority in this case." *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Id.* at 1377.

²⁸ 340 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Md. 1972).

²⁹ *Id.* at 1263. For other [CRA] cases in which the reasonableness of the police action was in issue see *Anderson v. De Cristofalo*, 494 F. 2d 321 (2d Cir. 1974), *Street v. Surdyka*, 492 F. 2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974), *Rodriguez v. Jones*, 473 F. 2d 599 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 412 U.S. 953 (1973).

³⁰ Proponents of strict police liability cite *Joseph v. Rowlan*, 402 F. 2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968), wherein that court stated "where a police officer makes an arrest which is unlawful under the federal constitution because made . . . without probable cause . . . sec. 1983 imposes on the officer a liability which is recoverable in federal court."

However, in 1974, the same circuit decided *Brubaker v. King*, 505 F. 2d 534, at 536 (7th Cir. 1974), and stated: "the test, thus, under § 1983 is . . . whether the officer believed in good faith that the arrest was made with probable cause and whether that belief was reasonable."


³¹ 366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973).

³² *Id.* at 593.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ The Court held that punitive damages also recoverable in [CRA] suit "where the defendants have acted willfully and in gross disregard for the rights of the complaining party . . . or where the defendants have acted in bad faith or for an improper motive, even though behaving like gentlemen [citations omitted]." *Ibid.* at 596.

WANTED BY THE FBI



Photos taken 1974.

STEPHEN ALLEN MASER, also known as "Sam," "Steve"

Bank Robbery; Escaped Federal Prisoner

Stephen Allen Maser is currently being sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for bank robbery and escape from a Federal prison.

The Crime

On July 6, 1973, Maser, who was alone at the time, allegedly robbed the Dunes Branch of the South Carolina National Bank, Myrtle Beach, S.C., and fled with over \$156,000 in cash. On May 24, 1974, the fugitive made an attempt to rob the same branch of the South Carolina National Bank, but was apprehended after an exchange of gunfire with local police. On June 16, 1974, while in custody of the U.S. Marshal on bank robbery charges, Maser escaped from Charleston County Hospi-

tal, Charleston, S.C., where he was receiving medical treatment. Federal warrants were issued on July 10, 1974, at Columbia, S.C., charging Maser with bank robbery and violation of the escape and rescue statute.

Description

Age -----	26, born July 20, 1949, Raleigh, N.C.
Height -----	5 feet 10 inches.
Weight -----	165 to 175 pounds.
Build -----	Medium.
Hair -----	Sandy blond.
Eyes -----	Blue.
Complexion ---	Medium.
Race -----	White.
Nationality ---	American.
Occupations ---	Automobile salesman, operator boutique store.

Scars and marks. Surgical scar across abdomen from side to side.

Social Security Nos. used----- 246-78-8485, 267-82-4929.

FBI No.----- 990, 344G

Fingerprint classification:

21 M 1 U IIO 11

L 3 W OII

NCIC classification:

21 05 06 14 11 17 C0 07 12 12

Caution

The fugitive has previously been convicted of tampering with an auto, larceny from an auto, and larceny of an auto. He has also shot at a bank manager and police during the commission of a bank robbery. He is an escape risk and should be considered armed and dangerous.

Notify the FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating this fugitive is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.



Left Index Fingerprint.

Information

on

Robbery Wanted

Sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m., April 2, 1976, the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alcoa Highway, Knoxville, Tenn., was robbed after the guard was overpowered and bound by what appeared to be three individuals.

Reported stolen during this robbery were the following weapons: 140 M-16 rifles (caliber 5.56 mm) of which 40 were without fully automatic sears; 18 .45 caliber semi-automatic pistols; 2 M-60 machineguns (caliber 7.62 mm) along with tripods and an extra barrel for each; and 4 M-14 rifles (caliber 7.62 mm). The ammunition stolen consisted of 1,440 rounds of 5.56 mm tracer ammunition for M-16's and 1,140 rounds of 5.56 mm blanks for M-16's. The weapons stolen were operational and their firing mechanisms had not been removed.

All law enforcement agencies are requested to be alert for any information concerning the identity of those involved in this theft and the whereabouts of the weapons. The serial numbers of the weapons have been entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Notify the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation immediately concerning any information received concerning this crime. Criminal elements or extremist groups which may have stolen or acquired these formidable weapons could utilize them in encounters with law enforcement personnel.

FOR CHANGE OF ADDRESS ONLY

(Not an Order Form)

Complete this form and return to:

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JUS-432

THIRD CLASS

QUESTIONABLE PATTERN

In the Identification Division of the FBI, the most unusual impression at left is given the preferred classification of an accidental-type whorl as it conforms to no other pattern definition. Inasmuch as the whorl-type formation in the lower right portion of this pattern is possibly the result of an injury or deformity, this impression would require reference searches as a plain whorl and central pocket loop-type whorl.

