


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
LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

JUNE 1971

VOL. 40 NO. 6



THE COVER—*Destruction caused by Hurricane Camille in Gulfport, Miss. See article beginning on page 6.*

FBI

LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

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MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR . . .

. . . To All Law Enforcement Officials

THE GENIUS OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM of government lies specifically in the protection of individual rights and the maintenance of due process through a system of law. This cornerstone of freedom has been safeguarded and more clearly defined by court decisions throughout the years. Yet guilty defendants in some courts today might well ask of their counsel, "Never mind my fundamental rights; dig up a legal technicality. Error is more important than truth."

Sometimes, law enforcement officers attribute a part of the blame for the crime problem to legal technicalities used by some courts to free the obviously guilty. Those who disagree charge that police officers do not understand the difference between a technicality and a fundamental right. Interestingly enough, some highly distinguished and respected jurists from time to time have supported law enforcement's stand. Indeed, Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States itself have voiced alarm over the "technicality" issue.

In dissenting from reversal of a conviction in 1961, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, long acknowledged as a great champion of fundamental rights, repeated a warning against interposing a "bare technicality" between a defendant and his just conviction. While quoting with approval from a similar charge made earlier by Chief Justice Taft, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented:

"More than a half-century ago, William H. Taft, reflecting his wide experience

even before he became Chief Justice, laid this charge at the door of the courts:

' . . . The . . . disposition on the part of the courts to think that every provision of every rule of law in favor of the defendant is one to be strictly enforced, and even widened in its effect in the interest of the liberty of the citizen, has led courts of appeal to a degree of refinement in upholding technicalities in favor of defendants, and in reversing convictions that render one who has had practical knowledge of the trial of criminal cases most impatient.

' . . . When a court of highest authority in this country thus interposes a bare technicality between a defendant and his just conviction, it is not too much to charge some of the laxity in our administration of the criminal law to a proneness on the part of courts of last resort to find error and to reverse judgments of conviction.'

I am convinced that today's decision falls within these weighty strictures."

In March 1971, Mr. Justice Black, another staunch defender of fundamental rights, dissenting from a reversal of a conviction, stated, ". . . I believe the decision here is a gross and wholly indefensible miscarriage of justice." The decision by the majority of the court, he added,


MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR

"may well be classified as one of those calculated to make many good people believe our Court actually enjoys frustrating justice by unnecessarily turning professional criminals loose to prey upon society with impunity. . . . There is not even a suspicion here that this hardened criminal is innocent. . . ."

It is apparent that Chief Justice Taft, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Black were capable of distinguishing between a technicality

and a fundamental right. These strong dissenting opinions identify a crisis point in contemporary society: the need for a restoration of balance between the protection of the rights of the individual and the welfare of society. The judicial concern for absolute fairness must be viewed as part of free government's efforts to maintain this essential balance. However, overzealous searches for technical impropriety serve neither goal honorably.

JUNE 1, 1971



J. Edgar Hoover

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, *Director*



Vice President Agnew Defends the FBI

In an address before the Southern Gas Association Convention in New Orleans, La., April 26, 1971, Vice President Agnew discussed some of the erroneous allegations and criticisms being made against Director J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI. "If the FBI suffers from these attacks," the Vice President explained, "all law enforcement in America will suffer." We believe Mr. Agnew's observations will be of interest to Bulletin readers, and with his permission, his speech is reprinted here.

HON. SPIRO T. AGNEW

**The Vice President,
Washington, D.C.**

In the past several weeks we have witnessed a series of vitriolic attacks on one of the Nation's top law enforcement agencies and particularly on the man who built it into a highly professional and efficient organization respected throughout the world.

It is not the first time that the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover have been assailed. They have withstood many assaults during their long association. The attacks generally have come from expected quarters—subversives, mobsters, extremists, and anarchists—ene-

mies of the American system, who quite naturally detest an agency that stands between them and the accomplishment of their objectives—the perversion or destruction of our institutions.

But this time the scenario is somewhat different. While the attacks appear to be as well orchestrated as if they were being performed in concert by the professionals of disruption, this latest assault is from another direction. It gives off an unpleasant political odor—perhaps for the first time in FBI history—and it comes mainly from presidential aspirants who apparently foresee some political accretion from the radical left if they challenge the integrity of the FBI and its longtime director. These opportunists are being aided and abetted by certain of their friends in the liberal news media who automatically shout "Right on!" every time someone claims his civil liberties have been threatened, regardless of the transparency of such charges.

Now I am sure that most of these charges will fall of their own weight—or rather vaporize because of their lack of weight. Those that have an aura of credibility will be disproved in the course of thorough examination of all the evidence. But in any case, the very fact that these fractious allegations will be known by many more than ever learn of their successful refutation cannot possibly be of help to, and indeed could damage, an outstanding American institution. If the FBI suffers from these attacks, all law enforcement in America will suffer. And we can ill afford that, particularly at a time in our history when the FBI and the police of this Nation have their hands full maintaining order and preserving our institutions of government from those who would tear down our society.

So I would like to discuss with you today this great law enforcement institution—what it means to us as citi-

zens and what it means to our government. I also would like to examine candidly the fitness of its director, whose ouster is energetically sought by those now attacking the institution to which he has devoted his life. And in doing this, we can look perhaps a little closer at some of the charges that have been brought against the FBI and Director J. Edgar Hoover.

In recognition of the nonpartisan nature of the FBI, I shall endeavor to keep politics out of this. If I succeed, I will have accomplished more than the irresponsible critics who generated this controversy.

If you took literally some of the more dramatic statements in the news accounts about the FBI controversy, you could only conclude that there is an Agent behind every tree and monument in Washington, in the closet of every Congressman's office, in automobiles trailing him from work to home to parties, and in listening posts monitoring his wiretapped conversations.

Note carefully, if you will, these words from Senator McGovern, a presidential aspirant and one of the leaders of the "Dump Hoover" movement, as reported in the Washington Star of April 20th:

"There is no doubt in my mind that virtually every political figure, every student activist, every leader for peace and social justice is under the surveillance of the FBI."

Now let's think about that statement for just a minute, ladies and gentlemen. I do not know how many political figures there are in Washington, to say nothing of the rest of the country. But I do know that there are 535 Members of the Congress alone.

I assume that Senator McGovern is including all of these in his term "virtually every political figure," and


probably would include, in addition, key members of their staffs.

Even if the FBI were to use as few as four Agents per 24-hour day to keep these political figures under surveillance—and surveillance in this sense means constant, close watch—it would tie up 2,140 Agents just to keep an eye on the Members of the Congress. Since the FBI has a total of only 8,365 Agents throughout the entire Nation—and the great majority of these operate outside Washington—the agency would be hard pressed indeed to keep the Members of Congress under surveillance. And this doesn't even begin to consider other political figures or Senator McGovern's generous additions of "every student activist, every leader for peace and social justice." Heaven only knows how many of those there are.

As we shall see in a few minutes—when we look at some of the work that the FBI is really involved in and is charged by law with accomplishing—the Bureau does not have the time or the manpower for the "surveillance" that it is accused of maintaining on innocent people.

But first I'd like to briefly mention two other cases that have kept the FBI controversy high in the news for several weeks.

Senator Muskie, who also is a presidential candidate, is another who has gathered considerable publicity by attacking the FBI. He shares the phobia of those who believe they are under surveillance. As proof, he released publicly an FBI memorandum which was a factual report of the Earth Day activities in Washington last year, at which the Senator happened to be a speaker. Agents had been sent there primarily to watch the activities of an incendiary radical, one Rennie Davis, and a few others also better known for their subversive proclivities than for their interest in ecology.



Hurricane Camille is said to have been the worst storm ever to hit the mainland of the United States. With winds in excess of 200 miles per hour and tidal waves over 20 feet, Camille smashed into the Mississippi Gulf Coast on Sunday night, August 17, 1969.

By

HOWARD L. HOBBS

Chief of Police,
Gulfport, Miss.



This sailboat was washed ashore in front of a church in Gulfport, Miss.

Hurricane Camille

Police Operations During a Natural Disaster

As there was with the other principal participants in the rally, there was a brief mention of Senator Muskie in the memorandum. Here it is in full. I quote: "Shortly after 8 p.m., Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Maine) arrived and gave a short antipollution speech."

That was the report's total reference to Senator Muskie's participation, although you would not know it from the news coverage of his startling revelation that he and other innocents were spied on by the FBI.

Newsweek Magazine, for example, devoted two pages of its April 26th issue to the incidents, which it headlined, "Who Dug for Dirt on Earth Day?" Said Newsweek: "It is becoming plain that the Democrats sense they have a powerful public issue in the surveillance activities of the feds." It featured a photograph of Senator Muskie, a large photograph of the Earth Day crowd, and the top of the FBI document made public by the Maine Senator. The magazine account deserved that one of those the FBI was interested in was Rennie Davis, convicted Chicago 7 member. Newsweek said Davis "spoke at the rally but was mentioned only briefly in the report." Actually, it was Senator Muskie who got only one sentence in the FBI document. In the report, Davis rated two full paragraphs summarizing his 10-minute speech. None of the news accounts that I've seen have quoted Davis. Here is what Davis had to say that apparently wasn't worth mentioning in Newsweek.

"He called for tearing down the capitalistic structure," the FBI reported. After he was heckled, we are told by the FBI document, Davis proclaimed that he "opposed all pollution except (to) 'light up a joint and get stoned.'" He said "one way to fight for ecology is to go to New Haven on May 1st to stop Bobby Seale's trial." That hardly sounds like a speech on environment, but it certainly

sounds like the kind of exhortation to violence that merits FBI surveillance. How does a crowd stop a trial without violence?

Senator Muskie and his media supporters apparently feel it is terribly wrong to send the FBI to a rally where so many innocent people gather in the name of ecology, even if radicals have a prominent role in it and seek to use it as a forum.

Well, I disagree with them. I hope law enforcement officers will keep the Rennie Davises and the Abbie Hoffmans and their ilk under surveillance wherever they go to preach sedition.

Another recent well-publicized attack on the FBI was that of the well-known Congressman who claimed that his and other Members' phones had been tapped and demanded the immediate resignation of J. Edgar Hoover. We have now been given what he calls his evidence—a statement that if the phone company denies your phone has been tapped, it means that the FBI did the tapping. I don't think that case deserves any further comment.

Now let's look at what the FBI is really up to and consider the man whose firm leadership and dedication to principle have restructured this organization from an inefficient division of the Justice Department in 1924 to the world's best known, most professional, and scientifically efficient investigative and law enforcement agency.

The FBI has jurisdiction over some 185 Federal investigative matters. These range from such longtime responsibilities as civil rights violations, bank robberies, subversion, and kidnapings to aircraft hijackings, and, in the past year, broader investigative authority over syndicated gambling and bombings.

To handle its workload, the Bureau has a force of about 19,000 employees, of whom 8,365 are Agents. It operates 59 field offices in major cities through-

out the United States and in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and maintains 17 liaison posts in foreign countries.

One thousand Agents have been added within the past year to meet new responsibilities under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and to relieve a workload that had grown to the point that each Agent was handling an average of 31 separate investigative matters at a time. The ideal load, according to Director Hoover, is 18 cases per Agent. So you can see they have had little time to do the "political sleuthing" attributed to them.

During their investigation of the burning of the ROTC building at Kent State University and the shooting of four students by National Guardsmen there last May, the FBI had a peak of 302 Agents assigned to the case. They worked 6,316 hours of overtime for which they received no compensation. Their reports totaling over 8,000 pages were filed with the Department of Justice, which ordered the investigation, and with the President's Commission on Campus Unrest.

Every year the Bureau brings in more money than it costs to operate. Last fiscal year, FBI investigations accounted for nearly \$411 million in fines, savings and recoveries—an average return of \$1.60 for every dollar appropriated for FBI operations. Moreover, the Bureau has an outstanding record of convictions. Last year, over 96 percent of the persons brought to trial in cases investigated by the FBI were convicted, 83 percent of them as a result of guilty pleas.

In addition to its work in Federal law enforcement, the FBI works very closely with State and local law enforcement agencies. FBI Laboratory services, provided without charge to local police departments and to other agencies, are indispensable to successful crime control. The Laboratory made nearly 385,000 examinations

(Continued on page 28)




In the Pass Christian, Miss., area, two of the four lanes of U.S. Highway 90 were severely damaged.

Several times each year the southeast coast of the United States is struck by hurricanes. Born over the warm seas of the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, these large cyclonic systems result from a peculiar blend of heat, winds, atmospheric pressure, and moisture. Anywhere from 100 to 800 miles across, they rage north toward Cuba or Florida, assaulting everything in their path. Usually, however, they turn out to sea or dissipate before they do too much damage. Only one out of four hits the United States mainland. Since 1953 they have been given women's names, such as Mah, Dora, and Flora.

On August 17, 1969, a Caribbean-born hurricane with the gentle name of Camille roared into the area of Gulfport, Miss., located directly on the Gulf of Mexico between Mobile, Ala., and New Orleans, La. Carrying tides as high as 23 feet and pushed by 210-mile-per-hour winds, the storm brought death, destruction, and misery. It also set records for being the strongest hurricane on record. The head of the National Hurricane Center in Miami, Fla., said that Camille was "the greatest storm of any kind that has ever affected this Nation, by any yardstick you want to measure with."¹

Camille blew harder than any other hurricane recorded and the barometer dropped to 26.61 inches, the lowest since a 1935 Florida hurricane.²

As the hurricane approached the Mississippi Gulf Coast on August 17th, the manager of the local television station went on the air and repeatedly warned residents of the beach-front area and low-lying locations to evacuate their homes and seek shelter elsewhere. Estimates of as many as 50,000 people leaving the coast have been given by different sources. However, no estimate can be made of the number of lives saved by heeding the television warnings. As a



The top photograph, taken before Hurricane Camille, shows the historic Trinity Episcopal Church, which was built in 1849. The bottom photograph was taken of the church site after the hurricane struck the area.

result of his actions, the manager was awarded a good Samaritan award by a national association in 1970.

Many citizens had ridden out the 1947 hurricane which had struck the Gulf Coast, and a lot of them believed that Camille could not possibly be worse than the terrible storm of 22 years ago. That storm had contained a tide of 12 feet above sea level and winds of 125 miles per hour.³ The area was severely damaged at that time, and even though storms were not then named, no one has since forgotten it. As Camille approached, the community boarded up and began the

tense waiting period before the arrival of the terrible winds and tides.

At 7 p.m. the winds had reached gale force; at 8 p.m. the tides were rising rapidly and were being pushed by hurricane force winds. By 11 p.m. the winds had reached an unbelievable 200 miles per hour with 20-foot waves battering the mainland. The wind can best be described as sounding like a locomotive going by a few feet away. All power failed when the winds reached their peak strength. The police department's electrical generator operated a short while and then it too failed. Around 11 p.m. the eye of

the storm raged inland just east of Gulfport. As it passed by, the rapid drop in the barometric pressure caused sharp pains in everyone's eardrums. With the passing of the eye, the winds reversed direction and maintained their ferocious velocity. Finally, at approximately 2 a.m. on the morning of August 18th, the winds started to abate slightly and the sea started receding. By 4 a.m. the winds had stopped altogether.

Severe Destruction

At daybreak the death and destruction were unbelievable to even the experienced residents who had seen many hurricanes in the past. Three ocean-going freighters had been tossed ashore as if they were toys, the entire downtown business district was in shambles, and the beachfront was virtually destroyed. All of the Gulf Coast was without fresh water, power, and natural gas. The total destruction of miles and miles of homes and buildings cannot be described by pictures or words. The stench of death everywhere; bodies were found hanging in trees, mingled in the debris, and floating in the cluttered waters of the gulf. The garages of two funeral homes were used to temporarily store bodies of victims until identification could be made. In some instances bodies were found to have been previously embalmed. It was then discovered that a cemetery had been washed open by the rush of the water which then deposited the embalmed bodies at another location far removed from the burial sites.

Statistics

Several months after the storm Red Cross statistics showed that on the Gulf Coast Camille killed 145 persons, 22 were still missing, 10,054 were injured with 73,857 families affected. As to damage, 5,652 homes were destroyed, 13,915 homes had major damage, 33,933 homes

minor damage, 1,082 mobile homes were destroyed, and 621 had major damage.⁴ The Office of Emergency Preparedness has set the figure for the amount of actual physical damage at \$950 million.⁵

All of the hospitals on the coast were damaged to the extent that a majority of them had to evacuate their patients to hospitals in other areas. The small city of Pass Christian, Miss., was so badly damaged that Gov. John Bell Williams ordered the forced evacuation of the entire town of 3,000 persons because of the health hazard posed there. The residents were bused to a National Guard installation at Camp Shelby, Miss.⁶

Communications with the outside world were severely hampered because over 80,000 telephones were out, power was off, and most news agencies could not function. A radio station went off the air while broadcasting during the height of the storm when its antenna fell on top of the

transmitting office. Two station personnel narrowly escaped death when the building was demolished by the steel tower.

The Gulfport police headquarters and jail facilities were severely damaged; three patrol cars were total losses; and all power, natural gas, and water services were out. All personnel of the department were exhausted from the all-night ordeal; the men held in reserve for depth of coverage were unable to rest during the long night and therefore were just as tired as the on-duty officers. Five members of the force lost everything they owned as a result of the wind and water. All that remained of several of the officers' homes were the concrete front steps.

Surveying the Damage

Survivors were found everywhere, usually stumbling around in debris that hours before had been their homes. Police patrols were kept constantly busy transporting victims to

shelters for medical treatment and temporary living quarters. Our department's doctor stayed on duty for several days without rest and was credited with treating over 1,000 patients that officers brought in.

A majority of the streets were impassable because of either debris or physical damage to the road surfaces. The streets that were passable were littered with roofing nails that had been blown from the roofs of thousands of damaged or destroyed homes. Flat tires on police patrol units became a serious problem; some had as many as three flat tires at one time.

Destruction was so severe and widespread over the entire Gulf Coast that police departments in the area could not possibly provide security for public or private property. The Governor quickly proclaimed a semi-martial-law situation which enabled him to call out the Mississippi National Guard to provide security guards and patrols 24 hours a day. The downtown busi-

The storm grounded three ocean freighters on the north side of the Gulfport harbor.



ness area was cordoned off by the Guard, and no one was allowed to enter the area unless he had first obtained a written pass from the police department.

The pass system caused police headquarters to be jammed with long lines of business people and employees waiting to identify themselves and obtain passes from the administrative officer. This security method caused many problems and delays. However, unlike police officers who generally knew the downtown merchants and clerks, the National Guardsmen did not know anyone and therefore a system of identification was necessary.

Getting Organized

At sundown each day the city was truly dark, with only an occasional light or lamp to be seen in entire neighborhoods. A curfew was imposed and no one was allowed on the streets after dark except police or emergency workers. Anyone else had to obtain a pass to travel at night. This was necessary to keep down looting and make security easier. Looters operating on foot at night were a

problem because the area was in complete darkness and the mountains of debris afforded numerous hiding places.

Service stations could not pump gasoline without power; however, some enterprising operators hooked up various gasoline-driven devices to their pumps and got back into business. The U.S. Navy Seabees rushed a large generator to the police department and soon had the power back on. This enabled the restoration of the department's gasoline pump which then serviced all emergency vehicles operating in the city.

Over the years law enforcement has met obligations to the public by planning translated into action. In the area of unusual occurrences, however, as other police departments have found, there is a lack of published information.⁷ At the time Camille struck, no formal written plan of police action was in effect. The usual practice was to handle the problems as they occurred with very little preparation beforehand. This disaster has shown us that we must have a written plan of action that is broad in scope

and flexible in operation. Experiences gained in a storm of this magnitude have given us much to work with in mapping out a plan of action for future disasters. Our written plan contains the following basic ideas that can be expanded or adapted to suit the needs of almost any agency.

I. Organizational Structure

A. The Department's organizational structure must be realigned to meet the changing situation. It must be changed to utilize personnel to provide:

1. Staff with depth.
2. Maximum line services.
3. Liaison services.
4. Supplies and auxiliary services.

Along with the realigned organizational structure, the new job assignments for all personnel must include written job descriptions with duties and responsibilities clearly defined. This is absolutely necessary in order to prevent duplication and improve efficiency.

B. The usual staff structure will be changed to handle the priorities that the situation has brought about. Staff officers who normally are in detective, traffic, and identification divisions are to be reassigned to liaison, line, and auxiliary services.

(Continued on page 29)



A barge pushed onto U.S. Highway 90 by the winds and high tides was refloated by means of a dike lined with plastic.

"... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ."

—Fifth Amendment



DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Among its provisions, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares that no person shall "... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." The principle underlying this guarantee "... is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty."¹

Similar double jeopardy provisions are to be found in the constitutions, statutes, or common law of every State.² State and Federal standards developed separately as the States were not bound by this portion of the Fifth Amendment.³ Thus, the States

were not required to follow the Federal view which prohibited the Government from securing a new trial by appeal following an acquittal.⁴ Nor were they bound by the Federal determination that jeopardy attaches once the defendant is put to trial before a jury or that the defendant cannot be tried again if the jury is discharged without his consent.⁵

However, in 1969 the Supreme Court, in *Benton v. Maryland*,⁶ overturned the former rule and held that the double jeopardy requirement of the Fifth Amendment is such a "... fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage . . . that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."⁷ This decision continues the trend of the Court in looking to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights to determine the contours of the Fourteenth Amendment.⁸

Benton was tried in State court on burglary and larceny charges and was convicted of burglary but found not guilty of larceny. The appellate court determined that both the grand and trial juries had been improperly selected, and Benton chose to demand a new indictment and trial. He was reindicted and convicted on both charges. The Court held that the retrial on the larceny charge following the acquittal violated the Federal jeopardy standard⁹ and reversed the conviction.

Since *Benton*, the Court has handed down two decisions of importance to the law enforcement officer. The first, *Waller v. Florida*,¹⁰ involved successive trials by a municipal and a State court. The defendant was initially tried and convicted in municipal court for violation of city ordinances prohibiting destruction of city property and disorderly breach of the peace in

connection with the removal of a mural from a city hall. Subsequently, based on the same occurrence, he was charged and convicted of grand larceny in State court.

If the municipal and State governments are separate sovereigns, then by analogy to *Bartkus*¹¹ and *Abbate*,¹² decisions which permitted successive prosecutions by both the Federal and State governments, the second trial would not be barred on double jeopardy grounds. However, the Court found that municipalities are not considered sovereign entities,¹³ and have the same relationship to the State as exists between a territory and the Federal Government. As such, prosecution by one will bar prosecution by the other.¹⁴ Therefore, the prosecution in city court constituted jeopardy and the State could not later try the defendant for a violation of State law growing out of the same occurrence.

In *Ashe v. Swenson*,¹⁵ four men, including Ashe, were charged with the armed robbery of each of six individuals in a poker game. In the first trial, Ashe was charged with the robbery of one of the victims and the jury found him "not guilty due to insufficient evidence."¹⁶ He was then tried and convicted for the robbery of another of the participants in the game.

Since the second trial involved but another part of the same criminal epi-

sode, should it be barred on double jeopardy grounds? A majority of the courts would permit successive prosecutions either on the theory that the "same offense" is not involved (robbery of B, not A) or that the "same evidence" is not required to convict at the second trial.¹⁷ Some, however, view the "same evidence" or "same offense" tests as too narrow and hold that the accused may only be tried once for conduct arising from the "same occurrence" or "same transaction."¹⁸

Although application of one of these competing theories could have decided the case, the Court found it unnecessary to choose between them, and resolved the issue in terms of "collateral estoppel" by determining that this doctrine is included within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.

While not unknown to the criminal law,¹⁹ collateral estoppel has its origins in the civil law and bars relitigation in a subsequent suit between the same parties of those issues actually determined at a previous trial. It is grounded on policy considerations that a party should not be required to be subjected to successive suits on the same issue. While the finality of judgments made possible by collateral estoppel is commendatory, the application of the doctrine in the criminal context can be difficult in that a verdict of guilty or not guilty sheds little

light on any issue actually determined by the jury other than the guilt or innocence of the accused.

To apply this doctrine in *Ashe*, the Court reviewed the record of the first trial and found the testimony clearly established that there had been a robbery; however, the evidence identifying Ashe as one of the robbers was weak. The Court concluded the verdict of not guilty meant that the jury had determined that Ashe was not present at the robbery. Since the first trial determined that Ashe was not one of the robbers, the State was precluded from later trying to prove that he was present during the robbery. The conviction, therefore, will not stand. ■

FOOTNOTES

¹ *Green v. United States*, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).

² *Sigler, Double Jeopardy*. Cornell University Press, 1969, pp. 77-83.

³ *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

⁴ *United States v. Ball*, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); *Kepner v. United States*, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).

⁵ *Wade v. Hunter*, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).

⁶ 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

⁷ *Id.* at 794.

⁸ *Washington v. Texas*, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).

⁹ *United States v. Ball*, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).

¹⁰ 397 U.S. 387 (1970).

¹¹ *Bartkus v. Illinois*, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).

¹² *Abbate v. United States*, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).

¹³ *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).

¹⁴ *Grafton v. United States*, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).

¹⁵ 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

¹⁶ *Id.* at 439.

¹⁷ 65 Yale L.J. 339, 347-348 (1956).

¹⁸ Note, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev., 79, 83-84 (1937).

¹⁹ *Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions*, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1960).

Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal advisor. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law, or are not permitted at all.

Residents of Charles City and Oelwein, Iowa, will long remember May 15, 1968, as the day tornadoes killed several persons, caused numerous injuries, and resulted in property damage totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. This was also the day that Unit 25, Iowa's radio communication command vehicle, was conceived in the minds of those offi-

cials responsible for directing law enforcement personnel assigned to police protection in the devastated areas.

Lt. Col. James Machholz, Assistant Chief of the Iowa Highway Patrol, was assigned with 100 patrolmen to the area, only to learn the storm had played havoc with local radio and telephone communication networks.



By

COL. HOWARD S. MILLER

**Chief,
Iowa Highway Patrol,
Des Moines, Iowa**

On the Scene—

UNIT 25 FOR EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION

The Iowa Highway Patrol mobile command vehicle is a trailer 55 feet long and 13 feet 2 inches high pulled by a 427-cubic-inch truck tractor.



The Charles City and Oelwein Police Departments were without communications facilities, and other departments were without power. The Iowa Highway Patrol did not have radio communications with the Iowa National Guard or local and State highway maintenance personnel. The sheriffs' officers were likewise limited to radio contact only with those agencies on the sheriffs' and State frequencies. The many volunteers with amateur bands could not communicate with the authorities. The need for a self-powered centralized communications vehicle for future disaster situations was evident.

Within the Unit

Colonel Machholz presented the dilemma and plans for solving it to the Iowa Executive Council. As a result, the Council granted emergency funds

to the Highway Patrol for building a mobile communications center, later known as Unit 25. Designed with the help and cooperation of local contractors and specialists in the communications field, the Unit is housed in a 55-foot trailer pulled by a 427-cubic-inch radio-equipped truck tractor.

Contained within the unit is, we believe, one of the most complete and efficient mobile communications units in the Midwest. The interior consists of three separate, paneled compartments. The foreroom is designed for radio and telephone communications. Seven transmitters provide radio communications on 25 frequencies with no more effort than manipulating a switch. Radio crystals and frequency meters are inventoried to facilitate establishing communication with any law enforcement agency, military authorities, and highway maintenance personnel in a matter of minutes. In

addition, a multiple channel radio is included for those times when amateur operators can provide assistance. A 24-hour 10-channel tape recorder monitors all telephone and radio communications. A commercial radio is available for obtaining additional information when the unit is operational. A teletype on the local police, sheriffs', and State police radio nets completes the specialized communications gear.

Powerful Transmission

Unit 25 has seven antennas—three 25-foot high band aerials on the front of the van and four 10-foot low band aerials lifted 40 feet above the ground by two hydraulic towers to the rear.

The middle compartment, used as the operational room, contains four of the van's 13 telephones as well as facilities for remote operation of any

The van is divided into three paneled compartments for communications, operations, and staff meetings.





The unit contains 10 incoming telephone lines as well as an intercom system.

two radio frequencies. A window permits communication with persons outside. A steel plate covers the window when the unit is being moved and during emergency conditions. Just off the middle room are restroom facilities, including a hot and cold pressurized water system. The operations room also has a combination stove-refrigerator and cabinets and drawer space for storing gas equipment, radio parts, blankets, first aid supplies, and other necessary equipment.

The Rear Room

The rear room is designed for staff meetings and includes sleeping and eating facilities. The occupants of this room have access to all of the 10 incoming telephone lines as well as an intercom with the operations and radio rooms.

Each compartment has central heating and cooling vents as well as ex-

haust ducts, allowing the temperature to be adjusted both centrally and by individual room.

At the rear of Unit 25 is a 30,000-w. powerplant. It is powered by an industrial engine and is capable of operating on load for 48 hours without refueling. This complex unit not only provides the power for Unit 25 but also can supply power for other purposes. The power unit is self-governed and, in addition to electric power, also provides the necessary air pressure for the hydraulic towers and the water system. In situations where local power is readily available, the design allows for total operation from public or private power sources.

Good Results

Six mercury vapor floodlights attached near the top of the vehicle supply sufficient lighting, not only for the

unit, but also for the surrounding area.

This vehicle was designed to provide communications and a mobile command post at the scenes of natural disasters and civil disturbances. It is effective as a backup for our own and other law enforcement communications systems. In recent months we have handled situations that test the unit's design and construction, and the results have been good. The number of modifications we have made since accepting operational custody has been small. Adding to the efficiency of this vehicle, the State Police Radio Division has assigned radio operators, who also are experienced technicians.

During its first 18 months of operation, Unit 25 has proved to be useful, and we hope that in the future it will enable us to better serve the people of Iowa during natural and manmade disasters.

The Bank Protection Act of 1968 can be an effective vehicle for establishing a more meaningful rapport between local police departments and banking institutions and can result in many professional benefits to both.

On July 7, 1968, Public Law 90-389 was passed and approved by the 90th Congress. Designated as the Bank Protection Act of 1968, the act requires, among other things, that four Federal supervisory agencies—the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board—promulgate rules establishing minimum standards for security devices and procedures for each bank or savings and loan association coming under their jurisdiction. The act was passed in the face of a rapidly rising rate of armed robberies, burglaries, and larcenies perpetrated against banking institutions.

The rules subsequently set forth by the four Federal supervisory agencies were comprehensive and explicit. They covered such items as the construction specifications of vaults, the distribution and use of "bait" money, and the contents of written security programs. The specific requirements most affecting law enforcement will be discussed in more detail later. Of prime importance to law enforcement agencies, however, was the requirement that all institutions covered under the act appoint a security officer who would be responsible, *after seeking the advice of law enforcement officials*, for determining the specific needs of his banking office. These

needs might include such items as robbery alarms, burglary alarms, night lighting, locking devices, opening and closing procedures, employee education programs, and many other security measures.

Montgomery County, Md.

Montgomery County, Md., is situated adjacent to Washington, D.C., with the Potomac River as a western

By

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Rockville, Md.



The Police R Bank Protect

boundary. Operating under a county executive/county council form of government, the county includes a highly urbanized southern sector with the accompanying urban police problems and a northern sector which was, un



Montgomery County police officers make one of numerous daily bank checks during routine patrol.

in the on Act of 1968

recently, largely rural, but which is rapidly changing because of the expanding population and the location there of Federal agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Bureau of Standards. The

county covers an area of 526 square miles and has a population of approximately 555,000.

The prime law enforcement agency in the area is the Montgomery County Police Department, organized in 1922.

The department presently numbers 635 officers.

In addition to a headquarters building located in Rockville, Md., the police department has four geographical police districts, each having a district police station housing a uniform patrol section, a detective section, a traffic unit, and other related police services.

Within the county are approximately 115 banks and savings institutions which are subject to the provisions of the Bank Protection Act of 1968. These institutions range from the multibranch organizations located mainly in the urban portion of the county to the single-branch rural

banks. With a variety of locales involved in the county, we noted that the regulations under the act require varying degrees of protection for individual banking offices in accordance with the incidence of crimes in the area.

Police Response to the Act

Subsequent to the passage of the act, our superintendent designated a department bank liaison officer to assist the banking institution security officers in the implementation of the act. The author was appointed to this position. There followed a series of conferences with departmental executives during which the act was carefully studied and an operating procedure developed. The regulations require that institutions seek the advice of law enforcement officers but do not necessarily bind the security officers to all recommendations made. It was decided early in the discussions, therefore, that any recommendations to be made would, from the law enforcement point of view, provide the individual banking offices with the most nearly ideal security program possible, giving consideration to the individual characteristics of each branch. This was done, of course, with the knowledge that no institution would be forced to suffer a financial hardship because of our recommendations.

Initial Survey

The duties of the bank liaison officer were primarily to make contact with the appropriate bank security officers and to assist them in the surveys required by the regulations. Of course, as the program progressed, new duties were added as the need for them arose, as will be seen in a subsequent discussion of false alarms. In each instance the initial contact was made for the purpose of arranging a convenient time for the liaison

officer and the institution security officer jointly to conduct a survey of the premises of each branch of that particular organization. Any recommendations resulting from the surveys were submitted in letter form.

The physical surveys disclosed that the existing security programs varied greatly from bank to bank, ranging from those institutions already complying with the requirements under the act to organizations having no security equipment or procedures whatsoever. (As one security officer of an inadequately protected bank put it, "I stick my head out the door and yell for help.")

Lieutenant Daniels (left) and Col. Kenneth W. Watkins, acting superintendent of the Montgomery County Police Department, discuss policy on bank security liaison.

One of the major factors considered during the surveys was the potential for false alarms. Even in those branches having all of the required equipment, changes were frequently recommended in an effort to reduce the possibility of an accidental alarm transmittal by an employee. In each instance where this was done, the bank security officer was first advised that the existing equipment met the requirements and that the changes were being recommended in order to reduce employee error.

In those branches having no security devices at all, the recommendations were naturally more comprehen-



ive. One controlling influence was the location of the institution, as the requirements vary in relation to anticipated police response time. For example, those branches wherein police response time is estimated to be in excess of 5 minutes are not subject to the same provisions regarding robbery and burglary alarms as are the more urban branches.

Equipment Required

The rules under the act require the installation of the following security devices in all relevant locations:

1. *Robbery Alarm*: All institutions considered to be within the 5-minute response area are required to have a robbery alarm system "designed to transmit to the police, either directly or through an intermediary, a signal indicating that a crime against the banking office has occurred or is in progress." This alarm system must be capable of activation by devices located at *each* teller's station. Few of the institutions surveyed met this requirement, and in those instances where additional equipment was needed, the bank liaison officer recommended initiating devices which are capable of rapid activation and at the same time are as safe from employee error as possible. When equipment already installed technically complied with the act but was of the type that employees could not safely activate while a robbery was in progress, I recommended that the existing equipment be supplemented with at least one such device for safe and rapid transmittal.

2. *Burglary Alarm*: The provisions under the act also require the installation of a burglar alarm system "capable of detecting promptly an attack on the outer door, walls, floor, or ceiling of each vault, and each safe not stored in a vault, in which currency, negotiable securities, or similar valuables are stored when the office is closed." This

requirement by far exceeded the existing arrangements in many of the branches surveyed, as quite often the only equipment found on vaults and safes was of the door-contact variety.

Although the regulations do not specify burglar alarms on banking doors and windows—they require tamper-resistant locks on both—I made such a recommendation in each of the branches surveyed, as it was fairly simple to integrate such additional equipment into the required alarm systems. All alarm systems installed in compliance with the act must also be equipped with a visual and audible signal capable of indicating improper functioning of or tampering with a system, and with an independent source of power (such as a battery) sufficient to assure continuous reliable operation for at least 80 hours in the event of failure of the usual source of power.

3. *Lighting*: The majority of institutions surveyed met the requirements on lighting, which must consist of a system for illuminating, during the hours of darkness, the area around the vault if it is visible from outside the office. In only a few instances was it necessary to recommend additional lighting.

4. *Surveillance Equipment*: The rules under the Bank Protection Act do not specifically require the installation of surveillance cameras. They leave that option to the discretion of the bank security officer by providing for the installation of "such other devices as the security officer, after seeking the advice of law enforcement officers, shall determine to be appropriate for discouraging robberies, burglaries, and larcenies and *for assisting in the identification and apprehension* of persons who commit such acts." If, in the opinion of the security officer, cameras are appropriate, then regulations issued pursuant to the act set forth in some detail suggested specifications regarding camera size,

film capacity, and frame-per-second capability. They further point out that it is appropriate for banking offices in areas with a high incidence of crime to install many devices which would not be practical, because of cost, for small banking offices in areas substantially free of crime.

In keeping with the goal of ideal security, I recommended the installation of surveillance cameras at each of the offices surveyed. Further suggestions were also made regarding camera location and the relative benefits of both the continuous surveillance camera and the alarm-activated camera equipped with a suspicion button, as variations in banking locations and problems dictated different needs for different branches. It was also pointed out to security officers that cameras unquestionably provide a deterrent which cannot be measured in cost-benefit terms.

5. *"Bait" Money*: Under the rules institutions are required to include "bait" money at *each* teller's station or window and to maintain records on this currency. All organizations surveyed had such a program in effect, but with wide variations as to banks of issue, denominations, and series years being used for this purpose. Because of these facts, certain recommendations were made which, if followed, will result in a general standardization of "bait" money on a countywide basis and thereby make the currency involved more easily recognizable to law enforcement officers.

False Alarms

Frequent reference has been made to the check of false alarm potential during the banking survey. This was done because of the hazards involved for police officers and citizens during the response to such an emergency call. Another consideration is the loss of patrol coverage experienced until such time as the call is verified.

Upon receipt of a bank robbery alarm, the Montgomery County Police ordinarily dispatch several cruisers to the branch in question. If, prior to the arrival of all units, the department receives notification from the bank by telephone that the alarm is false, at least one unit will continue on to the scene to verify that the alarm is actually a false alarm. Once verification has been made, the responding officers clear the call by use of a four-digit radio code suitable for computer input. The particular code utilized will indicate whether the false alarm was caused by employee error, malfunction of equipment, or some other cause such as adverse weather conditions. This information is subsequently forwarded to me in the form of periodic reports giving a branch-by-branch breakdown of all false alarms transmitted during the period covered by the report.

"The security officer has . . . the function of convincing his banking directors of the necessity of following his recommendations, and conveying to them the 'think security' awareness needed for the successful accomplishment of his programs."

When such a report is received, I contact the security officers of each of the organizations involved. If, for example, a particular branch has shown a high number of false alarms caused by malfunction, we discuss the problem and attempt to initiate corrective action. On the other hand, if a branch has transmitted an unreasonable number of false alarms due to employee error, I point out the need for additional employee education in the use of security devices.

In addition to providing some form of control over false alarms, this procedure also enables me to maintain and perpetuate the rapport established

with the security officers during the initial physical surveys. This relationship has not only improved cooperation and efficiency in the investigation of bank robberies and burglaries but has also greatly enhanced the investigation of other bank-related crimes such as false pretense and forgery.

The Bank Security Officer

Perhaps one of the major benefits derived from the act by both law enforcement and banking institutions is the requirement that all banks appoint a bank security officer. Prior to this time, a law enforcement official wishing to discuss a problem of mutual interest would frequently be transferred from one banking official to another because of the lack of fixed responsibility and authority regarding security problems. It was often difficult to locate an official having the

time available to discuss such a problem in detail, as his time had to be devoted to many other pressing and important banking functions.

With the advent of the bank security officer, a major change has taken place. A large number of the banking institutions in Montgomery County, especially those having multibranch operations, have appointed full-time security officers who have previously retired from a law enforcement career. These officers come from a variety of backgrounds, including military intelligence, and Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies, and all bring to the field of banking security

an expertise and interest which heretofore did not exist.

Important Functions

The duties of the bank security officer, as prescribed by the act, are many and varied. Aside from the major responsibility of providing for the installation and maintenance of security devices, he is also held accountable for the following:

1. Establishing schedules for the inspection, testing, and servicing of all security devices.
2. Providing that cash be kept at a minimum at each banking office and specifically at each teller's station.
3. Providing for opening and closing procedures, including inspecting the premises prior to opening and before permitting other employees to enter, and inspecting the premises again after closing to make certain that all security devices are operating and the premises are secure.
4. Providing for the training of employees in the use of security equipment and in their proper conduct during and after a robbery.

The security officer has another equally important function which is not prescribed by the act. This is the function of convincing his banking directors of the necessity of following his recommendations, and conveying to them the "think security" awareness needed for the successful accomplishment of his programs.

Progress to Date

The Bank Protection Act of 1968 has been in effect for too short a period of time to support statistical evaluation of its impact on banking and law enforcement. Statistics aside, however, it has been the experience of the Montgomery County Police Department that the act, and the liaison and rapport resulting from its passage, has caused a noticeable improvement in the relationship between the two

(Continued on page 31)

A good photograph of a bank robber taken while the crime is being committed is perhaps the most impressive item of evidence that a prosecutor can have. This is not a new idea. The courts have long favored the admissibility of such evidence on the grounds that the identification of per-

An increasing number of banking institutions throughout the country are installing surveillance cameras to photograph bank robbers in the act of committing the crime. Pictures obtained from the cameras help to make identification and apprehension of the violators easier for law enforcement officers. Certain factors, such as the selection of the proper camera, lighting, and focus, affect greatly the quality of the photographs and their value to the investigator. This article discusses the factors and offers suggestions for using this security device to the best possible advantage.

Bank Surveillance Cameras

sons by photographic means is more accurate than by eyewitness verbal description. [*Considine v. United States*, 112 F. 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 184 U.S. 699 (1902).] However, it should be pointed out that the photograph of the suspect at the time of the robbery is not conclusive evidence of guilt. It is only a means of identifying the person on trial with the suspect at the crime scene. [*Madden v. United States*, 20 F. 2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927).]

The regulations issued in accordance with the Bank Protection Act of 1968 do not require but encourage all banks to have camera systems and contain the following minimum specifications:

- (1) Surveillance systems—(i) General. Surveillance systems should be:
 - (A) Equipped with one or more photographic, recording, monitoring, or like devices capable of reproducing images of persons in the banking office with sufficient clarity to facilitate (through photographs capable

The bank surveillance camera shown is positioned to avoid photographing against bright sunlight coming through the front window.



- of being enlarged to produce a 1-inch vertical head-size of persons whose images have been reproduced) the identification and apprehension of robbers or other suspicious persons;
- (B) Reasonably silent in operation;
 - (C) So designed and constructed that necessary services, repairs, or inspections can readily be made.

Any camera used in such a system should be capable of taking at least one picture every 2 seconds and, if it uses film, should contain enough unexposed film at all times to be capable of operating for not less than 3 minutes, and the film should be at least 16 mm.

The FBI cannot make specific recommendations concerning the installation of surveillance equipment in banks nor survey a bank's security needs or deficiencies. However, some basic photographic principles can be used in evaluating certain types (not makes) of cameras, and the following facts are presented for consideration.

Two types of cameras may be used: motion picture and sequence, both of which are available in many sizes. Movie cameras, generally 8 mm. or

16 mm., take pictures at 16 to 24 frames per second. The sequence cameras are 16 mm., 35 mm., and 70 mm. and take still pictures at regular intervals, such as every second or every few seconds.

For Best Results

Some bank surveillance systems require a bank employee to activate the cameras while other systems operate automatically—taking pictures every second or more during banking hours or in some cases at all times, day and night. Also employed as surveillance apparatus are closed-circuit television cameras, in constant operation, storing pictures on tape which can be erased and reused if there are no bank robberies. In the case of a robbery, the tape is replayed and pictures taken of the monitor.

On the basis of the many bank robbery photographs reviewed, it has been found that the 35 mm. and 70 mm. sequence cameras generally pro-

duce the best pictures for use in identifying the subject, although 16 mm. and 8 mm. cameras produce good photographs when properly installed. The size of the image on the film determines, to a large degree, the quality of the picture, provided of course that the lenses and other components are of equal quality and lighting and focus are properly adjusted. If an 8 mm. or 16 mm. camera is used, the image of the bank robber's face is small and the lens and film cannot resolve sufficient detail to show those facial contours and characteristics that distinguish one person from another with a generally similar appearance. A 35 mm. camera covering the same area will record the bank robber's face on the film in a size approximately two and a half to three times that of the image on the 16 mm. film. Therefore, if the 16 mm. camera is set to photograph a proportionately smaller area, the bank robber's face on the film will be approximately the same size as it would be on the 35 mm. film.

Two millimeters of lens focal length for each foot of distance from camera to subject is sufficient to produce recognizable pictures of individuals. For example, a 35 mm. sequence camera with a 50 mm. lens would take identifiable pictures up to 25 feet from the camera, while a 16 mm. camera with a 25 mm. lens would be effective up to 12.5 feet. Usually, if pictures are taken beyond one foot of camera-to-subject distance for each millimeter of lens focal length, recognizable photographs will not result. A camera placed over exit areas will probably gain a larger size image of the subject on the film because, leaving the bank, he gets closer to the camera. Also, this location is advantageous if the victim employee does not activate the camera until the subject has left the counter.

Since lighting in the bank is important to good pictures, the came-

The position of this camera takes advantage of the best lighting on the tellers' area to the left.



should be positioned to take advantage of the best lighting on the subject, or it may be desirable to revise the lighting. In placing the cameras, remember that a picture taken against the bright sunlight outside will provide a very unclear picture of facial features.

Equipment, control devices, condition of the film, and aim and focus of the system should be periodically tested to insure good results in the event of a robbery. Such tests should take into account any variance in light available at different times of the day due to the presence or absence of sunlight from the outside. If test photographs are unsatisfactory, bank officials should be advised.

Identifying the Suspect

When a bank robbery occurs and surveillance camera pictures are of good quality, wide publicity of the photographs may result in the robber's giving himself up or a relative friend's furnishing information about the identity of the subject.

In the absence of such assistance, it may be necessary to compare the bank pictures with the photographs of a suspect. In comparing these photographs, FBI Laboratory experts study all the facial characteristics and contours. Unless these general characteristics are of an unusual nature, there must also be some scars or marks or other features that will support a positive identification. Mug shots are usually full-face or profile views and are generally not useful in comparison with the bank pictures unless they also are full-face or profile views. Facial features do not appear the same in a three-quarter view as in a full-face view. If the suspect is available to be photographed, his picture should be taken at the same angle and distance as the pictures of the robber. The possibility of identifying other items in the picture, such as details of the sub-



The 35 mm. sequence camera properly installed generally produces recognizable pictures of bank robbers.

ject's clothing with that of the suspect, should not be overlooked.

Bank robbery photographs may be useful in determining the height of the subject. Many times the height can be calculated by ascertaining where the subject was standing when the picture was taken. By relating the subject in the photograph to objects around him, such as floor design, teller's station, or tables, the investi-


gating officer can make a close estimate of his exact position. A large scale like the one in Figure 1 should be mounted on a vertical support and placed in the spot where the robber was standing. A hall tree, collapsible light stand, or camera tripod can be used as the vertical support. The scale should be mounted facing the camera lens and with the height measurements the correct distance from the floor. Pictures are then taken with the surveillance camera in the same position as when the bank robbery photographs were taken.

Reference Points

If the subject's foot position does not correspond to a pattern on the floor, his position can be calculated as follows: (1) suppose an imaginary line from the camera to a designated reference point on the wall behind subject; (2) place the height scale along this line; (3) moving the scale about 6 inches for each picture, take photographs in the approximate area of those taken during the robbery. The Laboratory examiner can determine

A properly positioned camera using 16 mm. film produced this clear image of a robber in the act.





the subject's height by superimposing the bank robbery picture over the photographs of the height scale and matching similar background objects. The film may be processed locally and the prints submitted to the FBI Laboratory, or the undeveloped film may be submitted to the FBI Laboratory. Pertinent photographs of the bank robber or robbers and the original bank robbery film, if available, should also be submitted to the Laboratory.

An alternate method to determine the suspect's height involves locating some point on the wall or other fixed object in the robbery photograph in juxtaposition to the top of the robber's head. From this reference point a length of light string or fishing line should be stretched to the center of the camera lens. Subsequently, the unknown subject's height can be determined by measuring the distance of the string from the floor at that point where the photographed suspect was

standing. (It is important that the string be stretched tightly.)

Reference points are necessary for effective use of the two methods described; some photographs will not adapt to either procedure. For example, the posture of the unknown subject (if he is leaning on a counter, walking, or running) may make the process of determining height most difficult. On the other hand, the Laboratory reports that in those instances where favorable conditions exist, that is, where reference points are employed, the calculation varies less than an inch from actual measurements.

Legal Evidence

If the camera system is in good working order, the photographs of the robbery should be acceptable as legal evidence of the crime scene, subject to verification by the photographer, that is, the bank employee who activated the camera, or any witness having sufficient knowledge of the crime scene to say the photograph is a true representation of it.

Both still pictures and motion pictures of the bank robbery along with individual frames and enlargements of them may be used as evidence (29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, sec. 785-801). Regarding the use of soundtracks in connection with motion pictures, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that ". . . in this day and age of photographic and recording devices, there is no reason why relevant conversations and scenes should not be brought before the jury by these means." [United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F. 2d 490 (2nd Cir. 1964).]

The bank camera photographs may be shown to the eyewitnesses to the crime for the purpose of having them identify the robber. Such viewing will not jeopardize the admissibility of their testimony at trial on the identification issue as this ". . . would not be a circumstance tending to cause misidentification." [United States

After a bank robbery in a southern State, the 35 mm. surveillance camera photograph (right) was used as evidence at the trial in which the three subjects were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms.



Parhms, 424 F. 2d 152 at 157, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970).]

If, by comparison of the bank picture and an available photograph of a suspect, the U.S. Commissioner or other magistrate determines that the person in the two photographs is one and the same, sufficient cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant exists. The descriptions of weapons, items of clothing, or disguises observed in the photograph may be used for purposes

of an affidavit for a search warrant.

An illustration of the use of bank camera photographs resulting in conviction for bank robbery may be found in *United States v. Hobbs*, 403 F. 2d 977 (6th Cir. 1968). A teller saw a man wearing a stocking mask run into the bank with a gun in his hand. She activated an automatic camera which took sixty pictures. The photographs, assembled in a looseleaf notebook and offered in evidence,

were authenticated by the trial testimony of the teller that they clearly represented what she personally witnessed and that she had examined each of the photographs and found each to be a fair and accurate representation of what occurred. The court was solely concerned with whether the scene photographed was an accurate representation of the robbery and did not require evidence of how the surveillance system operated. FBI

This is a composite of the same subject in three different bank robberies. Photograph No. 1 taken by a 16 mm. bank surveillance camera is of relatively poor quality, while Nos. 2 and 3 taken by 35 mm. cameras produced much clearer images of the subject.



Operation Identification

The best way to stop a thief is to convince him that he will be caught with his hand in the "cookie jar." This is what is happening to the daylight house burglar—the plague of suburbia—in a citizen-police project called "Operation Identification."

The common denominator of almost every daytime house burglar is that he rings the doorbell to determine whether anyone is on the premises. What he usually sees as he looks anxiously about is: "No peddlers or solicitors" or the "We Gave" sticker.

In Monterey Park, where the project was initiated in 1963, at an ever-growing number of homes, now approximately 4,000, he also sees a decal with a facsimile of a policeman's badge. It says, "We have joined Operation Identification. All items of value on these premises have been marked for ready identification by Law Enforcement Agencies."

Since the project was launched jointly by the Monterey Park Police Department and the local Exchange Club which purchased the decals and electrical etching tools for loan to citizens, the idea has been adopted in 23 other communities, supported by organizations such as the Kiwanis Club, Rotary, Independent Insurance Agents Association, police officers' associations, and others. Inquiries

By
EVERETT F. HOLLADAY
Chief of Police,
Monterey Park, Calif.

Many residents in the Monterey Park, Calif., area use this decal to deter house burglars.



We Have Joined...
**OPERATION
IDENTIFICATION**

All items of value on these premises have been marked for ready identification by Law Enforcement Agencies.

have been received from approximately 160 additional communities across the Nation and from the foreign countries of Canada, Pakistan, and Israel.

The challenge that has always plagued law enforcement in the case of thievery is the identification of the rightful owner of recovered stolen items. Police auctions held across the country are evidence that manufacturers' serial numbers have been ineffective in this regard.

Citizen-Police Partnership

With the advent of the computer, law enforcement in most areas either presently have or will soon have real-time access to the name and address of the holders of operators' licenses. The owner's inscription of his operator's license number on portable items of value, such as power tools, electrical appliances, TV sets, etc., presents the officer in the field a ready means of establishing ownership should he stop a thief with loot in his possession.

When alert to this process, the officer, in checking a suspect vehicle and recognizing this mark, simply compares it with the operator's license number of the suspect. If the two are not the same, he has reason to make further investigation.

Pawn shop ordinances will probably be rewritten to require the immediate reporting of all proffered items marked in this manner.

The preventive results of this citizen-police partnership are evidenced by the fact that while residential burglaries across the Nation have been increasing, the same is not true in Monterey Park. In fact, during the past 2 years, there has been an actual reduction of these offenses even though the population has increased. Of the homes identified in this manner, since 1963 only six have been burglarized.

(B)

"LEAD" IN BOTH ENDS!

A midwestern police administrator recently recovered what he initially thought was an ordinary mechanical pencil (photo No. 1). Upon closer observation, the officer found the 5½-inch pencil doubled as a .32-caliber handgun.

The weapon is loaded when a cartridge is placed between the two knurled steel caps (photo No. 2), which are then screwed together to en-

case the bullet. This "barrel" (with bullet inside) is screwed into the main pencil shaft which contains a spring-operated firing pin (photo No. 2). The gun is fired by pulling back and releasing the "trigger" lever protruding from the bottom of the pencil in the photographs.

Firearms experts say this "gun" will fire but is extremely hazardous since repeated use weakens its parts.




Photo No. 1.



Photo No. 2.

Rockford Illinois Police Department
sub 6 let dated 3/26/71

VICE PRESIDENT

(Continued from page 5)

last year, most of them relative to documents, photographs, and shoe and tire prints.

The fingerprint division started by J. Edgar Hoover in 1924, less than 2 months after he became director of the Bureau, now houses the fingerprint records of more than 86 million people—the largest collection of fingerprints in the world. These are used to identify thousands of people each year, accident victims as well as fugitives.

Adding greatly to efficient and effective law enforcement everywhere in the United States is the National Crime Information Center which the FBI established 4 years ago. It is the hub of a vast telecommunications network linking local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies. The computers in the FBI Headquarters in Washington now store more than 2½ million record cards on crime and criminals. This information is provided in a matter of seconds to inquiring local police departments. For example, an officer in New Orleans, pursuing a car which has run a red light, can radio the license number to local police headquarters and within 1 minute have back from Washington information that the car was stolen 4 days ago in Ohio and other pertinent information. When he pulls alongside the driver, the officer is ready to wrap up the case.

The FBI, a thoroughly professional organization since the 3-year period that J. Edgar Hoover spent cleaning it out and reshaping it in the 1920's, also has been long dedicated to the full professionalization of law enforcement throughout the United States. During the last fiscal year, FBI instructors assisted in the training of more than a quarter of a million local police officers at schools throughout the country. The FBI National Acad-

emy, which can train up to 100 officers at a time in a 12-week course that makes them better police executives, celebrated its 35th anniversary last year. The class now enrolled for graduation on June 30th will bring to nearly 6,000 the number of graduates since it was founded. New academy facilities will be completed next year which will enable the training of 2,000 local candidates each year instead of the present 200 annually.

With all of these activities going on, there just isn't much time available for spying on Congress.

Now, if the present-day Senators who are worried about FBI surveillance had been around in the period immediately prior to Hoover's taking over the directorship, their complaints would have been justified.

In a Senate investigation of corruption at the close of the Harding era, Gaston B. Means, a former detective and patronage appointee in the Bureau of Investigation, admitted to Senators that he had Agents sneak into their offices, open their mail, search their files, and spy on them in an effort to find something damaging which could be used to stop their attacks on Attorney General Daugherty.

To save time, he was asked what Senators he had not investigated. Means replied: "Oh, there are lots of them I haven't. They are a pretty clean body. You don't find much on them, either."

The new Attorney General appointed by President Coolidge, Harlan Fiske Stone, asked J. Edgar Hoover to take over the job as Director of the Bureau of Investigation. He agreed only on condition that the Bureau be divorced from politics and that appointments and promotions be based strictly on merit. Stone agreed and said he wouldn't have it any other way. Incompetents were weeded out and professionalism began.

In the 47 years since then, Hoover

has kept the Bureau out of politics. The fact that he has served under Presidents—Republican and Democrat—and 19 Attorneys General since he joined the Justice Department as a young Master of Laws graduate in 1917 is testimony of his strictly non-partisan and even-handed administration of a sensitive agency. The relatively low turnover rate of Agents—more than half have been with the Bureau for periods from 10 to 25 years or more—is a further criterion of sound administration.

Yet Hoover's critics continue their drive to get rid of him. One of their principal arguments is that he is 76 years old—6 years beyond the mandatory retirement age for Federal employees. President Johnson issued an Executive order exempting Mr. Hoover from that requirement, and President Nixon asked the vigorous Director to continue in the job. You don't judge a man's worth or his competence by his age, and that certainly holds true in Washington as well as elsewhere.

Three Justices of the Supreme Court are over 70. The senior member, Mr. Justice Black, is 85 years old and still going strong.

Twelve U.S. Senators among those who list their age in the Congressional Directory are over 70, and four of them are 75 or over, including the 80-year-old chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. I haven't heard any Hoover critics in the Senate calling on their colleagues to resign.

At least 14 Members of the House of Representatives among those who list their age are over 70, including the 82-year-old chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and four other committee chairmen. And I don't hear any Hoover critics in the House calling on them to resign.

And outside the Government we find many men in their 70's and 80's active and vigorous, including such spokesmen for the left as Cyrus Eaton,

87 Averell Harriman, 79, Herbert Marcuse, 72, Robert Hutchins, 72, and Linus Pauling, 70.

Dr. Benjamin Spock, almost 68, does not qualify but is moving up fast. However, he really doesn't seem to improve with age, so we have little to look forward to.

Walter Lippmann at 81 still finds the opportunity to write a stinging essay now and then.

We don't hear these men put down for their age by Hoover critics. To the contrary, they enjoy among their followers wide respect for their experience, as well they should.

But still we find those, particularly among the news media, who try to make some issue of Mr. Hoover's age. Most news stories out of Washington about the current controversy carry the Director's age, whether or not it is pertinent to that day's developments. And just the other night, the commentator, Eric Sevareid, in a mild disparagement described the FBI Director as "surrounded by old cronies." We would assume that Mr. Sevareid

isn't surrounded by old cronies. Yet, with silver hair and silken voice, he has appeared before us nightly for years in tandem with the familiar countenance of Walter Cronkite.

No, I think it is something more than age that is the real issue in the effort to drive J. Edgar Hoover out of office. A more likely explanation is the fact that he is anathema to the New Left and extremists of every stripe, and he doesn't mince words in calling attention to them as dangerous to the country. Not surprisingly, this firm stand is a constant irritation to those who would have us believe that there is more to be feared from effective law enforcement than from the radicals and fledgling anarchists who daily call for the destruction of our institutions.

The FBI has frequently been called a Gestapo or secret police by its critics and is again being called that today. But the Bureau's Director has resisted every effort to make the FBI a national police force and has succeeded in keeping it a factfinding agency within

the Justice Department throughout the past 47 years.

J. Edgar Hoover prepared the Justice Department's first brief on the newly formed Communist Party in the fall of 1919, and he has watched the party with an expert's eye ever since. He has authored three best-selling books on the menace of communism to the United States. He understands perhaps better than anyone in this Nation the nature and danger of subversion.

Listen to his own thoughts on this subject, expressed in his foreword to the book, "The FBI Story," in 1956:

"The acts of the subversive, particularly the 'dyed-in-the-wool' Communist, call for increased vigilance. The security of our country has suffered because too many of our people were 'hoodwinked' by the propaganda which claimed that the Communist Party was a political party like the Democratic or Republican

(Continued on page 31)

HURRICANE CAMILLE

(Continued from page 10)

II. Equipment

A. A detailed list of all equipment owned by the department will be maintained under this section. This will include vehicles, radios, flashlights, generators, tools, supplies, foul weather gear, etc. In the rush and excitement of disasters, many pieces of equipment in possession of the department have been overlooked or forgotten.

B. An inventory checkout system must be instituted and kept up to date on all equipment to insure that all articles are getting maximum utilization.

C. A list of equipment owned by other public-service-type agencies in the city will also be included in the plan. Fire, civil defense, and public works departments maintain large aggregates of equipment needed

during emergencies. Knowing what equipment is available and where it is located is a valuable asset and can save a lot of time and work. In an emergency operation center where representatives of each of the above-mentioned agencies would be present, the list of equipment would

still be valuable. In these types of operations, the police executive is normally the person to whom the requests for material are directed, and therefore he should be familiar with the location of needed items.

D. Assistance by private industry and individuals. Privately owned mobile

Gulfport's new recreational center had been open less than a month when Camille reduced it to a shambles.





The Highway Patrol and the Chamber of Commerce quickly moved in house trailers to use as offices after the storm.

radio units are an asset not to be overlooked. Our plan will include a resume of vehicles that are available to the department. This will include heavy equipment, cars, trucks, and specialized items such as trucks with generating plants attached. During Camille many citizens volunteered mobile radio units that greatly relieved patrol units for emergency assignments. Working agreements should be thoroughly discussed with all parties concerned with respect to these vehicles. Instructions on whom to see and what to do in order to secure the operation, use, or loan of these items, plus any restrictions or stipulations, should be in writing in the plan.

III. An emergency operations center is a desirable item in a disaster plan. We are constructing one in a house trailer obtained from the Gulfport Housing Authority and have requested a Justice Department grant for purchase of the equipment to be installed in the center. The trailer will contain:

- A. Staff office.
- B. Telephone switchboard.
- C. Radios for city, county, State, and public works departments along

with a collapsible antenna for mobility.

- D. Overhead projectors which will show current situations and maps of the area of concern.
- E. Air conditioning and a kitchen. A large generator on another trailer will be kept with the center.

The mobility of the center will allow us to move our operation, if necessary, right to the scene of problem areas. This would be true only in smaller disasters, however. A storm the size of Camille would require that the trailer be utilized as a center of all police operations and liaison with other agencies.

Since Hurricane Camille, the Gulfport Police Department has constructed a complete new complex of buildings located farther away from the beach area. On April 1, 1970, we moved into the new buildings which were constructed in record time. While the city had lost most of its tax structure from all the destroyed homes, the construction of the police facilities was started soon after the storm. This was possible because busi-

ness firms in the area donated a majority of the materials and supplies used in the project. Officers of the force who were skilled in building trades furnished the labor.

With our new buildings, equipment, and hard-earned experience from that terrible night in August 1969, we feel that we are now in a position to better serve the citizens of our community should another Camille decide to visit the Mississippi Gulf Coast. We just hope that we do not have to put our planning into action anytime in the near future.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Killer Camille: The Greatest Storm," Time Magazine, vol. 94, No. 9, Aug. 29, 1969, p. 20.

² Ibid.

³ H. C. Sumner, "North Atlantic Hurricanes & Tropical Disturbances of 1947," Monthly Weather Review, vol. 75, No. 12, Dec. 1947, p. 251.

⁴ "Hurricane Camille," Nursing and Medical Task Force Action, The American National Red Cross, Dec. 31, 1969.

⁵ The Biloxi-Gulfport Daily Herald, Aug. 17, 1970.

⁶ "A Killer Named Camille and Her Toll," Newsweek Magazine, vol. 74, Sept. 1, 1969, p. 18.

⁷ Henry H. Berth, Jr., "Police Participation in Disaster Control," Police Research and Development Institute, Apr. 21, 1965, p. 1.

BANK PROTECTION ACT

(Continued from page 20)

fields of endeavor. Throughout the many man-hours expended on the surveys conducted with the banking security officers, the author consistently found the cooperation excellent and the interest in security sincere. As previously pointed out, responsibility and accountability for banking security are now firmly fixed. As a direct result, a definite channel of communication which makes possible the joint discussion and solution of problems of mutual interest has been established. Law enforcement officers and banking officials both have an interest in understanding the Bank Protection Act of 1968 and complying with it to the fullest extent possible.



Lieutenant Daniels (left) and Mr. Robert Garvey, security officer at the American National Bank, Montgomery County, Md., check alarm-initiating device at a teller's station.

VICE PRESIDENT

(Continued from page 29)

Party. Likewise, too many of our people have fallen for the line that spies, subversives, agents of foreign governments and Communists who have been convicted and sent to prison are 'political prisoners.' 'Political prisoners' do not exist in the United States. Those who are prisoners violated the laws of the United States, were indicted by Federal grand juries and convicted in federal courts. I do not think they deserve the special treatment, with special rights and privileges, which is sought for them by their sympathizers.

"In the United States, the subversive is a lawbreaker when he violates the law of the land, not because he disagrees with the party in power. And anyone who violates the law commits a criminal act even if the motives of the lawbreaker are self-servingly

claimed to be political. If we ever permit political motives to justify lawbreaking, we shall develop political tyrannies in this country as similar instances have developed tyrannies in other countries."

In 1936, on direct orders from President Roosevelt, Mr. Hoover and the FBI began gathering information on Communist and Fascist groups in this country. In 1939, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation announcing the FBI's broadened responsibility for national security.

Later when the FBI arrested a dozen Communists and sympathizers who had been indicted for conspiring to recruit volunteers for the Spanish Loyalist Army, a barrage of protests broke around Hoover and the FBI. He was accused of running a Gestapo and trying to persecute people who held political views contrary to his own. He was attacked in Congress, but backed up by the Democratic President and Attorney General, and eventually weathered the storm.

In his 1956 foreword to "The FBI Story," recalling some of the earlier battles, Mr. Hoover wrote:

"In recent years, a campaign of falsehood and vilification has been directed against the FBI by some ignorant and some subversive elements. In the worldwide struggle of free peoples, the truth is still one of our most potent weapons. And the record of the FBI speaks for itself. It is the best answer to the falsehoods, half-truths and rumors. . . ."

With a little dusting off and the change of a word or two, he could use the same statement again today.

Personally, I have complete confidence in this dedicated, steel-willed public servant with the 20-20 vision into our national security and crime control problems and the institution that he has made the beacon of law enforcement in America. I am sure they will again triumph over their critics, and the American people will be the winners.



WANTED BY THE FBI



VINCENT ARTHUR HALL, also known as: **Christopher M. Barnes, Chris Barnes, Vince Hall, Bernard Arthur Haynes, Bernard Chester Haynes.**

Interstate Stolen Automobile; Bank Robbery; Assaulting Federal Officer; Conspiracy.

Vincent Arthur Hall is being sought by the FBI for interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle, bank robbery, assaulting a Federal officer, and conspiracy.

A Federal Grand Jury, at Miami, Fla., indicted Hall as Bernard Arthur Haynes on October 1, 1969, in connection with a car stolen in New York City on August 22, 1968, and recovered in Miami on October 7, 1968.

On June 10, 1970, Hall and an accomplice allegedly robbed the Columbia Savings and Loan Association, Bergen Mall Office, Paramus, N.J., of \$9,213. The two bandits were armed with handguns, and the loot was gathered in a brown grocery bag before the men departed in a getaway car.

On July 9, 1970, Hall reportedly was one of three participants in the \$23,413 robbery of the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. in Brooklyn, N.Y. Two of the bandits, armed with a handgun and a sawed-off shotgun,

staged the holdup while Hall waited in the getaway vehicle. When New York City police arrived on the scene, Hall abandoned the automobile and fled on foot. His two associates were taken into custody, and most of the loot was recovered.

On July 17, 1970, Hall and an accomplice reportedly robbed the Franklin National Bank, Queens, N.Y., of \$9,722. The robbers entered the bank displaying handguns, and, while Hall held the bank floorman at bay, his partner collected bank funds in a brown paper bag. They escaped in a car which had been double-parked outside the bank.

On July 27, 1970, Hall is alleged to have used an 8-year-old boy as hostage to evade arrest by FBI Agents and New York City police detectives in Brooklyn. Holding a gun to the head of the victim, Hall threatened to kill the youth and himself should the officers interfere. The hostage was

later located unharmed approximately 1 mile away.

A Federal warrant was issued on October 3, 1969, at Miami, Fla., charging Hall as Bernard Arthur Haynes with interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. Federal warrants were also issued on September 24, 1970, at Newark, N.J., and on November 12, 1970, at New York, N.Y., charging Hall with bank robbery, assaulting a Federal officer, and conspiracy.

Caution

Hall is reportedly armed with a .38 caliber snub-nosed revolver. He allegedly has used hostages to avoid apprehension on two occasions; therefore, he should be considered dangerous.

Description

Age-----	30, born February 21, 1941. New York, N.Y.
Height-----	5 feet 11 inches to 6 feet.
Weight-----	160 to 170 pounds.
Build-----	Medium.
Hair-----	Black.
Eyes-----	Brown.
Complexion..	Medium.
Race-----	Negro.
Nationality..	American.
Occupations..	Laboratory technician, truck driver.
FBI No.....	548, 633 C.
Fingerprint classification:	17 I 31 W IOO 12 M 27 W OIO

Notify the FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating this fugitive is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.

FOR CHANGE OF ADDRESS ONLY

(Not an order form)

Complete this form and return to:

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(Name)

(Title)

(Address)

(City)

(State)

(Zip Code)

NCIC Board Meets




The National Crime Information Center Advisory Policy Board met and was photographed recently at FBI Headquarters. Shown (left to right) in the first row are: Mr. Donald S. Genung, Sheriff of Pinellas County, Fla.; Mr. O. J. Hawkins, Deputy Director, California Department of Justice; Mr. Peter J. Pitchess, Sheriff of Los Angeles County, Calif.; Mr. J. Preston Strom, Chief, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; Col. S. H. Berthelot, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police; Col. David B. Kelly, Superintendent, New Jersey Division of State Police; Mr. Giles William Crisler, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Public Safety; Assistant Director L. M. Walters, FBI; second row: Mr. Clarence M. Kelley, Chief of Police, Kansas City, Mo.; Mr. W. B. Surdam, Assistant Deputy Superintendent, New York State Police; Mr. William L. Reed, Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement; Insp. Jerome J. Daunt, FBI; Mr. James J. Hegarty, Director, Arizona Department of Public Safety; Col. Thomas S. Smith, Superintendent, Maryland State Police; Col. John R. Plamets, Director, Michigan Department of State Police; Col. Wilson E. Speir, Director, Texas Department of Public Safety; third row: Insp. James C. Herron, Philadelphia, Pa., Police Department; Mr. Charles B. Bernskoetter, Director, Data Processing, Missouri State Highway Patrol; Dr. Robert R. J. Gallati, Director, New York State Identification and Intelligence System; Oliver C. Furseth, Chief, Washington State Patrol; Col. Walter E. Stone, Superintendent, Rhode Island State Police; Mr. John R. Shryock, President, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and Chief of Police, Kettering, Ohio; Mr. Herbert D. Brown, Director, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement; and Assistant Director Thomas E. Bishop, FBI.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535


OFFICIAL BUSINESS

RETURN AFTER 5 DAYS



POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUESTIONABLE PATTERN



This questionable pattern is interesting because of the unusual formation in the lower right portion of the impression. Because this formation is so far out of the usual pattern area and might not always be visible, this impression is classified as a plain whorl and is referenced to an accidental-type whorl. The tracing is inner.