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Lateral Entry
A Move Toward the Future



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William S. Sessions, Director

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Lateral Entry

A Move Toward the Future



By
J. EDDIE NIX

One of the most frequently asked questions by police administrators is, "How can we hire qualified, experienced personnel?" The answer to this question may come in the form of lateral entry. In fact, one of the keys to successful recruiting in the future will be the practice of a full-scale lateral entry program.¹

Basically, lateral entry is the ability of a police officer in one

geographic location to enter employment in another area. The officer's pay at the new department is based on experience, job knowledge, and the ability to do the job.²

The concept of lateral entry is not new. It has existed for some 25 to 30 years. Unfortunately, however, police departments overlook the advantages of lateral entry, even though its potential to improve a

department's recruiting efforts and professionalism is evident. This article discusses several of the benefits of lateral entry and some of the obstacles to implementing such programs within police departments.

ADVANTAGES OF LATERAL ENTRY

For most law enforcement departments, there are four areas

that benefit the most by lateral entry:

- Recruiting
- Individual mobility
- Training and cost effectiveness and
- Competition and educational growth.

Even though most departments will benefit from lateral entry programs, some departments may not experience advantages relating to all four of these areas.

Enhanced Recruitment

The recruitment of qualified personnel becomes more difficult as time passes. In the past, all that was necessary was a pool of applicants. Today, this is no longer the case. In fact, in many police agencies, position vacancies outnumber the applicants.

However, when initiated and administered properly, lateral entry could open up a new source of qualified applicants to help meet future recruiting needs.³ Lateral entry programs attract innovative, administrative, professional and technical personnel, especially for the small department.⁴ For example, many former police officers have left law enforcement because of inflexibilities, such as the lack of mobility and promotional opportunity. Yet, these officers would be desirable candidates in many police departments, if they were available for employment. Lateral entry is a way to gain access to such an untapped resource.

Individual Mobility

Another benefit of lateral entry pertains to police officers who are currently employed in law enforcement, but would like to relocate.⁵ Typically, officers desire relocation in order to move from a

smaller department to a larger department, for more promotional potential, more job responsibilities or enrichment, or because of spouse relocation. All of these are valid reasons for mobility and should in no way detract from the individual seeking lateral entry.

Today, with community and corporate growth, mobility is becoming even more of a concern. One reason for this is the changing role of women.⁶ Women also are thinking "careers." In fact, dual-career couples have become the rule rather than the exception in American society.⁷

Dual-career couples create problems for law enforcement. Now, a police officer with a family must consider the spouse's career opportunities in the decisionmaking process. In many cases, a spouse may have more advancement and earning potential than the law enforcement officer, and relocation may be necessary in order to advance within the organization. Often times, husbands or wives are giving up or changing professions so that their spouses can pursue their careers.⁸

In addition, officers may look toward mobility for other reasons, such as caring for ill relatives or wanting a change in climate. In today's law enforcement community, a police officer who is fully qualified and capable of performing the job should have the option of lateral relocation without fear of losing rank and/or pay.

Training and Cost Effectiveness

Police officer training is both time consuming and expensive. It is



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the police function.***
”

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Department of Police.*

not only costly from the view point of salary, benefits, and uniforms but also because of down-time prior to achieving patrol officer status. For this reason, lateral entry police officers provide substantial savings to police departments. In cases where the lateral entry applicant comes from within the State, the savings could be even greater. For example, in most States, individuals must meet certain basic minimum standards and must complete a prescribed training program in order to be employed anywhere in the State.⁹ This is usually a one-time process and permits a certified officer to transfer. Adapting police standards and training legislation is a good first step toward lateral entry.¹⁰

In many areas, the Field Training Officer (FTO) Program is the second step in the training process. This is an important phase and should be required of every new officer, even the lateral entry officer. However, even if the FTO phase of the training is included, the lateral entry candidate still saves police departments both time and money.

For example, in 1985, the Cobb County, Georgia, Police Department estimated that each new police officer costs the department between \$18,000 to \$20,000 before that officer can work a shift without direct supervision. Lateral entry candidates save a large portion of this cost. These savings could be better used to pay the increased salaries of lateral entry employees.

When considering the variables of cost and time, it is easy to see that the savings realized from the lateral entry candidate can be spent on higher salaries. What the police administrator really gets

from lateral entry is an experienced officer who is assimilated into the department faster. In today's fast moving world, this is very much desired.

Competition and Educational Growth

Support for lateral entry also comes from the Nation's leadership. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement in its *Task Force Report: Police* stated:

"To improve police services, competition for all advanced positions should be opened to all qualified persons from both within and outside of the department. This would enable a department to obtain the best available talent for positions of leadership. If candidates from within an agency are unable to meet the competition from other applicants, it should be recog-

nized that the influx of more highly qualified personnel would greatly improve the quality of the services."¹¹

The commission's recommendations and farsightedness were optimistic that lateral entry is one of the keys to the competitive spirit needed to enhance the police profession. This prescription for the success of the police field is as valid today as it was in 1967. Lateral entry is essential to the professionalization of the police function. It also disturbs the status quo and avoids the we've-always-done-it-this-way approach.¹²

In addition, lateral entry affects positively the educational processes of the upwardly mobile department members. It helps provide fresh points of view because people with different experiences and insights introduce variety,



“...lateral entry is one of the keys to the competitive spirit needed to enhance the police profession.”

change and innovative ideas.¹³ Many officers are finding out, or will find out, that in order to keep up with the competition, they must refine skills already developed. Lateral entry also bolsters management and technical strength, as well as increases competition and productivity, by providing new talent and ability.¹⁴ It also provides management with a better yardstick for evaluating executive performance and forces management to compare the present group with outsiders.¹⁵ And, once police departments start using lateral entry, law enforcement executives will no longer have to accept marginal employees. Lateral entry could also help to merge effective policing concepts from various police

departments, thereby raising the levels of education and training in participating departments. This creates a better understanding of law enforcement affairs.¹⁶

OBSTACLES TO LATERAL ENTRY

Despite the obvious benefits, obstacles to lateral entry still exist.¹⁷ Police personnel at the patrol level and upper management seem to have the least resistance. And, as expected, the more established the department, the more restrictions there seem to be to the lateral entry concept.

Department Personnel

Mid-level police administrators present the biggest

obstacle. At one time, police officials believed that lateral recruiting was the equivalent of "raiding," and police chiefs even had pacts that they would not hire each other's personnel.¹⁸ However, the resistance and obstacles to full implementation of lateral entry are not limited to department personnel. Roadblocks can arise in the form of civil service, retirement plans, maximum age limitations, and legislative restrictions.

Resistance to Change

Change in law enforcement comes slowly, and this is the case with lateral entry. In fact, some believe that it will never reach the level that the President's Commission on Law Enforcement envisioned in 1967. To achieve this goal, all of the obstacles to lateral entry must be addressed individually and systematically. Many departments have already dealt with some of the obstacles. Obviously, eliminating the obstacles is not easy, but the result to law enforcement will be well worth the effort.

CONCLUSION

Acceptance of lateral entry will continue to be a long, uphill battle. However, it is imperative that those in law enforcement who support lateral entry, both academically and professionally, continue to chip away at the resistance until it is universally accepted. The future of police improvement in all jurisdictions will be handicapped if there are not forthcoming changes in the acceptance of lateral entry.¹⁹

Some believe that the key to the success of lateral entry is at the State and Federal level. In a real

Benefits of Lateral Entry

- Enhances the recruiting effort
- Offers individual mobility
- Reduces training time and is cost effective
- Increases competition and self development
- Attracts innovative, administrative, professional personnel
- Provides for fresh points of view
- Bolsters management and technical strength
- Disturbs the status quo and avoids the we've-always-done-it-this-way-approach
- Provides management with a better yardstick for evaluating executive performance
- Creates a better understanding of law enforcement affairs

sense, this is true because through legislative reform and financial encouragements, the State and Federal Governments can do much to implement lateral entry. Some advancements in this area have been made, such as legislative reforms that contribute to the cause of lateral entry and the statewide training requirements that are recognized anywhere in a given State. But, the battle for lateral entry is not going to be won at the State and national levels. It will be won one police department at a time, and one geographic area at a time.

LEB

Footnotes

¹ W.H. Hewitt, "Police Personnel Administration: Lateral Entry," *Police*, January-February 1971, p. 13.

² The salary will be at a level higher than starting pay. A. Stone and S. Deluca, *Police Administration: An Introduction* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1985).

³ C. Swank and J. Conser, *The Police Personnel System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982).

⁴ Supra note 1.

⁵ P. Weston and P. Fraley, *Police Personnel Management* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980).

⁶ M.H. Sekas, "Dual-Career Couples—A Corporate Challenge," *Personnel Administrator*, April 1984, pp. 37-45.

⁷ Ibid, p. 37.

⁸ Supra note 6, p. 40.

⁹ Supra note 2, p. 293.

¹⁰ O. Wilson and R. McLaren, *Police Administration* (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1977).

¹¹ The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Police* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

¹² Supra note 1.

¹³ Supra note 1.

¹⁴ Supra note 1.

¹⁵ Supra note 1.

¹⁶ Supra note 1.

¹⁷ W. Bopp and P. Whisenand, *Police Personnel Administration* (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn Beacon, Inc., 1980).

¹⁸ Supra note 5, p. 56.


¹⁹ A. Cohn (Ed.), *The Future of Policing* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1978).

Unusual Weapon

Key Knife

During a recent arrest, officers of the Vinton, Virginia, Police Department discovered a set of car keys attached to an additional plastic key that contained a small hidden knife blade. The approximately 1/2-inch blade extends and retracts by pressing a small button on the key's casing. With the blade extended, the weapon is 3 inches long.

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Wanted: Photographs

The **FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin** is always on the lookout for dynamic law enforcement-related photos for possible publication in our magazine. We are interested in photos that visually depict the many various aspects of the law enforcement profession and illustrate the numerous tasks law enforcement personnel perform.


We can use either black-and-white glossy or color prints or slides, although we prefer prints (5x7 or 8x10). In particular, we are always on the lookout for dynamic photos in a vertical format for use on the cover. Appropriate credit will be given to contributing photographers when their work appears in the magazine.

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Confronting the Terrorist Hostage Taker

An armed terrorist with a bag over his head stands at the door of a hijacked TWA jet.



By
G. DWAYNE FUSELIER
and
GARY W. NOESNER

“For the foreseeable future, terrorism, both domestic and international, will continue to be a major concern to U.S. Government and law enforcement agencies.”¹ Concern over terrorism is consistently voiced by officers attending the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Some officers have the impression that in a terrorist hostage incident, the crisis management approach would (or should) be substantially different from that in a

criminal hostage incident. This is not the case.

Since the mid-1970s, the FBI has grouped hostage taking incidents into four broad categories—the terrorist, the prison situation, the criminal, and the mentally disturbed. State and local law enforcement officers at the FBI Academy have indicated that these four major categories are still commonly used by law enforcement agencies.² Further, there is also the consensus that the current set of negotiation

strategies and tactics available to law enforcement provides viable alternatives from which to choose, whatever the motivation for the taking of hostages.³

Unfortunately, much of what is believed about terrorist conduct and behavior is derived from the media and the entertainment industry. Both the general population and the law enforcement community have come to accept the terrorist stereotype as accurately depicting personality traits, dedica-

tion, sophistication, commitment, and modus operandi.

All too often, the dramatic events surrounding a terrorist incident are misrepresented in fictional accounts or in media efforts aimed at recreating actual situations that have occurred. Further, a brief news flash, broadcasted during an ongoing terrorist siege, does not draw an accurate picture of a terrorist's total range of conduct and personality traits. Therefore, many of the expressed ideas regarding terrorists appear to be based upon incorrect perceptions.

The Terrorist Hostage Taker

The FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals.⁴ One major difficulty in discussing the terrorist hostage taker is that the words "terrorist" and "terrorism" have been used by the media to such an extent that they are virtually useless as valid descriptive terms. They have become political terms with almost as many definitions as speakers.

From the viewpoint of the crisis manager (i.e., the on-scene commander), does it help to distinguish a hostage taking as a terrorist act, separate from a criminal act? No, it does not. The label given the behavior does not change the act. In fact, the FBI now refers to such acts as "terrorist crimes" to underscore the fact that the motivation for the behavior does not change the criminality of such behavior. The emphasis here is not meant to imply


a lesser risk but to stress that the act is, first and foremost, a violent crime in progress, regardless of the stated motivation of the hostage taker.

Too often, those who are quick to point out that an act is a "terrorist incident" (or any other kind, for that matter) mistakenly confuse the labeling with understanding. In this case, the label is one that is so subjective that it is meaningless. To describe an incident as only a "terrorist" event implies that all such events are similar. Even additional adjectives, such as "Palestinian" terrorists, fail to identify, for example, significant differences in motives, methods, and goals of the various Palestinian factions, and of course, individual differences among the members themselves.

The use of a label is helpful only if the term is associated with

essential elements that differentiate one set of behaviors from another. Perhaps a more-descriptive term would be "planned political/religious" hostage taking, since this term does not have the emotional overtones currently attached to the word "terrorist." Such a term avoids the automatic, and potentially misleading, assumptions made when the word "terrorist" is used.

The essential question is: In confronting such an incident, will law enforcement agencies employ crisis management techniques that have been used successfully in a wide variety of hostage/barricade situations, or will those procedures be discarded as a result of faulty assumptions of how terrorists are supposed to behave? Popular perceptions regarding terrorists would lead us to believe that they comprise a unique and specific personality type, and that terrorists are to be



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differentiated from the wide range of criminal and mentally disturbed personalities more frequently observed by law enforcement crisis managers. To our knowledge, no scientific studies or analytical surveys exist that might serve to provide the basis for such a belief. In order to examine the validity of current crisis management/negotiation techniques in confronting such incidents, it is essential to separate common myth from factual knowledge.

The Terrorist Mystique

In a planned political/religious incident, the subjects typically take hostages with the intent of getting publicity for their cause, and in some cases, to demand the release of imprisoned group members. The fact that these are planned rather than spontaneous hostage takings indicates an increased likelihood of outside moral and/or operational support and creates a virtual certainty of extensive media coverage.

It appears that some political and religious extremists, particularly in the Middle East, have been successful in one very basic way—they have generated an extreme interest and concern for their activities among Western law enforcement officers. Former Chinese Communist party leader Mao Tse Tung maintained that terrorists should kill one to influence a thousand, and some radical Palestinian groups and extremist Lebanese Shia (e.g., Hizballah) seem to have accomplished this.

However, in an article reviewing the terrorist psychosocial profile, Strentz concludes that terrorist groups (particularly those of

Middle Eastern origin) have changed dramatically.⁵ Contrasting left-wing Middle Eastern groups of the 1980s to those groups active a decade earlier, he found the more-recent Middle Eastern groups to be poorly educated, unskilled, unemployed, illiterate, undisciplined, and ill-trained. Does this mean that

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a planned political/religious hostage incident is not dangerous? Obviously not. As Strentz notes, “While one should never consciously underestimate adversaries, neither should one make them into supermen. They are a force to be reckoned with, but must be viewed within the perspective of reality.”⁶

Beginning in 1985, the FBI began investigating violations of the Hostage Taking Statute (Title 18, USC, Section 1203) and in 1986, the Overseas Homicide/Attempted Homicide Statute (Title 18, USC, Section 2331). These statutes provided for the first time the investigative vehicle through which FBI Special Agents could actively and aggressively respond to major terrorist incidents abroad wherein American citizens and property were the victims.

Starting with the June 14, 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight 847, FBI Special Agents came into direct contact with a number of American victims. Through detailed debriefings in pursuit of criminal prosecution, they collected a large volume of data concerning observed terrorist behavior. Subsequent FBI victim debriefings and interviews of incarcerated terrorists involved in almost all of the planned political/religious incidents that have occurred during the second half of the 1980s expanded this database significantly.⁷

Understandably, the information-gathering process during this investigative activity was not designed as an orderly scientific examination that would provide the basis for personality assessments. Rather, it aimed at developing evidentiary material. Nonetheless, relying on these interviews, and on the experience and observation of FBI Agents, a clearer and more accurate picture of terrorist behavior can be drawn. This picture should serve to demystify the terrorist, to separate fact from fiction, and to support the position that decades of significant crisis management experience in a variety of circumstances has prepared American law enforcement to deal with a political/religious hostage incident.

It appears that the average terrorist is not as sophisticated as is commonly believed. Terrorist interviews and victim debriefings show that most of the terrorists of the 1980s received very marginal training prior to deployment for an operation. They were provided with only a minimal set of instructions as

to how to conduct themselves during an operation. And while these terrorists may have been given a list of demands, for the most part, they were not trained to negotiate with authorities to achieve those demands.

In the course of the FBI's investigations, it became evident that these subjects are seldom prepared to deal with the unknown variables and unforeseen changes that routinely play an integral part in such sieges. As a general rule (and more specifically applicable to Middle Eastern subjects), the terrorists are young males with little or no formal education. These individuals come from deprived economic conditions and are without any significant positive work experience. Contrary to popular notion, they do not employ sophisticated false documentation or disguises and most certainly do not fit the "jet set" multilingual, worldly, and savvy profile so often projected in popular literature.

For example, before going to Italy to initiate the October 1985, Achille Lauro incident, the four young terrorists involved never traveled outside of Lebanon. Only one spoke a second language. They received little training, were afforded only minimal instructions regarding their mission, and traveled on Scandinavian passports. These terrorists stood out as four young Arab males aboard a ship populated almost entirely by elderly American and European tourists. Once the operation began, they were confronted with unexpected responses from government officials. This put them in a panic, since they failed to prepare contin-

gency plans and could not adapt to the circumstances.

During the September 1986, hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, the four terrorists who boarded the Boeing 747 immediately rushed to the front of the aircraft looking for the cockpit in order to gain control of the crew. They were dumbfounded when they discovered the cockpit was not located at the nose of the aircraft, as anticipated. They did not know that a Boeing 747's cockpit could only be reached by ascending a stairway located at the rear of the first class cabin. This delay allowed the cockpit crew to escape.

The April 1988, hijacking of Kuwaiti Flight 422 has been cited as demonstrating terrorist sophistication. However, during this incident,

land in the water, float, and then be driven onto land.

Such incidents clearly do not support the popular belief that all terrorists undergo extensive and detailed aircraft hijack training at so-called "desert terrorist academies." However, these examples should not suggest that political/religious hostage takers are harmless or incompetent. These subjects, like all hostage takers, should be treated with the utmost caution and respect. These unsophisticated, uneducated, and ill-trained young men have killed many innocent victims. Indeed, they probably should be considered even more dangerous because of their inadequate preparation and the acts of violence they tend to commit when their plans do not materialize.

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when Beirut International Airport controllers denied landing clearance and blocked the runway, one terrorist demanded the pilot land in the ocean and taxi from there onto the land. When the pilot argued that such a maneuver was impossible, the terrorist displayed the plastic safety card found in the back of all passenger seats and pointed to a drawing depicting a floating aircraft with passengers exiting and gathering on flotation equipment. The terrorist firmly believed that this picture proved that the aircraft could

The Law Enforcement Response

One question frequently asked by police officers during training sessions is, "How would you negotiate differently during a terrorist incident?" Once the distinction is made between kidnapping (where the location of subject and victim are typically unknown) and hostage taking (where the subject and victim are contained within a police perimeter), officers are surprised (or perhaps disappointed) to hear the answer. Basically, negotiation strategies and tactics

Guidelines For Negotiation

- Stabilize and contain the situation
- Select the right time to make contact
- Take your time when negotiating
- Allow the subject to speak; it is more important to be a good listener than a good talker
- Don't offer the subject anything
- Avoid directing frequent attention to the victims; do not call them hostages
- Be as honest as possible; avoid tricks
- Never dismiss any request as trivial
- Never say "no"
- Soften the demands
- Never set a deadline; try not to accept a deadline
- Do not make alternate suggestions
- Do not introduce outsiders (nonlaw enforcement) into the negotiation process
- Do not allow any exchange of hostages, especially do not exchange a negotiator for a hostage
- Avoid negotiating face to face

for terrorist incidents are identical to those that would be used during any hostage or barricade incident, regardless of the political or religious backgrounds of the subjects.

Simply stated, there are a finite number of strategies (and particular tactics to support each of those strategies) to choose from when negotiating with hostage takers that are contained and isolated. The fact that a particular group of subjects puts forth political or religious reasons for taking hostages does not call into play a conceptually different set of strategies. The negotiation team assesses the motives, demands, and behaviors of these hostage takers

and makes recommendations to the on-scene commander as to the most appropriate strategy, drawn from the same set of possibilities as in any other hostage incident.

However, the specific factors the team considers crucial to a particular incident, in all cases, depends on the circumstances of the hostage taking. For example, suppose a person, claiming harassment and persecution by Federal authorities who are stealing thoughts from his mind, took hostages in a public office building and threatened to kill the hostages unless the FBI stopped the persecution. The negotiation team would logically focus on the subject's medical history, seeking records of past treatment for mental

disturbance, interviewing any mental health professional (MHP) who may have treated the subject, and perhaps using the MHP as a consultant. On the other hand, if a group of subjects took the same hostages in the same building, but claimed to represent the "People's Holy Liberation Forces," the team would certainly value any information on the origins, composition, and any previous actions by this group. Knowledgeable sources on both the political and religious dogma of the group, as well as language experts, would be consulted and perhaps incorporated into the negotiation team. As one can see, the process of assessment and recommendation remains the same, but clearly the specific factors or issues that the team considers critical vary with each incident.

This is not to say that when a politically motivated incident occurs in the United States, there is not a greater amount of involvement by the higher levels of the U.S. Government, because there is. In fact, "The desire of terrorists, both international and domestic, to focus media attention on their causes by staging attacks at locations or events of international interest has made it necessary for governmental and law enforcement authorities to closely coordinate their preparations for special events."⁸ That involvement, however, does not call into play "better," or even different, negotiation strategies or principles. The negotiation recommendations are simply reviewed by a longer chain of command.

Even as long as 12 years ago, Stratton stated that social, political

or religious terrorists are the most difficult to deal with because of their commitment.⁹ However, he also pointed out that negotiation with political/religious hostage takers has been successful.

When hostage takers plan to be surrounded, as in the takeover of a public building, the probability of a prolonged incident increases and the risk to the hostages is considered to be very high. However, notwithstanding the fact that such an incident was deliberately planned, the commitment of the hostage takers may not be a "total" commitment. Post-incident review of the behavior of some of the hostage takers in planned political incidents indicates that there may be a difference in being "willing" to die for a cause and in "wanting" to die for a cause. Once the subject has been away from a support system for days or weeks and emotional and physical exhaustion sets in, that person may be more willing to accept the rationale presented by the negotiator.

Political hostage takers have been negotiated with effectively by stressing that their point has been made, their demands have been heard, their cause has been "aired" to the world, and therefore, killing hostages would only serve to discredit them and their cause in the eyes of the public. One author concludes that police negotiating tactics are most likely to succeed in planned, political/religious situations if the subjects are primarily interested in making a symbolic statement and obtaining publicity.¹⁰ These negotiation tactics have, in fact, been successful in resolving a number of planned political/

religious hostage incidents in the United States and elsewhere.¹¹ Even incidents that required a tactical resolution, such as the siege at the Iranian Embassy in London in April 1981, confirmed the appropriateness of these negotiating techniques.

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Conclusion

The dangers posed by planned political/religious hostage taking incidents should in no way be minimized. Rather, law enforcement should respond to these incidents in a manner that is consistent with the crisis management procedures that have been developed and validated through thousands of hostage/barricade situations worldwide.

If political/religious situations are accorded special status or are the cause for law enforcement to ignore effective crisis management strategies, then law enforcement falls victim to the "terrorist mystique" that has allowed terrorism to become a potent weapon in recent years. However, if a planned political/religious incident is not treated as a special case, and hostage takers instead are dealt with

as any other high-risk subject would be, then law enforcement will be better able to employ the professional skills learned through the lessons of the past years.

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Footnotes

¹ Oliver B. Revell, *Terrorism: A Law Enforcement Perspective* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988).

² Statements received from officers attending negotiation classes conducted by the Special Operations and Research Unit at the FBI Academy.

³ Participants from major U.S. cities, England, Germany, and Hong Kong during an advanced hostage negotiation seminar held at the FBI Academy in February 1989.

⁴ *FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1986*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Washington, D.C., 1986.

⁵ Thomas Strentz, "A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile: Past and Present," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, April 1987, pp. 13-19.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Incidents included the Achille Lauro hijacking, the EgyptAir hijacking in Malta, the Rome and Vienna airport attacks, the bombing of TWA Flight 840, the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan, The Royal Jordanian Airline hijacking, the hijacking of Kuwaiti Flights 221 and 422, and dozens of attacks directed against American diplomats and citizens worldwide.

⁸ Supra note 1.

⁹ John Stratton, "The Terrorist Act of Hostage Taking: A View of Violence and the Perpetrators," *Police Science and Administration*, vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-9.

¹⁰ A.H. Miller, *Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980).

¹¹ Incidents included the seizure of a train by South Moluccans in the Netherlands in December 1975; the Balcombe Street siege by IRA members in London in December 1975; the hijacking of TWA Flight 355 by Croats in September 1976, finally resolved in Paris; the Hanafi Muslim siege of three buildings in Washington, D.C., in March 1977; the hostage taking by Croats at the West German Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, in August 1978; the takeover of the Turkish Embassy by Armenians in Ottawa, Canada, in March 1985; and the Oakdale, Louisiana, and Atlanta, Georgia, prison sieges by Cuban inmates in November/December 1987.

Police Practices

Bomb Dog Teams



There are times when police departments may require the services of an explosives detection dog team. When such an emergency occurs, the U.S. Air Force Security Police can respond to such requests with military dog teams. However, there is one condition that accompanies each response—the Air Force cannot be held liable for any damages or consequences arising from the search.

Most Air Force security police squadrons have bomb dog teams, which consist of an experienced handler, a highly trained

explosives detection dog, and a spotter who assists the handler and acts as backup. Each team is proficient in detecting several common types of explosives and can provide detection capability for bomb threats, suspicious packages, airport security breaches, and terrorist incidents.

Team Response

During the past 2 years, explosives detection dog teams from the 63d Security Police Squadron (63d SPS) at Norton Air Force Base in California assisted Federal


and local authorities in over 20 incidents. The teams responded to bomb threats at local government buildings and shopping centers and cleared VIP platforms and routes for such dignitaries as former President Reagan, the Duchess of York, and the President of Colombia.

After receiving a call for assistance from the California Highway Patrol, an explosives detection dog team searched a vehicle used by an arrested grenade-tossing driver who terrorized several miles of California freeway. In another incident, a 63d SPS team conducted a baggage and commercial airliner search when notified by airport police that the carrier received several bomb threats on an inbound aircraft.

To Request Assistance

Civilian police agencies should coordinate requests for assistance with local Air Force Security Police. The law enforcement desk sergeant is the designated point of contact for bomb dog requests. The sergeant, in turn, obtains permission from the chief of security police and the base commander to dispatch the dog team off base. The base commander is advised of the nature of the request and any impact it would have on base operations. Unless the team is conducting a search on base, or there is an

A military dog team recently discovered this cache of explosives in an automobile located on the Norton Air Force Base in California.



impending military mission, the request is honored within a matter of minutes. Military necessity governs the priority of the dispatch.

For example, on February 19, 1990, the 63d SPS received a request for assistance from the San Bernardino Sheriff's Office. There was the possibility that three explosive devices had been planted in the county courthouse. Within 3 minutes, the law enforcement desk officer received permission to dispatch the team. Thirteen minutes later, the team was on its way to the courthouse. With this particular incident, a team was on duty and available for immediate dispatch. When a team is off duty, the handler maintains contact with the law enforcement desk officer by informing the desk officer of location and telephone number at all times. This is to ensure the handler is in constant contact with the law enforcement desk in the event of an emergency. When off duty, team response time is less than 1 hour.

On the Scene

Once the team arrives on site, it reports directly to the commanding law enforcement officer for a final situation report. The handler then briefs the commanding officer on the search pattern, the method to be used for alerting and marking the device, and any other information that may be pertinent to the search. If the dog

alerts to an explosive device, the handler marks the area or item where the explosive device can be found. The explosives detection dog team does not deactivate the device. That responsibility rests with law enforcement bomb disposal experts. The length of the search, which may take up to several hours, depends on the area or the item being searched. After completing a search, or in the event an explosive device is located, the handler then debriefs the on-scene law enforcement commander.

Conclusion

Air Force explosives detection dog teams constitute a valuable resource that is available to law enforcement agencies. Use of this service can counter potentially dangerous situations that threaten the safety and well-being of citizens in any community.

LEB

Information for this column was obtained from Capt. James L. Setzer, 63d SPS/Operations Officer, Norton AFB, California.

Police Practices serves as an information source for unique or noteworthy methods, techniques, or operations of law enforcement agencies. Submissions should be no more than 750 words (3 pages, double spaced and typed) and should be directed to Kathy Sulewski, Managing Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Room 7262, 10th & Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20535.



Campus Security

The Mule Patrol

By
JAMES A. HUFF

Rumors of rape being committed at Central Missouri State University in Warrensburg, Missouri, created tremendous public relations problems for the university. And, even though subsequent investigations proved these allegations to be false, the rumors could not be quelled.

To counter the damaging effects, the Department of Public Safety initiated a series of public relations efforts. The department believed that meetings with the news media, the Neighborhood Watch Program, and crime prevention and rape awareness presentations would alleviate the problem.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. Despite all the public relations announcements and awareness presentations, the rumors prevailed and the university community wanted more. Students demanded that campus police patrol residence halls and parking lots more frequently. Faculty and staff members also made similar requests for academic and office buildings. But, because campus crime did not statistically increase in recent years, hiring additional officers could not be justified.

As a result, the administrative staff of the Department of Public Safety explored other alternatives. One viable option was to establish a student security patrol. A number of universities used student patrols to supplement their campus police forces with positive results. However, before initiating such a program at the university, several areas needed to be addressed:

- How would the security patrol be funded?
- What name would be given to the patrol?
- How would the student employees be identified as members of a student security force?
- What would their responsibilities be?
- How many students would be hired, and what would be their qualifications?

These questions needed to be answered before any further planning could continue.

Funding

In 1985 the Director of Public Safety received permission to implement a student security force to assist the campus police, with one provision. Because of fiscal constraints, no State funding could be used in support of the project. Funding would have to come from other sources within the university, especially those operating within the auxiliary budget.

One main area of the university that needed additional security was the 60 campus parking lots, in view of the recent increase of vandalism and theft from vehicles, especially at night. Therefore, funding for 50 percent of the student security force came from the parking lot operation, which is a budgeted auxiliary service.

The Department of Residential Life, which has responsibility for all residence halls, is also an auxiliary enterprise. And, because the students requested more foot patrols within the residence halls, funding from this source was also targeted. After realizing the benefits an added sense of security would project to the students living on campus, the Director of Residential Life agreed to fund the remaining 50 percent of the student security force. The biggest hurdle, funding, had just been cleared.

What's in a Name


Choosing a name for the student security force was the next consideration. The name selected had to be one that would lend an esprit de corps. After much deliberation, the student security force was named the Mule Patrol, since the university's mascot is the mule.

Identification

The university believed that it was important for Mule Patrol officers to wear uniforms, but the uniform had to be easily distinguishable from the navy blue uniform of the university police. The uniform selected for the Mule Patrol consists of a white shirt, black pants, and a baseball-type hat. Sewn on the shirt is the Mule Patrol patch.

“
**...a student
security force
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eyes and ears to
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university police
force.**

”



Mr. Huff is the Director of Public Safety for the Central Missouri State University in Warrensburg, Missouri.

Responsibilities of the Mule Patrol

One critical question was, "What would be the job responsibilities of the Mule Patrol?" To arrive at an answer, university administrators asked various campus groups what security measures they would like to see implemented. The feedback revealed that high visibility on campus was the primary concern.

To define more specific responsibilities of the Mule Patrol, coordinators interviewed the student patrol force of another university campus. This student patrol force operated successfully for several years. However, what works well for one campus may not work at all for another. Fortunately, this was not the case. Many of the concepts and ideas of the veteran student patrol force were incorporated into the Mule Patrol.

The job responsibilities and regulations for the Mule Patrol were defined and implemented. Specifically, Mule Patrol officers:

- Do not carry weapons of any type
- Have no arrest powers. Their primary function is to observe and report
- Cannot leave their assigned patrol area without permission of their supervisor
- Are under the direction of the Department of Public Safety
- Must be courteous and professional at all times, especially with the public

- Must render assistance to everyone to the best of their ability

Mule Patrol officers are expected to adhere to higher standards as compared to other student employee positions on the campus.

Selection Process

To begin, the university set specific qualifications for Mule Patrol officers. First, the student must be enrolled at the university and have completed at least 30 hours with a minimum grade point average of 2.3. Also, a criminal justice major was not a prerequisite.

“Mule Patrol officers are expected to adhere to higher standards as compared to other student employee positions on the campus.”

And, although not a requirement for the position, the Department of Public Safety preferred to hire students who demonstrated active involvement in college life, such as members of activity groups or residence hall councils.

After meeting the necessary qualifications, the student then appears before an oral selection committee composed of students, faculty and staff. This allows the committee to determine an applicant's

views about the position. It also provides insight into the applicant's personality, community service commitment and attitudes about the university and the public safety department. After the oral selection process, a background investigation is conducted on each applicant to assure that the applicant has not been involved in any illegal activity.

On Patrol


The Mule Patrol can be described as students protecting students. They patrol the academic buildings, residence halls and parking lots and report any suspicious or criminal activity that they witness. Their equipment consists of a flashlight and a two-way portable radio, which allows them to talk on the police frequency to the dispatcher, campus police patrol vehicles, and city police patrol vehicles. There are four Mule Patrol officers on duty each night when the university is in session.

Mule Patrol officers are assigned to one of four zones when they report for duty. Within each zone are specific buildings, parking lots, and athletic areas that they are required to patrol. If a particular area within the zones has a specific security problem, this information is noted at the beginning of each shift and relayed to the Mule Patrol officer assigned to that zone at the beginning of the following shift. Mule Patrol officers are also required to report any safety-related problems that they may encounter, such as hazardous materials improperly secured or stored and inoperative fire alarm systems or fire extinguishers. Mule Patrol officers

Photos courtesy of Jim Wiltse



*Left: Mule Patrol officer patch.
Above: Mule Patrol officers assist a
university police officer with crowd
security at a concert.
Right: Mule Patrol officer conducts a
building security check.*



also provide crowd control and security at concerts and major athletic events. Many times, they team up with police officers. Future plans are being made to have them assist in the dispatch centers as back-up dispatchers.

Mule Patrol officers do not write parking tickets or perform other such negative duties. The department believes that if the Mule Patrol officers are not given any negative responsibilities, the student body and the university community would view the project in a more positive light, an assumption proven to be correct.

Project's Expectations

The Mule Patrol project has been in place for a little more than 3 years and has met and even exceeded the department's expectations. Within the first few months, the rumors of rapes on campus were virtually eliminated. The entire campus community soon realized that there were people patrolling the campus on foot each night.

The Mule Patrol has also been instrumental in apprehending several automobile thieves who were working university parking lots. The Patrol has also gathered information that helped to solve a variety of crimes, such as burglaries, larcenies, and drug cases. The Department of Public Safety has also used Mule Patrol personnel on surveillance exercises, especially in parking lots, with excellent results. Mule Patrol officers also serve as excellent ambassadors for the department in its recruiting efforts for various positions. These procedures have reduced the amount of overtime required for police officers and, thus, have saved the university money and reduced officer burnout.

Currently, project expansion is under way because the Mule Patrol program has been so successful and beneficial. The university now realizes that a student security force acts as additional eyes and ears to the regular university police force. In fact, during the past academic year,

the number of Mule Patrol officers increased from 12 to 16.

Conclusion

Thorough planning and positive supervision have contributed to the success of the Mule Patrol. However, student security officers must know the importance of their jobs to the academic community, and that they are a vital part of a team. After all, they are not only representing the university and the Department of Public Safety, but most importantly, they are representing themselves.

The positive aspects of the Mule Patrol are clearly evident. The rumors of rapes on campus have been eliminated, and the campus community now enjoys a heightened sense of security. The Mule Patrol officers have become more personally involved and more serious about their responsibilities to the campus community. But, the most positive byproduct of the Mule Patrol program is that students are protecting students.

LEB

The Bulletin Reports

Drugs and Crime Online Library

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has released the *National Institute of Justice Drugs and Crime CD-ROM Library*. The library is a resource for criminal justice and drug abuse treatment program administrators and researchers, as well as virtually anyone concerned with the drug and crime issue.

CD-ROM (Compact Disc-Read Only Memory) technology employs optical discs to store information. Each *NIJ Drugs and Crime CD-ROM Library* has the storage capacity of 1,000 floppy

diskettes or 250,000 pages of hard copy. The format is IBM-compatible and requires a hard disk drive, a CD-ROM drive, and a graphics adaptor.

The CD-ROM contains abstracts, full text books, journal articles, reports, monographs, bulletins, test results, images, and data sets from the Departments of Justice, State, Health and Human Services, Education, Transportation, Treasury, and Defense, as well as foreign governments and private sector sources. Some of the topics covered include drug

laws and drug control statutes, drug-related crimes, money laundering, international and foreign law enforcement, approaches to prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation, the economics of drug trafficking, and Federal research and evaluation strategies.

For more information, call or write the National Institute of Justice/NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850. The toll-free number is 1-800-851-3420. For callers in Maryland and metropolitan Washington, D.C., the number of 1-301-251-5500.

Integrity and Corruption in Police Departments

Building Integrity and Reducing Drug Corruption in Police Departments is a Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) report that is a result of a joint 15-month project by the U. S. Department of Justice, BJA, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Six major city police departments voluntarily participated in the project, which was undertaken to provide insight into the contributing factors of drug-related police corruption and the determinants of a high level of integrity within a police department. The project was also designed to provide prac-

titioners with recommendations for improving integrity in policing.

The project staff identified three principal areas on which to focus—the applicant selection process, the reinforcement of high integrity values among individual officers, and effective anti-corruption programs—to reduce the opportunities for corruption. The report contains information on all three areas and tells how departments differ in their approaches to each. It also covers how each area can be best addressed to strengthen integrity and reduce corruption. At the end of the report is

a model policy that incorporates the principles and techniques by which departments can assess what areas need to be improved. In addition, the model policy can help departments to develop a plan to make improvements and to monitor progress.

A copy of the report can be obtained from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD, 20850, or by calling toll free 1-800-851-3240 or 1-301-251-5500 for callers in Maryland, and the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area.

Asset Forfeiture

Another issue of the *Asset Forfeiture Bulletin* has been released. Covered in this issue are a pro/con discussion on drug taxes, information on a guide for tracking currency, an interview with a U.S. Department of Justice official on a Federal equitable sharing program, and four recent Federal cases that have again expanded the facilitation provision for real property contained in 21 U.S.C. 881 (a)(7).

The bulletin is one component of the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Training and Technical Assistance Project, which is administered by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) for the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). In addition to the bulletin, the project has developed a publications series on asset forfeiture topics that now covers 11 legal, policy, management and technical issues.

To order the Asset Forfeiture Bulletin or to obtain more information about the project, write to the BJA Asset Forfeiture Project, Police Executive Research Forum, 2300 M St., N.W., Suite 910, Washington, DC 20037.

Officers Killed—1989

During 1989, 67 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty, according to preliminary statistics of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. An additional 77 officers lost their lives to accidents while performing their duties. The 1989 total was the lowest during the decade, except for 1986 when 66 officers feloniously lost their lives.

As in previous years, firearms continued to be the weapon most often used to slay officers. Handguns were used in 42 of the murders, rifles in 10, and shotguns in 6. Five officers were intentionally struck with vehicles, 2 were stabbed, 1 was beaten with a blunt object, and 1 was shoved to his death.

Among the 23 officers slain while attempting to apprehend or arrest suspects, 8 were involved in drug-related situations, 8 were attempting to thwart robberies or were in pursuit of robbery suspects, and 7 were attempting arrests for other crimes. Fourteen officers were killed when answering

disturbance calls, and 9 were murdered while investigating suspicious persons or circumstances. In the other incidents involving officer deaths, 8 were enforcing traffic laws, 6 were handling or transporting prisoners, 6 were ambushed, and 1 was killed by a mentally deranged person.

Geographically, 32 officers were killed in the Southern States and 9 each in the Northeastern, Midwestern, and Western States. Eight officers were killed in Puerto Rico. Thirty-eight of the victims were city police, 14 were county officers, 8 were territorial officers, 4 were employed by State law enforcement agencies, and 3 were Federal officers.

Twenty-two officers were wearing body armor at the time of their deaths, and 10 officers were killed with their own weapons. Law enforcement has cleared 57 of the 67 slayings.

(Source: Press release, Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., April 1990.)

The Bulletin Reports, a collection of criminal justice studies, reports, and project findings, is written by Kathy Sulewski. Send your material for consideration to: *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Room 7262, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 10th & Penn. Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20535.

(NOTE: The material presented in this section is intended to be strictly an information source and should not be considered as an endorsement by the FBI for any product or service.)

The Forensic Anthropologist

By
ROBERT W. MANN, M.A.
and
DOUGLAS H. UBELAKER, Ph.D



In recent years, just as the investigation of a crime scene has become more complex and sophisticated, so has the task of the forensic anthropologist. Forensic anthropologists assist medical and legal specialists to identify known or suspected human remains.

The science of forensic anthropology includes archeological excavation; examination of hair, insects, plant materials and footprints; determination of elapsed time since death; facial reproduc-

tion; photographic superimposition; detection of anatomical variants; and analysis of past injury and medical treatment. However, in practice, forensic anthropologists primarily help to identify a decedent based on the available evidence.

For example, when a skeleton found in a wooded area is brought to a morgue or an anthropologist's laboratory for examination, the first step is to determine whether the remains are human, animal, or inorganic material. If human, an anthro-

pologist then attempts to estimate age at death, racial affiliation, sex, and stature of the decedent.

If the skeleton shows evidence of prolonged burial or is accompanied by coffin nails or arrow points, it usually represents an historic or prehistoric burial rather than a recent death. Construction crews frequently unearth such skeletons during road or housing excavations. After combining all of the evidence, the anthropologist determines the skeleton's possible

significance to medical and legal authorities.

Although the primary task of anthropologists is to establish the identity of a decedent, increasingly they provide expert opinion on the type and size of weapon(s) used and the number of blows sustained by victims of violent crime. It should be noted, however, that forensic pathologists or related experts in forensic medicine determine the cause or manner of death, not the forensic anthropologist.

Most anthropologists have advanced degrees in anthropology and have examined hundreds of remains. They are also thoroughly familiar with human anatomy and how it varies in different populations. Some anthropologists may also have experience in police science or medicine, as well as in serology, toxicology, firearms and toolmarks identification, crime scene investigation, handling of evidence, and photography. A limited number of anthropologists deal with footprint analysis and species identification of carrion insects in relation to estimating time elapsed since death.

Perhaps the anthropologist's most valuable skill is familiarity with subtle variations in the human skeleton. Although most adult skeletons have the same number of bones (206), no two skeletons are identical. Therefore, observations of patterns or unique skeletal traits frequently lead to positive identifications. The most frequently used method for identification is to compare before- and after-death dental photoimages. If such photoimages do not exist, or if they are unavailable, then old skeletal injuries or

anatomical skeletal variants revealed in other photoimages may provide the comparative evidence necessary to establish a positive identification.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE

Suppose hunters find a partially clothed skeleton lying on the ground in a heavily wooded area with much of its clothing torn and scattered by carnivores. Law enforcement officers are called to the scene, as is the medical examiner or nonphysician coroner. The scene is photographed in detail, and the skeleton is examined and photographed before being removed to the city morgue.


At the morgue, the medical examiner examines the remains for evidence of trauma, such as stab marks in the shirt, blunt trauma to the skull and mandible, and broken

bones. Photoimages and photographs of the body show that no bullets or pellets having been noted. Also, examination of the clothing reveals no wallet or other personal identification.

The medical examiner determines through measurement of the pubic area that the remains are those of a middle-aged adult male. There is no evidence of facial or head hair to aid in determining racial affiliation. From measurements taken at the scene, the examiner roughly estimates the stature. Also, a forensic odontologist is called in to take dental photoimages. Although the decedent has a number of large dental cavities, he shows no restorations or evidence of having seen a dentist. At this point, the medical examiner requests assistance from a forensic anthropologist, who conducts further



Mr. Mann



Dr. Ubelaker

The authors are physical anthropologists at the Smithsonian Institution's Department of Anthropology in Washington, D.C.

study of the remains in the laboratory.

The forensic anthropologist's examination confirms the medical examiner's findings that the individual is a middle-aged male. However, questions remain that the forensic anthropologist must answer, such as:

- What is the individual's racial affiliation?
- What is the individual's age and stature?
- How long has the individual been dead?
- Is there any evidence of trauma or foul play at or near the time of death?
- Are there any distinguishing skeletal traits that may aid in establishing the identity? and
- Is there any indication of post-mortem treatment or alteration of the remains?

Racial Affiliation

The question of racial affiliation is difficult to answer because, although racial classification has some biological components, it is based primarily on social affiliation. Nevertheless, some anatomical details, especially in the face, often suggest the individual's race. In particular, white individuals have narrower faces with high noses and prominent chins. Black individuals have wider nasal openings and subnasal grooves. American Indians and Asians have forward-projecting cheekbones and specialized dental features.

Examination of this skeleton reveals traits consistent with white

racial affiliation. Further examination of the skull produces a few strands of straight blonde hair. Microscopic examination shows the hair to be consistent with that of a white person.

“ A forensic anthropologist makes significant contributions to an investigation. ”

Age and Stature

Usually, examination of the pubic bone, sacroiliac joint, amount of dental wear, cranium, arthritic changes in the spine, and microscopic studies of bones and teeth narrows the age estimate given by the anthropologist. After examining the skeleton, these indicators suggest that the man was between 35 and 45 years of age at the time of death.

Estimation of stature can be narrowed by measuring one or more complete long bones, preferably a femur or tibia. If stature estimates are based on incomplete long bones, less confidence can be placed in them. This measurement of the maximum length of the bone can then be plugged into a formula based on race and sex to produce an estimate. In this case the individual's stature was estimated at 5'7" to 5'9" with a mean stature of 5'8".

Time Interval Since Death

Estimating the time interval since death can be extremely dif-

ficult. For the most part, such an estimate is based on the amount and condition of soft tissue, such as muscle, skin, and ligaments present, the preservation of the bones, extent of associated plant root growth, odor, and any carnivore and insect activity. However, many other variables must also be considered, including the temperature at the time of death, penetrating wounds, humidity/aridity, soil acidity, and water retention. The longer the time since death, the more difficult it is to determine the time interval since death. In this hypothetical example, the anthropologist determined that the individual died 6 to 9 months previously, based largely on the condition of the soft tissue and the amount of root growth in the individual's clothing.

Evidence of Trauma

After the dirt and forest debris were removed from the bones using water and a soft brush, a number of faint cuts became visible in the left ribs and the mid-back. The number of discrete cuts in three ribs and in one vertebra suggest that this male was stabbed a minimum of three times. No additional evidence of trauma was noted.

Distinguishing Skeletal Traits

Further examination revealed that the male sustained a fracture above his right eye and upper jaw bone at least several years before death. The individual also had a severely deviated nasal septum and presented evidence of a severe chronic nasal infection. This observation is noteworthy because if he sought medical help for the fractures or sinus condition, photographs may have been taken that

would provide an excellent opportunity for positive identification.

POST-EXAMINATION PROCEDURES

After the forensic anthropologist completes the examination, the medical examiner provides all information obtained from the skeleton to the law enforcement officials investigating the case. The information is then entered in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).

In this hypothetical case, after several months, a search failed to locate a missing person matching this description. Therefore, the medical examiner and the detectives returned to the forensic anthropologist to request that a facial reproduction be attempted.

Two approaches are available to an anthropologist in reconstructing facial appearance during life. First, the anthropologist could work with a composite artist experienced in rendering sketches based on information supplied by eyewitnesses. Or, the anthropologist could call in a specialist in three-dimensional facial reproduction, a technique in which the head is constructed in clay directly over the skull and mandible or over good casts of them. Because of limited funds, and because an experienced composite artist is available on staff, the forensic anthropologist and artist worked together to produce a drawing of the person represented by the skeletal remains. This drawing was then made available to the public via the local media.

Shortly thereafter, two unrelated men who had seen the image on television came forward because

they thought that it might be a relative. Medical and dental records for both individuals could not be located, but facial photographs taken within the last 2 years were available.

Using new techniques of photographic superimposition and comparison, the forensic anthropologist excluded one of the individuals outright. However, frontal photoimages of the second individual taken 3 years before death showed the individual was treated for facial injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The configuration of the frontal sinuses on the photoimages matched exactly the photoimages of the recovered skull, thereby positively identifying the victim.

“
...a forensic anthropologist is now an integral member of most mass disaster teams.
”

VALUE OF FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY

A forensic anthropologist makes significant contributions to an investigation. The greatest of these could well be the anthropologist's intensive training and experience in distinguishing between human and nonhuman remains, determining age at death, racial affiliation, sex, stature, elapsed time since death, skeletal trauma, post-mortem damage and alteration of the skeleton, and estab-


lishing positive identification based on skeletal and dental evidence. Such information can be obtained from complete bodies or those partially destroyed by burning, air crashes, intentional mutilation and dismemberment, explosions, or other mass disasters. In fact, a forensic anthropologist is now an integral member of most mass disaster teams.

Through their anthropological training, most forensic anthropologists have knowledge of excavation techniques and mapping that are invaluable in recovering evidence. Consequently, the forensic anthropologist should participate in the investigation of the crime scene and, especially, in the recovery of human skeletal remains.

CONCLUSION

Many forensic anthropologists offer their services to law enforcement agencies, coroners, and medical examiners. However, if a law enforcement agency does not have access to a forensic anthropologist, experienced experts can be found in many of the larger universities, in anthropology museums throughout the United States, and in some medical examiner's offices. It should be noted, however, that not all physical anthropologists are qualified to practice forensic anthropology. A list of board certified forensic anthropologists can be obtained from the American Academy of Forensic Sciences. Forensic anthropologists have much to contribute to law enforcement and would welcome the opportunity to assist in the successful resolution of an investigation.

LEB



Police Personnel, edited by Stephen D. Gladis, *Human Resources Development Press*, Amherst, Massachusetts, 1990.

Faced with shrinking budgets and increasing demands for service, the modern police executive must be alert to new and better ways of using resources. Since no police resource is more expensive than personnel, efficient personnel management practices can go a long way toward cutting unnecessary costs. *Police Personnel* provides police managers with a complete review of the current trends and recent changes in personnel philosophy and practice. This source book affords the police executive a quick reference on topics covering all aspects of police personnel management from recruitment to retirement.

Chapters on recruiting, training, evaluating, and counseling consist of carefully selected articles that have appeared in the *FBI Law Enforcement*

Bulletin in recent years. Each of the articles discusses the latest theory concerning a unique personnel issue and addresses its practical application in today's environment.

The introduction, by Clyde L. Cronkhite, describes the steps taken by the Los Angeles Police Department to cope with reductions in revenue caused by the passage of Proposition 13. The first section discusses recruiting strategies, the selection process, the use of psychological consultants in applicant screening, and the psychological preparation of female police applicants.


The next chapter concentrates on training and development. Articles in this chapter range from the role of the modern training director to such specific topics as the stress of promotions. One article discusses a new approach to the training of first-line supervisors.

Chapter Three deals with the evaluation of police personnel. Three noted authors consider ways of assessing and influencing performance.

The final chapter discusses how police departments can improve internal communications by using employee councils and peer counseling. This chapter also features two articles discussing stress on police families and the need to prepare police personnel for retirement. The book concludes with an insightful analysis of the development of police services—from their origins to 20th century trends.

Reviewed by
Charlie T. Deane
Chief of Police
Prince William County, Virginia,
Police Department


Major Art Theft





On March 18, 1990, 13 works of art were stolen from the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston, Massachusetts. A \$1million reward has been offered by the museum for information leading directly to the safe return of all 13 works of art.

Any information concerning this theft should be directed to the FBI's Boston Office at (617) 742-5533. Refer to their file number 87A-BS-527120. You may also contact the National Stolen Art File, FBI Laboratory, Washington, D.C. at (202) 324-4434.

Pictured are all but one of the stolen works of art. A photograph of a stolen 9" x 7" gilded metal eagle is not currently available.



Pictured clockwise from the top left are:
Landscape with an Obelisk by Govaert Flinck
The Storm on the Sea of Galilee by Rembrandt
Program for an Artistic Soirée by Degas (unfinished version)
Program for an Artistic Soirée by Degas
A Lady and Gentleman in Black by Rembrandt
Three Mounted Jockeys by Degas
 Chinese bronze beaker or *Ku* from the Shang Dynasty
The Concert by Vermeer
La Sortie du Pesage by Degas
Self-Portrait by Rembrandt
Cortege aux Environs de Florence by Degas
Chez Tortoni by Manet



Focus on Crime Prevention

Business and Government Working Together

A joint crime prevention program has been initiated between the Creve Coeur, Missouri, Police Department and the corporate security department of Monsanto, Inc., which has its world headquarters in Creve Coeur. This new concept may lead to changes nationwide in the field of crime prevention in the years to come.

This program is geared to make homes and the workplace safer. It was established to promote crime prevention techniques and citizen awareness by sponsoring business watch, personal safety programs, Operation ID, and shoplifting and bicycle safety programs. Initially, Monsanto donated money for the development of a crime prevention logo bearing the words "Business and Government Working Together." Then, the corporation became involved in crime prevention projects by providing personnel from the corporate security department to work with police officers. Twenty-two thousand area residents and Monsanto employees were initially targeted by this joint program.

As part of the program, Monsanto security officers are available to make home burglary prevention

checks for the nearly 6,000 local Monsanto employees. These security officers, who receive special training from police officers, visit homes of Monsanto employees to point out security



“ ‘This joint effort is an exciting opportunity to fight crime before it occurs.’ ”


weaknesses and to offer suggestions to improve them. Creve Coeur police officers conduct similar security checks for residents of the city. Both police and security officers involved in this joint program are selected by their respective agencies. All candidates must undergo extensive evaluation in public speaking, writing skills, appearance and education.

An informational crime prevention booth is also operated during the city's annual Creve Coeur Days celebration held each May. This booth is staffed by police officers and Monsanto security officers. At the booth, parents and their children have an opportunity to see crime prevention displays, obtain handouts and make arrangements for programs in their neighborhoods and businesses. Monsanto also makes their world headquarters facilities available for large groups interested in crime prevention.

“So much of police work is reacting to crimes already committed,” said a Creve Coeur officer. “This joint effort is an exciting opportunity to fight crime before it occurs.” If results during the early stages of the program are any indication, the difference is not only being felt in this community but has also given new meaning to the phrase, “Business and Government Working Together.”

LEB

Information for this column was provided by Capt. Frank D. Harris, Commander of Administrative and Support Services, Creve Coeur, Missouri, Police Department.



Anticipatory Search Warrants

By
A. LOUIS DIPIETRO, J.D.

The fourth amendment to the U. S. Constitution requires that search warrants be based on a showing of probable cause. The probable cause requirement is satisfied when a law enforcement officer sets forth facts which indicate a fair probability that a crime has been committed and that evidence of that crime is presently located at a particular location.¹

Sometimes, however, law enforcement officers only have information that evidence will be in a

particular location at some future time, but have no reliable information about the present location of that evidence. For example, an officer might receive reliable source information indicating that contraband will be delivered to a particular address the next day. If the officer waits until the delivery is made to obtain a warrant to search that location, the officer runs the risk that the evidence will be moved or destroyed before the warrant can be executed. As an alternative, the

officer might conduct a warrantless search of the premises immediately upon delivery of the contraband and attempt to justify that search under the emergency exception² to the warrant requirement. The risk the officer runs by this course of action is that a court may find probable cause lacking or fail to recognize the emergency, and accordingly, suppress the evidence under the provisions of the exclusionary rule.³

The law provides a solution to this dilemma. Rather than risking

either loss or suppression of the evidence, the officer can use an anticipatory or prospective search warrant. An anticipatory search warrant is based on a showing of probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specific place. Where officers have probable cause to believe that evidence or contraband will arrive at a certain location within a reasonable period of time, they need not wait until delivery before requesting a warrant. Instead, officers may present this probable cause to a magistrate prior to the arrival of that evidence, and the magistrate can issue an anticipatory search warrant based on probable cause that the evidence will be found at the location to be searched at the time the warrant is executed.

The purpose of this article is to acquaint law enforcement officers with the uses and requirements for

anticipatory warrants. After reviewing the general judicial acceptance of anticipatory warrants, the article discusses numerous court decisions involving various investigative applications for anticipatory search warrants. The article also offers several recommendations for avoiding potential constitutional challenges to the use of anticipatory warrants.

JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF ANTICIPATORY WARRANTS

Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of anticipatory warrants,⁴ numerous lower courts have ruled that it is constitutionally permissible to obtain such a warrant. Challenges to the constitutionality of prospective search warrants often involve claims that the fourth amendment probable cause requirement is not satisfied, because at the time of the warrant's issuance, there is no prob-

able cause to believe that the items to be seized are presently at the place to be searched.

However, the vast majority of State and Federal courts that have considered this question have concluded that anticipatory warrants are constitutional and consistent with the longstanding preference that whenever possible, police obtain judicial approval before searching. Judicial acceptance of the anticipatory warrant also encourages police to use the warrant process rather than taking warrantless action. Moreover, privacy interests are better protected by permitting law enforcement officers to obtain warrants in advance if they can show probable cause to believe that the object of the search will be located on the premises at the time the search takes place.

INVESTIGATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ANTICIPATORY WARRANTS

For purposes of this article, court decisions involving various investigative applications of anticipatory warrants have been categorized according to the degree of police control over the delivery of the evidence to the place to be searched as follows: 1) Mail deliveries; 2) controlled delivery by cooperating witness; and 3) delivery uncontrolled by the government.

Mail Deliveries

The anticipated mail delivery of packages containing items subject to seizure is the most common use for anticipatory warrants.⁵ For example, in *United States v.*



**“
...anticipatory warrants
provide a practical
alternative to proceeding
with no warrant and
risking suppression of
the evidence.
”**

Special Agent DiPietro is a legal instructor at the FBI Academy.

Goodwin,⁶ and *United States v. Dornhofer*,⁷ the U. S. Postal Inspection Service set up a child pornography reverse sting operation to locate and prosecute individuals who receive child pornography through the mail.

Postal inspectors mailed to the defendants child pornography catalogs summarizing available material in graphic terms. After receiving orders from the defendants for this material, postal inspectors obtained anticipatory search warrants to search those locations where the material was to be delivered. In both cases, the postal inspectors affirmed in their search warrant affidavits that through their efforts, pornographic materials would be delivered by mail to the particular locations to be searched. Government agents, thereafter, observed the anticipated deliveries and then executed the search warrants and recovered the delivered pornography, as well as other sexually explicit material.

In both cases the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of these anticipatory warrants. The court concluded there was probable cause to issue a search warrant, even though at the time of the warrant's issuance the evidence had not yet been delivered to the location to be searched.

Controlled Delivery by Cooperative Witness

In *United States v. Garcia*,⁸ two U.S. military servicemen,

Hooks and Oliver, were caught by U. S. Customs agents in Miami trying to smuggle cocaine into the country from Panama. After being flown to New York to meet with Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, Hooks and Oliver

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”**

agreed to cooperate and proceed with a controlled delivery of the cocaine. They telephoned the defendant and made arrangements to bring the cocaine to the apartment where she was then located. Before delivery, DEA agents applied for and received an anticipatory search warrant for that apartment. With the cocaine still in their duffel bags, Hooks and Oliver went to the apartment under observation of DEA agents. After being admitted and given permission to wait for the defendant, Hooks and Oliver sat down in the living room and placed the duffel bags next to them. Five to 10 minutes later, while Hooks and Oliver were still waiting and before the defendant or anyone else had taken possession of the duffel bags, DEA agents entered and executed the search warrant.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the validity of the anticipatory search warrant and concluded as follows:

“The fact that contraband is not ‘presently located at the place described in the warrant’

is immaterial, so long as ‘there is probable cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed.’ ”⁹

In rejecting the defendant's claim that the agents acted prematurely when they entered and searched the apartment before the cocaine was transferred personally to the defendant, the court stated that the warrant was valid upon delivery of cocaine to the apartment and did not require that

anyone take possession prior to execution of the warrant.

Delivery Uncontrolled by the Government

In some cases, anticipatory warrants have been used where officers do not have control over the delivery of evidence to the location to be searched. For example, in *United States v. Goff*,¹⁰ DEA agents in Seattle developed probable cause to believe that Goff and Jacobson were making a 36-hour round trip to Miami to purchase a large quantity of cocaine. After airline personnel confirmed that the defendants had boarded the nonstop return flight to Seattle, the agents applied for an anticipatory warrant that was issued while the plane was in flight.

In approving the subsequent search that occurred when the

defendants disembarked from the plane in Seattle, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there was probable cause to believe that the persons searched would arrive within the district in a reasonable time and that the warrant could not be executed until their arrival. The court concluded that issuing a warrant in anticipation of these events created no danger that the property seized would be other than the property sought in the warrant; anticipating future events did not detract from probable cause which must exist at the time of the search.¹¹

In another uncontrolled delivery case, *Commonwealth v. Riviera*,¹² an undercover officer went to a certain address, knocked on the door, and told the defendant who answered the door that he wished to buy one ounce of cocaine. The defendant said he was waiting for delivery, which would occur at approximately 10:00 p.m., and directed the undercover officer to return after 10:00 p.m., at which time he could purchase cocaine for \$1,300 per ounce. Several other persons also approached the defendant about buying cocaine and were similarly told to return after 10:00 p.m. Based on these facts and additional informant information, an anticipatory warrant was obtained. The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the validity of this anticipatory warrant on the grounds there was a fair probability that contraband and evidence would be found at the particular location to be

searched at the time the warrant would be executed.

POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

The fourth amendment mandates that all search warrants, including anticipatory warrants, be based on facts establishing probable cause and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. The war-

“
**Judicial acceptance of the
anticipatory
warrant...encourages police
to use the warrant process....**
”

rant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Anticipatory warrants can also be challenged on constitutional grounds if the search warrant affidavit lacks adequate facts indicating that the evidence to be seized is on a “sure course” to the location to be searched, or if there is inadequate judicial control of the warrant execution.

Evidence on a “Sure Course” to Delivery

Although the vast majority of Federal and State courts that have considered anticipatory warrants have approved their use, some courts have required a showing that the contraband or evidence to be

seized is on a “sure course” to its destination. For example, in *United States v. Hendricks*,¹³ a Customs officer inspected a cardboard box arriving from Brazil, which was addressed to Hendricks in Tucson, Arizona, but shipped in such a manner that Hendricks was required to pick it up personally in Tucson. Inside the box was a suitcase in which the inspector found hidden 5 to 7 pounds of cocaine. The box was sent on to Tucson where it was turned over to the DEA. While holding the box, DEA agents developed additional incriminating evidence and applied for a search warrant to search Hendricks’ residence.

The magistrate issuing the warrant knew that the suitcase was then in the DEA’s possession and not at the Hendricks residence, and accordingly, inserted a provision in the warrant specifying that it was to be executed only upon the condition that the box is brought to the Hendricks residence. However, since at the time the warrant was issued, Hendricks had not picked up the box, there was no assurance that he would pick it up, or even if he did, that he would ever take the box to the house. Therefore, the court found there was not a sufficient nexus or connection between the box and the residence. The court held that unless the suitcase was on a sure course to the house (as for example in mail addressed to the house), no probable cause would exist to believe it would arrive there.¹⁴

on a sure and irreversible course to its destination prior to applying for an anticipatory warrant.

Ensuring Adequate Judicial Control of Warrant Execution

The element of time may be highly relevant to the validity of a search warrant and its execution. The reason many courts require traditional search warrants to be executed "forthwith" is to ensure that measure of judicial control over the search which the warrant procedure is intended to accomplish. Passage of an undue amount of time between issuance and execution raises the danger that the described property will no longer exist at the premises to be searched. The danger of loss of judicial control might be as great in the case of a warrant issued to take effect some time in the future as in the case of a stale warrant.¹⁶

An anticipatory warrant is based on a magistrate's determination that sufficient probable cause exists to believe that at some future time (but not presently), certain evidence will be located at a particular place. A potential constitutional problem with such warrants is

that the issuing magistrate abdicates to the officers executing the warrant an important judicial function, namely, the determination that probable cause exists to believe that the objects are currently in the place to be searched.

While it is logical to assume that officers will not be disposed to undermine the success of their investigative efforts by the premature execution of an anticipatory warrant, it is nonetheless preferable to

event never occurs, the warrant may not be executed.¹⁹

To guard against successful challenges to the validity of anticipatory warrants based on an alleged loss of judicial control in their execution, officers should place reasonable limiting language in their warrant affidavits specifying that execution will not occur in the absence of a particular contingency, such as: 1) A scheduled time for delivery; 2) a given event; 3) police surveillance confirming that the package has been delivered; or 4) a particular method that allows executing officers to know that the items are in the place to be searched. Such language in the affidavit may save an otherwise defective warrant if the magistrate merely fails to include that limiting language in the warrant itself.

“...investigators should attempt to develop facts indicating that the evidence is on a sure and irreversible course to its destination....”

CONCLUSION

The anticipatory or prospective search warrant is obtained in advance of the anticipated time for delivery of evidence to the place to be searched so police may promptly execute the search when delivery is made. When police are confronted with the need for quick action, anticipatory warrants provide a practical alternative to proceeding with no warrant and risking suppression of the evidence. If police delay applying for a warrant until the evidence arrives at the place to be searched, they increase the risk that the evidence will be lost before the search can be made. Officers applying for anticipatory warrants should ensure that their search

deal with time limitations as to execution explicitly in the warrant application process.¹⁷ In that regard, some courts prefer the issuing magistrate to protect against premature execution by defining the circumstances and/or conditions that must be present prior to its execution.¹⁸ For example, the issuing magistrate could delete the forthwith command found preprinted on many warrant forms and insert a directive that execution occur only upon the happening of a specific event, such as delivery of the evidence. This ensures judicial control because if the critical future

warrant affidavits meet traditional fourth amendment requirements, and also reflect that the items are on a "sure course" to the place to be searched. Officers should also include appropriate limiting language in the affidavit to prevent loss of judicial control.

LEB

FOOTNOTES

¹ See *New York v. P.J. Video*, 106 S.Ct. 1610 (1986); *Andresen v. Maryland*, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).

² See Sauls, "Emergency Searches of Premises," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 56, Nos. 3-4, March and April 1987.

³ See Fiatal, "The Judicial Preference for the Search Warrant: The Good Faith Warrant Exception to the Exclusionary Rule," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 55, No. 7, July 1986.

⁴ In *Berger v. New York*, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme Court indirectly acknowledged such a possibility when it indicated that it could be constitutionally permissible to obtain a warrant authorizing the seizure (through the use of electronic surveillance) of oral communications which will not exist until vocalized by the participants to that conversation at some future time.

⁵ 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 3.7(c) at 94 (2d ed. 1987).

⁶ 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).

⁷ 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1639 (1989).

⁸ 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989).

⁹ *Id.* at 702.

¹⁰ 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).

¹¹ The court also rejected a challenge to the warrant under Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires a Federal search warrant be issued in the district where the person or property sought is located. The court stated the rule does not require that in every circumstance, the evidence sought must be physically in existence within the district at the time the warrant issues. Although the warrant cannot be executed until the object of the search is in the district, the rule is not violated when the affidavit clearly demonstrates that the objects of the search will exist in the district within the time allowed for execution.

¹² 563 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. 1989).

¹³ 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985).

¹⁴ Although the warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause, the agents' good faith reliance on it was held to be reasonable, and therefore, the evidence was nevertheless admissible.

¹⁵ See, e.g. *United States v. Hale*, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107

S.Ct. 110; *Goodwin*, supra note 6; *Dornhofer*, supra note 7.

¹⁶ *United States ex rel Beal v. Skaff*, 41 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969).

¹⁷ LaFave, supra note 5, at 98.

¹⁸ *Commonwealth v. Soares*, 424 N.E. 2d 221 (Mass Sup. Ct. 1981). In *Garcia*, supra note 8 at 702, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held:

"When a government official presents independent evidence indicating that delivery of contraband will, or is likely to, occur, and when the magistrate conditions the warrant on that delivery, there is sufficient probable cause to uphold the warrant."

¹⁹ Although desirable, the absence of contingencies is not necessarily fatal where premature execution is unlikely. See, *Reviera*, supra note 12.

Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in this article should consult their legal adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law or are not permitted at all.

Author's Note


On May 1, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court sent to Congress proposed amendments to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The first amendment would permit warrants to search where the person or property is outside the jurisdiction when the warrant is issued, but within the district by the time the warrant is executed. A second amendment would permit the issuance, by Federal magistrates only, of search warrants for property or persons who are within the district when the warrant is issued, but might move outside the district before the warrant is executed.

In March 1990, Search Group, Inc., began to offer the *Bulletin* via a computer dial-up service. This service is available to those with an IBM-compatible personal computer and a telephone modem. Users can call up current issues of the *Bulletin* by dialing toll-free 1-800-448-8257. In addition, users can print any article from the *Bulletin* in their homes or offices—free of charge. Currently, the *Bulletin* is the most frequently accessed item in the Search network. To access the system properly, users need the following information:

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- Communication Parameters:
8 databits, 1 stopbit, no parity
- Pre-registration Required?
No
- Authorized Users:
Criminal justice practitioners and related professionals

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face each challenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actions warrant special attention from their respective departments. The *Bulletin* also wants to recognize their exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.



Officer Davis

While off duty, Officer Winford A. Davis of the Chattanooga, Tennessee, Police Department witnessed a collision involving a passenger vehicle and a truck. The severely damaged automobile, driven by a lone female, rolled over and caught fire. Officer Davis immediately rushed to the car and pulled the driver through the side window. While he carried the injured driver to safety, the car became fully engulfed by the flames.



Trooper Gorman

Trooper C. Randy Gorman of the Montana Highway Patrol rescued the driver of a vehicle that had submerged below a frozen river. Trooper Gorman came upon the accident scene after several unsuccessful attempts had been made to rescue the victim from the icy river. Trooper Gorman entered the frozen water and located the victim in the upside down vehicle. He then pulled the victim to safety.

While on patrol, Officer Thomas Scott of the Oak Lawn, Illinois, Police Department observed an individual who resembled a fugitive being sought for two homicides, five armed robberies and two sexual assaults in the northern Illinois area. He radioed for backup and then approached the man. Although the subject attempted to deny his identity, Officer Scott located tattoos that identified him as the fugitive. Officer Scott arrested the fugitive, who was subsequently convicted of his crimes.






Officer Scott

Washington, D.C. 20535

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Drug Use Among High School Seniors (From 1975 to 1989)



NOTE: Charts are based on a National Institute on Drug Abuse study in which students were asked if they had used illegal drugs within the past the 30 days.