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Louis J. Freeh  
Director

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**Editor**

John E. Ott

**Managing Editor**

Kim Waggoner

**Associate Editors**

Glen Bartolomei

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**Art Director**

Brian K. Parnell

**Assistant Art Director**

Denise K. Bennett

**Staff Assistant**

Linda W. Szumilo

**Internet Address**

leb@fbiacademy.edu

Send article submissions to Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

# FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

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Members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Committee on Terrorism prepared articles for this issue. The Committee was created in 1986 to counter the international terrorist threat through cooperative police activities. Members of the Committee on Terrorism represent a variety of local, state, and federal agencies and departments, both civilian and military, from the United States and abroad.

## Director's Message

### ***Responding to Terrorism***

**I**n many ways, terrorism is unique among crime problems. It is as old as organized society but has evolved continually to reflect the technologies and methodologies of the times. Terrorists are among the most ruthless of criminals, but their motivation rarely stems from personal need or a desire for material gain. Unlike the majority of violent criminals, terrorists do not know their victims; in fact, one of the hallmarks of terrorism is its indiscriminate victimization. Also unlike most serious criminal activity, terrorism invites—and even depends upon—media attention to ensure a maximum yield of terror.

During the past several years, the United States has witnessed two convergent terrorist trends: while the overall number of terrorist incidents has declined, the attacks that have occurred have resulted in increased destruction and casualties. In 1986, for example, there were 25 incidents of terrorism perpetrated in the United States, resulting in 1 death and 19 injuries. In 1995, only one act of terrorism was recorded in the United States (the truck bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City), but it resulted in 168 deaths and over 800 injuries. Our experiences in the United States reflect a worldwide trend toward fewer, but more destructive, terrorist attacks, carried out to achieve maximum casualties, terror, and media attention.

The U.S. government and FBI response to terrorism has changed during the past several years as well. In 1996, the FBI created the FBI Counterterrorism Center to expand and integrate many of its analytic and operational capabilities. The center combats terrorism on three fronts: international terrorism operations both within the

United States and in support of extraterritorial investigations, domestic terrorism operations, and countermeasures relating to both international and domestic terrorism. This center also reflects the coordinated interagency response that is critical to a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Representatives from 20 federal agencies maintain a regular presence in the center and participate in its daily activities. This multiagency arrangement provides an unprecedented opportunity for information sharing, warning, and real-time intelligence analysis.

The bombings of the federal building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in New York, and the simultaneous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, clearly demonstrate that the United States remains a target of both domestic and international terrorists. This issue of the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* focuses on the terrorist threats that confront the United States and the FBI and law enforcement response to these threats.

It is my hope that the articles in this issue of the *Bulletin* will give readers a clearer understanding of the challenges posed by terrorism and the importance of a coordinated response to the terrorist threats we face. Although the FBI has been designated as the lead federal agency in the U.S. government response to terrorism, the battle against terrorism demands the coordinated response of the intelligence and criminal justice communities. In recent years, this coordinated response has resulted in several notable successes—the arrest and conviction of the Oklahoma City bombers; the rendition from overseas of Ramzi Yousef—the mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing—and the

## Director's Message

conviction of Yousef and his coconspirators; and the prevention of an international terrorist plot to attack several New York landmarks, and the arrest and conviction of the plotters.

Cooperation among law enforcement agencies at all levels represents an important component of a comprehensive response to terrorism. This cooperation assumes its most tangible operational form in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces that exist in 16 communities across the nation. These task forces combine the resources of the FBI and other federal agencies with the street-level expertise of local and state law enforcement officers. This cooperation has proven highly successful in preventing several potential terrorist attacks, including the plot to bomb New York landmarks in 1993.


The increased globalization of crimes including terrorism also has led the FBI to expand the number of Legal Attaché, or LEGAT, offices abroad. Today, 36 LEGATs work with host governments to prevent crimes against U.S. interests and to investigate those that do occur. These offices provide the FBI with a valuable forward defense against international terrorists who target U.S. interests.

The future holds new challenges. Cyberterrorism and attacks on our nation's critical infrastructure and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are emerging as significant counterterrorism concerns. To help provide a coordinated platform to counter computer-based assaults and threats to our nation's critical infrastructure, the FBI has established the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). NIPC draws together personnel from federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies and state and local agencies, as well as

experts from critical industries, to safeguard the interlocking computer, mass transport, and public utilities systems that power our modern society. Likewise, the FBI has established the National Domestic Preparedness Office to coordinate the efforts of a wide range of federal, state, and local agencies to enhance the abilities of communities around the country to respond to WMD threats.

The FBI marked its 90th anniversary in 1998 by further enhancing its ability to respond to terrorist incidents of the future. On November 20, 1998, the FBI opened a state-of-the-art Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC. This expanded facility serves as a national command center during large-scale investigations or at times when risks to U.S. interests may be heightened. Reflecting the combined efforts that are necessary for an effective response to terrorism, SIOC is staffed by personnel from several agencies, depending on the nature of the incident or threat.


As we succeed in identifying and apprehending today's terrorists, the terrorists of tomorrow are mastering new strategies and techniques of terror. These and other issues pose daunting challenges to the intelligence and law enforcement communities. However, by building upon the strong foundation of cooperation already established and by pursuing aggressive, constitutionally sound investigative techniques, I believe we can meet these challenges.



Louis J. Freeh

# ***Fighting Terrorism in the 21st Century***

By JOHN F. LEWIS, Jr.



*World Trade Center  
in New York City*

**A**lthough not new to the United States, the threat of terrorism is changing and becoming more deadly. Over the last several years, the FBI has noted a new trend in terrorism within the United States that involves a transition from more numerous low-level incidents to less frequent but more destructive attacks, with a goal to produce mass casualties and attract intense media coverage. While the number of terrorist attacks in the

United States has declined in the past decade, the number of those killed and injured in distinct acts has increased.<sup>1</sup> A single attack in 1993 killed 6 people and injured nearly 1,000 when terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in New York City. Less than 2 years later, an attack in Oklahoma City resulted in the worst act of domestic terrorism in the United States and the deaths of 168 people. The number of attempted terrorist acts in the

United States remains equally alarming to the law enforcement community.

The FBI, working in conjunction with its state and local counterparts, prevented 5 acts of terrorism in 1996<sup>2</sup> and 20 acts in 1997.<sup>3</sup> How can law enforcement agencies best work together to fight terrorism today and into the 21st century? Investigators must consider the sources of today's international and domestic terrorism threats.





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*Mr. Lewis, retired assistant director of the FBI's National Security Division, currently serves as the director of Global Security for Goldman, Sachs, and Company in New York City. Mr. Lewis is a member of the IACP and served as chairman of the IACP Committee on Terrorism between 1996 and 1998.*

## **CURRENT TERRORIST THREATS**

### **International Terrorism**

International terrorism against the United States is foreign-based or directed by countries or groups outside the United States. In past decades, international terrorists have attacked the United States primarily by targeting U.S. citizens and interests overseas. The most memorable attacks include the abduction of hostages in Lebanon in the mid-1980s; the December 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 189 Americans; the June 25, 1996, detonation of an explosive device outside Al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in which 19 U.S. military personnel were killed; and the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which resulted in the deaths of 12 Americans. With one exception, no attacks by

international terrorists were recorded in the United States between 1984 and 1992.<sup>4</sup> All of this changed, however, on February 26, 1993, when foreign terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in New York City. The suspects intended to destroy the tower and murder over 35,000 people.

The FBI divides the current international terrorist threat to the United States into three categories. The first threat to Americans comes from the activities of foreign sponsors of international terrorism. The U.S. Department of State has designated seven countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. These sponsors view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. However, their activities have changed over time. Past activities included direct terrorist support and operations by official state agents. Now, state sponsors generally seek to conceal their support of terrorism by relying on surrogates to conduct

operations. State sponsors remain involved in terrorist activities by funding, organizing, networking, and providing other support and instruction to formal terrorist groups and loosely affiliated extremists.

Formalized terrorist groups, such as Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, and Palestinian HAMAS, pose the second threat to the United States. These autonomous organizations have their own infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. They can plan and mount terrorist campaigns overseas, as well as support terrorist operations within the United States. Some groups use supporters inside the United States to plan and coordinate acts of terrorism. In the past, these formalized terrorist groups engaged in criminal activities in the United States, such as illegally acquiring weapons, violating U.S. immigration laws, and providing safe havens to fugitives.

The third category of terrorist threats stems from loosely affiliated international radical extremists, such as those who bombed the World Trade Center. These extremists do not represent a particular nation. Loosely affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent threat to the United States at this time because they remain relatively unknown to law enforcement. They can travel freely, obtain a variety of identities, and recruit like-minded sympathizers from various countries.

### **Domestic Terrorism**

The devastating bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19,

1995, and the pipe bomb explosion in Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, underscore the ever-present threat that exists from individuals determined to use violence to advance their agendas. From 1982 to 1992, a total of 165 terrorist incidents occurred domestically.<sup>5</sup> The majority of these attacks were conducted by domestic terrorist groups, particularly Puerto Rican groups, left-wing extremist groups, and special interest groups.

Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who operate without foreign direction entirely within the United States and target elements of the U.S. government or citizens. Domestic terrorist groups represent extreme right-wing,

extreme left-wing, and special interest beliefs. The major themes espoused today by extremist right-wing groups include conspiracies regarding the New World Order, gun control laws, the approach of the millennium, and white supremacy. Many of these extremist groups also advocate antigovernment, antitaxation, or antiabortion sentiments and engage in survivalist training to ensure the perpetuation of the United States as a white, Christian nation.

One current troubling branch of right-wing extremism is the militia or patriot movement. Militia members want to remove federal involvement from various issues. They generally are law-abiding citizens who have become

intolerant of what they perceive as violations of their constitutional rights. Membership in a militia organization is not entirely illegal in the United States, but certain states have legislated limits on militias, including limits on the types of training (e.g., paramilitary training) that militias can offer legally. The FBI bases its interest in the militia movement on the rise of violence or the potential for violence and criminal activity stemming from the movement.

Experts have traced the growth of the militia movement in part to the effective use of modern communication mediums. Videotapes and computer bulletin boards and networks, such as the Internet, have been used with great effectiveness

### **Terrorist Threat Warning System**

**W**arning remains critical to the terrorism prevention effort. In 1989, the FBI developed its Terrorist Threat Warning System to transmit information and intelligence to other members of the law enforcement community. Acting as the lead federal law enforcement agency in combating terrorism in the United States, the FBI manages this system to ensure that vital information regarding terrorism reaches those in the U.S. law enforcement and counterterrorism communities. The warning system ensures the accurate, timely, and orderly dissemination of new information to those responsible for countering terrorist threats against individuals, property, and facilities within the United States. All federal government agencies and departments are reached through the warning system. If the threat information requires nationwide unclassified dissemination

to all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, the FBI can transmit such messages via the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, or NLETS.

The Awareness of National Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) Program is designed to provide unclassified national security threat and warning information to as many as 40,000 U.S. corporate security directors and executives, law enforcement personnel, and other government agencies. ANSIR represents the first initiative by the U.S. government to provide this type of information to individual U.S. corporations with critical technologies or sensitive economic information that foreign governments or organizations may target. Each FBI ANSIR coordinator meets regularly with industry leaders and security directors for updates on current national security issues.

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by militia sympathizers. Exploiting yet another medium, promilitia facsimile networks disseminate material from well-known hate group figures and conspiracy theorists. Organizers can promote their ideologies at militia meetings, patriot rallies, and gatherings of various other groups espousing antigovernment sentiments. Left-wing extremist groups generally profess a revolutionary socialist doctrine and view themselves as protectors of the American people against capitalism and imperialism. They aim to change the United States through revolutionary means rather than participating in the established political process.

During the last 3 decades, leftist-oriented extremist groups had posed the predominant domestic terrorist threat in the United States. Beginning in the 1980s, however, the FBI dismantled many of these groups by arresting key members for their criminal activities. The transformation of the former Soviet Union also deprived many leftist groups of a coherent ideology or spiritual patron. As a result, membership and support for these groups has declined.

Special-interest terrorist groups differ from extreme left- and right-wing terrorist groups because members of these groups seek to resolve specific interests rather than pursue widespread political changes. Members of such groups include animal rights advocates, supporters of environmental issues, and anti-abortion advocates.

While some consider the causes that special-interest groups represent understandable or even

noteworthy in nature, they remain separated from traditional law-abiding special-interest groups because of their criminal activity. Through their violent, criminal actions, these terrorist groups attempt to force various segments of society, including the general public, to change their attitudes about issues they consider important. Therefore, special-interest groups will continue to present a threat.

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### **Unconventional Weapons**

Along with the risk posed by groups and individuals, both foreign and domestic, a threat stemming from the choice of weapon used also exists. Although terrorists continue to rely on such conventional weapons as bombs and small arms, several cases suggest that terrorists and other criminals may consider using unconventional chemical or biological weapons in an attack in the United States at some point in the future.

### **The Cyberterrorism Threat**

The FBI defines cyberterrorism as terrorism that initiates, or threatens to initiate, the exploitation of or

attack on information systems. The U.S. government, state and local governments, and the private sector have become increasingly dependent on computer hardware, software, networking, and communications technologies for accomplishing operational and administrative goals. However, greater infrastructure sophistication presents new vulnerabilities and cyberterrorism threat scenarios. Compromise or damage to critical computer systems can jeopardize public safety and U.S. national security. In February, March, and June of 1998, the FBI's Terrorist Threat Warning System disseminated four separate warnings related to threats received against computer systems in the United States.

As the 21st century approaches, the FBI has prepared to address this new and growing threat in a variety of ways. The FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) has developed the capability to identify, analyze, and characterize specific cyber threats and incidents. The NIPC uses the FBI's criminal investigative and counterterrorism resources and expertise in carrying out its mission. The center works proactively to monitor all physical and cyber threats, to maintain relations with the greatest number of federal government agency watch centers, and to disseminate infrastructure threat information to government agencies, state and local law enforcement, and corporate security directors and executives.

Criminal and national security issues have converged in the cyberterrorism threat. Law enforcement can achieve success against



*Al-Khobar Towers in  
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia*



*Pan American Flight 103  
in Lockerbie, Scotland*

this and other terrorism threats by forging strong links among law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels, and through broad federal government agency and public sector participation.

### **FIGHTING TERRORISM TODAY AND TOMORROW**

Just as the threat from terrorism has changed over the last several years, so has the FBI response to this serious national security threat. In preparation for the next century, the FBI continues to bolster its ability to prevent acts of terrorism before they occur and to effectively respond to such acts once they have taken place.

An example of the FBI's readiness for the next century is the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters. This 24-hour operations center was recently enlarged and modernized with state-of-the-art technology. SIOC is available for use by FBI employees and representatives from other federal, state, or local agencies during times of national crisis, such as following the commission of an act of terrorism.

The linchpin of FBI efforts remains promoting its counter-terrorism capabilities and strengthening its ties with other agencies on the federal, state, and local law enforcement levels.

### **FBI Counterterrorism Mission**

The FBI counterterrorism mission is to prevent acts of terrorism before they occur or to react to them after they happen by bringing the perpetrators to justice. To enhance this mission, the FBI established a Counterterrorism Center in 1996 to combat terrorism on three fronts: international terrorism operations, domestic terrorism operations, and countermeasures pertaining to both international and domestic terrorism. The center helps law enforcement and intelligence communities to more effectively counter threats of terrorism within the United States by combining the experience and special skills of each



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represented agency in a coordinated effort directed at the threat of terrorism or in response to a terrorist act.

Twenty other federal agencies participate in the FBI center, and their representatives are fully integrated into its operation. These representatives serve as specific points of contact for their agencies, thereby enhancing the flow of intelligence and allowing for a collaborative exchange of information. The FBI believes that this interaction has increased the ability of the U.S. government to counter domestic and international terrorism, both at home and abroad.

#### **Objectives of the FBI Terrorism Program**

Major objectives within FBI domestic and international terrorism programs include identifying and preventing the activities of terrorists prior to the commission of terrorist acts and pursuing the arrest and prosecution of responsible individuals. As part of this prevention effort, the FBI collects foreign intelligence information relating to those international terrorist groups and individuals whose activities threaten the security of the United States. Pursuant to attorney general guidelines, the FBI analyzes the information collected and works with other members of U.S. intelligence agencies and law enforcement and counterterrorism communities to fully exploit such information.

In the fight against terrorism, the FBI Counterterrorism Center uses various resources, which include multiagency task forces; ongoing liaison with all federal,

state, and local law enforcement agencies; its Legal Attaché program; the Terrorist Threat Warning System; and the introduction of new federal legislation.

#### **Joint Terrorism Task Forces**

The FBI combats terrorism through its participation in 16 formalized Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) around the country. The JTTFs, composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel, strive to increase the

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effectiveness and productivity of limited personnel and logistical resources. They avoid duplication of investigative effort and expand cooperation and liaison among federal, state, and local law enforcement.

JTTFs have been highly successful in several critical operations around the country. The FBI-New York City Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force, for example, has worked on many critical cases, including the massive World Trade Center bombing investigation, the plot to bomb major New York City

landmarks, and the crash of TWA Flight 800.

#### **Legal Attaché Program**

The FBI currently counters global terrorism threats through meaningful cooperation with allied governments around the world. In coming years, the FBI anticipates a greater number of terrorist attacks aimed at U.S. citizens and interests abroad. Cooperation with other governments remains indispensable in countering this heightened threat of global terrorism. The FBI presently has 36 Legal Attachés overseas, and the program's success has resulted in the recent establishment of new offices in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. The trust and good faith developed through this cooperation are hallmarks of FBI relationships overseas. Among the many benefits of establishing Legal Attachés is the close working relationships FBI personnel form with the local law enforcement agencies, which have practical and operational familiarity with terrorist organizations that may pose a threat to Americans. These relationships further enhance the ability of the FBI to maintain a proactive, rather than reactive, posture in addressing terrorist threats. If a terrorist attack targeting U.S. citizens or interests does occur, Legal Attachés can provide the FBI with an immediate on-scene presence in the first critical hours of a post-incident investigation.

Additionally, the presence of Legal Attachés abroad has proven crucial in facilitating U.S. criminal extraterritorial jurisdiction. The U.S. government has successfully

returned terrorists from other countries to stand trial for acts or planned acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens. There have been over 350 extraterritorial jurisdiction cases since legislation was enacted in 1984 and 1986.

One recent case involved the rendition of a subject from Pakistan wanted for the shooting deaths of two CIA employees in Langley, Virginia. The Legal Attaché in Islamabad, Pakistan, coordinated extensive liaison with various foreign entities and U.S. intelligence agencies. Ultimately, the Legal Attaché coordinated the delivery of the subject to an FBI arrest team in Pakistan. The Legal Attaché's on-scene role was critical to the

successful rendition of the subject to the United States, where he stood trial.

### **Domestic Preparedness Program**

The Domestic Preparedness Program represents a major part of FBI liaison with state and local law enforcement agencies. The FBI coordinates efforts with other U.S. government agencies to train federal, state, and local emergency response personnel to deal with terrorist events involving weapons of mass destruction. Over the next 5 years, this initiative will support the training of emergency responders in approximately 120 cities, selected according to population density, upcoming large-scale security events,

critical infrastructure, and geographic orientation. Workshops and seminars include 1 week of training curriculum that addresses various levels of instruction.

To further facilitate this major outreach effort, the FBI has established a National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). The NDPO will serve as a clearinghouse for information on weapons of mass destruction training programs and will work to spur development of other national preparedness assistance initiatives.

### **CONCLUSION**

Terrorism has become a worldwide problem, and a major threat to U.S. national security. FBI Director

## **The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act**

**F**ederal law enforcement efforts received a significant boost in the fight against terrorism with the passage of The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.<sup>7</sup> This law, enacted and signed by President Clinton on April 24, 1996, includes several new measures aimed at countering terrorism. Highlights of the law include measures that enhance the powers of the federal government to deny visas to individuals belonging to groups designated as terrorist and that simplify the process for deporting aliens convicted of crimes. The new law also bans all U.S. aid to countries that provide assistance or military equipment to terrorist states, allows U.S. citizens to sue foreign nations in federal court for terrorist acts committed against U.S. nationals abroad, and authorizes approximately \$1 billion over 4 years to strengthen federal law enforcement in the

fight against terrorism. Additionally, the omnibus law broadened federal jurisdiction over crimes linked to terrorism and included new federal criminal statutes for participating in international terrorist activities in America.

A key provision of the law authorizes the secretary of state, in conjunction with the attorney general and the secretary of the treasury, to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). By designating an FTO under the law, the United States seeks to hinder the fund-raising ability of terrorist organizations. The law allows law enforcement to seize the funds of designated terrorist organizations. Because FTO branches within the United States function primarily as fund-raising arms for the overseas parent organization, the law could have a significant impact on their terrorist activities within the United States.

Louis J. Freeh has stated that law enforcement agencies must do everything within their power to prevent terrorist incidents from occurring.<sup>6</sup>

The FBI remains committed to its leadership in counterterrorism—a vital part in maintaining the security of the United States. The steps federal, state, and local law enforcement take today will strengthen the fight against terrorism in the 21st century. Effective means of identifying and preventing terrorist acts before they occur, enhanced

communication and liaison with various levels of law enforcement, close cooperation with agencies of the federal government, timely dissemination of threat information, and effective analysis of trends and developments have better prepared the law enforcement community in addressing terrorist threats. With the continued cooperation of law enforcement at all levels, the FBI will continue to enhance its ability to protect the American people from the threat of international and domestic terrorism. ♦

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Officially classified acts of terrorism include four attacks in 1993, no attacks in 1994, one attack in 1995, three attacks in 1996, and two attacks in 1997.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, *Terrorism in the United States: 1996* (Washington, DC: FBI, 1998), 5.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, *Terrorism in the United States: 1997* (Washington, DC: FBI, in press).

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, *Terrorism in the United States: 1982-1992* (Washington, DC: FBI, 1992), 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>6</sup> "What Can Be Done About Terrorism?" *USA Today Magazine*, January 1996, 24.

<sup>7</sup> Public Law 104-132.

### The *Bulletin's* E-Mail Address



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We would like to know your thoughts on contemporary law enforcement issues. We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Please include your name, title, and agency on all e-mail messages.

Also, the *Bulletin* is available for viewing or downloading on a number of computer services, as well as the FBI's home page. The home page address is <http://www.fbi.gov>.



## ***Confronting Terrorism on the State and Local Level***

By D. DOUGLAS BODRERO

**T**he bombing of the New York City World Trade Center in 1993 proved once again that law enforcement cannot ignore the threat of terrorism on American soil. Yet, after that tragedy, most state and local law enforcement administrators still viewed terrorism primarily as an international threat. While the New York bombing proved that foreign-inspired mass terrorism could occur on U.S. soil, many administrators believed that metropolitan centers

such as New York, Miami, and Chicago remained the most likely targets. However, the reality that Americans could perpetrate terrorist acts on their fellow citizens in their own country became apparent in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. Any previous abstract law enforcement perceptions about terrorism dissipated in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City explosion. For state and local law enforcement, perspectives concerning domestic terrorism and the need

for effective antiterrorism efforts changed forever.

A study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) confirmed that state and local law enforcement agencies view the threat of terrorism as real, but their response to the threat varies widely according to the size and resources of the department and the nature of the threat in any given community.<sup>1</sup> In the past, major cities developed preventive and preparation programs, often in cooperation with the





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***The FBI's activities  
cannot succeed  
without cooperation  
and assistance  
from local law  
enforcement  
agencies.***  
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*Mr. Bodrero currently serves as a senior research associate with the Institute for Intergovernmental Research, a nonprofit, Florida-based criminal justice research organization, and is the former commissioner of public safety for the state of Utah. Mr. Brodero is a member of the IACP.*

FBI and its joint terrorism task forces, whereas smaller cities and counties usually operated on their own. According to the NIJ report, antiterrorism resources varied according to the existing threat potential. Some smaller jurisdictions developed regional alliances to address specific extremist groups and organizations operating within locales.<sup>2</sup> However, the majority of jurisdictions only recently realized the threat presented by extremist individuals and groups and now assess the threat that such groups may pose to their respective communities and to related operational planning and readiness issues.

#### **AN INCREASE IN EXTREMIST ACTIVITY**

Unable to pinpoint an exact time or incident to account for the resurgence of extremist activity within the United States, some researchers speculate that the end of the Cold War left American patriots without an enemy. Emotions and

rhetoric previously directed toward the fear of a communist takeover became replaced by a fear that the United Nations, backed by a covert group of industrialists, sought to create a new world order marked by a centralization of power and wealth. Some individuals believe that the passage of gun control legislation fanned the flames of anti-government sentiment, or they attribute this attitude to the growing power and influence of the federal government, with diminishing control of state and local authorities. Other researchers point to the spread of the Christian Identity Movement and its religious-based beliefs in the superiority of the Aryan race. Additionally, documentation exists showing that the right-wing extremist movement grew out of the farm crises of the 1970s.<sup>3</sup>

Reviewing a list of individuals and groups indicted for recent terrorist-related incidents establishes common characteristics that

comprise the current terrorist movement. Adherents often move from one group or movement to another and may hold multiple memberships. Major movement themes include white supremacy, although often denied, and an advocacy of the violent takeover of a government that a group believes is corrupt and conspiring to deprive them of their Second Amendment protections. Whatever their philosophy and makeup, such groups appear to encourage and reinforce one another.

Holding an extreme view on an issue is not uncommon or illegal. When that belief turns radical and those individuals holding such views violate the law, attempt to force their will on others, or advocate and engage in violence, all levels of law enforcement should become involved.

#### **CHANGING PRIORITIES**

While international terrorism received the bulk of media attention during the 1980s, a concurrent growth in the variety of national, right-wing extremist organizations took place.<sup>4</sup> The death of Gordon Kahl, a staunch member of the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus killed in a firefight with state and federal officers in northwest Arkansas, marked the beginning of a new move toward violence among right-wing extremist groups.<sup>5</sup> The emergence of the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus; the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord; the Arizona Patriots; the White Patriot Party; and other right-wing extremist groups challenged assumptions about terrorism as the exclusive tool of

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violent leftists and forced law enforcement to reevaluate and re-examine previously perceived notions regarding the motivation of terrorists.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, with most left-wing extremist organizations in disarray and emerging violent right-wing extremist groups effectively neutralized by the FBI, most state and local law enforcement remained untouched by the threat of right-wing violence. The same time period also introduced increasing concerns and responsibilities for state and local law enforcement. The war on drugs and the increasing violence posed by street gangs, as well as the resulting struggle to meet the demand for law enforcement services, rapidly filled the gap left by the diminishing street unrest and the reduced threat from the extreme left. However, the reprieve from domestic terrorism was short-lived. By the early 1990s, a new movement of domestic terror had started, and by the middle of the 1990s, violent right-wing extremists obviously still existed in the United States.

## **TERRORISM OR EXTREMISM**

Although experts have attempted to explain the phenomenon, many definitions of terrorism exist. One such definition is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”<sup>6</sup> In other terms, terrorists intend for their acts to infuriate the public and cause outrage. They

sometimes use violence and bloodshed to accomplish these objectives. Referring to the pipe bomb explosion at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, one author stated that “there is a grim economy to the way a terrorist works, born of a dark arithmetic: fear rises exponentially.”<sup>7</sup> Portraying a government as ineffective and unable to provide security for its citizens remains an important objective of terrorism.

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***The prevention  
and response  
to terrorist acts  
require unified  
efforts.***

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Extremism is even more difficult to define. Many individuals harbor excessive views concerning subjects they consider important. If not for the violent activities of some individuals or groups, right-wing extremists merely would be exercising their right to free speech. Extremists become terrorists when they act on their beliefs through unlawful violent acts in order to influence or intimidate others into accepting their viewpoints.

For state and local law enforcement administrators, terrorist organizations, right-wing extremists, and hate groups all generate the same problems and produce the same amount of pressure for a resolution. Law enforcement efforts and

resources should concentrate on the criminality of actions, not culture or philosophy. While law enforcement may need to monitor groups that advocate the use of violence to achieve their objectives, agencies should apply the labels of terrorist and extremist with restraint.<sup>8</sup>

## **STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT**

Although the FBI assumes the lead federal role in the investigation and prevention of domestic terrorism, every act of terrorism occurring within the United States remains local in nature. Such acts, and the threat thereof, fall within the purview of state and local law enforcement and present significant challenges, far removed from the daily concerns, priorities, and operational considerations of most police administrators.

FBI activities cannot succeed without cooperation and assistance from local law enforcement agencies. Local police officers and deputy sheriffs, along with troopers and state investigators, sense the discontent among terrorist movements, monitor the advocacy of extreme causes, respond to hate crimes, and serve as the foundation for an effective assessment of threatening activities within their communities. In all probability, state or local law enforcement officers will respond first to a terrorist threat or incident. However, state and local administrators should remember that the FBI's unique role in the nation's counterterrorism efforts makes it a critical component in any terrorism-related investigation.



## PLANNING

At first glance, the threat of domestic terrorism and the scope of potential methods and targets may appear overwhelming. Activity by right-wing extremist groups has remained difficult to assess because of the cell-type structure and other clandestine tactics many groups have adopted and the fact that most groups operate in rural areas. Problems have appeared to increase since the Oklahoma City bombing. Klanwatch—a project of the non-profit Southern Poverty Law Center that attempts to curb Klan and racist violence through litigation, education, and monitoring—reported that “[t]here were 858 groups operating in the United States in 1996, a 6 percent increase over the 809 groups noted in 1994 and 1995.”<sup>9</sup>

Although others who track extremist activity acknowledge the difficulty when determining the level of threat, a concern for future activity remains. The same report, along with numerous others, warns of increased violence, including the possibility of biological and chemi-

cal attacks.<sup>10</sup> Disagreement exists concerning the level of threat, but administrators agree that the need to prepare and plan for the possibility of an incident occurring in any jurisdiction, regardless of location or size, remains strong.

By creating a domestic terrorism planning process at the state and local level, administrators can respond better to a terrorist incident and also help to identify and prevent an incident from occurring. First, law enforcement officers must recognize a domestic terrorism threat. Next, as with other important law enforcement challenges, agencies should develop a state of readiness to prevent, deter, and interdict terrorist attacks. Planning, an essential step, should include identifying potential threats and those areas that may be vulnerable to attack, maintaining an inventory of relevant agency resources, and creating interagency agreements. Such agreements should include information exchange, planning oversight, a survey of available resources, and formal involvement in an

incident command structure. Agencies also should engage in contingency planning to prepare for “what if” scenarios by exploring the various alternatives for attack in a particular jurisdiction. An effective planning effort also includes an enhanced ability for multiagency response.

The success of the planning process depends on the establishment of a planning team. The team should include a variety of personnel, including senior agency administrators, investigative commanders, agency or jurisdictional prosecutors or legal advisors, senior representatives from local emergency services providers (e.g., fire departments, rescue squads, hazardous material teams), ambulance or hospital representatives, state emergency workers, and local FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms personnel. Other federal agency representatives may have interest in a particular jurisdiction. For example, Department of Energy representatives, if a facility is located in their jurisdiction, or Department of Defense personnel, where military facilities are present, also should have representation on the team. Agencies can plan team participation as limited or as broad as possible, however, as a general rule, teams should involve as many agencies and individuals as feasible. If the planning team becomes too large, the formation of subcommittees addressing individual specific requirements of the plan may prove effective.

The planning team should articulate the elements of the plan,

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which should include, at a minimum, the following:

- the chain of command;
- command and control (an effective incident command system also would address this and other planning needs);
- the overall purpose of the plan, including a definition of what incidents or elements the plan intends to cover;
- individual contingency event plans;
- notification procedures;
- investigative and intelligence guidelines;
- media planning;
- emergency public notification plans;
- personnel and equipment databases;
- volunteer coordination; and
- a process for keeping the plan updated.

Not only will such a planning process assist in preparing for an event, but the planning steps themselves can enhance working relationships, establish mutual priorities, and identify and analyze the risk and vulnerabilities. Agencies also should have a process for evaluating the plan's effectiveness. The FBI, as well as other federal, state, and local participants, should have roles in reviewing, updating, and continually assessing the finished product. To maximize the effectiveness of this process, the planning team requires the support and endorsement of key administrative officials and elected government leaders.

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

Addressing the threat of domestic terrorism should include assessing and separating lawful, constitutionally protected rhetoric from criminal threats. To accomplish this difficult and sensitive task, agencies should initiate a formal process of threat assessment—"an intelligence-based methodology whereby situations, circumstances, or conditions are researched and evaluated..."<sup>11</sup> The vast majority of individuals who hold strong extremist beliefs pose no real threat to law enforcement or

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***Law enforcement efforts and resources should concentrate on the criminality of actions, not culture or philosophy.***

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society. Most remain content with espousing inflammatory rhetoric and attending meetings, rallies, and exhibitions to reinforce their extremist beliefs. Distinguishing between the individuals and groups who advocate extreme views and those who advocate harm becomes the challenge that law enforcement agencies must address effectively.

A close examination, however, reveals a dichotomy both in philosophy and rhetoric that can aid in the threat assessment process. On

one side of the equation, the criminal activity and accompanying threats made by such groups and individuals require that they maintain a secretive existence. However, for effectiveness and to gain public support while maintaining their followers, most organizations sponsor public meetings and seminars. Law enforcement personnel can attend such public meetings to monitor and assess the threat potential or seriousness of the proposed actions. Still, administrators should exercise caution to avoid opening investigations based on beliefs alone. If, however, those beliefs encourage or elicit others to commit violence to accomplish extremist objectives, then a legitimate law enforcement interest exists. Focus always should remain on criminal actions, not mere advocacy or impassioned pleas for legitimate action to correct perceived wrongs.

## Target Identification

Another contributing factor in threat assessment is target identification. Targets generally follow broad categories based on the motives of the group or on the individual planning the attack. Domestic groups, including right-wing, issue-oriented, radical organizations and separatists, often choose targets for a specific purpose. Targets normally fall into five broad categories, some that overlap, depending on the motives of those planning the attack.<sup>12</sup>

Symbolic or public message targets represent the first, the most common, and by far the largest, category. These may include prominent landmarks, electrical utilities,



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pipelines, state and local government buildings, universities, certain federal government buildings, and businesses and industries involved in such areas as chemical production, animal research, forest or wood products, and refineries.

The second category includes government-owned or -operated facilities. These consist of tunnels, computer facilities, airports, state capitols, bridges and overpasses, maritime facilities (e.g., locks and harbors), and law enforcement buildings and support structures.

The third category involves military targets (e.g., military bases, museums, and testing facilities). While generally more secure than other potential targets, these offer an immense opportunity to embarrass the military and the U.S. government.

Cyber targets comprise the fourth category of potential targets. An enormous psychological impact could result from targeting utilities, hacking into their networks and control systems, and shutting them down. Other potential cyber targets include air traffic control centers, financial networks, utility distribution networks, emergency 9-1-1 centers, and other vital services that rely on computer-operated control systems and networks.<sup>13</sup>

Individual victims represent the fifth and last major target category. Kidnapping, extortion, assassination, and other human target attacks accomplish terrorist objectives. While intimidation remains the most common tactic used against individuals to gain compliance, domestic terrorists continue to employ violence. Individuals most likely

targeted include elected government officials, law enforcement personnel, tax collectors, court clerks, members of the judiciary and prosecution systems, and families in each of these categories.<sup>14</sup> Threat assessment in this area requires not only evaluation of the individual or group making the threat but also an assessment of the vulnerability of the potential victim.

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**...agencies should  
develop a state of  
readiness to prevent,  
deter, and interdict  
terrorist attacks.**  
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#### INTELLIGENCE

Complicated and legally challenging intelligence issues surround the deterrence of domestic terrorism. Each agency should contact its respective legal advisor and review department policies for guidance. Many terrorist groups rely on the constitutionally protected rights of advocacy and assembly. Therefore, determining the curiosity seekers, followers, and those who may advocate violence requires an intelligence assessment of known and observed activities. For resource considerations, law enforcement should carefully analyze the extremists' activities for evidence of criminal conduct. Content with the opportunity to publicly expound

their beliefs, some movement leaders may not pose a threat. Many movement followers who may not understand the objectives of the group, much less their radical solutions, also may not pose a threat. In fact, most extremist leaders talk more about their various complaints than about their radical solutions so that they will not lose their followers.

Dependent upon the nature of the advocacy and associated actions, law enforcement should focus only on those groups that indicate intent to commit violent action. The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), a regionalized informational exchange network implemented by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, offers relevant analytical information dissemination services, as do many state information systems. There are numerous Internet sites dedicated to the extremist movement that individuals can access without violation of law or policy. The U.S. Department of Justice presently is developing *Guidelines for Online Investigations by Federal Law Enforcement Agents*. Additionally, many groups will discuss openly their objectives with anyone willing to listen, including law enforcement officials. Officers should review their agencies' policies and consult department legal advisors before implementing intelligence coverage.

#### TRAINING

After the Oklahoma City bombing, agencies began to ask, “Can it happen in our jurisdiction?” and “If it does, what would we do?” Unfortunately, except in the largest

metropolitan centers, agencies offer very little terrorism training other than civil disturbance and special weapons and tactical training. Training initiated after 1995 concentrates mainly on preparation and response. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides limited funding to state emergency management agencies. This funding is used primarily on orientation training for first responders, including law enforcement agencies. The FEMA training focuses mostly on the roles and duties of various responding agencies, stressing the need for emergency agencies to work toward a unified response. As part of this effort, some states include limited discussions of threat potential and awareness issues.

While response to an incident is critical, prevention of the act remains preferable. Antiterrorism (pre-incident) training involves preparation and response considerations in an effort to prevent violence from occurring in the first place. To maximize training time, available courses should assist state and local agencies in understanding the nature of extremists and their organizations to better assess their potential for violence. Agencies should disseminate useful information concerning the history and evolution of the right-wing extremist movement. Additionally, law enforcement should become familiar with current trends and activities to make informed interpretations of potential extremist activities.

Departments should discuss issues concerning the various terrorism roles and responsibilities of law

enforcement agencies at all levels. Terrorist and extremist organizations and individuals span jurisdictional boundaries, and the investigation and deterrence of criminal activities associated with such individuals strongly suggest a multijurisdictional approach. The training and adaptation of other successful multiagency investigative efforts apply in the investigation of terrorist groups and individuals. Additionally, a review of the legal issues surrounding privacy and intelligence guidelines and the adoption of formal intelligence, investigative case initiation, and case-closing policies remain critical factors in any training effort. Issues of surveillance assessment, as well as an understanding of the psychology and profile of an extremist individual or group, also remain important. As with any complex criminal activity, training becomes critical for developing both an effective approach and a better understanding

of the problem. The Bureau of Justice Assistance, in consultation and cooperation with the FBI, developed an antiterrorism training program specifically addressing the needs of state and local law enforcement—an effort that has proven beneficial.

## CONCLUSION

Assessing the nationwide domestic terrorism threat is difficult. Neither the movements nor the solutions are defined easily. However, one fact remains—successful antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts require the full participation and cooperation of law enforcement at all levels. Critical ingredients to success include coordinated planning, intelligence sharing, and a unified, informed response to terrorist threats. The prevention and response to terrorist acts require unified efforts.

While Americans should not live in fear, they need to recognize



and respond to the threat that terrorism presents to the United States. "The United States is the target of the future," and "terrorism is a greater threat to democracy than communism or socialism ever were"<sup>15</sup> represent views articulated by many individuals. All levels of law enforcement must implement effective antiterrorism efforts in combating this threat to ensure the safety of all American citizens and their communities. After all, the very foundation of democracy relies on freedom from fear, terrorism, and terrorist activities. ♦

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Kevin Riley and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism, A National Assessment of State and Local Law Enforcement Preparedness* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, National Institute of Justice, 1995).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Pitcavage, Ph.D., *Common Law and Uncommon Courts: An Overview of the Common Law Movement* (Tallahassee: Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 1997).

<sup>4</sup> Brent L. Smith, *Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> United States Code, Title 22.

<sup>7</sup> Pico Iyer, "Lost Magic, Terror at the Games," *Time*, August 5, 1996, 21.

<sup>8</sup> Richard Fairburn, "Labeling Terrorism," *Police Marksman*, July/August 1995, 41.

<sup>9</sup> "Officials Bolster Action vs. Far Right" *USA Today*, March 5, 1997, Sec. Nation.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ed Higgins, *Threat Assessments and the Antigovernment Extremist*, presentation at the State and Local Antiterrorism Training Program, Colorado Springs, Colorado, April 1997.


<sup>12</sup> Stephen Bowman, *When the Eagle Screams: America's Vulnerability to Terrorism* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1994).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

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## Wanted: Photographs



**T**he *Bulletin* staff is always on the lookout for dynamic, law enforcement-related photos for possible publication in the magazine. We are interested in photos that visually depict the many aspects of the law enforcement profession and illustrate the various tasks law enforcement personnel perform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or color prints or slides, although we prefer prints (5x7 or 8x10). Appropriate credit will be given to contributing photographers when their work appears in the magazine. We suggest that you send duplicate, not original, prints as we do not accept responsibility for prints that may be damaged or lost. Send your photographs to:

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# Focus on Counterterrorism

## ***Critical Incident Management in the Ultimate Crisis***

By Joel Carlson, M.S.

Photo © Jeanetta Clark



*"I've learned that emergencies can only be managed by people at the site. They can't be managed back in Washington."<sup>1</sup>*

*"Expect the unexpected and be prepared to adjust accordingly. The importance of limiting those things that any executive should attempt to do in the time allowed, and the importance of carefully choosing one's battles, is implicit in the fact that some of the toughest of those battles will be chosen for you."<sup>2</sup>*

—Government officials following the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power facility.

These two observations also could apply to other catastrophic events, including terrorist attacks, that have plagued the United States for the past several years. The International Association of Chiefs of Police defines a disaster as an incident that threatens to or actually takes lives, causes substantial risk to property or the well-being of the community or a segment of that community, or requires a commitment of resources beyond those normally available.<sup>3</sup> Such incidents may become more frequent and deadly as criminals and terrorist groups exploit the availability of chemical substances, biological agents, and nuclear materials to construct weapons of mass destruction. Reasons for accessibility include the increased volume and types of substances produced, the failure of security systems to protect the materials, the



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transfer of prohibited weapons to irresponsible governments, or the proliferation of various materials to countries that previously did not perceive a need for sophisticated weaponry.

The criminal use of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials could result in a disaster unparalleled in U.S. history and test the government's ability to avoid panic, disorientation, and loss of confidence in ensuring the public's safety. The specter of terrorist acts with catastrophic consequences remains of great concern to those individuals charged with combating such attacks. Leaders in the public emergency response and management sectors may face situations that could consume their processes, procedures, and capabilities. Emergency personnel may exhaust their experience, devotion, training, and capability attempting to protect the public from potentially catastrophic and devastating consequences. What critical incident management procedures are available for dealing with such incidents?

#### **UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL ROLE**

Within the federal government, systems exist that will respond to assist local, county, and state governments in mitigating the impact of a threat or actual misuse of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

- The FBI serves as the lead federal agency for resolving a crisis perpetrated by a malevolent element in a WMD incident occurring within the United States and its territories.
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports the FBI by coordinating consequence management (e.g., evacuation planning or search and rescue efforts) of a WMD incident. However, because crisis and consequence management may occur at the same time and require close coordination, the FBI remains the lead federal agency until the attorney general transfers that role to FEMA.

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**...a presidential  
directive designates  
the FBI as the  
lead agency of all  
federal resources.**

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- The U.S. Department of State is the lead agency in coordinating U.S. resources in response to a WMD incident in a foreign country should that government request such assistance.
- The U.S. Department of Defense provides specialized technical resources to assist in the mitigation of WMD devices or the consequences of their misuse, to supply logistical support to other federal responders, and to furnish additional assistance as defined by the situation and directed by the President.
- The U.S. Department of Energy provides technical and scientific assistance to locate hidden nuclear material; to diagnose a suspected, improvised nuclear device; to plan the disablement of a nuclear yield or radiological dispersal device; and to advise local authorities on the hazards and effects.
- The Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention respond with technical and scientific personnel and equipment to assist in the mitigation of the health concerns that could arise from various aspects of WMD misuse.

- Other federal agencies will respond with personnel and resources if the threat or attack requires their unique resources or jurisdictional authority.

Because criminal misuse or the threat of misuse of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials on a domestic target poses the ultimate management challenge for public safety agencies and government leaders, these federal responders will complement, and in many cases supplement, the resources of cities, counties, and states. While managing this multiagency response proves difficult, good planning, practice, and patience make it achievable.

#### **MANAGING THE CRISIS**

Generally, two ways exist to manage a crisis. One involves ignoring the need to define a command

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structure before a crisis occurs and then being forced to create such a structure during the incident. This route requires that onsite command or management personnel create a working incident structure while simultaneously attempting to manage the crisis. The risk of creating additional crises in the midst of managing one is almost guaranteed. The second option involves defining the incident command, coordination, communication, and operational direction.

The unified command and control of the incident, the setting of strategic and tactical goals, and the integration of resources from all responding agencies determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the government response. Therefore, the most pressing question for emergency management professionals is how they can direct resources from many agencies of different disciplines at all levels of government in a meaningful and coordinated way to address a potential technical disaster and maintain the confidence of the citizens who may become the victims. At the same time, these professionals face additional crisis management difficulties, including changing management objectives, differing value systems, political harassment, too little data, too much data, poor data-handling methods, little planning, insufficient time to learn, confusion, and fatigue.<sup>4</sup> What should these crisis managers do?

### **The Incident Command System**

The Incident Command System (ICS), which many fire, police, and emergency management agencies have used since its inception in 1970, may hold some of the answers. The ICS requires planning and practice on the part of the participating agencies. Unfortunately, it is impossible for the various emergency response agencies at all levels of government to develop and practice plans with one another to address the uncountable scenarios in the thousands of

different venues across the United States. However, an application of ICS to accommodate different levels of response represents an alternative to this maze of potential pairings of responding agencies. Through a well-developed ICS, state and local governments can alert their state, local, and county response agencies and deploy them under the predefined ICS, thus ensuring that a unified command and response team immediately begins to address the crisis and its consequences.

### **The Joint Operations Center**

In response to a domestic misuse of weapons of mass destruction incident, a presidential directive designates the FBI as the lead agency of all federal resources. To facilitate this responsibility, the FBI employs a joint operations center (JOC), a concept similar to that of the state-level ICS. This center coordinates interagency operational and support needs of the deployment and manages joint agency public information and media interaction. The federal agencies that respond to such incidents have worked with the FBI in exercises and drills based on the JOC concept.

Commanders from the various responding federal and state agencies converge as a joint operations command coalition to address critical decisions regarding incident resolution. The FBI designates a special agent in charge (SAC) to convene and head this command group. The SAC may recommend technical and scientific actions with potential catastrophic consequences to higher federal authority as required. The SAC also maintains a direct line of communication to the FBI director and the attorney general. The critical interfacing and coordinating of state and local operations with federal operations, and vice versa, occur through the various elements of the JOC. A close working relationship of all levels of government in this type of crisis management is not an option; it is essential.



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## The ICS and JOC Interface

How does the JOC interface with the state and local ICS? Unification of command and integration of operations is critical. Specialized federal technical and scientific resources can rely on the FBI, including its personnel with whom they have practiced, for a single format of decision making that remains the same no matter which community hosts the incident. The local FBI office where the incident occurs holds the key to managing deployed federal personnel and resources and organizing the JOC. Already familiar with state and local resources, these FBI offices must become acquainted with the ICS response plans for those states or communities within their regions. This melding of command and control resources builds a bridge between the federal JOC and the state ICS.

Moreover, the responsibility for initiating familiarization briefings and training programs at all government levels in this type of crisis management rests equally with state and FBI officials in the various regions. The designated incident commanders of the state or local ICS and the SAC of the JOC should work together through exercises and drills prior to a real test of their capabilities. The success of melding federal technical and scientific resources, which are unknown to local and state responders, with state and local personnel and resources will occur only through the management skills of the state ICS incident commanders and the SAC. For example, the management of the Oklahoma City bombing incident illustrates how the meaningful use of multiagency resources succeeded because of planning, preparation, and joint alliances. The former Oklahoma City chief of police noted the importance of establishing relationships with federal authorities and the local fire chief before a crisis because of the difficulty in doing so once the crisis begins. The federal and local response will become a unified incident command at the time of a crisis only with cooperation and preplanning on a local level between state ICS and FBI commanders.

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**Crisis managers  
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next one.**

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Predetermination of roles and responsibilities, crisis training and exercising of personnel, and a desire to prepare for the unfathomable will permit this melding of FBI and local crisis management resources. A federal report emphasizes this point in two statements: “Unified command...is essential...to avoid chaos and coordinate tactical activities” and “[t]he issue of who is the primary agency in charge is not to be determined on the emergency scene.”<sup>5</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Preparation for managing a weapons of mass destruction incident first requires an appreciation of the magnitude of the potential consequences. When all involved responding agencies have that awesome outcome in full focus, they will understand the truly essential elements of planning, training, cooperation, liaison, resource definition, and coherent public policy implementation. Therefore, crisis managers cannot wait for such an incident to occur to perfect a process for handling the next one. They must manage the first event intelligently and with a meaningful application of resources and leadership at all levels of government. ♦

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> “Crisis Management: 10 Key Lessons from the Three Mile Island Experience,” *Public Affairs Review* (1985): 26.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Critical Incident Management course, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA, 1991.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Kupperman, *Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today* (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977).

<sup>5</sup> *Report of the Joint Fire/Police Task Force on Civil Unrest* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Fire Administration, 1994).

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*Mr. Carlson, a certified protection professional of the American Society for Industrial Security and retired FBI special agent, currently serves as a member of the technical staff working on counterterrorism and criminal use of nuclear materials issues at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Mr. Carlson is a member of the IACP.*

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World Trade Center  
in New York City

# ***The Joint Terrorism Task Force***

## ***A Concept That Works***

By ROBERT A. MARTIN

**O**n February 23, 1997, a 70-year-old Palestinian visited the observation deck of the Empire State Building. Shortly after arriving, he opened fire with a handgun that he had legally purchased just 1 month after arriving in this country. He killed 1 person and wounded 7 others before killing himself. A search of his clothing revealed a long rambling letter that expressed anti-U.S. and anti-Israel sentiments, along with a Florida nondriver's license identification card and a receipt for the weapon.

Immediately upon receiving notification of this crime, the

FBI-New York City Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) responded. Task force investigators rushed to the scene to assist the local investigators. The task force command center opened, and the numerous agencies that comprise the task force immediately began working to ascertain the shooter's identity, his origin, and whether he had any ties to organized terrorist groups.

Within hours, the command center had answers to these questions. The FBI dispatched its Legal Attaché in Israel to the Gaza Strip to interview the subject's family. The FBI and local police in Florida

interviewed several people who could help track the subject's movements while he lived in that state, fulfilling the residency requirements he needed to purchase the weapon. This information, together with the information supplied by the task force command center, allowed investigators to quickly identify the shooter and, more important, determine if the incident was an act of international terrorism.

The task force concluded that the individual seemed mentally unstable, expressed hatred of Israel and the United States, had no connection to any organized international terrorist group, and had



committed the attack alone. The speed with which the JTTF arrived at this conclusion remains a testament to the effectiveness of a joint task force concept. Had the JTTF not been in place, the investigation may have taken days or weeks, rather than hours, to conclude.

### History of the JTTF

In 1979, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) first used the concept of combining federal and local law enforcement capabilities due to an overwhelming number of bank robberies. Because the concept proved valuable, administrators eventually applied it to the counterterrorism program. Prior to the establishment of the JTTF, an ad hoc task force of local and federal authorities would form to investigate each new terrorist case.

The idea behind the establishment of the JTTF was a simple one. Once established, the task force would remain in place, becoming a close-knit, cohesive unit capable of

addressing the complex problems inherent in terrorism investigations.

Originally the JTTF began with 11 members from the NYPD and 11 FBI investigators. Today's task force, 1 of 16 nationwide, includes more than 140 members representing numerous federal and local agencies, such as the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the New York State Police, the New York/New Jersey Port Authority Police Department, and the U.S. Secret Service.

All agencies participating in the JTTF sign a formal memorandum of understanding that clearly states the task force's two objectives:

- reactive: to respond to and investigate terrorist incidents or terrorist-related criminal activity; and
- proactive: to investigate domestic and foreign terrorist

groups and individuals targeting or operating within the New York metropolitan area for the purpose of detecting, preventing, and prosecuting their criminal activity.

### Integration of Agencies

The key to the success of the JTTF concept remains the melding of personnel from the various law enforcement agencies into a single focused unit. All members of the JTTF must think and perform as a team.

This concept best uses the individual skills and expertise of each JTTF member. The benefits of this integration are innumerable. NYPD members bring the insight that comes from years of living and working with the people in the city. These members typically have advanced through careers from uniformed precinct patrol to various detective duties before being assigned to the JTTF.

The FBI special agents bring vast investigative experience from assignments all over the world. The FBI Legal Attachés remain of particular benefit to the task force. These special agents, assigned to U.S. embassies throughout the world, provide initial law enforcement information on JTTF international terrorism cases.

Each of the other participating agencies similarly contributes its own resources and areas of expertise to the JTTF. The integration of the many agencies, each bringing its own unique skills and investigative specialties to the task force, makes this unit formidable in combating terrorism.



**“ The key to the success of the JTTF concept remains the melding of personnel from the various law enforcement agencies into a single, focused unit. ”**

*Deputy Inspector Martin, New York City Police Department, serves on the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force. He is a member of the IACP.*

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Despite the obvious benefits of the JTTF, measuring the success and effectiveness of the unit is not always as clear when judged by traditional standards. Law enforcement officers who work on terrorism-related investigations can labor for months without producing the usual results often used to judge the efficiency of a functioning detective squad (e.g., numbers of arrests, cases cleared, cases closed). Supervisors monitoring the productivity of the JTTF initially might not be impressed with the numbers produced, but such numbers can be deceiving. Opinions of the capabilities of the task force changed rapidly and dramatically on a day in February 1993.

#### **The World Trade Center Bombing**

On Friday, February 26, 1993, a massive explosion occurred in the public parking garage of the World Trade Center in New York City. As a result of the explosion, 6 persons were killed, and more than 1,000 injured. The site of the blast became one of the largest crime scenes in NYPD history. Estimates showed property damage in excess of one-half billion dollars. The sense of fear and panic in the city was palpable. Indeed, many in law enforcement thought of this investigation as the “case of the century.”

The JTTF stepped into the maelstrom and helped restore calm to the city. Within a month of the blast, the JTTF apprehended four individuals responsible for the attack. The suspects went on trial on September 13, 1993. The trial lasted 6 months with the presentation of

204 witnesses and more than 1,000 pieces of evidence. A jury convicted the four defendants on March 4, 1994, in federal court on all 38 counts against them. On May 25, 1994, a judge sentenced each of the four defendants to 240 years in prison and a \$250,000 fine. On February 7, 1995, authorities in Pakistan arrested the prime fugitive wanted in connection with the bombing and subsequently rendered him to U.S. authorities. This suspect, the mastermind behind the bombing, was sentenced to 240 years in prison on January 8, 1998.

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***...the task force would remain in place, becoming a close-knit, cohesive unit capable of addressing the complex problems inherent in terrorism investigations.***

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The quick action taken by the JTTF did much to allay fears and return a sense of normalcy to New York City. The World Trade Center bombing will be remembered as the gravest attack of international terrorism to occur directly on American soil. As part of the plot to strike at the United States, these international terrorists intended to disrupt the dynamics of daily life, commerce, and finance in one of the most heavily populated cities in the

United States. The suspect and his associates had hoped to kill upwards of 35,000 innocent people. The excellent work accomplished by the JTTF in investigating and successfully resolving the case dispelled the sense of vulnerability the terrorists had hoped to instill.

#### **Terrorist Groups**

As the World Trade Center case unfolded, investigators uncovered a second, potentially far more deadly plot—a threat posed by a radical Islamic terrorist group. It soon became apparent that this group planned to strike out against the United States, and intended to commit these acts in the New York City area. Investigation by the JTTF revealed that these individuals were making explosive devices and intended to use them on such targets as the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, the United Nations headquarters building, and the federal building that houses the FBI New York Field Office.

On June 23, 1993, JTTF members raided the group’s safe house and found its members making bombs they planned to use during simultaneous attacks on the four targets. As a result of this investigation, the JTTF made 15 arrests between June 24 and August 23, 1993. The arrests prevented the group from carrying out acts of planned terrorism, including murders and bombings. The arrests also increased confidence in the ability of law enforcement, working in concert on the federal, state, and local level, to protect the lives and businesses of the residents of New York City.



Five of the 15 defendants pleaded guilty or became government witnesses. Ten of the defendants went on trial in federal court on January 9, 1995. On October 1 of that year, a jury found all 10 defendants guilty of a total of 25 criminal charges. On January 17, 1996, the defendants received sentences ranging from 35 years to life plus 65 years.

#### **Additional Successes**

On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 crashed off the coast of Long Island, New York, killing all 230 people aboard the plane. Although ultimately determined not to be an act of terrorism, initial speculation centered on terrorism as one possible cause of the crash, and the

safety of U.S. civil aviation was called into question. The sense of fear grew among some air travelers.

Once again the JTTF ran the investigation. From the start, the FBI and the other members of the JTTF worked in tandem with the National Transportation Safety Board. The FBI handpicked special agents from terrorism squads to work on the investigation. Local law enforcement contributed resources, as well. The JTTF attempted to determine whether a criminal act brought down TWA Flight 800.

A 16-month exhaustive investigation followed. In that time period, investigators from the JTTF conducted more than 7,000 interviews that spanned from the shores of

Long Island to several foreign countries. Investigators recovered approximately 1 million pieces of the aircraft (about 96 percent of the plane), which bomb technicians and laboratory personnel visually inspected. All 230 victims were recovered and subsequently identified. Experts performed exhaustive analysis and explored all avenues of potential criminality to determine if a bomb or missile could have caused the explosion. The JTTF pursued every lead it found in this case. In the end, no evidence indicated that a criminal act caused the incident.

The JTTF concept again proved its worth. Months of delay in assembling a team and initiating liaison contacts with federal agencies were

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avoided because the mechanisms already existed. The members of the JTTF took great pride in the thoroughness of their investigation and in allaying the fears of the American public that terrorism caused this tragedy.

The year 1997 proved to be a busy one for the JTTF, providing new examples of the benefits the task force concept brings to investigations. In addition to the Empire State Building shooting, the year witnessed a terrorist threat in New York from an unconventional weapon. In March 1997, the suspect of a mail-order fraud case invited the investigating detectives into his residence. The cluttered house contained a large cache of chemicals, gasoline, and fuel additives. The suspect told investigators that he used these products to make "super fuel" for the model airplanes that he raced. However, he offered no explanation for the far more ominous canister clearly marked "Sarin Gas" that the detectives also found in the house. They immediately exited the house and called for hazardous materials support personnel.

Sarin gas is a highly toxic chemical nerve agent. On March 20, 1995, a Japanese terrorist group dispersed Sarin gas in three Tokyo subway lines at the height of morning rush hour. Twelve people died as a result, and 5,500 people required medical treatment.

Fearing that they had discovered a potential weapon of mass destruction, the JTTF responded and conferred with ranking police and emergency management personnel on the scene. The NYPD's elite hazardous materials team, the

Emergency Service Unit (ESU), entered the house and safely contained the canister. Because no facilities in the city existed to safely perform the tests needed to identify the contents of the canister, the ESU transported the canister to the NYPD's outdoor range in the Bronx. The JTTF followed established procedures and contacted the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit in Aberdeen, Maryland, which immediately dispatched a team to the Bronx location.

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***...the JTTF  
remains on the  
forefront of the  
war against  
terrorism.***

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Once the technical escort team contained the canister in its own cylinder, they boarded a military aircraft, which flew the team and their potentially deadly package back to Aberdeen. Tests performed there revealed the canister to be empty. The suspect had told investigators the truth—that he had labeled the canister Sarin gas as a joke. He was arrested on numerous theft charges, the neighborhood returned to normal, and police, fire, and city officials breathed a sigh of relief. The incident proved a good exercise for everyone involved and served as another example of the contacts and services the JTTF can provide.

## **Conclusion**

Since its inception, the FBI-NYPD JTTF has remained on the forefront of the war against terrorism. The World Trade Center bombing proved that Americans could not view terrorism as a malady that affected only other countries. That attack, as well as the Oklahoma City bombing and the bombing at the 1996 Summer Olympics, awakened Americans to the fact that terrorism had come to the United States.

Today, 16 JTTFs stand ready to deter, counter, and respond to acts of terrorism. The FBI-NYPD JTTF, as well as the others throughout the country, remain dedicated to fighting terrorism and eliminating the fear and panic that terrorists rely on to advance their causes. The combining of federal, state, and local law enforcement resources has resulted in effective maximization of resources, the provision of sophisticated investigative and technological resources, and linkage to all federal government resources in the United States and worldwide. The participating law enforcement agencies, working as one, provide the needed knowledge, skills, and resources essential for law enforcement agencies to succeed in fighting the menace of terrorism. ♦

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*The author gratefully acknowledges NYPD Lt. John Haughie, Detectives Thomas Corrigan and Louis Napoli, FBI Special Agent John J. Liguori, and all of the members of the JTTF for their significant contributions in preparing this article.*

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## **Bomb Threat** *A Primer for the First Responder*

By T.C. Fuller



A group of business people returning from lunch notices an unattended briefcase in the entryway of their building. Having heard about bombs left in such circumstances, one group member calls the local police and reports the suspicious briefcase.

An officer arrives at the scene and observes a growing crowd of onlookers standing in the lobby, eyeing the briefcase, and carrying on a spirited debate about who might have left it and whether they should be concerned. The building manager arrives and tells the officer that it is probably nothing and asks how long it will take to resolve. Unfortunately, the officer's ensuing actions are dangerously incorrect and the direct result of a preventable lack of proper training.

After cautioning everyone to stand back, the officer approaches the suspicious briefcase and examines it, looking for anything that might provide a clue as to what it contains. Without the proper training, however, the officer really has no idea what he is looking for or what to do if he finds something. After a cursory examination, the officer walks about 20 feet across the lobby and uses his handheld radio to call

for a bomb squad. After the officer learns that the nearest bomb squad is 250 miles away and will not be available for at least 4 hours, he informs the building manager who becomes upset and demands that something be done to resolve this major inconvenience. Faced with the distasteful duty of listening to the irritated manager for the next several hours, not to mention agreeing with the manager's assessment that the briefcase probably contains nothing dangerous, the officer decides to take matters into his own hands. He gingerly picks up the briefcase and moves it outside to lessen the inconvenience for the office workers and to make it more accessible to the bomb squad.

Such a scenario should sound somewhat familiar to anyone in the law enforcement community, especially those serving on bomb squads. Variations on this theme happen almost every time someone finds a suspect package, particularly if they find it in an inconvenient location. In this example, the officer safely resolved a potentially dangerous situation; however, without proper training, the officer may not be so successful, or so lucky, with the next suspect package.

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## TRAINING FIRST-RESPONDING OFFICERS

Today, society demands much from its law enforcement officers. As a result, time for training becomes a premium, constantly competing with the need for officers to remain on the street. Therefore, very few officers ever receive any training on how to identify and react to suspect packages. However, with the increase in dramatic bombings in the United States and abroad over the last few years, most departments should find the time to train their officers in handling such situations. Further, because first-responding patrol officers encounter these packages more often than any other law enforcement member, this lack of training becomes a serious safety issue when these officers suddenly face their first suspect package. Without proper training, these officers and the civilians they attempt to help could become victims of these devices.

However, if first-responding officers have received even the most rudimentary training in basic immediate reactions, they can greatly reduce or eliminate any danger presented by these devices. The fact that officers discover suspect packages that have not detonated prior to their arrival constitutes a victory for law enforcement. At this point, officers armed with basic knowledge about handling suspect packages can initiate an organized, professional response to lessen the danger to themselves and to innocent bystanders. Most important, these informed officers know that no way exists for determining what will detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) until it has been examined. Therefore, their only safe course remains to assume that the device could detonate at any time for any reason.

### Hands Off the Package

The most important rule in handling suspect packages remains: DO NOT TOUCH the package. If at all possible, officers should not approach suspect packages; they should observe them from a distance—the

greater the distance the better. Officers should remember that bomb squad personnel, with the benefit of specialized training and equipment, will not approach a suspect package until one of them has donned a bomb suit and helmet, and they have gathered as much initial information as possible. If officers must approach suspect packages, they should try to take the same path as others who may have approached the packages before their arrival. The same caution remains when officers depart the area. Most important, officers should never approach suspect packages solely for taking photographs. While photographs of these packages are valuable to bomb squad members, they rarely receive photographs and, consequently, do not expect them.

Additionally, because suspect packages can prove harmless, contain an actual device, or lure officers into an ambush, officers must remember the “street smarts” and survival tactics that they employ every day in their normal police duties. First responders—law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical workers, and bomb disposal personnel—have been the targets of bomb threats and IEDs in

foreign countries for several years. While instances of secondary devices placed specifically to target first responders have not become as common in the United States, officers must remain vigilant to this potential threat whenever they encounter suspect packages.

### Clear the Area

In handling potential bomb situations, officers should evacuate the area immediately and ensure that no one reenters. Establishing an initial “exclusion area” of a 300-foot radius constitutes a good rule to follow. Officers can adjust the size of the area, if needed. They should consider the physical size of the package and the surrounding area. For example, a suspicious paper sandwich bag in the empty gun vault of a National Guard Armory may indicate that

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**The most important rule in handling suspect packages remains: DO NOT TOUCH the package.**

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officers probably could lessen the distance because the package is small and the surrounding area contains little, if any, dangerous material. Conversely, officers encountering a suspicious 24-foot moving van in the center of an urban metropolis should increase the exclusion area appropriately. In this case, such materials as glass from nearby buildings can become incorporated into the blast, creating lethal secondary fragmentation that increases the destructive capability of the IED. Therefore, suspect packages, regardless of their size, found near potentially dangerous materials usually require a larger exclusion area. For example, officers discovering a small suspect package next to a large propane tank obviously should expand the 300-foot exclusion rule. Officers must use their common sense and remain alert to the many variables at the scene of suspect packages.

Moreover, during an evacuation, officers must plan the routes that individuals will use to leave the area. Officers must ensure that escape routes do not bring these individuals close to the device. Also, officers at the scene should request as many additional officers as needed to clear and secure the area. Because these scenes prove highly visible and attract many onlookers, including the media, getting individuals out and keeping them out of these areas remain vital to ensuring their safety.

### **Alert Emergency Personnel**

Along with clearing the area, officers should alert fire and emergency medical personnel. Officers should give these support units explicit instructions on how to approach the scene and where to wait. In case the device detonates, officers must keep these units far enough away so that they do not become incapacitated, yet close enough to respond rapidly. Also, officers and bomb squad members must maintain dependable communication with these personnel, even face-to-face contact, to ensure that all involved services understand the situation. Moreover, until fire

and medical emergency personnel arrive, bomb squad members will not approach a suspect package because they may need these services themselves if the device detonates.

### **Turn Off the Radios**

Officers should curtail all radio use within 300 feet of a suspected IED. Because all devices have a fuse, and some employ an electric firing system, using radio transmitters near such a device risks providing it with enough electromagnetic energy to detonate. After bomb squad members conduct an initial reconnaissance, they can provide officers with guidelines about using radios at the scene.

### **Investigate the Scene**

After officers have cleared the area and alerted emergency personnel, they should initiate a preliminary investigation of the scene being careful not to reenter

the evacuated area. At this point, the area involved has become a potential crime scene and officers should treat it as such. Patrol officers initiate crime scene investigations every day, and the standard rules apply to the scenes of suspect packages or IEDs. Some measures, however, warrant special mention.

As soon as possible, officers should identify and segregate witnesses and interview individuals who actually saw the device. They should have witnesses describe the suspect package in detail, including sketching the device. Because bomb squad members will want to speak with these individuals, they should stay near the scene. However, officers need to keep all witnesses apart from each other to prevent them from exchanging crucial information. Because every detail, no matter how trivial it may seem, proves vitally important to bomb squad members, officers should maintain the integrity of the eyewitness accounts.

Additional questions officers should ask witnesses include many similar to those they would ask at other crime scenes.

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**Along with clearing the area, officers should alert fire and emergency medical personnel.**

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- To aid in their examination of suspect packages, bomb squad members will appreciate any information that first-responding officers can obtain. Further, once the squad renders the suspect package safe, investigators conducting the follow-up investigation also will value this initial information, which may provide many of the answers they need.

Handling suspect packages remains one of the most hazardous law enforcement duties. Because patrol officers usually are the first to arrive at the scene of these packages, they need adequate training in how to identify and react to these situations.

When dealing with suspect packages, first-responding officers should observe the “assume the worst and hope for the best” rule. If these officers assume the worst and act accordingly, they can reduce the risk of injury or death to themselves and those around them. By employing such safeguards as not approaching the suspect package, clearing the area surrounding it, alerting emergency personnel, not using their radios near the area, and initiating a preliminary investigation of the scene, first-responding officers can resolve these potentially deadly situations effectively and, most important, safely. ♦

*Special Agent Fuller serves in the Burlington, Vermont, Resident Agency of the FBI's Albany Division.*

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# ***FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin***

## **Author Guidelines**

### **GENERAL INFORMATION**

The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* is an official publication of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of Justice.

**Frequency of Publication:** Monthly

**Purpose:** To provide a forum for the exchange of information on law enforcement-related topics.

**Audience:** Criminal justice professionals, primarily law enforcement managers.

### **MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS**

**Length:** Feature article submissions should be 2,000 to 3,500 words (8 to 14 pages, double-spaced). Submissions for specialized departments, such as Police Practice, Case Study, and Perspective, should be 1,200 to 2,000 words (5 to 8 pages, double-spaced).

**Format:** All submissions should be double-spaced and typed on 8 1/2- by 11-inch white paper. All pages should be numbered, and three copies should be submitted for review purposes. When possible, an electronic version of the article saved on computer disk should accompany the typed manuscript.

References should be used when quoting a source exactly, when citing or paraphrasing another person's work or ideas, or when referring to information that generally is not well known. Authors should refer to *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6th ed., by Kate L. Turabian, for proper footnote citation format.

Research papers, reports, and studies should be revised to reflect the editorial needs of the *Bulletin*. Subheadings and lists should be used to break up the text and provide direction to readers.

**Writing Style and Grammar:** Articles generally should be written in the third person. (Point of View and Perspective submissions

are exceptions.) The *Bulletin* follows the *The New York Public Library Writer's Guide to Style and Usage*. Potential authors should study several issues of the magazine to ensure that their writing style meets the *Bulletin's* requirements.

### **PUBLICATION**

**Basis for Judging Manuscripts:** Material that has been published previously or that is under consideration by other magazines will be returned to the author. Submissions will be judged on the following points: Relevance to audience, factual accuracy, analysis of information, structure and logical flow, style and ease of reading, and length. Generally, articles on similar topics are not published within a 12-month period. Because the *Bulletin* is a government publication, favorable consideration cannot be given to articles that advertise a product or service.

**Query Letters:** Authors may submit a query letter along with a detailed 1- to 2-page outline before writing an article. Editorial staff members will review the query to determine suitability of topic. This is intended to help authors but does not guarantee acceptance of any article.

**Author Notification:** Receipt of manuscript will be confirmed. Notification of acceptance or rejection will follow review. Articles accepted for publication cannot be guaranteed a publication date.

**Editing:** The *Bulletin* reserves the right to edit all manuscripts for length, clarity, format, and style.

### **SUBMISSION**

Authors should mail their submissions to: Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, Virginia 22135. Telephone: 703-632-1952. FAX: 703-632-1968.



## The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face each challenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actions warrant special attention from their respective departments. The *Bulletin* also wants to recognize their exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.



Officer Ross



Officer Lescure

Officers David Ross and Larry Lescure of the Waverly, Tennessee, Police Department responded to a report of a 14-year-old boy trapped in a rain-swollen creek. The boy and his 13-year-old cousin

were playing on a utilities crossing when rushing water swept the boy into the creek. The force of the water took the boy downstream, where his foot became stuck in a fallen tree. His cousin ran to a nearby house and obtained a rope, which he threw to the boy who tied it around his body. Upon arrival, the officers saw the boy's head begin to slide beneath the water. They immediately waded into the creek, freed the boy by removing his shoe, and carried him to safety. The selfless actions of Officers Ross and Lescure, along with his cousin's quick thinking, saved the boy's life.



Sergeant Norwood

Sergeant Wayne Norwood of the St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, Sheriff's Office responded to an accident involving a vehicle that had gone over an embankment and crashed into a swamp. Sergeant Norwood, who has years of diving experience, arrived at the scene. Although he did not have his diving equipment with him, he immediately dove into the murky water, which contained snakes and alligators. After several dives, he located the vehicle and pulled the driver out of the water. Tragically, the driver had died as a result of the crash, but Sergeant Norwood's valiant efforts were greatly appreciated by the victim's family.



Deputy Peterson

While on patrol late one evening, Deputy Jack Peterson of the Sevier County, Utah, Sheriff's Office received a call about a possible suicide. Deputy Peterson located the distraught female at a local park. She was sitting in her vehicle with the doors locked. She had a can of white gas in one hand and a cigarette lighter in the other and stated that she was going to set herself on fire. Deputy Peterson immediately smashed the drivers' side

window with his flashlight and took the woman into custody. She was transported to a local hospital as was Deputy Peterson, who received injuries to his right hand from the broken glass. Deputy Peterson's quick response thwarted the suicide attempt.

Nominations for the **Bulletin Notes** should be based on either the rescue of one or more citizens or arrest(s) made at unusual risk to an officer's safety. Submissions should include a short write-up (maximum of 250 words), a separate photograph of each nominee, and a letter from the department's ranking officer endorsing the nomination. Submissions should be sent to the Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.