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J. Edgar Hoover, Director

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

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The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* is issued monthly to law-enforcement agencies throughout the United States. Much of the data appearing herein is of a confidential nature and its circulation should be restricted to law-enforcement officers; therefore, material contained in this Bulletin may not be reprinted without prior authorization by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



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ERRATA: During the publication of this issue, outstanding Federal process against Virgil Larel Lyerla was dismissed. The wanted notice on him, intended for page 28, was, therefore, not published. Due to the printing schedule, the contents of page 28 as shown in the inside cover were not changed. Accordingly, you are requested to cancel the contents for page 28 as shown in the inside cover, including the notation "Wanted by the FBI (Virgil Larel Lyerla)."



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

March 1, 1955

TO ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS:

The thermometer of crime statistics has recorded a warning upward trend in general crime. It has, in the category of bank robbery, registered a rise of feverish proportions. Violations of the Federal Bank Robbery Statute soared from 226 bank robberies, burglaries and larcenies committed in the calendar year 1950, to a startling total of 517 such offenses in 1954. Of the three violations, robbery--the most serious--shot up threefold in the same period to 307 last year as compared with 100 in 1950. This offense, in fact, accounted for 59% of the violations recorded under the Statute in 1954.

The crime itself has changed perceptibly in its pattern. During the gang era of the Thirties, highly organized and seasoned veterans of crime hand-picked and victimized institutions most susceptible to attack. Today, in sharp contrast, every banking-type institution is a potential target. The bank robber list today reflects the prominence of the "lone robber"--and the amateur. The crime may be a spur-of-the-moment act in which little or no planning is involved.


Bank robbery all too often is regarded in terms of a crime against property and the threat to human life is overlooked. Even the perpetrators of several recent bank robberies expressed their belief that insurance coverage of losses to depositors lessened the seriousness of their crimes.

The threat inherent in the rapid rise in this crime can be met effectively only by coordinated effort. An offensive launched by individual citizens, by interested institutions, by civic authorities and by law enforcement is essential. Certainly it is the obligation of the citizen and his civic

representatives to insist upon properly trained, sufficiently staffed and adequately equipped law enforcement bodies. It is indeed the responsibility of banking establishments and their employees to utilize--and conform to--effective organizational security plans. And it assuredly is the duty of law enforcement to take the lead in this drive by spotlighting the problem, concentrating on preventive measures and fully cooperating in each case as it occurs.

In line with this offensive, a year-long series of FBI Law Enforcement Conferences on the subject of bank robbery, scheduled throughout the United States during 1955, is designed to add impetus to the cooperative pooling of experiences, techniques and resources which does so much to increase the efficiency of present-day law enforcement. A continuous program aimed at swift detection, rapid apprehension and leading to certain punishment is the most effective way to take the profit out of bank robbery. By making the offense more hazardous to the criminal we can reverse the trend of this vicious crime. We must heed the warning.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. Edgar Hoover". The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized script. The first letter "J" is large and loops around. The name "Edgar Hoover" follows in a similar cursive style.

John Edgar Hoover
Director



FEATURE ARTICLE

Robbery of Banks and Savings and Loan Institutions

The July 1952 issue of the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* carried an article entitled "Bank Robbery—Continuing Problem in Law Enforcement." Since that time, bank robbery has been not only a continuing but also an ever-increasing problem to law enforcement officers. A total of 244 violations were reported to the FBI in 1951. Since that time there has been a constant and marked uptrend in the frequency with which this crime is committed. Violations jumped to 289 in 1952, to 379 in 1953, and to 438 in 1954.¹

To put these figures in proper focus, two points must be clearly understood. First, the recent figures include violations committed against certain savings and loan institutions, not covered by the Federal statute until the present decade. Second, the figures cited include not only robberies but burglaries and larcenies as well, whether successful or unsuccessful insofar as the net result in loot is concerned.

These explanations, however, should not be cited to minimize the problem. There is genuine cause for concern in the sheer number of these offenses, the constant uptrend which has been in progress since 1951, and the fact that the 438 violations reported in fiscal 1954 are nearly five times the total of 89 reported in fiscal 1944.

The Federal Statute

The Federal statute covers banks which are members of the Federal Reserve system, banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and banks organized or operated under the laws of the United States. Savings and loan associations covered are those which are Federal savings and loan associations and those insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.

The crime committed against one of these institutions is a robbery if (1) property, money, or a thing of value is feloniously taken, or a felonious

attempt to take it is made, from a person or the presence of a person and the taking or the attempt is accompanied by force and violence or putting in fear, and (2) the property, money, or thing of value belongs to or is in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of the bank or savings and loan association.

The property protected against burglary and larceny is identical with that protected against robbery. A burglary is committed by entering or attempting to enter a bank or savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank or savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank or savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting the bank or savings and loan association or a larceny.

A larceny is the simple taking or carrying away, with intent to steal or purloin, of any property, money, or thing of value like that discussed under robbery, above.

Another offense which should be kept in mind by the investigator is the crime of receiving. This crime is committed when a person receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barter, sells, or disposes of any property or money or thing of value, knowing the same to have been taken from a bank or savings and loan association by robbery, burglary, or larceny.

The maximum penalty for either a robbery or a burglary is a fine of \$5,000 or imprisonment for 20 years, or both. The maximum for larceny of over \$100 is a fine of \$5,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both. The maximum for a larceny of less than \$100 is a fine of \$1,000 or imprisonment for 1 year, or both. The penalties for receiving are identical with those for larceny.

If an assault is committed as a part of any of the above offenses the financial penalty rises to a maximum of \$10,000 and the imprisonment penalty rises to a maximum of 25 years. If the robbery, burglary, larceny, or receiving is accompanied by a killing or kidnaping, the imprisonment penalty becomes not less than 10 years and

¹These are fiscal years. The fiscal year 1954, for example, began on July 1, 1953, and ended on June 30, 1954.

the crime is punishable by death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct.

100 Recent Cases

A study was made of 100 recent cases of the robbery of banks and savings and loan institutions (robbery only, not burglary or larceny) in an effort to locate information of value to the investigation of future cases. While each offense must still be investigated on the basis of its own facts, it seems likely that a wider knowledge of what has happened in earlier cases may suggest valuable leads for future reference when the occasion demands.

Some of these cases were solved by local officers, others by FBI Agents, and still others by the cooperative efforts of both. Some were solved in a matter of minutes; others took months; some are still unsolved. The robberies occurred in all sections of the country, in communities varying in population from 139 to 1 million and over. They occurred in institutions which employed their own guards and in others where the nearest policeman was miles away, in institutions where the latest safety devices existed, and in others where no safety measures were employed. They occurred in banks and savings and loan associations which had never been robbed previously and in others which had been robbed once, twice, or even three times. They represent cases in which months, and sometimes even years, of careful planning preceded the actual robbery, and others in which the robber decided on the spur of the moment to get some "easy" cash. They represent cases in which the robber received absolutely nothing for his efforts—except a jail term—and others in which he received thousands of dollars. Few definite conclusions can be drawn from this study, but a number of facts came to light which should be of interest to law enforcement officers.

Amateurs and Individuals

This study and another mentioned later clearly bear out the fact that the lone operator has become important in this field of criminal activity where the organized gang once held sway; approximately half the robberies were performed by one person.

This study also reveals that when a bank is robbed today, investigators should not always ex-

pect to find some hardened criminal at the root of the robbery. True, in many cases the robber is merely adding another crime to an already lengthy record, as in the case of the man who, when arrested in March 1954, admitted that he had robbed 20 savings and loan associations in a period of less than 3 months. Also true is the fact that the roster of bank robbers includes many ex-convicts, parolees, escapees, and hoodlums, all of whom are looking for "easy money." In addition to these flagrant lawbreakers, however, previously law-abiding citizens occasionally turn to the crime of bank robbery in an irrational moment. An example of this is the case of a noncommissioned Army officer with many years of honorable military service who staged a singlehanded bank robbery. Apprehended approximately 2 hours later, he gave this statement: "I had extreme financial difficulties, and every creditor was after me, and I just couldn't see my head above water. I just wanted to pay the people off. I had started over to Fort ——— to have an examination, drank a few beers, and these debts were on my mind all the time. I wasn't drunk. I knew what I was doing. I thought that was the best way to get some money. I used a cap-buster so I couldn't get excited and hurt anybody. The reason I chose a bank was that I didn't want to hurt anyone personally. I knew the banks were insured, and I knew the insurance companies would be the only ones hurt. The people who deposited money wouldn't lose it. It was insured, and they would get their money. For that reason I chose a bank."

Another example is the case of a man whose record showed arrests on minor charges but who had never committed a major crime. His story was that because he was unemployed, in debt, and unable to support his wife and children, he awakened one morning so despondent he decided to commit suicide. After borrowing a gun for this purpose, he hired a taxi to take him to his father-in-law's home where his wife and children were then living. En route, he saw a bank and suddenly conceived the idea of robbing it. Asking the driver to wait, he went in, robbed the bank of more than \$1,000, came back and asked the driver to proceed to their destination. Fifty minutes later he was captured by the sheriff.

An 18-year-old boy decided he would have to get some money if "he ever expected to get anywhere in life," so he robbed a savings and loan association. He then hired a taxi to take him to the airport to make his getaway. A local citizen

became suspicious of the youth's nervous manner, believed he saw a gun in his possession, and arranged to notify the police department. Police arrested the youthful bandit minutes later. His initial criminal performance was most unsuccessful—in a state of confusion, he had walked out of the loan company, leaving his \$20,000 loot on the counter.

Although amateurs such as these are not the worst offenders, it is most important that they be apprehended and prosecuted lest, through continued success at escaping apprehension, they adopt the attitude of a man arrested in July, 1954. Within a period of less than 90 minutes he had committed two armed robberies. He admitted both, saying, "I didn't know how much money I had got at the first place, but I knew I wanted some more. I started looking for another place to hold up." In his pocket was a long list of savings and loan associations copied from a telephone directory—prospective victims.

Some Are Slow Witted


Another group of amateur bank robbers may be classified as mentally incompetent of planning a bank robbery with any degree of success. They, like the three amateurs cited earlier, seldom "case the job" in advance or make definite plans for a getaway. A typical example of this type is an unemployed bricklayer who decided to rob a bank located about two blocks from his home. With his shotgun over his arm, he entered the bank, demanded and received a bag of money, and walked out. Minutes later cruising policemen picked him up as he walked along the street, the loot in one hand and the gun in the other. He was committed to a State hospital.

In another case an unemployed mentally retarded man attempted to hold up a bank hoping that the publicity would enable him to get a job.

One couple with the reputation of being "none too bright" and both of whom had been hospital-

VIOLATIONS

Of Robbery, Burglary and Larceny of Institutions Covered by the Federal Bank Robbery Statute.



ized previously in mental institutions, stole a car and drove into town for the express purpose of robbing the local bank. The bank was closed for lunch, so they parked out front to wait for it to reopen. While they were parked there, a number of passers-by recognized the couple and the car but assumed that the car was borrowed. As the bank employees returned from lunch, one of them spoke to the couple by name, and they returned his greeting. Minutes later, the man got out of the car, took his rifle and a pillowcase and entered the bank. Calling one of the employees by his first name, he threw him the pillowcase and said, "Fill it up." The employees went into the vault, closing the door after them. The robber took the loose money in the cash drawers and left. Four hours later the couple was apprehended in a neighboring State. They were both convicted on charges of bank robbery and interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. The husband said he "pulled the job" because he could not get steady work and at times he and his wife were hungry.

The Professionals

In cases like the above, investigating officers are not faced with the craftiness and cunning of an experienced criminal. In direct contrast, is a bank robbery which occurred in an Eastern State in April 1954. This was not the initial crime for either of the young men involved; each knew that planning necessarily plays an important part in any robbery. For some time these young men had known that a large manufacturing company paid its employees in cash and that the payroll was delivered by messengers from a nearby bank. As early as 1952 they started "casing the job," first with the idea of selling it to someone else. One of the men spent the greater part of one Friday lounging around the canteen of the manufacturing company. He talked to many of the employees, "keeping his eyes and ears open." He later reported to his friend that the payroll was worth at least \$25,000 and that it must be delivered either early Friday or late Thursday. Next, the two "tailed" the payroll car from the plant back to the bank. After that they "tailed" it from the bank to the plant 8 or 10 times, driving different cars to avert suspicion. They noted that the guard was armed but that *he carried the money in his gun hand*. Deciding that the job looked so easy that they would try it themselves rather than sell their idea to some other criminal, they started

making careful preparations for their getaway. They agreed that they must steal a getaway car and that it must be a Ford or Chevrolet, since those two makes were "very popular and would not be too noticeable." The night before the planned robbery, they stole a Chevrolet from its owner's driveway and drove it to a secluded spot about 3 miles from the plant. Early the next morning (Friday) they borrowed without permission a Plymouth belonging to the mother of one of the men, drove to the stolen Chevrolet, got into it, and drove to the plant. They parked and waited for the arrival of their loot. When the two men—the bank president and a guard—arrived with the payroll and started into the plant with it, the two robbers fired at their feet. One of the robbers yelled, "We've been waiting for you. Drop the bags and don't move." The guard obeyed and the two bandits drove away, temporarily richer by over \$33,000. It took the combined efforts of police and the FBI 6 weeks to track them down. A gun found in the abandoned getaway car was an important clue in this case. A check of the serial number of the gun with the FBI's National Stolen Property File revealed that it was one of several guns which had been stolen from a hardware store in 1953. Investigation also revealed that another of these stolen guns had been found in the possession of a man who had been killed by police while attempting another robbery a few days after the hardware store robbery. Now, almost a year later, investigation was undertaken to identify the dead man's associates in an effort to determine the ownership of the gun left in the abandoned car. Investigating Agents found that a policeman while investigating the hardware store robbery had jotted down in his notebook a penciled notation naming one of the dead man's friends. Agents determined that the person named had been incarcerated with the dead man at one time. They also determined that the man, although not steadily employed, was spending large sums of money. These combined factors made him a logical suspect. When interviewed, he first denied any knowledge of the robbery, but later confessed.

Another well-planned robbery occurred after a young man decided it "wouldn't be too difficult to knock off" the Michigan bank where he had an account. He enlisted the aid of a friend who went in, looked over the bank, and agreed. Then they started planning. They determined that police cars passed by the bank about three times every

hour. Noting that each car was manned by one officer, they decided that it would be difficult for one man to drive at high speed and at the same time shoot through the windshield at a getaway car. In case their reasoning proved incorrect, or in case they drew a left-handed officer, they decided to take along a high-powered rifle to "shoot out tires and radios of any police cars that might follow." By using a jumper, they stole their getaway car from a parking lot. Then the robber-customer donned a hood lest he be recognized, and the two armed men robbed the bank of over \$50,000. Their success was shortlived, though, as both were apprehended in less than a week.

Getaway Systems

As these cases illustrate, an experienced robber considers a carefully planned getaway of major importance. If an automobile is used, there is a strong possibility that it is stolen. Most robbers agree with the one quoted above regarding the wisdom of stealing popular makes of cars as they are less conspicuous. In many cases, the robber placed stolen license plates on the stolen car in order to make tracing more difficult. In other cases he borrowed a car from a friend. Sometimes he used his personally owned automobile with stolen tags. One bank robber who used his own car admitted that he used the license plates stolen from an acquaintance against whom he had a grudge, hoping to get his enemy in trouble with the law. Others merely removed the license plates from their own cars long enough to commit the robbery and make a getaway. One audacious robber drove into a local service station, borrowed some tools with which to remove his plate, removed it in the presence of the attendant, and then drove to the bank and robbed it. A few drove their own cars, making no attempt to disguise them. One made his getaway crouched in the trunk of his own car which was driven by an accomplice. The partition between the trunk and back seat had been removed making it possible for the robber to enter the trunk from the interior of the car.

In addition to the borrowing and outright stealing of cars, several robbers obtained their getaway cars by more ingenious methods. One robber parked his flashy red convertible beside a more conservative sedan owned by a highway maintenance employee, stole the employee's car long

enough to drive into town and rob the bank, and then returned the stolen car to its original parking place. Another obtained a car from a used car dealer on a tryout basis, drove to a nearby town, and after discussing with bank personnel the possibility of obtaining a loan on the car, pulled out a gun and robbed the bank. Another young man obtained for tryout purposes a car which a bank had repossessed, drove the car to a nearby town, robbed the bank, and then returned the car to the original bank. One pair of robbers stole a car in one State, robbed a bank in an adjoining State, using the car as the second getaway vehicle, and then drove the car back into the State from which it had been stolen. When apprehended, they explained this action by saying that they didn't want to be prosecuted by the Federal Government on charges of transporting a stolen automobile across the State line. Yet they had robbed a federally insured bank and transported a stolen auto in interstate commerce not once but twice!

In the 100 cases studied, the getaway in 70 instances is known to have been made in cars actually driven by the robber or an accomplice. The cars were either personally owned, borrowed, or stolen. In many cases, robbers abandoned their getaway cars a short distance from the bank, transferring from the "hot" car to a "cold" one, or proceeding on foot. Often the discovery of the abandoned car led directly to the identity of the robber. In the cases of borrowed cars, it was a relatively simple matter to discover from the legitimate owner the identity of the borrower. In most of the cases where the robber used his personally owned car, the solution of the case simply rested with locating the owner, providing his getaway was observed. In the cases of abandoned stolen cars, the bandit sometimes inadvertently left some identification behind, such as the stolen gun in a case already mentioned. Another robber left in the abandoned car the paper bag in which he had carried his loot from the bank. Latent fingerprints on this bag led to his identity.

One young man felt so strongly the necessity of destroying his stolen getaway car that he fired a bullet into its gas tank, caught the liquid in a can, saturated the interior of the car with it, and set it afire. He also burned the clothing he had worn during the attempted robbery. Despite his precautions, he was caught a short time later that day by alert State troopers who saw him duck down as their car approached the one in which he had hitched a ride. The stolen getaway car which he

had tried to destroy was still sufficiently intact to be easily identified.

As for the other methods of getaway employed in the cases studied, taxis were used in four cases, the driver being entirely innocent in every case. One robber hopped on a slow-moving produce truck. Another took a streetcar. One walked quietly around the corner and went to a movie. Others melted into noon-hour crowds. Others disappeared so successfully that their methods of getaway still are unknown.

Why Some Failed

In many cases, however, the robber did not have a chance to make a getaway or, if he did, he was emptyhanded. Why were some of these robberies doomed to failure at the very beginning? In some cases, quick thinking or bravery on the part of the intended victim, or both, combined with safety devices employed by the bank, thwarted the robbery. In one case, the teller had opened the bulletproof glass window in front of the cage in order to give a customer a bag of coins. As the customer left, a would-be robber stepped up and, with his left hand, thrust through the opening a plastic bag and a note which read, "Put money in bag and don't make a sound until I'm gone." The teller promptly slammed the bulletproof window shut, catching the bag and note in a vise. The bandit fled.

A female teller in a New York bank read a note which had been pushed through the bars of her cage: "Give me the money in your cage—don't say anything—I have a gun." The teller glanced at

the customer lounging against the counter, detected that she was in a drunken condition and pulled the alarm. A bank guard immediately apprehended the notepasser and held her for the police. The 39-year-old woman later said that she had consumed numerous bottles of beer, a pint of wine, and then more beer. She remembered writing the note in a bar but didn't recall what she had written. From that point she couldn't remember anything until taken out of the bank.

The presence of a guard in a southern bank, combined with considerable bravery on the part of a bank official, prevented a robbery. An unemployed man decided to rob a bank to get money to pay his bills. Taking his stepson's toy pistol, he went to the bank. Upon noticing the office of the president, he decided to commit the robbery through him. Posing as a "tax collector", he was admitted to see the president. When asked for credentials, he showed the butt of the gun in his belt. He then told the president that an accomplice was holding his wife and that he could not vouch for her safety if the president did not make it possible for him to leave the bank with \$50,000 in a matter of minutes. The president, thinking that the bandit actually was armed, told him he would be able to get approximately \$20,000 for him. The president collected the money and went to the door with the robber. There he managed to grab the bandit and summon help from a guard. Another employee turned in an alarm and the police arrived within 2 minutes to take their prisoner. His story concerning an accomplice's holding the bank president's wife as hostage was entirely false.

A lone bandit made the mistake of approaching a teller in a small country bank. He failed to consider the fact that the lobby of the bank is separated from the bank proper by a reinforced steel wall and that the only door from the bank lobby to the bank proper is steel reinforced and opens from the inside. This particular setup makes it virtually impossible for a bandit to force the employees within this reinforced area to answer his commands. In addition, the one teller's window is protected by bulletproof glass, and in easy reach are the burglar alarm and a tear gas gun directed at the area in front of the teller's window. Instead of complying with the lone bandit's demand for money, the teller reached for the tear gas release. The bandit fled.

A lone, female teller in a midwestern bank was approached by two middle-aged men who ap-

PROFITLESS HOLDUP

A southern bank which was robbed at gunpoint in recent years showed a profit as a result of the robbery.

A kidnaped man was forced to drive the bank robber to the bank and enter with him. Inside the bank, the robber seized another hostage and, after securing \$10,000 of the bank's funds, ordered both hostages to accompany him.

Irate citizens, after staging a running gun battle, wounded and captured the gunman. In the struggle, the stolen money was scattered about the street.

After the robber was subdued, the money was gathered up and turned over to the bank president. An audit after the robbery revealed that the bank had an excess of 80 cents.

peared to be more than slightly inebriated. They asked to be admitted to the teller's area. The teller, safely ensconced behind bulletproof glass, refused. "Shoot her," said one of the men. "With this?" inquired the other, holding up a toy, glass pistol. The two, after holding a brief conference, shuffled out.

In many other cases in which the proposed victim was not as adequately protected as in the cases just cited, quick thinking, nerve, and a good bit of luck on the part of the employees and the absence of these same qualities on the part of the would-be robber combined to foil the attempt. In one bank an armed man approached a female teller, pushing through the window a note which read, "Fill this bag with money or die." The teller asked, "Why pick on me?" and dropped down behind the counter. The bandit then fled.

In another bank, a 62-year-old man who said he had been drinking all night walked into a bank, hand in pocket simulating a gun, and demanded that a teller give him all the money. The teller merely stared at the man. The would-be robber cautioned the teller not to "get funny" as two men were waiting outside the door, and anyway the money was insured, so why worry! The teller, unimpressed, continued staring. The man nonchalantly walked out. Chasing the bandit, two bank employees hailed a police cruiser and the man was picked up within 5 minutes. He was on foot and had no gun. His reason for the attempted robbery? He was afraid of going broke.

One cashier, although he was at the wrong end of a gun held by a bank robber, remonstrated, "You'd better get out of here before you get hurt," ducked under the counter and pushed an alarm. The robber took his advice.

An employee of a bank foiled an attempted robbery by refusing to take seriously a note handed to her by a man who, while drinking heavily, or so he said, had decided to rob a bank. First, he walked into the bank and noted the name of a female teller. Then he went to a nearby drug-store, checked the telephone directory, found her home phone listed under her husband's name, noted the name, and dialed the number. By skillfully questioning the person who answered the phone, he verified the fact that he had the correct name of the husband and wife and also determined that they had one son. He then wrote this note: "Mrs. ———, your husband ——— and your son are outside in a car with my friend. Do not get nervous. Get me a sack of big bills. Do

not say anything for 30 minutes and they will not be hurt. *Their life depends on you.* Don't be foolish." When he handed his intended victim the note, she looked at it and promptly handed it to an adjoining teller. The unsuccessful robber turned and ran. Police officers, alerted by employees, caught him very shortly hiding in a garage about a block from the bank. At police headquarters he failed to recognize the man he supposedly had kidnaped—the teller's husband who was a member of the police department.

Another bank employee literally "ran for his life" about 6:35 one morning. It was his custom to arrive at the bank ahead of the other employees to do bookkeeping work. As he drove up to the bank on this particular morning, he noted a car parked in front of the bank. The hood was up and a person wearing a mechanic's clothing was apparently working on the motor. One person was seated in the car. The bank employee, getting out of his car and reaching into the back seat to get his briefcase, paid little attention to the two men until he felt a gun in his back and heard the "mechanic" say, "I mean business. We want to get in the vault. Walk to the front door and if you run I'll shoot." As they walked toward the bank, the employee told the "mechanic" that he couldn't open the vault as it was on a time lock. To this the bandit replied, "You're a liar. I have been watching you for 2 months. Get going." Fearing that the bandit would lock him in the unvented vault, the employee decided to run. As he took off in one direction on foot, the two bandits took off in another by car. They did not shoot at the fleeing employee, made no further attempt to enter the bank and did not take the employee's briefcase, which contained over \$45,000 in checks.

A 42-year-old man, who said he had been unemployed for 3 months and drinking heavily, purchased a toy gun from a dime store, entered a San Francisco bank, and demanded money from a female teller who noted that the gun was a toy. As she gathered the money together, she tripped an alarm connected to the manager's office and to the police department. The teller managed to stall the subject until the manager and his assistant came. They held the robber until the police arrived.

An off-duty patrolman singlehandedly captured the would-be robber of one bank. A lone armed bandit entered the bank, announcing that he wanted "all of the money." One of the two employees on duty told him to take all of it, and then,

seeing someone at the door, called out, "Come in, everybody, come in." The robber, becoming nervous, ran toward the back, asking for a rear exit. The other employee pointed out a door to him and when he entered it, slammed the door, thereby imprisoning the bandit in a small back room. Simultaneously, a patrolman who was off duty and out of uniform entered the front door with gun drawn, identifying himself just in time to prevent being hit over the head with a piece of lead pipe wielded by one of the employees who thought he was an accomplice of the robber. The patrolman ordered the bandit to throw his gun over the door of the back room where he was imprisoned and then arrested him. The man, who was identified as an escapee from prison where he was serving a 40-year term for armed robbery, had tried to escape from the back room, but bars over the window had prevented it.

The young man who selected a southern bank as his victim after "riding around for miles looking for a small town bank to rob" failed to reckon with the 72-year-old manager's determination to maintain the bank's reputation of never having been robbed in its 56-year history. The elderly man, deciding to meet fire with fire, threatened the intruder with his shotgun and the latter fled.

Occasional Violence

In the cases just cited the bank employees resisted the demands of the robber and escaped injury. Such, however, is not always the case. When an employee of a Los Angeles bank failed to obey the commands of an armed robber, the robber struck him severely on the head with his gun. The gun discharged, the bullet striking the wall, and the robber fled.

In Pennsylvania, a 24-year-old man, unemployed for 2 months, "cased" a bank and found that one employee came to work early every day. One morning he gained entry by asking to buy travelers' checks, struck the employee with a blackjack in the back and bit him severely over the eye. He then tied and gagged him but was frightened away by the arrival of other employees. The other employees obtained the license number of the getaway car and police officers caught the robber less than an hour later.

In Indiana, a bank examiner was accidentally shot in the arm by a nervous gunman who said he had consumed seven bottles of beer prior to committing the robbery.

In a very brutal robbery, the assistant manager of a Louisiana bank was killed and the manager wounded while scuffling with an armed robber. After the shooting, the determined robber returned to the vault and collected over \$20,000 before fleeing. Approximately 45 minutes later and 15 miles away the bandit was killed by State troopers while resisting arrest.

These examples prove that, although the trend today may be away from robbers assaulting, kidnapping, and killing bank employees, it often proves unwise for a person in an exposed area to offer resistance. Although the majority of the robbers treated their victims with surprising consideration, often inquiring as to whether vaults were vented before locking employees and customers in them and continually assuring them that "no one would be hurt if they would just cooperate," the example of the Louisiana killer-bandit whose motto reportedly was "Nothing is going to stop me" should certainly deter any foolhardy action on the part of employees or customers. In 75 of the 100 cases studied, robbers actually carried guns. They were fired, either intentionally or accidentally, in only seven of those cases, but that number is sufficient to make employees and customers wary. One customer succinctly remarked that he thought about tackling one of the robbers and then remembered his "wife and nine kids."

Guns and Fakes

In the 25 cases studied in which guns were not used, a blackjack was used in 1, guns were simulated in 13, and toy guns were used in the remaining 11. Inquiry at nearby stores revealed that in at least two instances the toy gun had been purchased only a short time before the robbery was committed. As other cited cases illustrate, the weapon, whether toy or real, was frequently borrowed or stolen. In cases where toy guns were used, the owner was occasionally found to be the young son of the robber. In attempting to get rid of their weapons, both toy and real, the robbers often threw them out of the window of the getaway car. Others buried the weapons or threw them into bodies of water.

Value of Witnesses

In the 100 cases studied, local officers and FBI Agents found alert bank employees, customers, and other witnesses of inestimable aid in solving

some cases and of no value whatsoever in others. As has been mentioned earlier, some employees and customers actually held the robber until the police arrived.

In many other cases, witnesses were able to get the license number and a description of the getaway car. One quick-thinking witness jotted the license number down in the dust on a parked vehicle. In another case a telephone linesman "shinnied" up a telephone pole, succeeded in getting a connection with the police emergency line, and relayed to the police the license number of the getaway car and the route it had taken.

In early 1954, a businessman noted a "suspicious" car in the vicinity of a nearby savings and loan association. He jotted down the license number. When the association was robbed a few days later, he furnished this license number to the police. This action led to the solution of this case, plus another.

The fact that an alert citizen in one town took down the license number of the car belonging to a man who he thought was acting "peculiarly" led to the discovery of the identity of a man who robbed a hardware store and attempted to rob a bank. The man went into a hardware store and asked to see a gun and some ammunition. He loaded the gun, pointed it at the female clerk who was alone at the time, took the money from the cash register, and departed. Later that day he used the same gun in an attempted bank robbery. He failed to obtain any money as the vault had been locked for the night, and the employee with the key had already gone home for the day.

Inquiry around the neighborhood of other banks, especially in small towns, revealed that strangers had been seen loitering round the area. In some cases, service station operators recalled having serviced the automobiles which later proved to be the getaway cars.

The personnel of a taxi company in a southern city was directly responsible for the prompt apprehension of a bank robber. The police department gave a complete description of the robber to taxi companies with radio facilities with the request that it be broadcasted over their radio systems. Personnel of one of the companies informed the police that a man answering that description had hired one of their cabs a few minutes earlier. They gave the police a description of the cab, its number, and the route which the driver was taking to a city in a nearby State. Shortly after police had broadcasted this information, a

constable along the cab's route apprehended the suspect. The cab driver, who was unaware that his passenger was a criminal, stated that very early that morning he had seen the man who later became his passenger and the man had inquired as to what times the banks opened. He said he later drove him to a bank, waited for him while he transacted his business, and then, after checking in at the taxi company headquarters, started for the town in the nearby State. (The robbery was only a secondary crime in this case as a few hours prior to robbing the bank the subject had killed a police officer.)

TELLTALE SPOT IDENTIFIES ROBBER

A small brown stain on the right side of the shirt worn by the robber of a savings and loan association last year proved to be the bandit's undoing.

At about 2:30 one summer afternoon, a short, slender man, approximately 40 years of age, carrying a brown leather briefcase, requested a private conversation with an official of a savings and loan association located in an eastern city. After the two men had retired to an office, the official asked his visitor to produce his credentials. The latter thereupon drew a gun from his coat pocket, ordered the official to lie on the floor and proceeded to tie his hands and feet. The observant official, having an opportunity for a close-range view of his captor, noted a small brown stain on the right side of the latter's shirt.

Shortly afterwards, two other employees of the association were tied up by the gunman. After opening the cash drawers, the robber stuffed more than \$4,000 into the briefcase and left the crime scene.

The FBI and local police authorities initiated an immediate investigation. Personnel at local public transportation facilities were alerted and were furnished descriptive data concerning the fugitive.

At approximately 6:30 p. m. an official at a nearby airlines office reported to the FBI that an individual who answered the description of the robber had purchased a ticket for a flight scheduled to leave at 8:56 p. m. The airlines representative noticed the spot on the right front of the suspect's shirt.

FBI Agents met the suspect as he awaited his flight. He was unable to identify himself satisfactorily and a fully loaded .32 Colt revolver was found in the left front pocket of his trousers. During a search of his personal effects, the suspect gave his name and admitted having committed the savings and loan association robbery earlier that day.

According to the robber, in his detailed planning to elude detection he had made careful preparations in order to prevent leaving fingerprints during the course of the robbery. He, however, had no way of knowing that a small spot on his shirt front would be observed by an alert victim and would, within a matter of hours, lead to his capture.

Early in 1954, a female bank robber's male accomplice was implicated in two attempted robberies simply because witnesses informed investigators that they had seen a man accompanying the woman prior to the robberies. A woman, apparently alone, robbed a Los Angeles bank. Approximately 3 weeks later she attempted to rob another bank in Los Angeles. Each time she presented a note and simulated a gun by holding her hand in her purse. The second time she was captured, after a terrific struggle, by bank employees and customers. During the commotion, her friend, who had stood quietly behind her in line both times, calmly walked out of the bank unnoticed. Investigators, however, were informed by a witness that the woman had been accompanied earlier in the day by a man and the search was on. The following day he was located and apprehended. He admitted that he had accompanied the woman into the banks both times.

SILVER BELT BUCKLE IS VITAL CLUE

In the recent past a bank in a Midwestern State was robbed of more than \$42,000. Less than 57 hours later the bandit was apprehended, with a silver belt buckle having played an important part in his apprehension.

Approximately 3 hours after the robbery, alert police officers discovered the getaway car. Investigation revealed that it had been stolen and the rightful owner stated that a number of articles which he had left in the automobile had been removed. Among these articles was a hand-tooled leather belt with a silver buckle and belt tip. In an extensive search of highways and side roads which could have been used by the robber as an avenue of escape, investigators located several articles, including the leather belt. The silver buckle and belt tip had been cut off with a sharp instrument, but the owner was still able to make a positive identification of the belt.

A detailed list of the remaining stolen articles and a description of the robber as furnished by witnesses at the bank were made available to business places in the vicinity of the robbery. Two days after the robbery, a suspect was reported to have purchased a hand-tooled leather belt. He said that he did not need a buckle as he had a "beautiful silver one at home."

FBI Agents went to the suspect's home and, with the permission of his wife, searched it. In the search, they found a silver buckle and belt tip, with a small piece of leather attached to each. When compared with the belt discarded by the bandit, the cut and the leather matched perfectly, thus becoming an important part of the evidence in the case. The suspect was subsequently located and arrested. He admitted the robbery of the bank, plus other criminal activities. He was later sentenced to serve 15 years in prison.

The fact that witnesses had seen the woman place the demand note in her blouse resulted in the recovery of this important bit of evidence. The woman later removed it from her blouse and hid it in the bank's stationery room where she was locked to await the arrival of officers. After considerable search, FBI Agents recovered the note, crumpled and torn, from the stationery supply room. The male accomplice admitted having written it, a fact which the FBI Laboratory verified.

Just minutes before closing time, a customer of a Texas bank attempted to enter the bank but found the door locked. Peeping through the glass, he saw a man who was wearing a hat, apparently working behind the counter. His suspicions aroused, the customer summoned the sheriff. After a brief chase on foot, the sheriff, aided by several citizens, took the two robbers into custody. Thus an alert customer thwarted a \$10,000 robbery.

Employees of one bank furnished so accurate a description of the robber that a newspaper artist was able to sketch an excellent likeness. Publication of this sketch resulted in the immediate apprehension of the robber.

Disguises

Most of the robbers in the cases studied apparently relied on the excitement of the moment to prevent future identification by the witnesses as hoods or masks were worn in only seven cases. In other cases, less effective disguises were used to hinder identification. One bandit used soot to make his complexion appear darker and wore sunglasses. A woman bandit wore a hair switch and a pair of "dime store" glasses, both of which she later abandoned in the ladies' room of a department store. Six robbers held handkerchiefs over their faces, and three of these wore sunglasses. Eleven others relied solely on their sunglasses to prevent identification. One man's nose was so obviously false that his intended victim, thinking he was a prankster, answered his demand for money by placing a penny on the counter. Ignoring this "loot," the robber fled. The robber of a Louisiana bank who was killed while making a getaway had in his possession two false mustaches and mascara to darken his hair and beard. The vast majority of the robbers wore hats or caps, several of which admittedly were purchased and worn to make it difficult for witnesses to see the color of the robbers' hair.

HAT HELPS SOLVE ROBBERY

Shortly after the banking day had begun one morning in mid-1954, two armed men entered a bank in a Western State, forced the manager at gunpoint to open the vault and collected more than \$42,000. An employee ran into the street, excitedly announcing the robbery just as one of the bandits fled on foot and his cohort joined a companion in a getaway car.

FBI Agents investigating the case found a hat, apparently abandoned by the fleet-footed robber. This hat was traced to a cleaner in a nearby town and the owner was identified.

In subsequent investigation FBI Agents located a box containing over \$13,000 in the home of the man who had lost his hat. A latent fingerprint on this box was identified by the FBI Identification Division, thereby definitely identifying another one of the robbers.

In a relatively short time, all three perpetrators of the robbery were identified, placed under arrest, and sentenced. In addition, all of the loot was recovered, with the exception of \$688. The prompt solution of this case rested chiefly on the hat lost by one of the fleeing bandits.

Modus Operandi

The cases studied show that many of the robbers employed similar modus operandi. As a general rule, if two or more persons were involved, they entered together, announced the stickup, and while one stood guard the other or others collected the money. The employees and customers were then herded into a back room or into the vault and the robbers, admonishing them not to try to come out for several minutes, departed.

Notes were used in 20 of the 100 cases studied, chiefly by lone operators. Often these lone bandits quietly approached a teller's window, displayed the note and a gun (or a simulated gun), handed the employee a paper bag, and waited for it to be filled.

In many cases bandits led up to their oral or written demand for money by asking for change, attempting to cash a check, or discussing a loan. Others were more ingenious, as in the case of the "tax collector" already mentioned. Another example of a "different" approach is found in the case of the lone bandit who posed as a stationery salesman carrying a large briefcase filled with "samples." Although the bank executive with whom he talked assured him that the bank was well supplied with stationery, the "salesman" insisted on leaving samples. He opened his brief-

case, pulled out a sawed-off shotgun and forced the manager to accompany him to the tellers' area and to empty the contents of all the cash drawers into his briefcase. Then, warning the employees and customers that his gun "could blow the head off a bull," he herded them into the vault and made his getaway unobserved.

Most Likely Targets

Which institutions are most susceptible to robbery? There is no clear answer to the question, but in case after case the robber admitted that he had ridden around looking for a bank in a small town. One robber even went so far as to inquire from local citizens as to whether the town had a law enforcement officer. When told that it did not, he proceeded to the local bank and robbed it. One pair of robbers got a head start on the law as the small town in which they robbed a bank had no telephone service. The cashier had to drive 12 miles to report the robbery. Nevertheless, the getaway car was located in a nearby State late that same afternoon, and this car, as is often the case, led to the robbers.

Another favorite target of the bank robber is the small branch bank in a large city or the small savings and loan association. Many admitted that in "casing" various banks and loan associations they immediately ruled out the larger institutions which employed many people and which were usually crowded with customers. In some cases, robbers checked several days in advance to see when various employees took their lunch hours and planned their robberies accordingly. Many others checked the closing time of their victim banks and managed to be the last "customer" to enter. Then at gunpoint, they forced the employees to proceed as usual with closing the blinds, locking the doors, and other routine chores so that passers-by would think the bank had closed as usual. Then the robber could leisurely rob the institution. One robber went into a savings and loan association a few minutes before closing time, went to the men's room, and after doors were locked, emerged, gun in hand.

Zero Hour

Although no specific hour was found to be the overwhelming favorite of bank robbers, the study definitely showed that robbers who planned their work with any degree of care usually chose the

bank's closing hour or an hour when some of the employees were at lunch. Many admitted having gone into their victim institutions one, two, or more times, asking for change, cashing checks, or "just looking" in order to determine the time when the building was least crowded. Others who robbed banks or loan associations which they patronized were aware of the most propitious time to enter.

No particular day of the week emerged as a favorite day for bank robbers, although Wednesday and Friday held a slight edge over the other days. In a few cases, robbers planned their work according to payroll deliveries, as already cited, and in one case, the robbers specifically asked for the money which had been delivered 20 minutes earlier. While gathering up this money, the robber inadvertently used profanity, immediately stopped and apologized to the lady from whom he was taking the money, and then continued to collect it.

Motives

Robbers who were apprehended in these cases gave various reasons for their actions. As is indicated in many of the examples just cited, the majority of bank robbers were allegedly either unemployed or in debt, and sometimes both. All were looking for money. Many chose federally insured institutions to rob because "it wouldn't hurt any one person." One man needed money to pay his first wife's alimony; another felt sorry for his wife because "she was having to do a man's work"; another was "nagged into doing it" by his wife—or so he said. Others wanted the money for groceries and other household expenses. Many wanted to pay gambling debts. One robbery was committed so that one of the robbers could obtain money with

PAYING THE FIDDLER

One sad answer to the question, "Why do men rob?" was provided by a bank robber apprehended by FBI Agents in the Midwest last year. The man admitted that he and an accomplice had split evenly the \$30,000 loot they obtained in the robbery of a bank in March 1954.

The arrested man was in possession of two cars purchased with the stolen money, a 1954 convertible and a 1950 sedan. He carried \$4,500 in cash and accounted for \$5,000 of the loot by saying that he had paid it to a dance studio for lifetime dancing lessons.

which to pay a debt he owed to his accomplice in the crime. Another robber wanted to buy a gasoline station so he could "get ahead." One youth had quarreled with his girl friend and wanted money to get out of town as quickly as possible. (After robbing the bank, he made up with his girl friend and they were married.) Another simply thought "he would be sitting on top of the world with all that money." One elderly man was so desperately in need of money that he committed suicide a few days after unsuccessfully trying to rob a bank. (Officials investigating his death found in his room the note used in the attempted robbery, and the intended victim identified him as the person who had presented the note to her.) Another man who was experiencing severe financial difficulties went into a bank to obtain a loan, but when he saw "all that money" an employee was counting, he decided to rob the institution. In case after case, the robber stated that he had been drinking heavily prior to the robbery, often bolstering his courage in a nearby bar just minutes before the robbery. It is not known, however, how many of these alibis were true or how many were conveniently invented in an effort to convince the court that the robber was simply a victim of drink or other circumstances rather than the premeditative type of criminal who might be expected to be more heavily penalized for his actions.

In many of the robberies studied, investigators easily recovered every cent of the money taken, but in other instances recovery was more difficult. Judging by these cases, investigators can expect to find money hidden in city dumps, lumber piles, garages, and steam rollers; in ash trays, heaters, trunks and headlights of cars; concealed behind partitions in attics and sheet rock in bathrooms; in thermos jugs, shoe boxes, detached couch arms, and babies' toys. One man mailed part of the loot to himself, and another mailed a box of dollar bills to his father. Two robbers washed in dirty water the new money they had stolen to make it appear worn and older.

How did the robbers spend the money that was not "stored" for future reference? One young man summed up fairly well the use to which most of the robbers put their money when he said, "I paid some bills and had me some good times!"

Value of Arrest Records as a Lead

Mention an unsolved robbery and the experienced investigator will immediately start to turn the

pages of his memory or files on known hoodlums. Experience has taught the value of this approach. But are there exceptions to it, and, if so, what is their relative importance? To answer these questions more conclusively a second study was made, entirely independent of that mentioned heretofore, of 100 bank robbery cases chosen at random, which were closed by prosecution and conviction in 1954. When the summaries were tabulated, 80 were found to be robberies of banks and 20 were robberies of savings and loan institutions.

There were 187 robbers involved in these 100 robberies. Fifty-five of them, or slightly more than 29 percent had no fingerprint arrest record in the files of the FBI prior to their arrest for this crime. Another 25 robbers, or slightly more than 13 percent of the total, had been fingerprinted once on a criminal charge. Another 16 of the robbers had been fingerprinted twice on criminal charges and 12 more had been fingerprinted 3 times. The remaining 79 robbers had been fingerprinted from 4 to 26 times each on criminal charges.

In 22 of the 100 cases none of the robbers had a fingerprint arrest record on file with the FBI prior to their arrest for these robberies. This group of 22 cases included 2 robberies committed by 3 persons each, 6 robberies committed by 2 robbers each, and 14 cases of lone robbers.

In an additional 18 cases of the 100, one or more persons without prior FBI criminal records participated in the robbery with others who did have records. By adding these 18 cases to the 22 mentioned in the preceding paragraph it can be seen that in 40 cases of the 100 the investigator was looking for at least one robber who had not previously been fingerprinted on criminal charges, so far as shown by the records of the FBI.

What of the 132 robbers, slightly more than 70 percent of the total, who did have prior FBI records ranging from 1 to 26 arrests? In how many cases would these records make their possessors appear as logical suspects in the robbery of a bank or a savings and loan institution?

A review of the arrest records for all of the 132 robbers who had prior FBI records showed that 36 of them had been arrested for robbery, 3 for suspicion of robbery and 1 for assault with intent to commit robbery, a total of 40 involved in some type of arrest for robbery. Also of possible interest is the fact that of the 132, 18 had been arrested for burglary and 2 for suspicion of burglary. Other arrests for the 132 robbers were for a great variety of charges such as drunken driv-

ing, vagrancy, pickpocket, theft, assault with intent to murder, and for investigation.

Local Talent

The study indicated that in a large majority of these robberies some "local talent" or "area talent" was involved. In 78 of the 100 cases the homes of the robbers were within a radius of approximately 100 miles of the institution which they robbed. In 33 of these 78 cases at least one of the robbers lived in the city or town where the robbery occurred. The cities and towns in these cases were usually large. Robbers who robbed institutions in small towns usually selected a victim in another town within the general area.

Robberies committed by complete strangers from distant places brought out some interesting situations. Two truck drivers said they "cased" various banks along their route of travel and then chose the one "easiest" to rob. Two brothers from Pennsylvania stopped for food and wine while traveling through Virginia, saw a loan association attended by only two women, robbed it and drove on home. Twenty days later they drove down from Pennsylvania and robbed the same place again. One man went to another State, lost his money at gambling, and then robbed a bank in the town where he had been gambling. In six other cases, all involving lone robbers, the bandits were visiting relatives or friends in the immediate vicinity of the institutions which they robbed.

As all law enforcement officers know, swift apprehension and certain punishment are proven deterrents to bank robbery. Whenever a bank is successfully looted, the confidence and boldness of the bank-robbing element are increased and other banks are earmarked for robbery at some future date. One bank robber who was apprehended immediately after robbing a bank described his escapade as an "unsuccessful business venture." When law enforcement, through the continued cooperation of local, State, and Federal officers, reaches the point that all such "business ventures" become unsuccessful, then—and only then—will the number of people undertaking these ventures begin to show a definite decrease!

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The general limitation on prosecution of Federal criminal cases was recently extended, by statute, from 3 years to 5 years.

POLICE TRAINING

Colorado Officers Hold Annual Crime Schools in Boulder

by MYRON M. TEEGARDEN, *Chief of Police,
Boulder, Colo.*

Boulder, Colo., the county seat of Boulder County and the home of the University of Colorado, not too long ago was the scene of two particularly atrocious crimes. I refer to the brutal murder of a university coed in 1948 and a sadistic beating resulting in the death of another university student, a young man, in the early summer of 1949. Neither of these crimes occurred within the corporate limits of the city of Boulder, but, nevertheless, we were vitally interested in them and actively engaged in the subsequent investigation by assisting the sheriff of Boulder County and his staff.

These crimes brought sharply into focus the realization that we were totally unprepared to ade-

quately and proficiently pursue a homicide investigation to a successful conclusion. This is not surprising, perhaps, when we consider that our experience in dealing with this type of crime, in the city of Boulder, was extremely limited. For, if my memory serves me right, we had had only two homicides in the city in the 15 years immediately preceding, and in both of those cases the perpetrator was apprehended at the scene. So, the techniques and methods for the conduct of an efficient and effective homicide investigation were, to us, somewhat nebulous. And it may well be that some of the criticism directed toward us was, to some extent, justified. While no one questioned our perseverance or diligence, it did appear to some of the



A class in fingerprinting.

bystanders that there were some lost motion and misdirected action. Nevertheless, the perpetrator of the first-mentioned crime was apprehended and convicted. We are still looking for the murderer of the young man who was killed in 1949.

As may well be imagined, these two brutal murders aroused this community as it had never been aroused before. The officials of the University of Colorado, reflecting the anxiety of the parents of students enrolled here, were alarmed and deeply concerned over what the future might hold in store with respect to sex crimes perpetrated upon their students. This quiet little college town had suddenly been headlined in all the important newspapers; radio stations throughout the Nation called attention to the brutal crimes. Our citizens were afraid. Moreover, the feeling of apprehension on the part of our university officials was communicated to those responsible for the safety of students in other universities throughout the country.


Crime Conference Held

Dr. Robert L. Stearns, then president of the university, called a 4-day crime conference to be held at the university, August 15-18, 1949, with the following objectives: "The conference hoped to achieve a dual purpose, to increase understanding of the problems of crimes of violence, and to explore ways in which provisions for prevention of crime and for detection, apprehension and treatment of criminals could be strengthened and improved." In attendance were law enforcement officials, sociologists, penologists, lawyers, psychiatrists, and legal authorities from many other States, and even foreign countries.

As chief of police (I had been appointed January 1, 1949), I attended the sessions of the conference with one of my officers, but the sum total of our conclusions of the value of the conference to the law enforcement official was that it missed the mark.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I feel that even in this day of enlightenment and progress the matter of causation of the crime and treatment of the offender presents a field of endeavor much too broad in scope for the police profession to assume. We did feel, however, that after the ball had been kicked around it had been tossed to us to carry to the goal; we were under the impression that the next move was ours.

Thus came about the decision to ascertain by



Chief Myron M. Teegarden.

what means we could acquire the training necessary to competently carry on the detection and investigation of crimes of violence, so that in the future we would not be caught in a position which could bring criticism on our methods or knowledge.

Realizing that we had no one capable of conducting training classes of the type desired, we cast around for some source of instruction. We contacted the resident agent of the FBI, who assured us that Mr. Hoover, Director of the FBI, was vitally interested in the promotion of police training and would look with favor upon our request to provide instructors for a comprehensive training program.

I discussed with Sheriff Arthur Everson the proposal to set up a 5-day school to be sponsored by his office and this department. The sheriff was of the same mind as I: let's do something about this training program. Accordingly, Mr. Hoover was contacted with respect to furnishing instructors and the first school was on the way. As it was contemplated that this would be a permanent institution, we decided to call it the first annual crime school.

As may be understood from the preceding data, our main interest at this time was that of homicide investigation. Accordingly, the theme or curriculum was built around that type of case.

First Annual Crime School

In the light of past experience concerning training needs, the theme or curriculum for the first school was built around a simulated kidnaping and murder. Accordingly, the subjects to be taught were selected on the basis of their application to that type of crime. Scripts were written by the Special Agent in Charge of the Denver, Colo., office of the FBI and his staff. The school was to be jointly sponsored by the sheriff's office and the Boulder Police Department. Invitations were sent to every sheriff and police chief in the State, outlining the purpose of the school and the type of instruction offered. Seven Agents of the FBI participated as instructors and the first annual crime school opened on the morning of November 14, 1949.

As the instruction consisted of classroom lectures, as well as field work on practical problems, it was necessary to secure rooms for that purpose. Arrangements were made with the school board for the use of the second floor of the high-school fieldhouse as classrooms. The classroom was set up as a police station, as it was here that the simulated crime was to be reported. A young woman came to the station to report that the night before she and her fiance had driven in his car to a spot near Gregory Canyon, where they parked to discuss the plans for their approaching wedding. They had been there but a short time when an armed man accosted them, and, after a few words with her fiance, forcibly removed him from the car and took him away in his car.

It was at this spot that the investigation started. From information obtained from the young woman, it developed that her fiance had been staying at a cottage camp just east of the city. In carrying on the investigation, many methods, procedures and techniques were employed.

As it had been decided that this was to be a two-part problem, the second part providing the theme for the second annual school, much emphasis was placed on the importance of preserving all evidence and developing facts in such manner that the data could be used at a later date. The first part was to successfully complete the investigation to the point where an arrest for the commission of the crime was made, with the second part to consist

of the presentation of evidence for the prosecution of the alleged perpetrator.

This schedule pointed up the necessity for taking notes and writing reports. This was one place where I felt that we had been lax in our previous investigations. In my opinion, too much stress cannot be placed upon the importance of properly recording all phases of an investigation in a chronological manner and with strict attention to detail. This subject was thoroughly covered by our instructors.

As we had ascertained where the kidnap victim had been staying, it was necessary to go into the matter of latent fingerprints, the search for them, and how to photograph and lift them.

At this point, information was received at the "police station" that a car had been seen at the southeast outskirts of the city and that the occupant had been acting in a suspicious manner. As we had not yet been able to locate the kidnap victim, it was decided to investigate that area. Accordingly, a crime scene search was set up. The search party was organized under the direction of one of the instructors and the resulting crime scene search was something to witness. The area covered about 5 acres in size and, while the finding of the body did not present too much of a problem, the matter of finding the murder weapon, an automatic pistol, and the discharged shells did cause some trouble. They were found, however.

The finding of the body, weapon, and cartridge cases then brought into focus the need for obtaining blood specimens, fingerprints, tire marks, footprints, and the like. A lecture on firearms identification followed with the firing of test shots for comparison purposes. The testing of blood samples was also demonstrated.

The use of photography (it has been proved to us that a photograph is worth a thousand words) and the charting of crime scenes were introduced at this time.

Gunpowder tests—paraffin and powder pattern—were demonstrated with a classroom lecture on the practicability of making the tests and what could be deduced from them. Soil, hair, and fiber analysis was the subject of another lecture period.

The making of plaster casts was demonstrated with a discussion period on how this might best be done and the importance of making casts of tire marks, foot and heel prints, and the like. Moulage prints for tool marks were demonstrated.

Laboratory Examination

Many of the items of evidence such as clues, traces, and the like would be of little value to the small departments, however, without the services of technicians and/or laboratory equipment to interpret and identify them for presentation before the court. Therefore, classroom periods were utilized to bring to our attention the services of the FBI Laboratory which are available to law enforcement agencies in the furthering of their efforts. Methods of proper preservation, wrapping and shipping of all such evidence were stressed, together with the importance of handling it in such a manner that the continuity of handling could be traced with certainty.

The sessions of the first school were brought to a close by the receipt of information that the person we were looking for had hidden in a cabin in the mountains to the west of the city. This development brought about the organization of a raiding party to effect the arrest. This also presented a problem of considerable magnitude in rough mountainous country but, under the capable leadership of our instructors, the arrest was made. The school closed with the arrest of John Doe who was to be held in custody pending his trial in district court the following year. All evidence of every kind was properly identified, marked and preserved for the second annual crime school.

At the second school the matter of case preparation was the subject of lecture periods. The presentation of evidence and courtroom demeanor were discussed in an attempt to prove that it is possible to lose cases in the courtroom through improper and/or incomplete case preparation and a slipshod manner of testifying.

I have attempted through the medium of the preceding pages to show how the first school was set up to fill a definite need for specific types of training. As each successive school was set up, the need for instruction in other phases of investigative techniques, methods and procedures became apparent. So, during the next 4 years, other subjects were added to the curriculum.

Burglary investigation in all its phases—safe jobs, carryout, and otherwise—was the subject of practical field problems as well as lecture periods.

Hit-and-run-accident investigations were, by request, added to the subjects taught from year to year, as was apprehension of armed subjects in rooms, buildings and automobiles. Armed robbery problems were set up and successfully worked.



Photographing a heel print.

An extortion problem, worked out at night, proved to be an interesting as well as an informative activity. The taking and study of handwriting and typewriting specimens were discussed. In fact, I do not know of any subject dealing with criminal investigation or any other phases of police science which has not, at some time or other, been included in the subjects taught.

Four years ago we added a fingerprint class to the school. This class operates independently of the other classes and is concerned with the classifying and filing of prints. It has been very successful and probably accounts for more tangible results than any of the other classes. I know from my own experience that before that time we did not have a fingerprint file or anyone who could classify prints. I sent one of my men to the first class—this is a 5-day course—and upon completion of the course he was able to classify prints and, therefore, was able to set up a fingerprint file. This training has been invaluable to our department. I have since enrolled two other members in this class.

Organizing a School

At this point, lest those who read this article conclude that setting up training programs such as



Organizing the crime scene search.

this is a simple matter, let me point out that such is not the case.

To get a training program rolling, many things must be taken into consideration. An auditorium or other large room must be secured for the opening of the school. Arrangements must be made for the use of hotel rooms or motel cabins for crime scenes. Proprietors of service stations or other businesses must be contacted and asked to cooperate by permitting their places of business to be used in staging practical problems. The same people are also asked to assist by taking part in the problem either as witnesses or victims. In the case of homicides, dummies must be obtained. Automobiles must be borrowed from car dealers. Classrooms must be arranged for. Other items, too numerous to mention, such as material used for the making of casts, equipment for making photographs, props of all kinds and nature, depending upon type of crime to be simulated, must be obtained.

Notices of the school must be mimeographed and mailed out together with registration cards (three times). Speakers for the opening and the banquet must be secured. Truly, such an undertaking requires a great deal of detailed work.

Now, what have we gained by all this? Several things.

We have, through the publicity given this school, thoroughly convinced the public that we

concede we do not know all there is to know; that we realize our shortcomings and are making an honest and determined effort to overcome them. They know that we are taking advantage of every opportunity to acquire more knowledge of our work that we may better serve them.

We have gained the innate sense of satisfaction that we are becoming more proficient in our chosen work. When we set up a training program, or make the necessary effort to take part in one, we are taking the first step toward the improvement of our status as law enforcement officers and of attaining our goal of professionalization.

Attendance at our schools—the crime schools—should provide the needed stimulus to those who attend to go back to their respective departments with the determination to set up an in-service training program for their own officers.

That is just what we do here. We make use of the knowledge acquired through the instruction received and use it as the basis for a continuous in-service training program—not just for recruits, but for all members of the department.

Notes taken, tape recordings of the lectures, and actual experience in field work dealing with the practical problems provide us with a vast amount of factual material which we can use in our own classroom periods.

(Continued on page 26)

TRAFFIC

Columbia's Program for Traffic Safety Wins IACP Award

by LYLE J. CAMPBELL, *Chief of Police,*
Columbia, S. C.

The city in which I have the privilege of being chief of police, Columbia, S. C., has been signally honored recently by other chiefs throughout the Nation. Our traffic law enforcement division was selected by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as the best for American cities of 50,000 to 100,000 population during the year 1953.

This distinction came to us, as most distinctions do come, as the result of work and planning and devotion to duty. We are proud of the record and would like to share some of our experiences with you by means of the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*.

The award of the IACP is presented annually on the basis of traffic facilities, methods, actual performance and results. Police Chief Herbert T. Jenkins, of Atlanta, Ga., a member of the IACP Executive Committee which presented the plaque, said the IACP initiated the National Traffic Law Enforcement Award in 1948 because the association felt that traffic departments, State highway departments, and other groups merited additional recognition for their work. The records upon which the IACP award is based are taken from National Safety Council records and there is no conflict between the two groups.

Most of my service with the Columbia Department prior to being named chief was in the traffic division, which I joined in 1930 as a patrolman. I became traffic sergeant in 1934 and 2 years later was promoted to traffic lieutenant; consequently, I have been close to the traffic problems. I have found that the solutions to many of these problems were facilitated by close contact with the citizens. If we can get our people to understand what we are up against, we can secure their cooperation more easily.

We had some success prior to 1953. Our traffic division, under the direction of Capt. B. F. Pruitt, in 1947 placed first in the Nation for cities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000 in the National Pedestrian Protection Contest. Columbia received the third place award in this contest in 1951. The National Safety Council has given

honorable mention to our over-all safety record. The IACP gave Columbia fourth place in traffic safety activities for three consecutive years—1950, 1951, and 1952.

How have we done it?

Good Public Relations

Our department is constantly conducting programs designed to attract the attention of citizens and instill in them greater consciousness of the necessity for traffic safety.

Last year, members of the traffic division safety section participated in meetings with 28,450 people. The department used 53 hours of radio time for safety talks. Safety literature was distributed to 5,770 school students.

In cooperation with the junior chamber of commerce, the department staged a "March of Death" parade, complete with bands playing funeral dirges and floats showing the results of careless



Chief Lyle J. Campbell.

driving. To our knowledge, this was one of the first uses of such devices for increasing safety-consciousness here.

Captain Pruitt and I agreed we wanted to shock the people into the reality of death on the highways.

Safety Patrolman W. J. Shirah visits all public schools in conducting a well-rounded program of safety education for children. He addresses adult gatherings and clubs to explain the need and means of achieving greater safety in crowded traffic conditions. He also organizes and takes charge of the schoolboy patrols. Along with Captain Pruitt and Capt. G. S. Friday, he also assists in the presentation of 3 television and 5 radio programs each week. These programs revolve around a certain theme in safety. They usually are put over by using a panel, or through demonstrations.

Mr. Shirah is well versed and thoroughly trained in lecturing on the various points in traffic safety,


laws, correct driving habits and in persuading the public to "lend an ear."

More Quick, Fewer Dead

The effect of the traffic safety program can best be judged by results. Traffic fatalities totaled 37 persons in the city of Columbia during the period 1940 through 1942, which exceeds by four persons the total number of traffic fatalities for the entire 5-year period, 1947 through 1951. This record has been attained in spite of the greatly increased number of vehicles and large population growth during this period.

Traffic fatalities for the entire 5-year period prior to 1946 totaled 59 in comparison with the 33 persons killed in the 5-year period following 1946.

Each year a Columbia automobile dealer and the junior chamber of commerce contribute a sta-



Chief Campbell (right) and Officer W. J. Shirah discuss "Signs of Life" used in public lectures.

tion wagon for the use of the safety section of the Columbia Police Department. This vehicle is specially equipped to assist the safety section in carrying out its program. The equipment includes a transformer to tape-record traffic accidents at the scene, a camera, movie projector, and a traffic signboard for demonstration purposes.

Columbia was one of the first cities in the State to license bicycles when it initiated the program of selling 50-cent bike tags. These bike tags are valid for 2 years before renewal. Pruitt describes them as insurance against loss or theft.

When the owner applies for a license, he must give the color, number and make of his bike as well as his address for police files. This information aids the police in locating him as well as the bike if it is lost or stolen. At the time he applies he is also given a pamphlet instructing a bike driver in traffic safety and in the right and wrong operation of his vehicle.

Cellophane tape for reflector purposes is given the bike owners. It has been provided by the junior chamber of commerce from the profits derived from the sale of reflector tape to automobile owners.

New traffic signals are partly responsible for the cutting down on pedestrian accidents. These signals stop all traffic during a "walk" period on busy downtown corners. Then all pedestrians are stopped while traffic goes in each direction.

Traffic channeling at busy intersections has been one of our programs in the past few years. We think the increase in traffic channeling has decreased traffic accidents.

Columbia has now used radar for 3 years to cut down on speeding offenses and to obtain more convictions on arrests for this offense.


A 99-percent conviction rate was tabulated on the 701 drunk drivers taken into custody in 1953.

Personnel

The department has 138 trained men and women to serve the public's needs. The average age of the Columbia policeman is 38.7 years and his average time of service is 8.9 years.

Captain Friday is a graduate of the traffic police administration course, a 5-month intensive training course given at Northwestern University. There now are 15 men with the department who have attended the Traffic Institute at Northwestern, Evanston, Ill.

In order to become a member of the force



The IACP award.

recruit must be 21 to 31 years old, at least 5 feet 9 inches in height, weigh at least 160 pounds, and be in good health. He must have a high-school education. Several members of the department are college graduates. All applicants must pass the city civil-service examination. In addition, we like to have our recruits in the traffic division possess another qualification—a real desire to help solve traffic problems.



Capt. B. F. Pruitt, traffic division.

OTHER TOPICS

With the recent completion of a new police station and municipal court building, the citizens of Gary, Ind., at last have a structure of which they can be proud.

Gary was founded in the sand dunes at the southern tip of Lake Michigan by the United States Steel Corporation in 1906 and it has mushroomed from nothing to a city of over 150,000 persons. As in any community which grows rapidly, problems arose as new and better services were demanded by the increasing population. The original city hall, which was erected in 1908, housed all city administrative offices as well as the police and fire stations. A new city hall was erected in 1925 which relieved the police department of congestion for a time but the situation deteriorated after a few years and the department

Features of the New Police Station in Gary

by JOHN F. FOLEY, *Chief of Police, Gary, Ind.*

was again pinched for space in which to function properly. Ground for a new police-court building was broken in 1951 and construction got under way the following year. It was hampered by shortages of critical material for a long period but eventually was completed under the administration of City Mayor Peter Mandich.

The building, of modern design, is buff brick construction with facing of Indiana limestone. On the first floor of the police station is an entrance lobby, and behind a marble counter are the desk sergeant, communications officer and complaint clerk. To the left rear are the traffic bureau and office of the station commander. At the left side of the entrance lobby is the office of the city clerk where traffic fines can be paid at any time of the day or night and bonds may be posted.



The desk sergeant's space and glass enclosed radio room in the main lobby.

On the first floor of the south wing of the building are the records bureau, telephone switchboard and rest rooms. Also located on this floor are the squad room, where the patrol division reports for roll call, and the office of the patrol sergeants. Each officer has a full length locker assigned to him, and it is located in the squad room in the proximity of a shower room and lavatory.


On the second floor are the office of the chief, the office of the chief of detectives, and the detective bureau. At the east end of the detective bureau there is a modern showup stage for the viewing of suspects in various crimes. Each team of detectives has an individual desk assigned to it for the making and filing of reports. A soundproofed room containing the polygraph machine and three other soundproofed questioning rooms are located adjacent to the detective bureau. A full basement in the building, which is utilized by the training division, contains a classroom and library, a gymnasium with equipment for use in the teaching of defensive tactics, etc., and a shower room. A 75-foot pistol range with an office for the range officer is located next to the gymnasium. All officers are required to shoot once a month. The bureau of identification and photo laboratory are also on this level.

The second floor of the south wing is occupied by the city court and the offices of the prosecuting attorney, bailiff and probation officer as well as the judge's chambers.



Chief of Police John F. Foley.

At the rear of the police station proper is the jail. At ground level there is a garage with automatic doors at each end which enable squad cars or a patrol wagon to bring prisoners inside without getting out of the car. A loading platform and receiving cell for prisoners are on this level. In the receiving cell there is an elevator which is used to take prisoners up to a second level where



Front view of the building.

the turnkey's office is located, and it is here that prisoners are searched and booked. There are three tiers of cells divided into blocks of varying capacities. There are a block for juvenile boys, another for juvenile girls, a block for women and two blocks for male prisoners. In addition there are three padded and rubberized cells for mental patients housed temporarily in jail. There is a total of 82 double cells, each equipped with toilet and lavatory. At the end of each cell block a shower has been installed. All cells can be opened or closed individually or collectively by the turnkey from a corridor outside the cell block. A corridor completely surrounds each cell block, enabling the man on duty to check all cells without having to enter the cell block proper. All plumbing and lighting fixtures are accessible from this corridor, eliminating any maintenance workers having to work in the cell. Floors are of terazzo and all walls are tile, enabling the custodian's staff to hose down each block with a minimum of effort and a maximum of efficiency.

Shortly after the new station was in operation, an "Open House" was held for anyone interested in viewing the building. More than 10,000 persons responded to the invitation and were given guided tours by members of the department. All were impressed and highly satisfied with what they observed.

CRIME SCHOOLS

(Continued from page 20)

The old order changeth. The age-old popular conception of a police officer as being just another individual, broad between the shoulders and narrow between the eyes, must be replaced by the more modern version: that of an alert, ambitious, interested and intelligent student of police science—an individual who has chosen police work as a career, to make it his life's work, not a fill-in until something better comes along.

In late years, the tempo of life has been stepped up. Laws have multiplied in number and complexity; ways of living have become more complicated. Population pressures and changes in communications and transportation have given rise to an increase in perplexing police problems of a ramified nature.

There is an ever-growing challenge to the police profession of today to meet, and solve, the prob-

lems that confront it. We must prepare ourselves to meet future problems of even greater perplexity and magnitude. And how are we to do this? As I see it, the first step must come from within ourselves; we must realize the need for more training that we may keep abreast of the times.

It seems to me a significant corollary that, though most police officials recognize the need, they still do not take the necessary action to insure that police training assumes its rightful place in their department's activities. Why?

Perhaps they should reappraise their administrative methods and, at the same time, evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of their departments with respect to their objectives. If this is done, the need for training will probably overshadow the priority of some of the department's other activities and place training in its proper perspective.

What are we going to do about it?

(Photographs by courtesy of the Denver Post.)



GLASS FRAGMENTS

Glass particles found at the scene of a "hit-and-run" accident have in some cases been sufficient evidence to determine the make of automobile involved.



POISONING SYMPTOMS

In acute poisonings the symptoms exhibited by an individual prior to death are indicative of the type of poison involved. Such information may enable the toxicologist to determine rapidly and with minimum expense the actual poisonous substance causing death. The symptoms which may be obtained from the victim's friends and family or the attending physician should include all information concerning the victim's actions immediately prior to death. Symptoms include such actions as vomiting, abdominal pains, convulsions, coma, dilation or contraction of the pupils of the eyes, slow or rapid respiration, cyanosis, and delirium. A chance remark by an acquaintance describing the actions of a victim prior to death may be the information needed to permit the toxicologist a calculated guess as the first step in determining the type of poison involved. It is even possible that some seemingly inconsequential bit of information may be the link which is necessary to solve the case.

Young American Medals Presented

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, at a White House ceremony held on December 14, 1954, presented Young American Medals for Bravery to Marilyn Baker Haar of Savannah, Ga., and to Gerald Ray Bergeman, of Menan, Idaho. A third award, The Young American Medal for Service, was bestowed upon James Thomas Welch, Jr., of Rochester, N. Y.

These annual medals, first awarded in 1952, were presented for acts of bravery or unusual service performed in the calendar year of 1953. The selections were made under an act of the 81st Congress which authorized the Department of Justice of the United States to recognize and to award to outstanding, courageous young Americans a medal for heroism known as the Young American Medal

for Bravery, and a medal for service and character known as the Young American Medal for Service. The rules and regulations governing these awards were printed in the January 1952 issue of the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*.

In July 1953, Miss Haar, then 18, saved the lives of four persons in an 11-hour ordeal following a boating disaster. In June 1953, young Bergeman, although only 13 years of age at the time, saved his father and younger brother from electrocution and drowning in a farm accident. In November 1953, Mr. Welch, who was then 18 years old, voluntarily submitted to a 4-hour operation in order to donate to an 11-year-old crippled girl with whom he was not acquainted an 8½- by ½-inch piece of bone from his leg. For 3 months young Welch's leg was in a cast, and for an additional 3 months he did not have full use of it. All three of these young people displayed a high type of courage and acted as outstanding young Americans.



A photograph taken when the winners of the Young American Medals Awards visited FBI Headquarters, Washington, D. C., with their parents and friends, on December 13, 1954. Left to right are: Sylner Bergeman; Richard Bergeman; Miss Mary Welch; Mrs. Sylner Bergeman; Mrs. James Welch, Sr.; Gerald Ray Bergeman, winner of a Young American Medal for Bravery; Miss Dorothy Trippe; James Thomas Welch, Jr., winner of the Young American Medal for Service; James Welch, Sr.; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Miss Marilyn Baker Haar, winner of a Young American Medal for Bravery; Timothy Welch and Mrs. Ernest Haar.

Unusual Check Fraud

Shortly after placing an ad in a local newspaper offering his small business for sale, a Kansas City, Mo., businessman received a telephone call from an unknown man who identified himself as a representative of the "KMN Sales Co." The caller requested an appointment for a representative of the company to see the businessman and discuss the sale of his business.

A woman representative of the company subsequently visited the businessman, offering to sell his business for a fee of \$100, which was payable only in the event that the sale was negotiated through the KMN Sales Co. The businessman agreed to the terms, a mimeographed contract was produced and the businessman affixed his signature at the bottom of the contract.

A few weeks later, when the businessman received his bank statement, he found among the cancelled checks one which had been paid to the KMN Sales Co., in the amount of \$200. Examination revealed that the signature was actually his own and that the check itself had originally been the bottom portion of the contract which he had signed. It had been clipped from the contract and the date, amount and name of the victim's bank had been inserted before the check was deposited in an Indianapolis, Ind., bank for collection.

This incident, together with several others of a similar nature, was reported to the Kansas City Office of the FBI. An investigation revealed that nine other Kansas City residents had been the victims of the same type of fraud. The entire modus operandi matched, even down to the deposit of the "contract checks" in the same Indianapolis bank. This bank account yielded more than \$1,300 to the unknown woman before she disappeared from Indianapolis.

These checks were sent to the FBI Laboratory in Washington, D. C., where it was determined that the checks and the "modus operandi" were quite similar to those in a scheme carried out by an unknown man and woman in Davenport, Iowa, in November of 1951. In this case, the unknown persons were doing business as the Midwest Buyers Directory and had signed contracts with at least two businessmen. The checks in the Davenport, Iowa, transaction had been deposited in an East St. Louis, Ill., bank—a clear case of interstate transportation of fraudulent securities and

a breach of the Federal law regarding the interstate transportation of stolen property.

A similar scheme was perpetrated in Houston, Tex., in March of 1952, in which three persons were defrauded of \$100 each. During this transaction, an unknown man and woman, using fictitious names, opened a bank account in Houston with an initial deposit of \$50, quickly followed by the deposit of three \$100 checks. After a few days, the entire account, with the exception of \$5, was withdrawn. This same scheme was attempted in Dallas, Tex., but was frustrated when an alert bank official refused to approve withdrawal of all but \$5, shortly after the deposit of three mimeographed checks in the amount of \$100, until the authenticity of the checks could be verified.

A suspect was developed and though he at first denied engaging in any activity or promotional scheme designed to defraud people of their money, sensing the futility of further denial, he subsequently admitted operating the KMN Sales Co., the Midwest Buyers Directory, and, in Houston, Tex., the Southern Business Sales. Through these enterprises, contracts to sell businesses were entered into with the various firms mentioned above. The bottom portion of the contract, carrying a genuine signature, was then clipped off and used as a check.

A Federal complaint filed at Kansas City, Mo., on August 25, 1953, charged the suspect and his wife with violation of the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Statute, in that they had transported, or caused to be transported in interstate commerce, certain falsely made and fraudulent securities. They were subsequently sentenced to 2 years in a Federal prison.

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GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON CONFIDENCE GAME OPERATORS

In connection with the Single Fingerprint Section there is maintained a general appearance file of confidence game operators. This file contains descriptive data and photographs of over 2,500 known confidence game operators. Searches in this file will be made upon request. In furnishing data on a suspect, the agency should make sure that complete descriptive data is sent in. Photographs and other material on individuals who may be identical with those being sought will be furnished to the interested departments.

Red Cross Act

The Red Cross Act states that whoever wears or displays the sign of the Red Cross or any insignia colored in imitation thereof for the fraudulent purpose of inducing the belief that he is a member of or an agent for the American Red Cross; or whoever, whether a corporation, association or person, other than the American National Red Cross and its duly authorized employees and agents and the sanitary and hospital authorities of the Armed Forces of the United States, uses the emblem of the Greek red cross on a white ground, or any sign or insignia made or colored in imitation thereof or the words "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross" or any combination of these words shall be fined not more than \$250 or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.

This act further provides that whoever, within the United States, falsely or fraudulently holds himself out as or represents or pretends himself to be a member of or an agent for the American National Red Cross for the purpose of soliciting, collecting or receiving money or material, shall be fined not more than \$500 or imprisoned not more than 1 year or both.

Matches as Evidence

A Delaware burglar recently made a sad mistake when he carelessly discarded the paper matches he used to light his way through the various rooms of the home he was burglarizing. He failed to reckon with the fact that State police detectives, when investigating the crime, would carefully collect, preserve, and identify these partially burned matches for future reference. The burglar's second mistake was to maintain on his person the matchbook from which he had torn the matches. Again he failed to reckon with the thoroughness and efficiency of modern police methods.

When questioned concerning the burglary of a Gordon Heights, Del., home, the suspect vehemently denied any connection with the crime. The Delaware State Police, however, were unimpressed by his protestations of innocence. The superintendent, Col. Harry S. Shew, forwarded to the FBI Laboratory 8 books of paper matches which were found on the suspect's person, together with the 5 partially burned matches found at the crime scene.

The laboratory examination proved that three of the burned matches had been torn from one of

the books taken from the suspect's person. When an FBI Laboratory technician presented his findings to the court, he used 8- by 10-inch photographs of the known and suspect matches for comparison purposes. The suspect was found guilty of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. On November 20, 1954, he received a 3-year sentence. The prompt solution of this case definitely hinged upon the careful collecting, preserving, and identification of physical evidence, followed by a thorough, scientific examination of that evidence.

A Difficult Identification

In late 1953, a sheriff from a western State was faced with the difficult and unpleasant task of identifying the badly decomposed body of a man recovered from a river. The outer layer of skin on the fingers had sloughed off, making it impossible to obtain the dead man's fingerprints. By using magnification, however, the sheriff examined the lower skin layers on the fingers and was able to provide a description of the patterns present. This information he sent to the FBI, along with enlarged photographs of two fingers and a physical description of the body.

In spite of the limited initial material furnished, an examination of the files in the Identification Division resulted in the identification of the drowned man with the record of a man who had been apprehended and fingerprinted on numerous occasions by various law-enforcement agencies.

Facts pertaining to the dead man's identity were sent to the sheriff, whose efforts to provide the FBI with workable impressions in view of the decomposed conditions of the body made this difficult identification possible.

Inciting Rebellion

One Federal statute governing the security of the Nation provides that whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Violations of this statute come within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

RETURN AFTER 5 DAYS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
(GPO)

Questionable Pattern



This pattern is classified as a plain arch and referenced to a tented arch. Ridge A rises and turns sharply but does not form an angle. Since undue pressure or incorrect inking could easily change the appearance of ridge A, it should be referenced to a tented arch.