




June 2012

FBI **Law Enforcement** **Bulletin**

Restraint in
the Use of
**DEADLY
FORCE**





June 2012
Volume 81
Number 6

United States
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20535-0001

Robert S. Mueller III
Director

Contributors' opinions and statements should not be considered an endorsement by the FBI for any policy, program, or service.

The attorney general has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the director of the Office of Management and Budget.

The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135.

Editor

John E. Ott

Associate Editors

Eric A. D'Orazio

Linda L. Fresh

David W. MacWha

Art Director

Stephanie L. Lowe

The Training Division's Outreach and Communications Unit produces this publication with assistance from the division's National Academy Unit. Issues are available online at <http://www.fbi.gov>.

E-mail Address

leb@fbiacademy.edu

Cover Photo

© shutterstock.com

Send article submissions to Editor,
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
FBI Academy,
Quantico, VA 22135.

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Features

Restraint in the Use of Deadly Force

By Anthony J. Pinizzotto,
Edward F. Davis, Shannon B. Bohrer,
and Benjamin J. Infanti

1

Preliminary data shed light on restraint in the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers.

Revolutionizing Policing Through Servant-Leadership and Quality Management

By Bill Gardner and
John Reece

25

The empowerment of law enforcement employees by their leaders can lead to widespread enthusiasm and creative problem solving in the workplace.

Departments

12 Leadership Spotlight
Idle Hands

18 ViCAP Alert
Unidentified Human Remains

13 Focus on Training
Corrective Feedback
in Police Work

19 Police Practice
Intelligence-Led Policing

Restraint in the Use of Deadly Force

A Preliminary Study

By ANTHONY J. PINIZZOTTO, Ph.D., EDWARD F. DAVIS, M.A.,
SHANNON B. BOHRER, M.B.A., and BENJAMIN J. INFANTI, M.A.



© iStockphoto.com

Occasionally, news articles and television reports bear banner headlines claiming a general and widespread use of excessive force by America's law enforcement officers.¹ Some radio commentators and citizens participating in call-in programs claim to know of an increase in such incidents. Further, scholarly articles have addressed the issue.² And, in fact, documented cases do exist of officers using excessive,

even deadly, force. However, is this presumption of widespread force overstated?

The authors do not intend to justify or even attempt to explain away any use of excessive force in law enforcement. Excessive—specifically, unnecessary, unwarranted, and disproportionate—force is both unlawful and unethical and has no place in the American justice system.

Rather, the authors intend to reflect their discussions with

thousands of police officers throughout the country over the past 30 years while teaching, conducting research, and engaging in consultations on various cases regarding the use of force—to include deadly force—in law enforcement.³ In some instances, officers used force; in others, they had it used against them, at times resulting in serious injuries and even deaths. In addition to speaking to the officers who took part in situations involving force, the

authors also interviewed many of the suspects and offenders in these cases.

The authors' experiences have revealed that a large number of officers have been in multiple situations in which they could have used deadly force, but resolved the incident without doing so and while avoiding serious injury. This led to an important issue. The authors know how many individuals officers justifiably kill each year (on average, approximately 385).⁴ However, the authors do not have even an estimate of the number of times officers legally and ethically could have used deadly force but did not. Therefore, they will discuss preliminary data regarding the issue of restraint in the use of deadly

force within the law enforcement profession.

THE DEADLY MIX

The authors conducted their original research on law enforcement safety while active members of the FBI, assigned either at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., or at the FBI Academy's Firearms Training Unit or Behavioral Science Unit in Quantico, Virginia.⁵ This research resulted in three publications. The first, *Killed in the Line of Duty*, in 1992, was a national study that examined 51 incidents in which an officer was feloniously killed in the line of duty.⁶ The second study, *In the Line of Fire*, in 1997, examined 40 incidents of serious assaults on law enforcement

officers.⁷ In 2006, the final publication, *Violent Encounters*, expanded the scope of the first two studies and focused on specific topical issues regarding the use of force in law enforcement.⁸

Each study within this law enforcement safety trilogy, as well as subsequent articles the authors wrote using data from these studies, focused on some aspect of what they termed "the deadly mix"—that is, the dynamic interaction of the officer, the offender, and the circumstances that brought them together.⁹ Any encounter where an officer was assaulted or killed transpired in a dynamic, evolving scene that included the perceptions of the officer and the offender. As they interacted, both persons altered these




Dr. Pinizzotto, a retired FBI senior scientist, is a clinical forensic psychologist who privately consults for law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies.



Mr. Davis, a retired police lieutenant and FBI Academy instructor, owns a private consulting company in Virginia.



Mr. Bohrer, a retired Maryland State Police sergeant and range master for the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions, is a self-employed law enforcement instructor and consultant.



Mr. Infanti holds a master's degree in forensic psychology and plans a career in law enforcement.

perceptions and the concomitant interpretations. And, based on those assessments of one another's behaviors, each acted accordingly. At that moment, the fluid movement of the deadly mix—set in motion when the offender and officer came together—began to shift. All of this occurs within only seconds, but has life-altering consequences. This concept of the deadly mix might shed light on the circumstances in which officers, although legally and ethically justified to use deadly force, did not.

Case Examples

The following real-life scenarios can be considered in two ways: 1) as examples of the dynamic and fluid movement of the deadly mix and 2) as a possible model for examining apparently similar situations in which some officers are killed and others are not. In the first case example, the offender was arrested for feloniously killing a law enforcement officer during a traffic stop. When the authors interviewed this subject, he claimed that another officer stopped him in a similar traffic incident 1 week prior to the killing. Similarities and differences in these two cases *in the mind of the offender* are significant to the authors' discussion of the deadly mix.

In the first incident, the traffic stop took place at night.

The offender had committed an armed robbery earlier that evening and did not know whether the officer had notified the dispatcher prior to the stop. When the officer activated the emergency lights, the subject knew that if he waited for two more blocks to pull over, he would come to a darker area with fewer streetlights. So, he continued to drive in spite of the officer now engaging the

“

The concept of the deadly mix—with its emphasis on the dynamic interaction of the officer, the offender, and the circumstances that brought them together—can provide insight into restraint in the use of deadly force.

”

siren. When the offender finally pulled over, he saw “that the officer was looking directly at me and was talking on the radio at that point. I had a gun under the front seat of the car, but I knew he was watching me, so I didn't move.”

As the officer exited his vehicle, the offender noticed that he “had his hand on his gun.” The offender explained, “I knew

that he could pull his gun faster than I could get to mine...so I decided to wait and see what was going to happen.” The officer told the subject to “remain in the car and keep your hands on the steering wheel.” This was said “in a voice that I knew he meant what he said.”

The officer asked the offender why he did not pull over immediately, and the subject said that he “didn't know you wanted me to pull over.” The officer told him that he stopped him because his left brake light did not work. After the offender produced a valid driver's permit and registration, the officer simply told him to “have that light fixed” and returned to his police vehicle.

When the authors questioned the subject, he stated that he felt the officer was in complete charge of the incident. The offender believed that if he “had gone for my gun, he would have killed me. And that wasn't worth it...even if it meant going to jail.”

The subject described himself as a predator and claimed that he “was looking for an opportunity to assault the officer who stopped” him. What did the officer do or not do that prevented an assault? The traffic offense that the officer acted on—a broken left brake light—was minor, but the officer never reduced his awareness of anything that might happen when

making the stop. As the offender stopped his vehicle, he saw the officer watching him while talking on the radio. Although this officer notified the dispatcher of the stop, he did not become distracted from observing the actions of the driver.

As the officer exited the patrol vehicle, he continued to watch the subject. He placed his hand on his weapon while approaching the stopped car. The officer strengthened his position of authority by immediately issuing a command to “remain in the car and keep your hands on the steering wheel.” The manner and voice inflection used by the officer convinced the driver to look for an easier victim and not try to retrieve his gun from under the seat, even if it meant going to jail that night.

The second incident involving this offender, which resulted in the death of an officer, also occurred during a traffic stop at night. The subject had reported a history of carrying concealed weapons throughout his adolescent and adult life. He also had a past arrest for using a firearm in the commission of a crime and had served time in prison.

An officer operating radar pulled him over for speeding. At the time of the traffic stop, the subject was transporting marijuana and cocaine in amounts that would have resulted in an

arrest and a possible felony conviction. In addition, a warrant had been issued for him due to a parole violation. As soon as the officer engaged the emergency lights, the offender pulled to the side of the roadway. Believing that the officer was aware of the warrant, the offender thought, “If they catch me with drugs, I’m in for a long time.” As he looked in his rearview mirror, he “saw the officer get his hat on and pick up something from the seat and get out of



the car...but he wasn’t watching me.” While continuing to observe the officer, the offender simultaneously took his own weapon from under the car seat and prepared to shoot the officer as he approached his vehicle. In the offender’s words, “I believed I could get him before he knew I had a gun.” His assessment proved accurate.

The victim officer in this case had made several traffic stops for excessive speed while operating radar. In each instance,

he issued a traffic citation and released the driver without incident. The offender, who exceeded the speed limit by 12 miles per hour, drove by the officer. When the officer activated the emergency lights, the offender immediately pulled to the side of the road and stopped. Did the officer reduce his level of awareness because of the appearance of immediate compliance? No one ever will know. The offender intently watched the officer and noticed that he not only did not use his radio but was not closely watching him. Therefore, the subject removed his gun from under the seat.

The offender saw the officer pick up something from the seat, exit the patrol vehicle, and walk toward his car. During the approach, the subject noticed that the officer continued not to look at him. The offender acted on his observations and lowered the driver’s side window. As the officer arrived at the window, the offender shot and killed him before he could make any statement to the driver. The object the subject saw the officer pick up from the seat was a ticket book. Responding officers found the victim’s service weapon in his holster when they arrived at the scene.

Application and Analysis

The two case examples involved traffic stops made at night on the same offender. In each

incident, the offender assessed both the circumstances of the stop and the behaviors of the officers.

Was the offender accurate in his assessment of the two officers in these traffic stops? In the authors' past articles, they continually reported that officers might do everything they were trained to do in a situation, yet possibly be feloniously killed.¹⁰ The circumstances at the scene of these traffic stops varied by location, lighting, and traffic; each of these factors had an impact on the offender's decision to assault or not. Use of alcohol or other drugs during a particular incident also can affect offenders' ability to make an accurate assessment. *Killed in the Line of Duty* featured the following statement:

Overall, it is clearly an oversimplification to say one error or mistake caused a law enforcement officer's death. Some of the killers in the study appear to have *evaluated a series of actions or inactions of the officer before considering an assault on the officer* [emphasis added].¹¹

In the two case examples, the same offender considered both actions and inactions of the officers before deciding what to do. This discussion does not suggest that in the second of the two cases the officer was killed because he made

a mistake. Rather, consistent with the theory of the deadly mix, an examination of this incident suggests that the death resulted from a confluence of several factors, to include the perceptions and behaviors of the officer, the perceptions and behaviors of the offender, and the circumstances that brought the two together.

The feloniously killed officer had stopped a number of cars that night without incident. As other officers related, he

“

...a large number of officers have been in multiple situations in which they could have used deadly force, but resolved the incident without doing so and while avoiding serious injury.

”

only sporadically advised the dispatcher of the cars he pulled over depending on the number and frequency of his stops, as well as availability of radio traffic. He had effected an arrest earlier in the evening for a DUI without incident. However, in this case, he was unaware of the outstanding warrant on the driver, the offender's possession of drugs, and the presence and

availability of the weapon. Additionally, the subject stated that he “was sure I could get away with this” because the officer “didn't look like he was paying any attention to what I was doing.”

The results of the three studies on law enforcement safety have been applied to various areas of law enforcement training, supervision, and investigation. Specific topics include suicide by cop; the role of perception of both the officer and the offender, to include memory and recall; implications for interviewing officers and offenders in use-of-force situations; personality aspects of offenders; postassault trauma; encounters with a drawn gun; searches; off-duty performance; backup; protective body armor; and mind-sets of officers and offenders.

Use of Restraint

The concept of the deadly mix—with its emphasis on the dynamic interaction of the officer, the offender, and the circumstances that brought them together—can provide insight into restraint in the use of deadly force. An example of an officer encountering two subjects in a traffic stop combines the principles of the deadly mix with the officer's ability to read and react to a dynamic set of circumstances that, in turn, influences the decision as to the use of deadly force.

Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Sample

Survey Item	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Total</i>
Years in LE	295	17.0	8.3	5017
Firearms Drawn/Year	271	66.3	110.5	17977
Critical Incidents	235	20.0	49.9	4696
Deadly Force Incidents				
Fired	293	0.3	0.7	87
Did Not Fire	282	3.9	13.7	1102
Assaults	287	7.1	15.7	2030
Injuries				
Accident	295	0.8	1.6	228
Assault	294	0.5	1.0	136

LE = Law Enforcement
n = Number of Participants
M = Mean
SD = Standard Deviation

Deadly force incidents indicate critical encounters where deadly force was a legal option.

A state patrol officer in a marked cruiser patrolled an interstate highway and witnessed a vehicle changing lanes without caution. After a short pace, the officer determined that the vehicle was going faster than the posted speed limit, so he activated his emergency lights. The officer observed the driver, along with a passenger who appeared to be slouched in the right front seat. The vehicle did not stop immediately, but continued until it subsequently pulled to the side of the

roadway and came to a halt. The officer noticed that this was an area of dim lighting.

The officer immediately called in the traffic stop by location and vehicle license plate number. He approached the vehicle from the rear of the driver's side with his flashlight in his weak hand. Thinking that he had a drunk driver, the officer stopped at the center post and looked inside the car. The male passenger was slumped in the seat as if sleeping, and the driver's window was down.

The officer demanded the license, registration, and proof of insurance from the female driver. As she fumbled in her purse, the officer saw the man slide his hand under the driver's leg and grab a gun. The officer immediately dropped to the ground and retreated to the rear of the car. He called for backup and reported the presence of the firearm.

The man with the gun turned from side to side, but could not locate the officer, who continued to command the subjects to remain in the car and drop the weapon. When backup arrived, officers removed the two subjects from the car without incident and retrieved the gun from the right floorboard of the vehicle. The male later stated that he "would have shot at the officer, but never had a clean shot."

The officer may have acted with additional caution after the driver failed to immediately stop. He took control of the situation by the placement of his patrol vehicle and the heightened attention he gave when approaching the subjects' vehicle. The message he transmitted by voice and behavior was clearly received by the pair in the car. They understood that he was ready and able to react to whatever they might attempt.

In this case, the officer would have had legal and ethical justification to use deadly

force. The offender not only produced a weapon but later admitted in the interview that he would have shot the officer if he “could have gotten a clear shot.” However, the officer believed that he safely and successfully could control the occupants of the car without the use of deadly force.

TRAINING AND RESEARCH

In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, awarded a grant to the authors and to the Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department to educate the law enforcement community regarding the principles of the deadly mix.¹² The training was designed and implemented as a 1-day session for state, municipal, and local law enforcement instructors and followed a train-the-trainers format. Ten sites from across the nation were selected, and the training was offered to approximately 50 students at each site. The participants were exposed to the principles of the deadly mix and their application to officer safety, supervision, and the investigation of the use of force. Students received hard copies of the trilogy on law enforcement safety, a CD with electronic copies of each study, and contact information for obtaining additional copies of each study for their own trainees. Each

participant also received a CD that contained the computer-based presentations, video clips used in the course of victim officers and offenders, and lesson plans for each presentation.

Student Survey

During the training, participants completed a confidential survey questionnaire regarding their own use of force, as well as some related issues. The

“

If officers risk their personal safety by using restraint in deadly force, why has this phenomenon largely gone unnoticed in the media and research?

”

questions dealt with the 1) number of years in law enforcement, 2) average number of times the officers drew their firearms per year, 3) number of critical incidents in which they were involved, 4) number of critical incidents in which they fired their weapons, 5) number of times during their career in which they legally could have discharged their firearm in the performance of duty (shooting at someone) but chose not to

fire, 6) number of times they had been assaulted during their careers, 7) number of times they were injured that required time off due to accidents, and 8) number of times they had been injured due to an assault that required them to take time off because of the injury. A total of 295 law enforcement officers participated in the survey questionnaire. These participants had an average of 17 years of law enforcement experience.

Results

Table 1 contains general descriptive statistics for the survey sample’s questionnaire.¹³ These include the number of participants scored for each question, the mean for each question, the standard deviations of the means, and the total number of incidents for each question. What follows is a description of the results relevant to the discussion of the use of deadly force and restraint.

Two hundred sixty participants (96 percent) responded that they drew their firearms at least once each year. These officers believed they acted under threatening or critical circumstances.

One hundred ninety-seven participants (83 percent) responded that they had been involved in at least one critical incident during their careers. Fifty-nine participants (20 percent) indicated that they had

been involved in at least one critical incident where they fired their weapon. Conversely, 197 participants (70 percent) responded that they had been involved in at least one situation where they legally could have discharged their firearm in the performance of their duties but chose not to fire. This corresponds with the information reported in *Violent Encounters* where 36 of the 50 officers stated that they legally could have discharged their firearm in the performance of duty.

Two hundred twenty-eight participants (80 percent) responded that they had been assaulted at least once during their career. Seventy-eight participants (27 percent) responded that they had received an injury due to an assault that required time off from duty.

Discussion

The results of the study indicated that 80 percent of the officers had been assaulted during their career and that officers were assaulted an average of approximately seven times in the line of duty. Most assault data on law enforcement officers are highly conservative because most officers do not report being assaulted. Officers either believe that being assaulted “comes with the job,” or their idea of an assault is when they receive injuries requiring medical treatment.

The study found that approximately 70 percent of the sample of police officers had been in a situation where they legally could have fired their weapon during a critical incident but chose not to. Officers were involved in an average of four such incidents during the course of their career. Only 20 percent of the sample had been involved in critical incidents where they fired their weapon during the incident.



These results are pertinent in the discussion of restraint by law enforcement officers and their decision to use deadly force. Officers in the sample were involved in a total of 1,102 situations where they could have fired their weapon legally and ethically as defined by both law and by the organizational regulations of the respective police departments, but did not. The 87 total incidents in which officers legally fired their weapon during critical incidents

pale in comparison with the number of situations where they chose not to fire. Officers in the sample were involved in 1,189 situations where deadly force was a legal course of action. Officers used deadly force in 7 percent of these situations. In other words, officers in the sample used restraint 93 percent of the time even when not legally mandated to do so. This percentage represents a significant amount of restraint by police officers. Further, in accepting the conservative nature of the data analysis, officers most likely used restraint in deadly force more often than what is accounted for in the data.

If officers risk their personal safety by using restraint in deadly force, why has this phenomenon largely gone unnoticed in the media and research? An analysis of research on the topic of deadly force yields no studies directly related to the use of restraint in deadly force by agents of law enforcement. Instead, many studies have focused on environmental characteristics of situations where law enforcement officers used deadly force.¹⁴ Research efforts also have examined how organizational factors influence deadly force.¹⁵ Taken together, these studies found that organizational factors, such as departmental policy, can curtail and somewhat control the use of deadly

force.¹⁶ However, these efforts did not assess the perceptions, beliefs, and thought processes of the individual officer in the situation. Studies that have taken this approach in research on deadly force focused on the perceptual distortions and psychological aftereffects of officers involved in deadly force situations.¹⁷ Thus, the body of research on deadly force has failed to examine the impact of the individual officer's thought processes in the decision to use deadly force or restraint.

In regard to the media, cases involving deadly force overshadow the actuality that police officers overwhelmingly employ restraint in their use of deadly force. Perhaps, this media focus on the use of deadly force helps create the misconception that police officers use deadly force more often than they actually do. As the results of this preliminary study indicated, this is not the case.

Another important consideration in the discussion of deadly force is accuracy. A police officer's decision to use deadly force in choosing to fire during a critical incident does not guarantee success. One researcher noted that police officers miss targets more often than they hit them when using deadly force.¹⁸ Further, hitting the target does not indicate whether a suspect was killed. Thus, the present study's finding that there were

87 incidents where an officer used deadly force does not equate to 87 lethal shootings. Although somewhat simplistic, this reasoning is essential in conceptualizing the use of deadly force.

Limitations of the Study

The most noteworthy limitation of the present study is that it was a preliminary exploration into the use of restraint

“

The study found that approximately 70 percent of the sample of police officers had been in a situation where they legally could have fired their weapons during a critical incident but chose not to.

”

in deadly force. Although research on deadly force has been conducted since the 1970s, a study on restraint in deadly force is a relatively new concept.¹⁹ As such, the fact that this study was preliminary does not diminish its significance. Instead, it was meant to establish a basis for future research on the topic.

Another limitation is that the concept of restraint cannot be further defined based on the present results because the questionnaire did not delve into the inner psychology and perceptions of police officers in their decision to use restraint with deadly force. Once again, this is attributed to the preliminary nature of the data.

A final limitation of the study is the self-reported information from the sample of police officers. The possibility exists that the self-reported data from the questionnaires are not representative of the actual phenomenon of restraint. Further, the responses given by the police officers in the study cannot be validated by objective reports on the careers of each individual officer. Nevertheless, the questionnaire responses are assumed to be reliable and valid. Additionally, as open-ended, nonnumerical answers to the survey were excluded, 85 responses were not considered in the analysis of the data; this exclusion likely led to conservative results.

Future Directions in Research

The findings of this study as they relate to restraint in deadly force have significant implications for future research in the field. For example, what factors led to the officers using restraint? Does the use of

deadly force reduce or increase the inclination of officers to use restraint in subsequent critical incidents? How do individual officers perceive restraint and deadly force? What characteristics of a critical incident lead to deadly force? These questions highlight the importance of the deadly mix in systematically studying and understanding restraint in deadly force. The core components of the deadly mix represent the dynamic nature of any law enforcement situation where the officer, offender, and circumstances come together. The decision to use deadly force is made in an instant. The factors that come together in the mind of the officer to use or not use deadly force can change dramatically within an individual encounter. The fluid nature of this deadly mix can help examine the officer's decision to shoot or not shoot within that given set of rapidly changing circumstances. Further research on restraint can elucidate how these three factors influence an officer's decision to use deadly force in the line of duty. The results of these studies can assist administrators, supervisors, investigators, officers involved in deadly force encounters, other officers from the department, prosecutors, citizens, and the media to better understand and evaluate the use of force in law enforcement.

From a training standpoint, an additional avenue of future research is the applicability of restraint in situations of excessive force. As stated earlier, excessive force—specifically, force that is unnecessary, unwarranted, and disproportionate—is both unlawful and unethical. Therefore, it is essential that research analyzes how

The findings of this study as they relate to restraint in deadly force have significant implications for future research in the field.

restraint can safeguard against the excessive use of force. These principles then can be applied to officer training in safety and tactics.

CONCLUSION

This preliminary examination of restraint in the use of deadly force established the extent to which a sample number of police officers used restraint throughout their careers. A survey on the use of force found that police officers exercised restraint in deadly force in 93

percent of the situations where they legally could have fired their weapons. This finding sharply contrasts with the public perception of police officers and the use of deadly force.

Documented research on restraint currently is lacking. There were two related issues under which the data found in this article were collected. First, the authors recognized that there exists an idea, created in part by the media, within society that there is excessive and widespread use of deadly force within the law enforcement community. Second, against this social perception, the authors wished to assess the view within a portion of the law enforcement community regarding how they see law enforcement's use of deadly force. The results of this preliminary review show dramatic differences between the two groups.

Future research is needed that reveals confirmed and validated numbers where law enforcement officers could have used deadly force, but refrained from doing so. Agencies that currently record instances regarding the circumstances where officers have drawn their firearms without firing them can assist in this important research question.

Conceptualizing restraint in terms of the theory of the deadly mix reveals the dynamic nature of restraint in deadly

force. In doing so, law enforcement entities can ensure the safety of the officer, the public, and the offender while maintaining order and justice. ♦

Endnotes

¹ K. Johnson, "Police Brutality Cases on Rise Since 9/11," *USA TODAY*, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-17-Copmisconduct_N.htm (accessed June 23, 2011); S. Lendman, "Police Brutality in America," *Baltimore Chronicle & Sentinel*, <http://baltimorechronicle.com/2010/071310Lendman.shtml> (accessed June 23, 2011); and *RTAmerica*, "Police Brutality Increases in U.S.," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TalvTj-vmLw> (accessed June 23, 2011).

² H. Cooper, L. Moore, S. Gruskin, and N. Krieger, "Characterizing Perceived Police Violence: Implications for Public Health," *American Journal of Public Health* 94 (2004): 1109-1118.

³ Dr. Pinizzotto, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Bohrer.

⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States, 2009*, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_14.htm (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁵ Dr. Pinizzotto and Mr. Davis.

⁶ A.J. Pinizzotto and E.F. Davis, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Killed in the Line of Duty: A Study of Selected Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers* (Washington, DC, 1992).

⁷ A.J. Pinizzotto, E.F. Davis, and C.E. Miller III, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *In the Line of Fire: Violence Against Law Enforcement* (Washington, DC, 1997).

⁸ A.J. Pinizzotto, E.F. Davis, and C.E. Miller III, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Violent Encounters: A Study of Felonious Assaults on Our Nation's Law Enforcement Officers* (Washington, DC, 2006).

⁹ A.J. Pinizzotto and E.F. Davis, "Interviewing Methods: A Specialized Approach is Needed When Investigating Police Deaths," *Law and Order* 44, no. 11 (1996): 68-72;

A.J. Pinizzotto and E.F. Davis, "Suicide by Cop: Implications for Law Enforcement Management," *Law and Order* 47, no. 12 (1999): 95-98; A.J. Pinizzotto and E.F. Davis, "Offenders' Perceptual Shorthand: What Messages are Law Enforcement Officers Sending to Offenders?" *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, June 1999, 1-6; A.J. Pinizzotto, E.F. Davis, and C.E. Miller III, "Suicide By Cop: Defining a Devastating Dilemma," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, February 2005, 8-20; A.J. Pinizzotto, E.F. Davis, and C.E. Miller III, "The Deadly Mix: Officers, Offenders, and the Circumstances that Bring Them Together," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, January 2007, 1-10; and A.J. Pinizzotto, E.F. Davis, S.B. Bohrer, and R. Cheney, "Law Enforcement Perspective on the Use of Force: Hands-On, Experiential Training for Prosecuting Attorneys," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, April 2009, 16-21.

¹⁰ A.J. Pinizzotto and E.F. Davis, "Cop Killers and Their Victims," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, December 1992, 9-11; and A.J. Pinizzotto, and E.F. Davis, "Killed in the Line of Duty: Procedural and Training Issues," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, March 1995, 1-6.

¹¹ Pinizzotto and Davis, "Killed in the Line of Duty," 48.

¹² U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Initiatives: Enhancing Law Enforcement (Category V - National Officer Safety Training and Technical Assistance).

¹³ For data quality and reliability, the authors took into account only numerical responses, disregarding questions answered with words, such as "multiple," "many," or "several," as well as those left blank or answered with "unknown." Overall, out of a possible 2,360 responses, 85 were disqualified.

Another discrepancy concerned an error in which 42 participants did not have the question about the number of critical incidents involved in throughout their careers. Although this slightly limited the utility of the data pertaining to that question, the authors believed that the 42 possible answers did not exert significant influence over the results. Further, this error does not affect the reported results or subsequent discussion on restraint in the use of deadly force.

An additional consideration involved the way in which the authors coded 49

responses with a "+" at the end of the reported numerical answer. For example, they coded a response of "25+" as "25." This coding technique yielded conservative results.

¹⁴ J.P. McElvain and A.J. Kposowa, "Police Officer Characteristics and the Likelihood of Using Deadly Force," *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 35 (2008): 505-521.

¹⁵ H. Lee and M.S. Vaughn, "Organizational Factors That Contribute to Police Deadly Force Liability," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 38 (2010): 193-206; A.N. Tennenbaum, "The Influence of the Garner Decision on Police Use of Deadly Force," *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology* 85 (1994): 241-260; M.D. White, "Controlling Police Decisions to Use Deadly Force: Reexamining the Importance of Administrative Policy," *Crime & Delinquency* 47 (2001): 131-151; and M.D. White, "Examining the Impact of External Influences on Police Use of Deadly Force Over Time," *Evaluation Review* 27 (2003): 50-78.

¹⁶ S.E. Wolfe and A.R. Piquero, "Organizational Justice and Police Misconduct," *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 38 (2011): 332-353.

¹⁷ N. Addis and C. Stephens, "An Evaluation of Police Debriefing Programme: Outcomes for Police Officers Five Years After a Police Shooting," *International Journal of Police Science and Management* 10 (2008): 361-373; A. Artwohl, "Perceptual and Memory Distortion During Officer-Involved Shootings," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, October 2002, 18-24; and D. Klinger, "Police Responses to Officer-Involved Shootings," *National Institute of Justice Journal* 253 (2006): 21-24.

¹⁸ M.D. White, "Hitting the Target (Or Not): Comparing Characteristics of Fatal, Injurious, and Noninjurious Police Shootings," *Police Quarterly* 9 (2006): 303-330.

¹⁹ McElvain and Kposowa, "Police Officer Characteristics and the Likelihood of Using Deadly Force," 505-521.

Dr. Pinizzotto welcomes questions and comments concerning this article. He can be reached by mail at 13807 Poplar Tree Road, Chantilly, VA 20151; by e-mail at cfpassociates@gmail.com; and by phone at 703-814-7989.

Leadership Spotlight

Idle Hands

The sluggard's craving will be the death of him because his hands refuse to work.

—Proverbs 12:24

It may come as no surprise that you simply cannot lead some employees. Despite all of your best attempts and good intentions, certain people lack motivation and resist leadership. In fact, sadly enough, these individuals often consist of those with the most talent and potential, yet they either are knowingly (state of denial) or unknowingly (state of ignorance) lazy. Not a derogatory term, laziness validly describes the reluctance or unwillingness to work, and leaders should call it out for what it is.

Of course, laziness counteracts human potential and usually results in substandard performance. Lazy individuals tend to do just enough to get by. Idle gossip and folly usually accompany laziness because they help camouflage these persons' actual behavior. For example, people commonly will use others' shortcomings to justify their own laziness; and, in time, even a false belief can become an acceptable truth to the one who embraces it. How often do we hear someone blaming their productivity woes on the greater organization, a supervisor, or another individual in the workplace? In essence, this provides lazy persons the perfect cover for holding back their own performance.



© Thinkstock.com

Laziness is a plague because it places an inordinate burden on leadership and team morale, and it must be addressed. No easy fix exists, and rooting out such behavior requires immense patience. And, in some cases, laziness simply may represent a person's nature. But, if you can get to the cause and apply sound logic, you may identify a viable solution to reenergize the employee. Joint goal setting can serve as a powerful incentive to counter the effects of laziness and revive interest. Remember, all goals should be tied to performance measures. Finally, if all else fails, you may have to encourage the employee to explore other opportunities. More than likely, the individual needs a change and knows it but requires honest encouragement. Be supportive and provide guidance in accordance with the situation. The key is to communicate and interact regularly with such employees—and not ignore them, but refresh them! ♦

Christopher C. Lenhard, a member of the Office of Learning Oversight at the FBI Academy, prepared this Leadership Spotlight.

Focus on Training



© Mark C. Ide

Corrective Feedback in Police Work

By Peter J. McDermott and Diana Hulse, Ed.D.

A central mission of police organizations is the ongoing development of personnel. Police recruits are trained and supervised in the work performance areas of tactical skills, communication abilities, understanding of human interactions, and the development of proper documentation skills. They need positive feedback that reinforces successful performance and corrective feedback that communicates that their performance does not meet identified criteria. Supervisors need to have the skills for providing corrective feedback to their personnel.

Because exchanging corrective feedback is complex and multifaceted, proficiency in delivering it requires an understanding of what feedback is, how it can be used to full advantage, and why it is important to prepare the giver and receiver.¹ Corrective feedback occurs when a field training officer (FTO) identifies that recruits' performance does not meet expectations and prepares to speak with them about changing their behavior.

BACKGROUND

The importance of corrective feedback is illustrated perfectly through clinical training in graduate counselor education programs. In counseling programs, students participate in scholastic and clinical settings, and their work with clients receives intensive, semester-long supervision. The monitoring instructors and supervisors evaluate students' intervention, conceptualization, and professional skills and judge their ability to link theory and content knowledge to effective clinical practice with real clients.

As students receive clearly articulated expectations for feedback exchange and talk through their feelings about receiving corrective responses, they develop a greater attraction to the ongoing feedback process. Since 1994, the Corrective Feedback Instrument-Revised (CFI-R) has served as a tool to encourage conversation between supervisors and personnel about the complex topic of feedback and its role in clinical supervision.² Counseling students must complete the CFI-R, and their responses provide opportunities for conversation in individual sessions with their supervisors and in group settings with other students. Conversations at the beginning of the semester help students frame the feedback process as a means for growth and development, rather than one of anxiety and defensiveness.

Just as clinical supervisors benefit from examining counseling student responses on the CFI-R, FTOs can benefit from reviewing and discussing recruit responses. In field training programs, recruits are expected to translate classroom instruction to acceptable performance in motor vehicle stops, criminal investigations, domestic violence, and other conflicts. They receive mandatory feedback on a daily basis for 10 to 14 weeks. As a result, FTOs can gain valuable information about the range of reactions that recruits may have to receiving corrective feedback. Additionally, when FTOs examine their own responses to corrective feedback, they increase their understanding of how their feelings and reactions may enhance or hinder their work as supervisors.

At this point, some might say “What’s the big deal here? We understand the need for feedback,

and it’s being done.” One of the authors argues otherwise. “It’s not easy, or it would be done on a regular basis, and I know that it is not. I have been inquiring in first-line leadership classes dating back to 1985 about the amount of feedback that students receive over their careers; it is pathetically low.”³

Police organizations are built on feedback. But, giving and receiving corrective feedback often intimidates people because it involves personal risk taking.⁴ Some supervisors may not know how to

give corrective feedback and may have their own anxieties that impede delivering it in a way usefully received and processed by personnel.⁵ As a result, behavioral change is not initiated, and professional development is stunted for both the giver and receiver. Predictably, the group or organization suffers in its mission to provide service because no impetus for growth and change exists. However, the CFI-R, paired with the Cycle of Effective Feedback (CEF), can

assist supervisors in preparing for and delivering corrective feedback that will be heard, understood, reflected upon, and translated into positive behavioral change within their police organizations.

CORRECTIVE FEEDBACK INSTRUMENT-REVISED

One of the functions of the CFI-R is to serve as a stimulus for conversation about potential obstructions to hearing, processing, and translating feedback into desired behavioral change. The CFI-R consists of 30 items presented in a 6-point Likert format: strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, agree, and strongly agree.

“

**...giving and receiving
corrective feedback
often intimidates people
because it involves
personal risk taking.**

”

All items focus on 1 of 6 factors: feelings, evaluative, written, leader, clarifying, and childhood memories.

FTOs can require recruits to complete the 30 items in advance of the field training program. Responses likely will vary following on a number of concerns. One recruit might agree with the item “When I receive corrective feedback, I think I have failed in some way,” while another might agree with “I usually am too uncomfortable to ask someone to clarify corrective feedback delivered to me.”⁶ Use of the CFI-R can help illuminate challenges for the FTO to address, which can be acted upon using the CEF.

CYCLE OF EFFECTIVE FEEDBACK


The 5 elements in the CEF provide the FTO with a sequence of steps to follow. These steps include:

- 1) understanding recruits and their idiosyncratic responses to feedback;
- 2) presenting the corrective feedback to recruits based on this understanding;
- 3) reflecting on the feedback exchanged with the recruits;
- 4) enacting problem solving steps to acquire the desired behavior; and
- 5) engaging in follow-up assessments to evaluate desired outcomes.

Depending on the results of these follow-up steps, the FTO may need to repeat the cycle again by focusing on one, some, or all of the 5 elements until recruits demonstrate expected performance criteria.

Understanding Recruits

As FTOs gain an understanding of feelings and reactions to corrective feedback, they can begin to design more effective ways to interact with each recruit. The FTO can explore recruit responses to



questions, such as “When someone gives you corrective feedback, what do you think, what do you feel, and what do you do?” as well as ask recruits how they would give out feedback. Through this exploratory process using the CFI-R, the FTO and recruit begin to develop a relationship that reduces the negativity associated with corrective feedback.

These steps are particularly easy to accomplish at the beginning of a field training program because they prepare the recruit for accepting continual feedback and give them a better understanding of its goals, which will enhance learning. For example, the FTO might say, “I noticed that on your responses to the CFI-R you indicated that you equate corrective feedback to criticism. Because you will be receiving corrective feedback from me throughout the program, I want to discuss how I can make the feedback I give you useful and productive.”

This statement demonstrates that the FTO has taken time to consider the recruit’s responses on the CFI-R and is committed to building an up-front relationship that benefits the delivery of effective feedback. The FTO also can prepare the recruit for the language of feedback, which includes using “I” statements, speaking in behavioral terms, and

applying phrases, such as “What did not work in your performance today was....” This accentuates performance criteria over personal judgment of the recruit.

Presenting Feedback

During a motor vehicle stop conducted by a recruit and observed by the FTO, it is determined that the recruit conveyed a rude and disrespectful tone toward the vehicle operator. The function of the FTO then is to give corrective feedback in a manner that will eliminate future negative interactions and at the same time put the recruit in a learning mode as opposed to a defensive one. The FTO has learned that the recruit interprets corrective feedback as criticism. The FTO might say, “You gave me the impression of rudeness, and you did not appear to demonstrate respect. Can you share with me your impression of the interaction?”

Reflecting on Feedback

Reflection is a critical point in the cycle where recruits clarify their understanding of the feedback. Three items on the CFI-R specifically address clarification. One item reads “When I am not sure about the corrective feedback message delivered to me, I do not ask for clarification.”⁷ A recruit’s agreement with this item indicates some hesitation that requires exploration. Perhaps, recruits feel overwhelmed, or their style is to act as if they understand the feedback because to do otherwise might convey incompetence. Whatever the reasons, the FTO should ensure that recruits understand the message. One way to do so is to have

recruits repeat back a message given to them.

Problem Solving and Following Up

Once feedback has been reflected upon by recruits, they have another opportunity to improve their conduct. The FTO will review any questions or concerns they may have and possibly suggest some ways for recruits to approach their next motor vehicle stop. As a follow-up, the FTO will observe the next interaction between the recruit and a motor vehicle driver and will evaluate the presence of positive change, some change, or no change. The FTO may revisit elements of the cycle as a result of this assessment. Thus, the cycle continues.

CONCLUSION

Effective environments for giving and receiving feedback will enhance the professional development of personnel while achieving the mission of a police organization. Interpersonal skills competencies combined with an understanding of how to prepare and present corrective feedback are fundamentals for success. Field training officer programs provide an excellent place to set in motion effective feedback skills for the giver and receiver. These programs are intense, and recruits can choose to endure what they perceive as a noxious experience, or they can become engaged in the learning process.

A clinical supervisor once said to counseling students in a beginning practicum class, “You never will have this many people interested in you at any one time ever again.” This statement could promote fear and dread, or it could convey a message of support—an invitation to engage to the

“
**Interpersonal skills
competencies combined
with an understanding
of how to prepare
and present corrective
feedback are fundamentals
for success.**
”

fullest degree in the learning process with professionals dedicated to helping their personnel be the best they can be. When these recruits understand the purpose of feedback and have a chance to voice their concerns in a supportive climate with those who provide such input, the chances increase that they will be more open to corrective feedback and its link to their personal and professional growth and development.⁸◆

Endnotes

¹ Diana Hulse-Killacky, Jonathan J. Orr, and Louis V. Paradise, "The Corrective Feedback Instrument-Revised," *Journal for Specialists in Group Work* 31 (2006): 264.

² Hulse-Killacky, Orr, and Paradise, 263; Diana Hulse-Killacky and Betsy J. Page, "Development of the Corrective Feedback Instrument: A Tool for Use In Counselor Training Groups," *Journal for Specialists in Group Work* 19 (1994): 197.

³ Peter J. McDermott, a 47-year veteran of law enforcement, including 20 years of teaching supervision classes.

⁴ Hulse-Killacky and Page, 198.

⁵ Hulse-Killacky and Page, 208.

⁶ Hulse-Killacky, Orr, and Paradise, 271, 268.

⁷ Hulse-Killacky, Orr, and Paradise, 268.

⁸ Hulse-Killacky, Orr, and Paradise, 277.

Peter J. McDermott welcomes readers' questions and comments at pete06422@yahoo.com.

Mr. McDermott is a retired captain from the West Hartford and Windsor, Connecticut, Police Departments and a retired instructor from the Connecticut Police Academy.

Dr. Hulse is a professor and chair of the Counselor Education Department at Fairfield University in Fairfield, Connecticut.

The *Bulletin's* E-mail Address

© Digital Vision



The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* staff invites you to communicate with us via e-mail. Our e-mail address is leb@fbiacademy.edu.

We would like to know your thoughts on contemporary law enforcement issues. We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions about the magazine. Please include your name, title, and agency on all e-mail messages.

Also, the *Bulletin* is available for viewing or downloading on a number of computer services, as well as the FBI's home page. The home page address is <http://www.fbi.gov>.

ViCAP Alert

Attention

*Violent Crime, Sex Crimes, Cold Case,
and Crime Analysis Units*

Homicide and Sexual Assault



Unidentified Offender Description

Race: Black

Sex: Male

Age: 25 to 35

Height: 5'9" to 6'0"

Weight: 180 to 220 lbs.

Distinguishing characteristics:
Beard and moustache

This offender has been forensically linked to two cases in the state of Virginia. On September 24, 2005, a 26-year-old female was walking home from a store in Fairfax when the offender grabbed her from behind, carried her to a pool/park area, and sexually assaulted her. On October 17, 2009, 20-year-old Morgan Dana Harrington last was seen leaving a Metallica concert at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. On January 26, 2010, Harrington's remains were recovered in a field on a 700-acre farm in Albemarle County. The investigating agencies are requesting assistance in identifying the offender responsible for these crimes.

To provide or request additional information, please contact Detective Michael Boone of the Fairfax, Virginia, Police Department at 703-385-7959 or michael.boone@fairfaxva.gov; Agent Dino Cappuzzo, Virginia State Police, at 434-414-4456 or dino.cappuzzo@vsp.virginia.gov; or the FBI's Violent Criminal Apprehension Program at 800-634-4097 or vicap@leo.gov.

Contact ViCAP for information on how your agency can obtain access to the ViCAP Web National Crime Database and view these cases. To review other ViCAP Alerts, please visit <http://www/fbi/gov/wanted/vicap/vicap.htm>.



Intelligence-Led Policing ***Connecting Urban and Rural Operations***

By John B. Edwards

Twenty-first century technology has changed everything—the way people interact, communicate, and live. At their fingertips, individuals have blogs that merge ideas and Web sites that provide portholes to volumes of data. Real-time information on personal conduct and specialized networks of knowledge on any subject readily are available. E-mails transfer information at lightning speed to many people at one time. Smart phones make it all mobile, immediate, and easily accessible. Modern technology has created one community wherein the whole world is interconnected.

Information Sharing

Police depend heavily on information and communication. In today's world, youthful offenders communicate, network, socialize, boast, and reveal their conduct on the Web via e-mail, smart phones, and Blackberries. Communication is carried into a new theater of real-time availability and simple methods.

Current communication systems require a small investment, but pay tremendous dividends. Today's technology opens huge doors behind which exist valuable information and exemplary methods

of communication. Unfortunately, obstacles sometimes prevent law enforcement agencies from stepping through those doors. Regionalization and resource sharing can address some of those barriers, such as budget issues and priorities.

Local law enforcement serves as the first line of defense and the best resource for criminal identification, apprehension, prevention, and disruption. In the United States, differences exist between urban and rural policing. However, efforts aim to foster communication by taking proactive measures toward homeland security through suspicious activity reports and identification of trends and criminal behavior patterns possibly linked to terrorist groups and radical domestic hate groups or militias.

With homeland security as a priority, federal agencies rely on their frontline law enforcement partners. When an environment exists that allows all officers to possess knowledge and use it to cooperate, communicate, and coordinate, premier results can develop. Actionable intelligence proves


valuable in preventing and disrupting crime. Performance and results are enhanced when law enforcement agencies tailor their focus toward evidence- and intelligence-based operations.

This fundamental concept does not always materialize due to gaps between rural and urban law enforcement operations. For example, in large cities, agencies often have roll-call meetings during which supervisors share information and intelligence. Large geographical areas may be broken down into zones or precincts that allow for a more specific focus. Frequently, officers communicate via cellular phones or laptop computers. In more rural areas, roll calls do not always take place, and officers may not have cellular phones or laptop computers. Thus, information and intelligence may not readily be available.


Intelligence-Led Policing

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) can help improve information and intelligence sharing. The use of a full-time intelligence analyst to perform duties that result in increased cooperation, communication, and coordination among interconnected, small, rural agencies is relatively new. The push for state and regional fusion centers and the development of Law Enforcement Online (LEO), a real-time, controlled-access communications and information-sharing data repository, demonstrates the increased interest in an intelligence structure within local law enforcement.

ILP embraces the notion that rural officers should have access to current technology, such as smart phones and Blackberries, as a real-time conduit for relating past data to current intelligence information. Rural sheriffs and police chiefs working together to create one central clearinghouse for information collection, analysis, and dissemination constitutes another ILP concept. Innovative policies, procedures, protocols, and structures require collaboration between sheriffs and chiefs for common interest, shared gains, notoriety, credit, and productive results.



Rural law enforcement agencies need to shift to a proactive ILP culture. Such programs have benefitted state and federal stakeholders. ILP provides real-time information on current operations to state parole and probation officers and locally assigned federal agents. These officers benefit from complete two-way communication—they see who the sheriff's office interacts with and when.



The Process

ILP is based on a three-step process. The first involves incorporation of the ILP model, which maintains, “Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and criminal intelligence are pivotal to an objective decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption, and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement tactics that target prolific and serious offenders.”¹

The second step includes incorporating guidelines for protecting privacy—mandatory if the intelligence system is supported by federal funds. Intelligence gathering and the pooling of intelligence can lead to more effective policing. However, the collection and sharing of intelligence also can implicate significant privacy concerns. Accordingly, if the intelligence system is supported by federal funds, the agency must employ within the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies at Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, part 23. Third, stakeholders participate in aggressive information gathering, specific analysis, and structured classification of real-time communication paths, supporting actionable intelligence dissemination.

Evans County, Georgia, provides specialized training, equipment, and information-sharing policies and procedures to officers. By knowing what

incidents have occurred, law enforcement agencies can maintain situational awareness. This aids in identifying, preventing, disrupting, and solving crimes. Local, state, and federal officers use one source to obtain comprehensive information.

A county intelligence analyst provides numerous documents to officers, to include a list of calls with a short narrative from each department. During e-roll call, the list and narratives are e-mailed to officers. Also provided are patrol alerts containing corroborated criminal intelligence and BOLOS—wanted persons with pending warrants.²

Open-case alerts communicate facts to deputies regarding current cases under investigation. Public and private-sector partners receive open-source bulletins that can help prevent or disrupt crime. An all-hazards report is issued to officers when inclement weather, dangerous incidents, or potential public safety issues occur. Bulletins are disseminated, and officers learn of national trends and safety concerns.

Cooperation and Communication

Strategic and tactical decisions made by commanders and supervisors are information- and intelligence-based. Agencies communicate, support, and cooperate with each other.

Intelligence-Led Policing Operations

System	Process	Result
E-Roll Call	An intelligence analyst electronically sends all local, state, and federal officers a list of calls from the night before.	Law enforcement becomes aware of all incidents and events.
Shift Report	Deputies, dispatchers, and jailors read and initial the calls-for-service report updates since their last shift.	Staff becomes aware of incidents and events that have occurred.
Problem Adoption	Deputies hear of problems from citizens, adopt these problems, identify strategies for solutions, and proceed with tactics.	Relationships are built that lead to trust and the production of intelligence information.
Web/Tips	Via a Web site, citizens provide tips that automatically are e-mailed to intelligence analyst and investigator.	Information analysis provides intelligence.
Patrol Alerts/ Open Case Alerts	Flyers are produced and distributed by e-mail, then posted in the operations center.	Total situational awareness occurs.
Inmate Information Collection Document	An investigator regularly interviews local jail inmates regarding criminal information.	This resource provides corroborative intelligence on histories, trends, patterns, and methods of criminals' operation.
Deputies Information Binder	A three-ring binder containing current intelligence, memos, and latest officer awareness and safety information.	The binder enhances intelligence products and communication.
Issue Board	A white board is used to highlight important communications for all.	Important information is disseminated and shared.
Status Board	The board gives status of pending state, local, and federal investigations.	Pending case knowledge is shared.

Intelligence-Led Policing Operations

System	Process	Result
Project Board	A large white board is used for projection of presentations and real-time collective data mining.	The board enhances intelligence products and communication among all law enforcement.
Geo-Call Mapping	A county map with colored push pins representing call types and locations. The color bar and pie charts correlating calls by day and time.	Awareness of crime locations and nexus to day and time lead to meaningful patrol, prevention, and disruption.
Deputies Resource Center	The center offers professional magazines, intelligence pamphlets, and case law updates.	This creates a professional culture with efficient and effective law enforcement.
Intelligence Database	Intelligence information is submitted.	Intelligence is shared.
All Hazards	An intelligence analyst e-mails important information regarding potential public safety hazards.	This leads to situational awareness among all public safety stakeholders.
Open-Source Alerts	An intelligence analyst provides public and private sector open-source intelligence.	These identify criminals and assist with crime prevention, disruption, and reduction.
Web site Alerts, News, and Twitter	An analyst uses a Web site as a communication vehicle to the public.	These identify criminals and assist with crime prevention, disruption, and reduction.
Daily Meetings	An intelligence analyst, investigator, and chief deputy meet to identify crime patterns, trends, and situational topics.	The meetings focus on problems and help to identify and arrest offenders and to prevent, disrupt, and reduce crime.
Weekly Report	An analyst provides weather forecast.	Reports facilitate environmental awareness for traffic and other public safety and law enforcement planning.

This culture of cooperation and communication occurs due to support from commanders based upon the common interests and mutual benefits realized. This is accomplished through open communication and cooperation with structured planning and preparation, ensuring inclusion and consideration of stakeholders throughout the process.

Operations centers house programs and systems. Project boards illuminate and illustrate real-time data mining through computer projection. A records management system documents deputies' actions. To ensure seamless oversight and communication between operations, the chief deputy, investigator, and intelligence analyst are housed together. Specific protocols and procedures guide all aspects of the operation. It is critical that all law enforcement agencies, fusion centers, and federal agencies remain informed by participating in online programs.

Conclusion

Agencies at all levels can use intelligence and communication to become more efficient and effective, thus producing stellar results. In today's age of domestic terrorism, law enforcement must evolve to strive for excellence in criminal intelligence operations. It takes specific, structured, and current policy, procedures, and guidelines in concert with mandatory training for any intelligence initiative to succeed. Intelligence-led policing can help by linking all departments, urban and rural. With this strategy, cities, counties, parishes, districts, and tribal lands all can work together, eliminating boundaries and interconnecting law enforcement everywhere. ♦

Endnotes

¹ J.H. Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-Led Policing* (Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing, 2008): 89.

² Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies, 28 C.F.R. § 23.

³ BOLO is an acronym for "be on the lookout."

Chief Deputy Sheriff Edwards heads the Evans County, Georgia, Sheriff's Office

Wanted: *Photographs*




The *Bulletin* staff always is looking for dynamic, law enforcement-related images for possible publication in the magazine. We are interested in those that visually depict the many aspects of the law enforcement profession and illustrate the various tasks law enforcement personnel perform.

We can use digital photographs or color prints. It is our policy to credit photographers when their work appears in the magazine. Contributors sending prints should send duplicate copies, not originals, as we do not accept responsibility for damaged or lost prints. Send materials to:

Art Director
*FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin*, FBI Academy,
Quantico, VA 22135.

leb@fbiacademy.edu



Revolutionizing Policing Through Servant-Leadership and Quality Management

By BILL GARDNER and JOHN REECE, Ph.D

© Bryan E. Lockerby

The focus of the last 10 years of an emerging law enforcement leader's career has focused on working, studying, and preparing for a top leadership position. This individual has passed the rigors of testing for sergeant, lieutenant, commander, or deputy chief. The leader has graduated from a prestigious law enforcement leadership school such as the FBI National Academy, and may have completed a baccalaureate or graduate degree.

That professional now competes for and obtains the position of police chief, sheriff, or director.

When this executive enters the door of the new agency, whether it has 10 or several hundred employees, the leader learns that staff morale is low, trust levels between ranks in the organization and with the community are low, financial support from elected officials is in jeopardy, and crime fighting and crime prevention practices are second-rate. The new senior

manager's shiny collar brass suddenly feels very heavy. How does the new leader resolve the dilemma between the opportunities presented by the newly gained power and authority with the discouraging reality of skepticism and widespread apathy within the agency? Further, the new top manager knows the community and local government leaders depend on the agency to deliver excellent services soon. Where does the leader begin?

COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE

Law enforcement agency executives are accountable to their political leaders, their communities, and their employees for inspiring leadership and effective management. In today's demanding social and political environment, the executives will fail if they do not meet those demands. Established leaders or newly selected administrators face the same challenge: serve the needs of their primary constituencies or fail.

Success requires enlightened leadership practices.¹ Many researchers have argued that personal leadership behavior is the area the law

enforcement leader has the most control over.² Next, the executive consciously can select the finest management systems required to implement quality services. Finally, the top manager must provide the specific skills training and education to qualify and empower frontline staff to deliver exceptional policing services. Once employees experience the satisfaction of their own success, they yearn for more. Experience has shown that when community members and elected officials witness excellence in law enforcement practices, high levels of trust and support will follow soon.

Transitioning an agency to an internally and externally effective workplace is an

important task leaders must undertake. How do leaders guarantee that frontline staff and first-line supervisors have the same mission and behavioral values as the chief executive? More so, how does that top manager ensure all employees are competent in the skills needed to identify and analyze community problems and produce innovative solutions?

Executives must create a department where employees are excited to come to work, zealous about getting mission-driven results, and empowered to take skilled initiative. This workplace is a law enforcement agency where constant learning and improvement exemplify agency culture. This special organization is rich with frontline employees cherishing the philosophy of teamwork, information-sharing, problem solving, and mutual accountability.

Top policing leaders should embrace the principles of servant-leadership, employ quality management (QM) practices, and teach staff members the disciplines required for such service delivery. Servant-leadership inspires trust and cooperation inside and outside the organization. Next, when executives and their top management teams commit to the methodologies of QM, long-term effectiveness



Mr. Gardner, a retired police chief from the Grand Junction, Colorado, Police Department, heads the Public Safety Department at Colorado Mesa University in Grand Junction.



Dr. Reece is an assistant professor of criminal justice at Colorado Mesa University in Grand Junction and the former director of the institution's Western Colorado Peace Officers Academy.

can be maximized. Finally, the executive must establish a continuous learning culture where the skills required for delivering QM services are institutionalized.

SERVANT-LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

Despite the overwhelming demands placed on the 21st century policing executive, the one thing leaders absolutely control is their own behavior. Executives will more likely earn the respect of their staff by displaying traits such as humility, trustworthiness, vision, inspiration, empathy, cleverness, and loyalty. The traits of leaders most likely to fail include insensitivity to others, intimidation, arrogance, lack of trustworthiness, and micro-management.³ Hence, the concept of law enforcement executives serving the legitimate needs of their staff, as well as the needs of citizens, offers leaders a new and powerful paradigm.

Effective law enforcement leadership involves an affinity for relying on autocratic leadership decisions or democratic decision-making processes. Of course, police executives are looked to for command decisions in circumstances, such as crisis or tragedy. Yet, research has proven that over time, leaders who provide direction but avoid domination and encourage participation, mutual

respect, and independence of thought achieve higher-quality organizational results.⁴ Servant-leadership theory, then, is the ideal behavioral model to influence the law enforcement agency's culture to practice democratic problem solving and decision making.

Servant-leadership theory, at its simplest, requires that leaders internalize leadership as a

“

Servant-leadership theory...requires that leaders internalize leadership as a calling to serve others before self.

”

calling to serve others before self. While servant-leadership has deep roots in philosophical and spiritual literature, the concept has been embraced by chief executive officers in the American business sector for years.⁵ Such leaders behave as ethical stewards of the power given to them. They use their position's power to increase levels of trust and loyalty throughout the workplace. This leadership practice increases the propensity of staff to become invested in the leader's

vision because that vision also includes the staff's legitimate motivational needs.

The notion that servant-leaders are soft is a myth. Servant-leadership focuses on inner strength, and its practitioners have unshakable ethical principles. Such leaders have internalized courage to act in the best interests of the community and the law enforcement organization before any one individual.

Leaders who model the behavior of considering others' needs before their own can create a new dynamic in their department. One noted researcher has documented that humility in leaders is the number one predictor of widespread organizational loyalty.⁶ Because people trust in their leadership, these executives are poised to introduce the principles of commitment to the larger community and the organization. Organizational pride, individual self-confidence, and teamwork then follow.

Loyalty and trust work in unison with the employee motivational needs of mutual respect, camaraderie, appreciation, and self-actualization—feelings of making a difference in the world.⁷ When leaders have succeeded in building trust and respect at all levels of their organization, the stage is set for implementing QM

Characteristics of the Servant-Leader

- Listening: identifying, clarifying, and reflecting on the needs of the group
- Empathy: seek first to understand employees and community
- Healing: transforming the organization and integrating people and systems
- Awareness: both of self and of issues involving ethics and values
- Persuasion: servant-leaders seek to persuade and build consensus rather than coerce
- Conceptualization: seeing greatness balanced by operational awareness
- Foresight: using the intuitive part of the mind to build on lessons for the future
- Stewardship: holding the organization as a trust for the larger good of society
- Commitment to people: valuing employees as humans and developing them
- Community building: taking responsibility for making the agency larger than work

Larry C. Spears, ed., *Reflections on Leadership* (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1995)

systems. In short, loyalty and admiration of leaders precedes change.

QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Law enforcement executives committed to high performance can embrace and manage their organizations through QM best practices. These systems inspire employee initiative through emphasis on guiding principles and core values instead of rules and regulations. QM organizations combine high levels of creativity with the discipline of regularly checking data to see which strategies are working and which are not. These types of processes, once understood and practiced by the staff, ideally lend themselves to meeting

modern policing demands. The power of the QM model lies in synthesizing the motivational needs of employees with the work strategies that meet the agency's and community's needs.

Servant-Leadership and Quality Management

Research has shown that the leadership of senior management is the key factor in making a QM program succeed. Autocratic executives often create an admirable vision for their agency, but fail while trying to implement it. Leaders may see the vision as a top-down directive, rather than a noble cause. Such leaders see coercion and sanctions as the solutions to resistance to change. They fail

to take personal responsibility to instill their vision in the hearts and souls of the staff. Changing organizational culture is not a top-down event; it is an inspirational journey led by a committed, tireless leader and leadership team, each personally communicating, listening, and clarifying the organization's new direction through passion and sincerity.

This combination of authentic leadership strategies provides leaders with the realistic chance to create enduring transformational change. Externally, the model builds citizen confidence in their law enforcement agency. As success occurs, trust levels will rise among the citizens. Equally important is the transformation of employees

into energized problem solvers. As one observer wrote, management research over the past several decades consistently has found that when employees feel valued by their bosses, productivity, quality, and teamwork accelerate.⁸ The law enforcement executive who creates systems to meet community service requirements as well as the motivational needs of employees, has a recipe for success.

Creation of the Learning Culture

The prevalence of servant-leadership and QM depends upon institutionalizing continuous learning as a way of doing business. The executive and the leadership team must take several steps in creating the learning culture.

Leaders Become Teachers and Coaches

When a work team brings a problem to its supervisor, that leader's preferred response should be to initiate inquiry and dialogue.⁹ Leaders should teach their officers effective problem solving methods. First, team members should ask what steps have been taken to size up the problem and what the possible and most likely causes are. Next, they should ask what solutions lend themselves to best solving or improving the status of the problem and what resources are required and

available. Before implementing a solution, the team must consider what could go wrong with the strategy they choose.¹⁰

Learn and Practice Leadership Flexibility

Leaders need to assess when a work group needs direction. Perhaps they cannot solve a problem, or they need an injection of leadership energy because of lost confidence. For example, a newly created narcotics task force may hesitate to make decisions. In this case, the leader needs to provide the group direction with specific goals and rigid timelines. On the other hand, a usually top-notch investigative team may be embroiled in

conflict, arguing over the future strategy in a homicide case. In this instance, team members may need a reminder of their strong capabilities and past successes. Situational leadership becomes a key skill for the development of the transformational leader.¹¹

Reinforce Quality Results Through Timely Recognition

Appreciation by leaders reinforces agency culture through validating positive behavioral change in employees. If staff members feel that appreciation from top management has been lacking, discouragement likely will encompass part of the agency culture. When duly earned, sincere gratitude from a leader becomes even more important in

Key Factors in Successful QM Programs by Percentage of Respondents

Factor	Percentage
Senior management leadership	82%
Clear vision	60%
Employee training	41%
Recipe for reengineering	36%
Cross-functional teams	31%
Financial resources	24%
Information technology	15%
Other	10%

From: Oxford Associates' Survey of Fortune 500 Companies, 1993

Principles of Quality Management

- 1) Quality of service or product is the top priority of the organization.
- 2) The customer defines quality. Thus, all effective community-based policing strategies are, in reality, quality management systems with targeted customer-defined outcomes.
- 3) Equally important to quality management is a leader's delivery of quality service to the organization's internal customers—the employees.
- 4) The top executive holds responsibility for the essential synergy of creating, communicating, and enrolling the energies of staff through the organization's vision, mission, and values.
- 5) Employee work behavior is governed more by mission and values (guiding principles) than by rules, policies, and procedures. Top management must change its culture in this respect.
- 6) Organizational problem solving is required at every level in the agency.
- 7) Teamwork has priority over individual effort.
- 8) Mutual accountability is emphasized as being as important as individual accountability.
- 9) Regular analysis of data concerning goals and performance outcomes determines changes in organizational tactics, strategy, and resource deployment.

Edward Deming, *Out of the Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1986).

become internalized cultural habits within the organization.

Educate Leaders in Servant Leadership and Quality Management Principles

As funding permits, the agency executive should send leaders at all levels to modern leadership development seminars based around servant-leadership and QM principles. One way to economize this education is to bring the instructors to the agency. Another approach is to build a relationship with college business or public administration faculty members. These professional educators may be willing to donate time teaching modern leadership skills as part of their institution's community service obligation.

Dramatize Agency Learning Through Teamwork

Debriefings held after a traumatic incident offer the opportunity for both coaching and teaching team learning through dialogue. This encourages the affected group members to share their views without direct criticism and, most important, without personal emotion.¹³ Major case investigations or planned patrol responses to large events are other outstanding examples of opportunities to build team learning. The leader (e.g.,

this instance.¹² Some agencies have made it a tradition to have an informal "stand-up meeting" with all staff invited on a monthly or more frequent basis. Instead of a formal meeting, the

executive greets employees in a large hallway or lobby area, encouraging positive information sharing and praising recent employee wins. Broad communication and appreciation then

sergeant, lieutenant, or captain) can outline the status of the situation and encourage positive dialogue. The only enforcement role the formal leader plays is to ensure everyone's ideas are considered fairly. In these examples, employees learn how to treat each other with respect and, as such, feel safe to contribute positive critiques. The group learns that more can be accomplished as a team.

*Empower Staff to
Take Initiative*

The overarching goal of the executive is to empower and liberate employees to take initiative appropriate to their mission and assignment. For instance, a leader aims to reinvent the existing delivery system for a community policing service. After executives clearly have communicated the goals, work-team membership, leadership structure, timeline, and availability of resources, team members tackle the assignment. Several months later, but within the timeline given, the team presents top management with a new structure, complete with an implementation plan and ways to measure results. As a result of empowering staff, both leaders and employees have succeeded in their tasks.

CONCLUSION

Agency transformation from a traditional top-down

autocratic model to a servant-leadership model sets the stage for an effective law enforcement organization. When leadership rooted in humility combines with quality management principles, the employees, leadership team, and community-orientated policing strategies thrive. A law enforcement agency directed by a servant-leader with engaging

“

These systems inspire employee initiative through emphasis on guiding principles and core values instead of rules and regulations.

”

and passionate vision, mission, and values creates a culture of individual and mutual accountability. The leader's empowerment of work teams can lead to widespread enthusiasm and creative problem solving.

Accountability remains of paramount importance in any law enforcement agency. By adding mutual accountability and retaining the traditional systems of individual accountability, a culture of “responsibility” becomes possible.¹⁴ The first key to such a transition is

the executive's embracement of servant-leadership.

Officers and their civilian work-partners demand a strong leader. Yet, the strength of that leader's influence increases exponentially when earned through admiration, not decree. Chiefs, sheriffs, and directors who see leadership as their calling must use the power of their positions to protect the organization internally from lazy, incompetent, uncaring, unethical, and illegal behaviors. Conversely, they must build trust and motivation levels through sincere work to teach, empower, and fulfill employees' needs to make a difference through their careers.

QM systems provide the vehicle for agency leaders, as well as their top managers, to organize staff and processes to constantly seek quality results. Vision, mission, and value-based policing, where every level of leadership is accountable for team building and problem solving, energizes the entire workplace. Top management can encourage evolution and change by regularly using data to analyze the results of the various work teams' efforts in a positive and supportive manner.

Instilling a culture of continual team learning in a law enforcement agency brings about a model of excellence.¹⁵

When executives become rigorous teachers, instead of merely tough enforcers, they energize employees and the organization to seek an excellence that is both worthy and enduring. ♦

Endnotes

¹ Stephen R. Covey, *Principle-Centered Leadership* (New York, NY: Free Press Publishing, 2003).

² Jim Collins, *Good to Great* (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001).

³ James R. Evans, *Total Quality: Management, Organization, and Strategy*, 4th

ed. (Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western, 2005).

⁴ Charles Manz and Henry Sims, *Super Leadership: Leading Others to Lead Themselves* (New York, NY: Berkeley Books, 1993).

⁵ Robert K. Greenleaf, "Life's Choices and Markers" in *Reflections on Leadership*, ed. Larry C. Spears (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 17-21.

⁶ Collins, 2001.

⁷ Fredrick Herzberg, *Work and the Nature of Man* (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1966).

⁸ Evans, 2005.

⁹ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of a Learning*

Organization (New York, NY: Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 1990).

¹⁰ Charles Kepner and Benjamin Tregoe, *The New Rational Manager* (Princeton, NJ: Kepner-Tregoe, Inc., 1997).

¹¹ Paul Hersey, Kenneth H. Blanchard, and Dewey E. Johnson, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Leading Human Resources* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Publishing, 2001).

¹² B.F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1974).

¹³ Senge, 1990.

¹⁴ Covey, 2003.

¹⁵ Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, *In Search of Excellence* (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992).

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Author Guidelines

Length: Manuscripts should contain 2,000 to 3,500 words (8 to 14 pages, double-spaced) for feature articles and 1,200 to 2,000 words (5 to 8 pages, double-spaced) for specialized departments, such as Police Practice.

Format: Authors can e-mail articles. To send by mail, authors should submit three copies of their articles typed and double-spaced on 8 1/2-by-11-inch white paper with all pages numbered. An electronic version of the article should accompany the typed manuscript.

Criteria: The *Bulletin* judges articles on relevance to the audience, factual accuracy, analysis of the information, structure and logical flow, style and ease of reading, and length. It generally does not publish articles on similar topics within a 12-month period or accept those previously published or currently under consideration by other magazines. Because it

is a government publication, the *Bulletin* cannot accept articles that advertise a product or service. To ensure that their writing style meets the *Bulletin's* requirements, authors should study several issues of the magazine and contact the staff or access <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin> for the expanded author guidelines, which contain additional specifications, detailed examples, and effective writing techniques. The *Bulletin* will advise authors of acceptance or rejection but cannot guarantee a publication date for accepted articles, which the staff edits for length, clarity, format, and style.

Submit to: Authors can e-mail their articles to leb@fbiaacademy.edu or mail them to Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135.

Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face each challenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actions warrant special attention from their respective departments. The *Bulletin* also wants to recognize those situations that transcend the normal rigors of the law enforcement profession.



Deputy Sheriff Khan

Deputy Sheriff Shastri Khan of the Polk County, Florida, Sheriff's Office was attending a residential gathering while off duty in Davenport, Florida, when he heard screams coming from a neighboring home. Through the neighbor's window, he observed a woman being struck by a male assailant. Without hesitation, Deputy Khan responded to the residence, entering through an unlocked sliding glass door and arriving at the bedroom where he saw the incident taking place. Upon gaining entry, he observed the assailant standing over the victim with a knife over his head, pointed downward in a stabbing position. Deputy Khan reacted immediately and tackled the assailant, getting the knife away from him as a struggle ensued. His life saving action provided ample time for the victim to exit the home with her children and safely hide. Deputy Khan subdued the subject until law enforcement personnel arrived on the scene to take him into custody.



Officer Miller

Officer Justin D. Miller of the Radford City, Virginia, Police Department was on his first day of patrolling when he responded to a report of a subject threatening suicide by jumping off a bridge into a river 90 feet below. The distraught man remained silent toward officers already present at the scene. As Officer Miller arrived, the man climbed over the side rail of the bridge and prepared to jump. Officer Miller approached the man and talked to him, patiently building a rapport until the individual calmed down. The man eventually climbed back to safety and, once out of danger, thanked Officer Miller for saving his life.

Nominations for the Bulletin Notes should be based on either the rescue of one or more citizens or arrest(s) made at unusual risk to an officer's safety. Submissions should include a short write-up (maximum of 250 words), a separate photograph of each nominee, and a letter from the department's ranking officer endorsing the nomination. Submissions can be mailed to the Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135 or e-mailed to leb@fbiacademy.edu. Some published submissions may be chosen for inclusion in the Hero Story segment of the television show "America's Most Wanted."

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535-0001

Periodicals
Postage and Fees Paid
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ISSN 0014-5688

Official Business
Penalty for Private Use \$300

Patch Call



True to its name, Cave City, Kentucky, is in close proximity to the world's longest known system of caves, the over-390-mile Mammoth Cave National Park. Visitors to the park fuel the tourism industry on which the city thrives. As such, the patch of the Cave City Police Department pays homage to the caves with the stalactites hanging from above. Also depicted on the patch are the rolling hills of Kentucky and a layout of the commonwealth superimposed by the two men portrayed on the Seal of Kentucky.



Merrill, Wisconsin, is colloquially known as the City of Parks due to its 15 outdoor recreational areas. The nickname is so synonymous with the city that it proudly is displayed on the service patch of the Merrill Police Department. The vista in the center of the patch depicts the historic Lincoln County Courthouse as seen through the trees when entering the city from the South. The patch's light-blue background symbolizes the Wisconsin River, along which the city was founded in the mid-19th century.