


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
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THE COVER

A Norfolk, Va., police officer and his
dog symbolize the lonely, but neces-
sary, work of routine patrol.



The POLICE OFFICER as



Burned-out Samaritan

By

DR. KATHERINE W. ELLISON

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and

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Crisis, it has been said, is the business of the police. In recent years, there has been increased emphasis on training police officers to deal with a wide variety of crisis situations, from domestic disputes, to suicide attempts, to psychotic episodes, to rape victimization.¹

Another kind of crisis confronts many officers, a crisis produced by the stress of certain kinds of police work. When subjected to severe or prolonged stress, many officers become what psychologist Dr. Christina Maslach has called "burned-out samaritans."² Burnout not only affects the officer's health and well-being, it interferes with his or her ability to function effectively in many aspects of police work.

While many departments have acknowledged that policing can be a stressful business, most have taken the official attitude that crisis reactions in an officer are a sign of personal weakness. Some "modern" departments have sought to help their members deal with the symptoms of job-related stress—alcoholism, suicide attempts, and the like—by hiring psychologists or other counselors.³ Such professionals have the potential to be of help, particularly to an officer suffering the effects of acute stress. Unfortunately, their effectiveness often is compromised because their first loyalty is to the department. As such, it is their duty to identify officers who are "unfit" to carry out their regular duties and recommend "corrective" measures. Often these measures involve removing the man from his regular assignment and assigning him to a "rubber gun" squad. While this may be necessary for the good of the department, it often is devastating to the officer. To be deprived of the symbols of his authority, his weapon and his badge, is one of the greatest disgraces that can befall him. Few will feel free to admit serious problems, or even

trifling ones, to someone who has the power to use these revelations against them.

The idea that crisis reactions reveal a problem in the individual also suggests solutions involving better selection procedures and inservice screening to weed out the "inadequate" personality. While certainly there are people who are unfit intrinsically for police work, there are many others whose "symptoms" result from pressures intrinsic to certain organizational and supervisory styles. There may even be assignments for which certain organizational styles make efficient, creative police work impossible.

In her studies of other high-stress professions, Maslach found that "many of the causes of burnout are located not in permanent traits of the people involved, but in certain specific social and situational factors."⁴ This article suggests that organizational structure may be as important as personality variables in producing crisis reactions in police officers. Crisis reactions observed in police are related to those found in professionals working in other stressful occupations. In addition, a general theoretical model is presented to aid in understanding these crisis reactions, and suggest or-

ganizational changes aimed not only at minimizing stress, but also at maximizing effectiveness as a police officer.


These suggestions are based upon a review of literature for examples of crisis-producing stresses and an interview of police officers and supervisors at all levels in several jurisdictions. Particular emphasis was placed upon interviewing supervisors who were identified by their peers and subordinates as "good" leaders, whose units have been successful at difficult tasks and have maintained high morale.

Introduction to Crisis Theory

The term "crisis" has been used very broadly, such as the energy crisis, a crisis in confidence, and so forth. As the term will be used more narrowly in this text, and because some psychologists writing about crisis have used the word to mean different things, it seems useful to define crisis as used here. In the psychological sense, crisis is a subjective reaction to a stressful life event. It is the way a person feels when confronted with drastic, life-threatening changes or too much pressure. Indeed, any major



Dr. Katherine W. Ellison



Det. Sgt. John L. Genz

"A major symptom of burnout is 'the transformation of a person with original thought and creativity on the job into a mechanical bureaucrat'."

change in a person's life may be stressful. Even positive experiences, such as marriage, a new job, a new home, or the birth of a child, can lead to crisis reactions. This is especially true if the individual experiences too many changes in a short time period.⁵ For example, a person who, in the space of a year, graduates from college, gets a good job, gets married, goes to Europe for a honeymoon, buys a house, and has a baby has an increased chance of developing stress symptoms such as depression or a psychosomatic illness, such as ulcers.

"A situation is more likely to be stressful and result in crisis reactions if it is unpredictable and if the individual has, or feels he has, little or no control over it."

People can plan for and control many of the changes in life, and control lessens the crisis impact of change. A situation is more likely to be stressful and result in crisis reactions if it is unpredictable and if the individual has, or feels he has, little or no control over it. Such stresses may be acute in nature, such as an accident, natural disaster, crime victimization, or sudden death in the family. They may also be the chronic stresses of living in a disturbed family relationship, in a community in chaos, or of working at a job that makes demands that are impossible to meet.

In many cases, crisis reactions are a normal, understandable defense against overwhelming stress, and are *not* indications of a "weak" or "sick" personality. Given appropriate support, most people can recover from very traumatic situations and return

to normal levels of functioning. Lacking support in crisis situations, even the "normal, healthy" individual may suffer personality change and long-lasting psychological damage.

One form of psychological damage seen in stressful professions is "institutional dehumanization" or "burnout." Burnout is the tendency to "cope with stress by a form of distancing that not only hurts [the professional people] but is damaging to all of us as their human clients."⁶ Distancing, of course, is a matter of degree, and some distancing—"objectivity"—is necessary to allow an individual to work in difficult situations. How, then, is "burnout" different from these normal defenses which facilitate competence?

Maslach describes a variety of symptoms which point to a person who is burning out. He becomes cynical and develops negative feelings about his clients. He may begin to talk of them as other than human, and to withdraw from contact with them. Withdrawal is further characterized by sharp distinctions between job and personal life. A major symptom of burnout is "the transformation of a person with original thought and creativity on the job into a mechanical bureaucrat."⁷ The individual withdraws from personal involvement by "going by the book" rather than by unique circumstances of each situation. He treats interpersonal management tasks as if they were technological ones.

Coping mechanisms of this sort, while they may work in the short run, take a toll. A person who is burned out often develops physical symptoms, such as ulcers, anxiety attacks, and insomnia. He may seek relief in alcohol, drugs, or tranquilizers. Family

life deteriorates, and divorce and suicide rates are high.

The reactions described by Maslach are seen all too frequently in police officers. Niederhoffer⁸ has described a process of alienation and increasing cynicism in urban police officers that in many aspects parallels Maslach's description of burnout. Niederhoffer goes so far as to assert that the kind of cynicism that is directed against life, the world, and people in general . . . is endemic to policemen of all ranks and persuasions . . .⁹ Certainly the distancing phenomenon, the feeling of an ingroup "we" versus the rest of the world, seen as "they," is a commonly reported experience of those who observe police society, a feeling which may increase with length of service.¹⁰ Many writers have documented the high rates of psychosomatic illness, divorce, and suicide that are the extreme consequences of burnout.¹¹

The prospect is not so grim as it would first appear. Both Maslach and Niederhoffer—and many others—find examples of individuals who have escaped cynicism and burnout. They become, as Niederhoffer puts it, "tolerant observers of the human comedy,"¹² and even dedicated and successful agents for change. Maslach believes that "burnout is not inevitable and that steps can be taken to reduce and modify its occurrence."¹³

Burnout in Police

Research revealed a high degree of consensus about the stressfulness of certain situations in policing. These conditions were categorized into acute, transient, situational stresses—those that come on suddenly, even accidentally, and usually are over

quickly—and chronic stresses of certain assignments or organizational patterns.

Two kinds of acute stress which seem to precipitate crisis reactions in even the most seasoned, best adjusted officer are: The wounding or death of a fellow officer, particularly one's partner; and having to deal with cases involving a child who has been injured or killed, particularly a child who has been physically or sexually assaulted. Joseph Wambaugh, who has provided us with many insightful characterizations of police officers and their reactions to stress, dealt with the first kind of stress in "The Onion Field."¹⁴ This book details the deterioration of a conscientious officer whose partner is shot and who is blamed publicly for the death by his department.

Many officers relate their horror in having to deal with child victims. It is one of the few occasions when officers feel free to weep openly in front of their fellows, and the one in which brutality against an offender is most likely to be condoned. The laughing and joking that relieve tension in so many other stressful situations is largely absent in these. They are frequently relived in nightmares.

Certain assignments also seem to involve high psychological risk. Those assignments which involve dealing with mutilation and death, such as working in a medical examiner's office or in homicide investigation, come immediately to mind, and indeed, are stressful for many people, especially at first. However, people who work these assignments often have, or develop in the course of the work, the kind of personality that can cope with such situations. These defenses, which permit one to do an important job well, often prevent him from doing the work which involves interacting with others. By analogy, the successful surgeon would make a dreadful psychiatrist.

As long as a job requires only one basic kind of skill or personality problems may be minimized. Special problems arise in assignments which require different, contradictory skills and defenses. Many tasks on policing involve human interaction skills, the kind in which it is impossible to follow a formula. These are the tasks which demand a different response to each situation and from different individuals. When the necessity for interaction and sensitivity to human feelings and behavior is combined in an assignment with the necessity for dealing with situations which demand distancing because they deal with basic human fears of mutilation, trauma, and death, the officer must attempt to perform the almost impossible balancing act of working appropriately with "clients" who are undergoing ego-threatening crisis and protecting his own ego. Respondents listed several assignments that fit this category as particularly stressful: Sex crimes investigation, undercover narcotics work, and increasingly, juvenile work.

Burnout is also seen more frequently in patrol officers who have to handle large numbers of calls that involve serious problems that they are not equipped by training or mandate to solve. Residents of urban ghettos commonly call the police with such problems. This is consistent with Maslach's finding that:

"... burnout often becomes inevitable when the professional is forced to provide care for too many people. As the ratio increases, the result is higher and higher emotional overload until, like a wire that has too much electricity flowing through it, the worker just burns out and emotionally disconnects . . ."¹⁵

Job-related stress is exacerbated, and indeed, may be caused by cer-

tain traditional police practices. One of the most devastating of these is the indiscriminate use of a military model. This model sees police skills as technological ones. It assumes that every assignment involves skills that do not vary greatly from individual to individual or with the setting. It views discretion as unimportant and inappropriate for all but top brass. Certainly there are skills and assignments in policing for which such a model is appropriate. For many others it is not.

The practical consequences of such a model have been satirized by Wambaugh:

"Deputy Chief Lynch wouldn't stand for a violation of the Los Angeles Police Department order concerning phone answering . . . Officers had to answer thus:

"'Good morning [afternoon or evening], Wilshire Watch Commander's Office, Officer Fernwood speaking. May I help you?'"

"If any word was left out of this standard greeting, the officer could be subject to disciplinary action.

"It was said that once when a desk officer at Newton Street Station had uttered the entire phrase before giving the caller a chance to speak, the caller, a cardiac victim, fell unconscious before completing the address where the ambulance should be sent and died 20 minutes later."¹⁶

Consequences also extend to the officer. Untrained in the exercise of discretion, told it is not part of his job and is inappropriate for one of his rank, the officer on the street finds himself called on to exercise his own judgment hourly. Frustration sets in when he is seldom rewarded for the many instances his judgment is ap-

"[S]erious crisis impact [is] lessened if several basic human needs are met. These are: To feel that one has control over the circumstances of one's life, to understand why things happen, and to be able to predict one's future."

appropriate, but is often punished if his actions attract adverse public attention. The creative person learns to take the conservative path, not to make waves, to go by the book even when such action may be damaging to his larger mandate to serve and protect.

A corollary of the military model is the view of the police officer as a Renaissance Man. Once he pins on his "tin" he magically becomes able to perform any task to which he may be assigned, regardless of training, interest, experience, or personality style. As one supervisor said to a man given a clerical assignment who complained that he did not know how to type, "You've got ten fingers, of course you can type." (And even, as on "Barney Miller," find ways to improvise missing letters.)

Preventing Burnout

Burnout is not inevitable. Preventive measures may be taken in a number of areas. The chances that an event will have serious crisis impact are lessened if several basic human needs are met. These are: To feel that one has control over the circumstances of one's life, to understand why things happen, and to be able to predict one's future. After confronting a stressful event, one needs to ventilate—to "get it out of his system," to talk about it to someone who can understand but will not pass judgment. Ventilation can serve a further purpose. As the person talks about his experiences and feelings and attends to the reactions and experiences of others, he may learn new ways of dealing with situations.

Maslach emphasized the importance of opportunities for ventilation in pre-

venting burnout among the groups she studied: Poverty lawyers, prison personnel, child-care workers, and psychiatric nurses. She found that "burn-out rates are lower for those professionals who actively express, analyze and share their personal feelings with their colleagues."¹⁷ The opportunity for such ventilation could best be provided by having available a variety of programs, formal and informal, which could provide opportunities for sharing problems. These were particularly effective when they were developed and supported by the agency in which the individual worked.



In addition to the opportunity to get together with coworkers and share experiences, people in stressful professions need the opportunity to get away from the stressful situation from time-to-time. If the person is not allowed sanctioned opportunities to do less stressful work from time-to-time, he will find ways of escaping, often at the expense of his clients or the job. The "sanctioned time-out" is more than a coffee break; it is an opportunity to continue to do useful work, but work that does not involve direct contact with clients. Thus, it is not the length of the work day that contributes to burnout, but the continuous contact with the public throughout that day.¹⁸

The interviews uncovered examples of practices similar to those which Maslach found effective. Sanctioned time-outs, which allow the professional some control over his work life, were provided in a variety of ways. A supervisor of a sex crimes squad, for example, would allow, encourage, or even assign his officers to give a lecture, set up a demonstration, or just work in the office for a day after they had worked a particularly difficult investigation, such as one involving a child. Interestingly, those officers, whose supervisors allowed them some control and flexibility over their assignments and schedules, reported that they were less likely to try to "cheat" or malingering than those with little control.

Other supervisors would from time-to-time share the work of their officers and give them informal opportunities to ventilate. In one unit, there was a change of commanding officers over the time that some of the members were being studied. The first commander, who had had little street experience, spent most of his time in his office and seldom spoke to most of the members of the unit except to give assignments or ask direct questions. The second frequently worked at a desk in the squad room, and often during the first weeks, solicited information and advice from older hands. Absenteeism decreased, morale improved, and there was an increase in the number of cases investigated by the unit that resulted in conviction.

One practice that was mentioned frequently as a means of relieving tension was some form of what Wambaugh popularized as "choir practice,"¹⁹ and which others called "debriefing." These occasions usually were informal, often spur-of-the-mo-

ment, as events dictated. A group of officers from the same unit or shift get together after work and talk about the events of the day. In one unit, beer and pizza would be brought into the station for end-of-tour parties (in violation of rules but with the tacit approval of the unit commander). Members of the unit felt these gatherings solidified the group.

Unfortunately, if this form of ventilation is not carefully controlled, it contains the ingredients for disaster, as brought out in Wambaugh's book. Too often the setting is a local ginmill, where alcohol and weapons are mixed with outsiders. Thoughtful officers recognize these dangers, and several explained they pick a spot across the county or State line, make sure to get a room to themselves, and leave weapons at home. One group said they take along a nondrinker to do the driving! In some cases, supervisors or even chiefs have given direct or tacit approval to squad parties and may even allow officers to bring beer into the station house and drink it together at the end of their tour.²⁰ Perhaps, more study is needed here; if these occasions are carefully controlled, they can provide an appropriate setting in which officers can fulfill their need to ventilate.

In a few cases, social science professionals were able to provide support for officers. The most successful of these seemed to be people who were involved with the department in one way or another, but had no formal input into the officers' records or other forms of individual evaluation. Some of these were researchers or trainers hired by the department on a consultant basis who worked closely with officers on projects of interest to both. In one case, a department hired a so-

cial worker to work out of the station and take responsibility for some of the problems confronting their officers, but for which they have neither the training, resources, nor interest. At first the officers were suspicious, but after finding that he could be trusted, often would drop in to discuss a case, share solutions and insights, or discuss problems. Many researchers who spend time "on the bricks" with officers find them eager to talk about the rewards and problems of the job. Those who realize this as potentially more than just chit-chat or griping can sometimes perform a valuable service, as well as gain insights that may be useful in their work.

Not all ventilation is verbal. A common finding among people in stressful occupations is that a regular program of physical exercise contributes substantially to their feeling of well-being. Stress has physiological as well as psychological consequences,²¹ and exercise both conditions the individual to be able to withstand increased tension and works some of the tension off.

While exercise is something an officer can do on his own, departments can encourage it by providing good, attractive facilities and a variety of activities and encouraging officers to use them. It should be noted, perhaps, that the use of exercise as punishment, as happens in some recruit training programs where demerits are worked off by pushups, hardly encourages officers to enjoy physical activity.

Other techniques to reduce stress, such as biofeedback and meditation, are also being tried by some departments. Biofeedback, of course, has the disadvantage of requiring equipment for the observation of one's heart beat

to induce relaxation. Meditation, on the other hand, can be used on an individual basis without equipment.

The need of a person in a high-stress profession to gain control by being able to understand and predict may be met, in part, by training. Training aimed at minimizing police burnout should begin at the recruit level. A section on the police officer in crisis fits well into a broad crisis intervention unit, that includes the study of techniques for interviewing victims and handling psychotic or suicidal people, as well as for intervening in domestic disputes. The kinds of situations most likely to lead to crisis reactions should be discussed, as well as the symptoms of crisis most common in police officers. Suggestions for ways to minimize the crisis impact of stressful events are presented. This training predicts for the new officer some of the feelings he may have, and helps him understand that many of his reactions are normal and not an indication that he is going crazy, or evidence that he is inadequate as an officer.

This training may be repeated profitably in a variety of inservice courses. It is included particularly in the specialized sex crimes courses taught at the New Jersey State Police Training Center. Here, too, the purpose is to allow the officer to understand and predict. Officers are also encouraged to participate in creative ventilation by sharing their solutions, things that have worked particularly well for them or for other officers they know. This sharing has, parenthetically, been an important source of knowledge on the subject of police burnout and has provided much of the basis for questions in this systematic research.

"A common finding among people in stressful occupations is that a regular program of physical exercise contributes substantially to their feeling of well-being."

Inclusion of a section on crisis reactions in police is particularly important in courses for supervisors and police administrators. They need to realize the crucial nature of their role, and help to develop techniques for satisfying the needs of their subordi-

increased concern for the needs of the officer. As the organization helps him meet these needs, he, in turn, becomes better able to perform the functions society has given him.

"[S]upervisors and police administrators . . . need to realize the crucial nature of their role, and help to develop techniques for satisfying the needs of their subordinates in ways that enhance their ability to perform their duties."

nates in ways that enhance their ability to perform their duties.

The prevention of burnout in police officers requires a reorientation, an

FOOTNOTES

¹ Morton Bard and Katherine Ellison, "Crisis Intervention and Investigation of Forcible Rape," *The Police Chief*, May 1974, pp. 68-73.

² Christina Maslach, "Burned-Out," *Human Be-*

havior, September 1976, pp. 16-22.

³ Georgette Bennett-Sandler and Earl Ubell, "Time Bombs in Blue," *New York Magazine*, March 21, 1977, pp. 47-51.

⁴ Maslach, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁵ See Barbara Dohrenwend and Bruce Dohrenwend (eds.), *Stressful Life Events*, John Wiley, New York, 1975.

⁶ Maslach, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁸ Arthur Niederhoffer, *Behind the Shield*, Anchor, New York, 1967.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰ J. L. Genz and D. Lester, "Authoritarianism in Policemen as a Function of Experience," *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, 1976, 4:1, pp. 9-13.

¹¹ William Kroes, *Society's Victim: The Police Officer*, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Ill., 1976.

¹² Niederhoffer, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹³ Maslach, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁴ Joseph Wambaugh, *The Onion Field*, Dell, New York, 1973.

¹⁵ Maslach, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁶ Joseph Wambaugh, *The Choirboys*, Dell, New York, 1975, p. 14.

¹⁷ Maslach, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁹ Wambaugh, *op. cit.*, 1975.

²⁰ Richard C. Clement, Chief, Dover Township, N.J., Police Department, "Reducing the Divorce Rate in Police Departments by the Use of Alcoholic Beverages," unpublished manuscript.

²¹ Hans Selye, *The Stress of Life*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956.



Article Suggestions Invited

To determine those law enforcement subjects of greatest interest to the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin readership, a sampling of opinion among 200 students at the FBI National Academy was recently made.

Those surveyed indicated greatest interest in management methods, legal matters, investigative techniques, discipline, training, and professional ideals. Over 30 percent of those queried thought more articles on these subjects should be included in the Bulletin. One fifth of these officers preferred less material on firearms and defensive tactics.

The Bulletin would like to receive the opinions of all its readers on subjects of interest to you. Instead of a mail survey, which can only be general in nature, you are invited to send the Bulletin specific suggestions for articles, along with any comment on content.

The purpose of this journal is to foster an exchange of views among criminal justice professionals. Your ideas are needed to accomplish this. Suggestions should be sent to the Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 20535.

Officer Disarmings—A Response

By

JAMES W. LINDELL

Physical Training Supervisor
Regional Center for Criminal
Justice
Independence, Mo.

Fact: Law enforcement officers carry guns.

Fact: Incidents of assault against law enforcement officers have increased tremendously in recent years.

Fact: More officers are being killed with their own guns than ever before.

FBI Uniform Crime Reports indicate that in 1970 some 100 officers were slain, 9 with their own guns. In 1975, 129 officers were killed, 19 of them with their own weapons, an increase of 111 percent in just 6 years.

In view of this onslaught against officers' lives, the law enforcement community cannot take a defensive position and simply hope that future assault statistics will be lower. What is required without delay is a coordinated offensive by all law enforcement agencies to provide more and better methods of protection for their officers.

In an attempt to meet and overcome this growing threat, the Kansas City, Mo., Police Department developed a program called the Revolver Reten-

tion System, which offers a totally new approach to the problem of officer disarmings.

"[T]he Revolver Retention System . . . offers a totally new approach to the problem of officer disarmings."

Within an 18-month period starting in January 1975, nine officers of the Kansas City Police Department were disarmed, with one incident resulting in the slaying of an officer with his own revolver. In the remaining eight incidents, one officer was shot in the leg as the assailant tried to remove the officer's gun from its holster; another was brutally beaten with his own weapon and left unconscious by

his assailant, who subsequently robbed and killed a taxi driver with the officer's revolver.

One officer had his own weapon taken from him twice. "I was trying to disarm an intoxicated 'mental' in a narrow hallway," he related. "There were a lot of people around and it was hard to maneuver. She grabbed my flashlight, and as I wrestled it away from her, she removed my gun from its (unsnapped) holster." Fortunately, in that instance, another officer knocked the revolver from the subject's hand. The second disarming incident occurred when the same officer, responding to an officer assistance call, walked into a bar during a wild melee. "As I entered the bar I saw a vice officer in a tussle with a

male suspect," he said. "I encircled him with my arms from the front and pushed him into the bar. We both fell to the floor and as we rolled over and over he must have taken my weapon, because as we fell I reached for my gun, still thinking it was in my holster. The next thing I knew he hit me alongside my head with it . . . just then a shot rang out. Luckily, it was wide of the mark, but I hope I never have to come any closer."

Twice lucky! Who can tell about the next time?

In reviewing occurrences of officers being disarmed, one thing becomes clear—no two instances are ever exactly the same. Therefore, any training program designed to guard against officers being disarmed must concentrate on common denominators rather than on any specific attempt that has already occurred.

The Administrative Analysis Division of the Kansas City Police Department conducted interviews with officers who had been disarmed and determined a number of factors were instrumental in the officers' failures to retain their weapons. The most notable were:

1. The holster was left un-snapped or was snapped improperly on calls.
2. There was a lack of support or assistance due to a failure to comply with one-man car procedures.
3. The officer was subject to an assault that incapacitated him immediately and gave him no opportunity to resist.
4. The officer failed to react in a specific manner under the circumstances to prevent his gun from being taken.
5. There was no training program of revolver retention against a variety of attack situations aimed at disarming the officer.

As a result of the numerous disarming attacks and using data from the surveys, the Physical Training Department of the Regional Center for Criminal Justice was directed in January 1976 to study and formulate improved methods of weapon retention. There were apparently no existing techniques to counter effectively disarming attempts; research showed the only information available advised officers of techniques to regain a weapon AFTER it had been taken from him.

The process began with an intensive search in various law enforcement journals and manuals for previous studies in the area. When it was determined virtually nothing had been written, further research was done by soliciting reports from the FBI and various police departments on incidents in which officers had been disarmed. It was discovered that officers had often unknowingly encouraged attacks on themselves by having their holsters un-snapped or snapped incorrectly, not being fully alert to the suddenness and surprise of attacks, or by reacting improperly when they

realized their weapon was being grabbed.

A picture began to emerge that showed three general situations faced by the officers: (1) The weapon had been removed from the holster; (2) the assailant had grabbed the barrel of the officer's gun; or (3) the assailant had grabbed the officer's wrist holding his gun and attempted to wrench the weapon from his grasp.

The Revolver Retention System was developed as a result of trial and error experimentation with various defensive and offensive techniques, including wristlocks (jujitsu) and blocks (karate). These techniques were employed to overcome the various kinds of attacks generally used when disarming police officers. A study of nerves, leverage, and body mechanics also contributed several effective release techniques to the system. However, certain criteria had to be met before a technique could be considered for inclusion in the system.


The first criterion was that the kind of attack to be defended against had actually occurred or could conceivably occur with some degree of fre-

Marvin L. Van Kirk
Chief of Police



James W. Lindell





One of the techniques of the Revolver Retention System is the forearm release for use against an assailant who has grabbed the officer's gun or gun hand with both hands.

quency. The second was that all retention, release, and defense techniques were required to have an extremely high degree of probability of success when properly applied. The third was that when attacked, the officer must be able to effect a release in 1 to 2 seconds.

The Revolver Retention System training manual, available from this department upon request, outlines

seven basic techniques designed to be effective in any situation or combination of situations.


Revolver Leverage Release—The officer is instructed to use his revolver as a lever against an assailant's arm or arms when his own weapon arm has been grabbed with either one or two hands.

Lower Forearm Block—The officer learns to turn properly to defend his

weapon against assault from the rear and to block an attempt to remove his revolver from its holster.

Rear Wristlock Nos. 1 and 2 (two hand)—The officer is taught how to keep his revolver in its holster against an attempt to remove it and how to effect a handgrip release by the use of properly applied wristlocks.

Front Wristlock Nos. 1 and 2 (one hand)—The officer learns to utilize



In the forearm release, officers are instructed to step to the left, turning toward the assailant while simultaneously reaching under his right arm, pushing down on his left wrist, and pushing forward on his right elbow.

wristlocks properly to break an assailant's grip and retain his revolver in his hand against a one- or two-hand grab of the revolver barrel.

Nerve Release—The officer is shown the proper method to apply pressure against nerves in the assailant's hand which will effect a release against a one- or two-hand grab of the revolver barrel.

Forearm Release—The officer is

taught to use his arm as a lever to effect a release against a two-hand grab of either his revolver or his wrist.

Revolver Disarming Method—The officer receives instruction as to regaining his revolver once he has been disarmed and how to disarm a subject who is holding a weapon by proper use of applied wristlocks.

The majority of officers who took part in formulating these techniques

were completely unprepared to cope with two major areas of weapon protection and defense: How to maneuver to meet someone at their rear, and how to regain a gun taken from their holster.

“[M]ost law enforcement officers have never given much thought as to how they might . . . best protect themselves and their weapons from attack.”

It is probably safe to say that most law enforcement officers have never given much thought as to how they might turn to the rear to best protect themselves and their weapons from attack. Because he is armed, an officer should move in a manner that offers him protection and allows him to withdraw his weapon side quickly.

There are four ways to turn to the rear: (1) Cross step to the right with the left leg, (2) cross step to the left with the right leg, (3) pivot to the left on the right foot, and (4) swing the left leg to the left rear or pivot to the right on the left foot and swing the right leg to the right rear.

If the officer carries his weapon on the right side, only the last tactic offers a maximum degree of safety and an opportunity to defend one's gun with specific, effective techniques.

This change in position allows the officer to turn his weapon side into and then away from an attacker, allowing no opportunity for the attacker to continue contact once his arms have been knocked aside by the officer's forearm. If the attacker has a tight grip on the holstered gun, the officer can proceed from an attempt to turn into a wristlock release.

Any of the other procedures provides the attacker an opportunity to move with the officer as he turns, making it difficult or impossible to move his weapon side away from the at-


tacker, especially if the assailant already has a grip on the holstered gun. The preferred method should be used as a matter of course by officers to insure maximum weapon security, even at those times when no apparent threat is present.

When officers were asked to try to disarm associates holding training guns in their hands, it was learned that an average of four out of five either pulled on the revolver or twisted it from side to side in an attempt to remove it from the hand.

This high ratio of ineffective attempts indicated that a large percentage of veteran officers had never learned disarming methods or had forgotten the methods taught them as rookies.

In order for an officer to regain his handgun or to disarm a person holding a gun at close quarters, it is imperative that the gun first be directed out of line with his body as it is grasped.

Although not always possible, it is desirable in a disarming situation to take hold of the gun barrel first, with either hand in a palm-up position, for if the hand reaching for the gun misses because of movement, another attempt can be made without hesitation. Also, by seizing the barrel in a palm-up position, maximum pressure is exerted upward and toward the subject's gun hand, causing tremendous pressure against the subject's thumb and forefinger. If the forefinger is in the trigger guard, the subject must release his grip on the gun or suffer a fractured finger; if not, the gun will be forced out of the hand anyway because of superior leverage exerted by the officer. A final reason for the officer to grasp the barrel of the gun first is to prevent the subject from taking hold of it, thereby placing himself in a position to exert more leverage and control over the gun than the officer.



For additional leverage, the officer throws his left shoulder forward.

In order to effect this release, the officer must secure the gun hand to prevent the subject from moving it as the release technique is performed. This is best accomplished if the officer places his thumb on the back of the subject's gun hand and wraps his fingers into the palm of the hand as he pushes the gun barrel toward the subject's thumb and forefinger. If maximum force is applied, the subject will release the gun immediately.

This particular release is well-known to many police instructors and is generally considered to be one of the surest and most effective disarming methods that the officer has at his

disposal. Every law enforcement officer should become proficient in its use on the chance that he may have to recover his own gun from an assailant or disarm a person holding a gun in his hand.

Under the direction of Maj. Harold G. Wears, Director of the Regional Training Academy, the academy compiled a training bulletin of the revolver retention techniques which included graphic photographs and step-by-step directions. The training bulletin's summary indicates the techniques are only as good as an individual's ability to perform them, and officers should learn to evaluate quickly

each attack and apply the correct technique as a reflex action. Practice and personal familiarity with the techniques are a necessity for maximum effectiveness.

The real difference between the revolver retention techniques and self-defense tactics routinely taught to police officers is that the former is revolver-defense oriented rather than personal-defense oriented. If the techniques are learned thoroughly and applied properly, personal defense is a natural consequence of the procedure.

The revolver retention techniques, now routinely taught at the police academy, were first introduced to po-

lice officers during training for the 1976 Republican National Convention. Acceptance of the techniques by the officers was almost universal, indicating a high probability of street use. To date, more than 1,000 Kansas City Police Department officers and 300 officers from outside agencies have received the training. Those who have undergone the program feel that it is one of the most practical inservice training programs they ever received.

There have been a number of attempts to disarm officers since the Revolver Retention System was introduced. None have been successful to date against officers who have had the

training; however, two officers who had not received the training were disarmed in the 12 months since the program was introduced.

"[T]he reduction of successful disarming attempts against trained officers is not necessarily limited to their ability to effectively apply . . . defensive techniques . . . [I]t is as likely to be related to the officers' heightened awareness of the potential danger of being disarmed in various situations and the regular avoidance of dangerous practices"

The officer then pulls his revolver from the assailant's grasp with a sharp rearward jerk.



It may be that the reduction of successful disarming attempts against trained officers is not necessarily limited to their ability to effectively apply those defensive techniques. But it is as likely to be related to the officers' heightened awareness of the potential danger of being disarmed in various situations and the regular avoidance of dangerous practices as a result of the revolver retention training program.

Whatever the reason or combination of reasons, the goal of reducing disarming assaults against Kansas City Police Department officers is being attained to date by taking the offensive through progressive development and more advanced training methods.

"[T]he Revolver Retention System offers the officer a definite course of action, increased awareness, and possibly ways to save his life."

In essence, the Revolver Retention System offers the officer a definite course of action, increased awareness, and possibly ways to save his life.

FBI

The FBI National Academy “A Unifying Force”


FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley was the principal speaker at graduation exercises held December 9, 1977, for the members of the 111th Session of the FBI National Academy.

Many friends, relatives, and distinguished guests gathered at the auditorium of the Academy's training complex at Quantico, Va., to observe this special event.

The 250 officers comprising the

Session represented 49 States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and 8 foreign countries.

Following the call to order by Assistant Director Kenneth E. Joseph of the FBI's Training Division, S. Insp. Dennis V. Scott-Herridge of the Winnipeg Police Department, Manitoba, Canada, was introduced as the elected class spokesman. In his remarks to the class, he described the FBI National



Clarence M. Kelley, Director of the FBI, delivered the principal address.

Academy as "a unifying force . . . bringing together of [police] departments internationally in both personal and professional ties."

At the conclusion of Mr. Scott-Herridge's remarks, Deputy Associate Director John J. McDermott introduced Director Kelley who expressed to the graduates his belief that they have the credentials to "insure that law enforcement remains on the path of progress . . . that it remains a proud, selfless and worthwhile profession."

Director Kelley noted that the National Academy provides students

with a highly specialized curriculum, and the ultimate beneficiaries of this education "are the citizens for whom you toil and risk your necks in your communities."

Mr. Kelley went on to say that the law enforcement profession "will always be subject to condemnation by one interest group or another no matter how noble our intentions might be, no matter how meticulously we observe the rules that govern law enforcement in this a free, fluid and democratic society." He added that this is a risk to the profession, just as police officers risk being shot by a

robber or face threats from terrorists.

However, Mr. Kelley also warned the graduates never to let the unjust criticism divert their attention from their primary mission as law enforcement professionals. "That mission," stated Director Kelley, "is to strive for a peaceful and tranquil environment, an environment in which people can enjoy that great wealth of freedom into which they were born."

The ceremony concluded with the awarding of diplomas by Director Kelley and a benediction led by Lt. Cmdr. Ignatius E. Smith, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy. (FBI)



Pictured with FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley are the five section leaders of the 111th Session. Shown, left to right, are: S. Insp. Dennis V. Scott-Herridge, Winnipeg Police Department, Manitoba, Canada; Insp. George William Allen, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada; Special Agent James T. Stewart, Training Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Director Kelley; Cpl. Kevin P. Scully, Burlington, Vt., Police Department; Lt. Frank Edward Piersol, Los Angeles, Calif., Police Department; and Lt. Thomas Boyd Chase, Burlingame, Calif., Police Department.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ROLE



A "Bear" on Safety

By

S. SGT. BILL FARBER

Community Services Bureau
Alaska Department of
Public Safety
Anchorage, Alaska

When the school principal stepped to the microphone at the front of the auditorium, the din and rustle of 400 elementary school children began to fade. After a reasonable level of quiet had been reached, the principal made some opening comments and introduced WO Edward Rhodes of the Alaska Department of Public Safety Community Services Bureau. The auditorium exploded with the shrill cheers of the same previously quiet 400. Warrant Officer Rhodes, better known as "Sergeant Ed" to thousands of Alaskan school children, smiled as he waited for the pandemonium to die down. This reaction was totally expected because when Sergeant Ed is at a school, children know the Alaska State Trooper "Safety Bear" must be hibernating nearby.

A creation of the Community Services Bureau in June 1975, Safety Bear has appeared before more than 25,000 Alaskan school children throughout the State. The Safety Bear program was designed to provide an interesting, and fun, child participation safety program which could be used anywhere in the State at any time. On the surface, Safety Bear is cuddly, loveable, and mischievous, but behind the antics a serious mission is being accomplished. Safety Bear brings cops and kids together. As the mascot of the working trooper, Safety Bear urges a child to "use his head," and "ask an adult" when in doubt about safety. Matches, abandoned ice boxes, getting lost, medicine cabinet items, and strangers are some of the hazards children in Alaska are learning to be alert to in this new type of lecture.

With some clowning from the Bear, who is prone to falling asleep, conducting inspections of Sergeant Ed's uniform, and hugging teachers, the team talks about a wide range of ac-

"The Safety Bear program was designed to provide an interesting, and fun, child participation safety program which could be used anywhere in the State at any time."

tivities in which youngsters are often injured; bicycle riding, exploring isolated areas, picking up strange objects, and investigating noises in the woods. The two also advise the kids against vandalism and show them that

law enforcement officers are their friends.

The 6½-foot bear costume is animated by the author who obtained the original costume from a local design house and spent many hours in front



Author Bill Farber prepares to don the Safety Bear costume before meeting 400 children. Photograph by Chris Anderson.

of the full-length mirror learning how to behave like a bear. Since the use of a costume was a departure from the normal uniformed officer lecture, the Bear has to appeal not only to kids and teachers, but to members of the Department of Public Safety as well.

A stroke of good fortune came when Disneyland characters, touring in Anchorage, agreed to give the author instructions in animating the costume. After many suited-up sessions and more calisthenics in front of the mirror, Safety Bear finally moved like a bear rather than a trooper in a furry pair of pajamas. By March 1976, the final reservations of those who had doubts about the success of such a program had been overcome and a custom design house in California was contracted to build a new costume. Two months later, the new Safety Bear was ready.

"Safety Bear's credits include appearances in more than 300 Alaskan schools, being a regular on a state-wide children's television program, and appearing in six State holiday parades."

Because the new costume was designed from the ground up and techniques of animation were now completely different, the author re-contacted Disneyland and managed to secure an appointment with Jim Grimes, better known as "Mr. Brer Bear." Grimes, an innovative Disneyland staffer, had developed a high degree of expertise when it came to the animation of the large and heavy Brer Bear costume. His ability to ride a bicycle, hands off in costume, was legendary. Grimes was happy to share his knowledge with the author, who began to get the hang of the new 30-pound bear after several hours suited-up.

Safety Bear's credits include appearances in more than 300 Alaskan



Safety Bear prepares to deny that he was into some mischief while Sergeant Ed wasn't looking, but the Sergeant knows better.

schools, being a regular on a state-wide children's television program, and appearing in six State holiday parades. In November 1976, Safety Bear visited the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Whitehorse, Yukon Territory, appearing before several thousand Whitehorse youngsters to

talk about safety. The program was so successful that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have plans underway to obtain their own bear costume and implement the "Bear" program on a Canada-wide basis.


Since the size of the State tends to limit regular visits to some of the



Col. Thomas R. Anderson
Director
Alaska State Troopers

more remote Alaskan villages, hours have been spent in local television studios producing video tape programs to be aired on bush stations. Children join the "Safety Bear Club" by taking the safety pledge and signing their Safety Bear certificates which they receive after the presentation. In addition to the certificate and wallet card, children receive numerous coloring handouts which stress the safety issues covered in the presentation.

Safety Bear's future looks bright—requests for the program continue to

pour in and the team continues to produce video tapes for the bush areas. Safety Bear is an entertaining and educational presentation for the benefit of Alaska's youngsters. In return for two troopers' time, the presence of a bear, and a bit of theatrical "know-how," the State of Alaska will reap inestimable benefits, because the Department of Public Safety subscribes to the philosophy that by making little friends today we may eliminate some big enemies tomorrow. 

Safety Bear tells children
about the dangers of the medicine chest.



The Role of The Organized Crime Prevention Council

By

F. D. HAND*

Chief of Police
DeKalb County, Ga.

Planning an effective program to combat organized crime is not an easy task. The typical charter or by-laws of an organized crime prevention council charges the council and staff with the following mandate: To develop and coordinate strategies and plans to attack and control organized crime. This is a very general goal; therefore it becomes necessary to devise specific plans.

The Georgia Organized Crime Prevention Council realized the need for an effective intelligence gathering capability and thus created the

Georgia State Intelligence Network (GSIN). The GSIN is the hub of statewide planning, coordination, and intelligence effort. The immediate and continuing goal of the council is the coordination of the 26-agency Georgia State Intelligence Network. Additional goals include defining Georgia's organized crime problem for the issuance of annual reports, public and confidential; coordinating joint Federal, State, and local intelligence conferences; conducting organized crime and intelligence training courses; developing an annual organized crime

legislation package; providing advice and counsel to the Governor of Georgia and other key officials on a need-to-know basis; and informing the public about the menace of organized crime and the continued threat it poses to the citizens of the State. In April of last year, the council voted to coordinate, oversee, and provide monies for joint Federal, State, and local special operations. In addition, it voted to coordinate the targeting of some major organized crime figures for extensive investigation; i.e., major drug traffickers, gamblers, and fences.

*Chairman of the Georgia Organized Crime Prevention Council

distribution, illegal trafficking in liquors, illegal distribution of deadly weapons, theft offenses, extortion, arson, lending money at usurious rates of interest, counterfeiting, bribery of law enforcement officers and other public officers, or any other criminal offense for profit. It is just as important to define what organized crime *is not*. It is not the "Mafia," per se. The Mafia is a part of organized crime, or, if you would, a part of the whole. But it is not the most serious part of organized crime that exists in the State today. The most serious concern in the area of organized crime is the local homegrown garden variety: Local criminals and their associates who are engaged in the organized criminal activities cited in the preceding definition.

An overview of organized crime in Georgia shows that gambling, with an estimated annual revenue of \$300 million, remains the most lucrative source of income for organized crime. The importation and distribution of illegal drugs has become a major source of revenue for subjects from varying criminal backgrounds, with an estimated \$225 million in annual revenue obtained through narcotics transactions. Pornography is a multi-million-dollar industry. Investigations substantiate interrelationships between the State's major pornography organizations and other avenues of illicit activities, including narcotics and prostitution traffic. Additional traditional problem areas include cor-

ruption and bribery, organized theft and fencing, and infiltration of legitimate businesses.

"In the past several years, organized crime figures and their associates have become more sophisticated and have moved into new fields of crime"

In the past several years, organized crime figures and their associates have become more sophisticated and have moved into new fields of crime including insurance and securities frauds, stock exchanges, financial markets, labor unions, and interstate shipping. Organized criminals are now involved in pencil and briefcase types of crime, and as a result, they are much more difficult to investigate. GSIN agents can reconstruct murders, bank robberies, or extortions; however, it is harder to unravel a corporate maze. As one Federal prosecutor stated, "It's like trying to nail jello to a wall." In order to make professional efforts in combating this type of white-collar crime, the council and GSIN concentrated in 1976 on providing extensive training on the financial investigative techniques of white-collar crime. GSIN agents have to acquire a working knowledge of business records and accounting that will assist them in finding and investigating business frauds and other white-collar crime activity.

"The most serious concern in the area of organized crime is the local homegrown garden variety"

Defining Organized Crime and the Problem of Organized Crime

The council's definition of organized crime is: Any group of persons collaborating to promote, or conspiring to engage in, on a continuing basis, criminal activity as a significant source of income or livelihood, or aiding or abetting in the violation of the laws of this State relating to prostitution, lotteries, gambling, illegal drug

The Need for a Statewide Intelligence Gathering Capability

The first step in the organized crime prevention platform has to be defining the problem. This can be done through questionnaires, onsite visits, and analytical research. However, before any of these methods can be implemented there must exist a statewide intelligence gathering apparatus that can provide information for any of these methods. It is imperative at the outset, then, to initiate, develop, and refine intelligence gathering capabilities in the key State and local agencies responsible for combating organized crime. When this statewide capability has been achieved, emphasis can be shifted to accurately portray the statewide organized crime problem in a concise and definitive manner. In planning a statewide intelligence network one must reconcile the seemingly paradoxical goals of, on the one hand, encouraging participation, disclosure, and cooperation, and on the other hand, guaranteeing security, privacy, and protection of sensitive confidential intelligence information.

Because of the difficulties and complexities involved, it is almost universally accepted in law enforcement that organized crime can be investigated effectively only by forming special intelligence units of skilled and experienced investigators whose sole function is to examine major criminal organizations. The work of these units must be coordinated closely with that of other agencies. Georgia had addressed this problem by creating the Georgia State Intelligence Network in 1972. The goal of this network is to engage in a coordinated and organized effort to develop intelligence data on organized and major crime. Each

member agency has designated one or more experienced investigators to devote full time to the development of strategic intelligence information. This intelligence network must be able to: Recognize and differentiate between national organized crime activities and State and local organized crime activities, determine the multi-county or regional nature of local organized criminal activity and the possible and/or probable affiliation of such activities with national organized crime syndicates, identify through accurate intelligence to what extent national organized crime has penetrated the State of Georgia, and further develop strategic intelligence or analytical functions to provide insight and briefings to the Governor and other officials on a need-to-know basis.

The goal of initiating and developing these intelligence resources was met several years ago in the State, and the emphasis has now shifted to defining and investigating the organized crime problem. This successful effort by the network has enabled the council to issue annual reports for the years 1971 through 1976, and annual confidential reports for the years 1973 through 1976.

Intelligence gathering, of course, is a means of defining the problem. The second logical step is *investigation*. Pure intelligence, strategic intelligence, intelligence per se—or intelligence for intelligence's sake—is not worth much. There needs to be a specialized target investigation based on intelligence furnished. This type of investigation will hopefully produce the hard evidentiary facts that will lead to the third and most important plank in a platform, *prosecution*.

Successful prosecution of organized criminals and their associates has to

be the end product. The ultimate goal is for intelligence units to identify all organized crime figures and compile evidence of proven illegal activity that will lead to the successful prosecution of such individuals. When this is achieved, the specialized prosecution stage of the organized crime reduction strategy should be designed to bring about swift and judicious action based upon carefully gathered and decisive evidence.

Suffice it to say that any organized crime prevention project is doomed to failure unless it is clearly documented that the project is designed for the operational interaction among the three parts: Intelligence gathering, target investigation, and prosecution. Also, any organized crime prevention project should be developed with the strike force or task force concept in mind. This task force or strike force concept should benefit from the cooperative efforts of all the resources available to a State organized crime prevention council. This would include Federal, State, and local prosecutive and investigative agencies. Joint Federal, State, and local investigations will reduce the fragmented and duplicative efforts existing in a State and will increase the level of operational security and data exchange among the various cooperating agencies.

Coordination of Joint Federal/State/Local Organized Crime Prevention Projects

It is most important that organized crime prevention projects are coordinated at the Federal, State, and local level. Georgia is one of the many recent States that have involved them-

“[A]ny organized crime prevention project is doomed to failure unless it is clearly documented that the project is designed for the operational interaction among the three parts: Intelligence gathering, target investigation, and prosecution.”

"It is most important that organized crime prevention projects are coordinated at the Federal, State, and local level."

selves with the antifencing "Sting" projects. Georgia's project, Cooperative Operational Network to Arrest Criminal Receivers and Thieves (CONTACT), was under the auspices of, and funded through, the Organized Crime Prevention Council. Project CONTACT had its beginning when agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms' Atlanta office came to the council and stated that while looking to buy weapons they were offered various kinds of stolen goods, thus suggesting the idea of a phony fencing operation. At about the same time, the Savannah Police Department developed the idea of operating an antifencing, storefront operation similar to the "Sting" operations conducted in Washington, D.C., and other parts of the country. The council approached the State Crime Commission and asked for funding for these two operations. It was agreed that the commission would fund, through the council, a \$50,000 grant to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation to commence these operations in Atlanta and Savannah. An ad-

ditional \$50,000 was later added to the grant, allowing for 6 months of operation. The joint Federal, State, and local effort recovered 1,700 items of stolen property worth more than \$1½ million. These two operations and a subsequent one in Columbus, Ga., resulted in 328 convictions, with an outstanding conviction rate of 99 percent. Project CONTACT accomplished its goals and proved that joint Federal, State, and local operations can be productive. It also laid the groundwork for operations that are now being launched against other major criminal activity throughout the State.

News Media Involvement


An organized crime prevention council must encourage news media involvement in its programs. In recent years the American press has become acutely concerned about organized crime and corruption. Some metropolitan newspapers report organized crime activity on a continuing basis, and a few employ investigative reporters whose exclusive concern is organized crime. The television industry, as well, has accepted the responsibility for informing the American citizen of the magnitude of the problem. State newspapers and television stations will cooperate with a council. They will use, and have used, information provided by the council to prepare articles on gambling, infiltration of legitimate businesses, or any other organized crime subject. TV stations will prepare special documentaries and interviews of council staff and selected intelligence agents. Here again, a council can play a strong coordinating role in bringing together news media personnel and knowledgeable intelligence agents. In addition,

the news media, including educational public television, can play a major role in helping a council to conduct a public awareness program that will better inform the citizens of a State about organized crime.

The Council as a Service Agency

An organized crime prevention council is not an investigative agency. It is not in competition with operational agencies and can thereby, more readily, gain their confidence. A council should always act as a central coordinating body responsible to the Governor. It should coordinate intelligence gathering activities, intelligence conferences, intelligence training activities, and it should draft and sponsor legislation proposals where existing statutes are not adequate or are ineffective in protecting against organized crime. The Georgia Council endorses legislation each year and asks that it be considered by the Georgia General Assembly. Significant legislation passed in 1977 includes a bill to make commercial gambling a felony and a bill that requires that pawn brokers and secondhand merchandise dealers be licensed statewide in Georgia. The bottom line is that it is im-

"The bottom line is that it is imperative to maintain a coordinated prevention, reduction, and elimination strategy against organized crime."

perative to maintain a coordinated prevention, reduction, and elimination strategy against organized crime. There is a need for a statewide body responsible to and reporting to the Governor, or a fragmented approach to the problem will result. 



Chief F. D. Hand

Rating Criminal Justice Teaching

By

CHARLES W. STEINMETZ

**Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Training Division
Quantico, Va.**

Criminal justice academic programs have begun to join colleges and universities in an attempt to evaluate teaching effectiveness. Instruments of evaluation have ranged from simple rating sheets to sophisticated techniques. Many of these tried and tested evaluation instruments are available through educational institutions or educational service agencies. Most of these have been devised and tested with college students as the population group and are available for a fee. The question that the law enforcement training director is confronted with is: "What rating or evaluation device will meet my particular needs?"

The ultimate purpose of any faculty

evaluation is to improve the instructional program. Law enforcement training programs have expanded greatly in recent years. The purpose of evaluation to determine quality applies equally as well to the law enforcement program as to the collegiate disciplines.

There is a myriad of choices to make when developing any evaluation program. Course content, facility or equipment appraisal, material learned, objectives achieved, sufficiency of time allotted, and instructors can be evaluated.

For more than four decades, the FBI Academy has been involved with law enforcement training. Achieve-

ment and excellence have been hallmarks in the history of the Academy. Programs are based on the premise that professionalism and superior quality in law enforcement services are founded on sound training, broad education, and awareness. This can only be achieved through continuous research, societal experiences, and an enthusiastic, openminded approach to law enforcement education. Observation and innovation are necessary ingredients in establishing and maintaining a comprehensive evaluation program.

The staff of the FBI Academy at Quantico, Va., has explored and used several evaluative methods in its train-

ing programs, which encompass police managers in the National Academy, major city police chiefs in the National Executive Institute, newly recruited FBI Special Agents, and in-service attendants in courses for both local law enforcement agencies and the FBI.

A faculty rating instrument (evaluation form) that was developed by an individual instructor has been used successfully for purposes of determining instructor effectiveness and program quality. It is also used on an optional basis by other instructors who feel such evaluative feedback is necessary in their particular courses.

Commencing with the concept that the evaluative device should not be used as a threat to instructors, both

students and staff members contributed to the design of the form. In view of course changes and requirements, new programs, and continuous feedback, the rating instrument is frequently updated to meet the needs of the particular program. As an experimental model, it is most valuable in providing current course analysis data. It must be stressed that the rating device was designed for developmental feedback for the instructor and is not used as a method of instructor performance appraisal for administrative decisions.

Interviews were conducted with students and faculty in order to establish an item pool or list. The item pool is merely a list of factors which the interviewees felt a good law enforcement instructor should possess. As a result

of the interviews, a pool of 50 items was accumulated. Following a screening process in which items that were redundant or ambiguous were eliminated, a final pool of 38 items was distributed to a population group consisting of a total of 407 new FBI Agents, National Academy students, Academy faculty, and administrators. The return rate was 89 percent. Each of these individual respondents was asked to "place a check by the 10 most important traits that you feel the ideal instructor should have." The results of this survey were listed in order of importance by groups.

The items selected were then formulated into a one-page instrument that is used at various intervals as needed. For example, during a National Academy session of 11 weeks, it may

Factors in Teaching

Agents	Faculty	Police	Administrators
Well-prepared	Well-prepared	Command of subject	Command of subject
Command of subject	Concern for teaching quality	Well-prepared	Well-prepared
Interesting style of presentation	Command of subject	Interested in students	Concern for teaching quality
Concern for teaching quality	Concerned whether students learn	Explains clearly	States objectives
Concerned whether students learn	Enthusiastic	Sense of humor	Enthusiastic
Makes course enjoyable	Interested in students	Makes course enjoyable	Concerned whether students learn
Sense of humor	Makes course useful to students	Concerned whether students learn	Fair grading
Explains clearly	Encourages class participation	Concern for teaching quality	Relates to students as individuals
			Has an interest in students

Student Evaluation of Instructor

INSTRUCTOR'S NAME.....
COURSE TITLE.....

Listed below are items reflecting some of the ways an instructor can be described both in class and out of the classroom. Circle the number which indicates the degree to which you feel each item is descriptive of your instructor.

	<i>Not at all descriptive</i>			<i>Very descriptive</i>	
1. Has command of his subject.....	1	2	3	4	5
2. Discusses recent developments in the course area.....	1	2	3	4	5
3. Explains clearly.....	1	2	3	4	5
4. Is well-prepared.....	1	2	3	4	5
5. Summarizes major points and identifies what he considers important.....	1	2	3	4	5
6. States objectives.....	1	2	3	4	5
7. Encourages class participation and regards students' experiences as important.....	1	2	3	4	5
8. Invites criticism of his own ideas.....	1	2	3	4	5
9. Recognizes whether or not the class understands him.....	1	2	3	4	5
10. Has interest in and concern for the quality of his teaching.....	1	2	3	4	5
11. Has a genuine interest in students.....	1	2	3	4	5
12. Relates to students as individuals.....	1	2	3	4	5
13. Is accessible to students out of class, when necessary.....	1	2	3	4	5
14. Has an interesting style of presentation.	1	2	3	4	5
15. Is enthusiastic about his subject and seems to enjoy teaching.....	1	2	3	4	5
16. Has a sense of humor.....	1	2	3	4	5
17. Makes the course enjoyable.....	1	2	3	4	5
18. Is concerned whether the students learn the material.....	1	2	3	4	5
19. Is fair in his grading.....	1	2	3	4	5
20. Makes the course useful for the student.	1	2	3	4	5

You are invited to comment further on the course and/or effectiveness of the instructor.


be applied at the halfway point by the instructor to determine his effectiveness, or it may be used at the conclusion of a session for restructuring or reinforcing certain aspects of a course. Traits that received a high number of checks or selections in addition to the 10 most desired traits were added to the rating instrument after consultation with various student and faculty representatives.

Although this survey and the resultant instrument were oriented toward a law enforcement program of instruction, the instructional qualities do not differ significantly from a number of educational studies conducted at the college and university level. This may indicate that students, whether in traditional collegiate programs or law enforcement academies, have a direct and vested interest in the quality of instruction and effectiveness of their instructors.

Conclusion

Teaching excellence and effectiveness are extremely elusive and difficult to measure. One may be personally aware of a specific trait or quality that makes a law enforcement instructor highly effective, but we find it difficult to analyze that information for the benefit of all instructors or for the overall upgrading of a law enforcement curriculum.

One step in reaching the goal of a quality program is the development of a useful tool, such as a rating instrument based on a program's particular needs. An evaluation device can be adapted or devised for specific uses, and if it is organized thoughtfully, it can be an inexpensive and simple method to fill a void in the area of faculty and program development. Hopefully, this will be an asset in the improvement of the quality of teaching and learning in the rapidly expanding discipline of law enforcement education.



Search by Consent

By

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PART IV

The Second Requirement of Lawful Consent—Voluntariness

To be lawful, a consent to search first must be obtained from a person entitled to grant such authority. The foregoing sections considered the problem of who is empowered to consent. What follows addresses the second obstacle which must be overcome—proof that the consent is voluntarily given.

The leading Supreme Court decisions concerning the voluntariness question are *Bumper v. North Carolina*, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) and

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In *Bumper*, the majority pointed out:

“When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” 391 U.S. at 548.

Five years later, the Court in *Schneckloth* considered the question of what the prosecution must prove to demonstrate that a consent is voluntary:

“The problem of reconciling the

"Whether the consent is in fact voluntary . . . is determined by a careful review of all the facts surrounding the giving of consent."

recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone. To approve such searches without the most careful scrutiny would sanction the possibility of official coercion; to place artificial restrictions upon such searches would jeopardize their basic validity. Just as was true with confessions, the requirement of a 'voluntary' consent reflects a fair accommodation of the constitutional requirements involved. In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. Those searches that are the product of police coercion can thus be filtered out without undermining the continuing validity of consent searches. In sum, there is no reason for us to depart in the area of consent searches, from the traditional definition of 'voluntariness.'" 412 U.S. at 229.

The Court thus adopted a "totality of circumstances" test. As in the question of voluntary confessions, no single criterion controls. Whether the consent is in fact voluntary or the product of duress and coercion, express or implied, is determined by a careful review of all the facts surrounding the giving of consent. In the remainder of this section, factors relevant to a determination of voluntariness will be considered.

Custody

One of the issues left open in *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), was whether a voluntary consent could be obtained from an accused in police custody. Some earlier authority existed for the proposition that custody in and of itself was sufficiently oppressive as to render any consent to search coerced. See, e.g., *United States v. Nikrasch*, 367 F. 2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); *Judd v. United States*, 190 F. 2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); *United States v. Ortiz*, 331 F. Supp. 514 (D. P.R. 1971). But the majority view considered custody simply one of many factors to be evaluated in judging the voluntariness of consent. Custody alone was not determinative.

Whatever doubt lingered in the wake of *Schneckloth* was dispelled by the Supreme Court in *United States v. Watson*, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In *Watson*, the defendant was arrested without warrant for possession of stolen credit cards. He was searched, but no credit cards were found on his person. An officer then asked if he could look in Watson's car, which was located nearby. Watson told him to "go ahead" despite the officer's warning that anything found could be used against him. Stolen credit cards were found in the car, and Watson was charged and convicted. On appeal, he argued that both the arrest and the ensuing vehicle search were illegal.

In considering the voluntariness of Watson's consent, Justice White, speaking for the Court, noted:

"There was no overt act or threat of force against Watson proved or claimed. There were no promises made to him and no indication of more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw his

judgment. He had been arrested and was in custody, but his consent was given while on a public street, not in the confines of the police station. *Moreover, the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search.*" *Id.* at 424 [emphasis added].

That consent to search was obtained from Watson on the street rather than in the stationhouse in no way impairs the conclusion that custody is but one of many factors to be weighed in determining voluntariness. While the government's burden of proof may be greater where a police station consent is obtained, recent decisions indicate that such consent is valid.

In *United States v. Smith*, 543 F. 2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1976), the defendant, suspected of possessing a stolen government check, was stopped in his vehicle by local police. When the officer smelled alcohol on his breath, he was taken into custody for driving while intoxicated and transported to the police station. At the stationhouse, it was determined that defendant had failed to register as a convicted felon in accordance with local law and was charged with that misdemeanor. He was then advised of the suspected possessory violation and asked for consent to search his car and personal belongings. He signed a form granting the officers permission to search, and a stolen U.S. Treasury check was found in the car. The defendant was convicted.

"[T]he government's burden of proof may be greater where a police station consent is obtained. . . ."

On appeal, Smith argued that the stationhouse consent to search was involuntary. The Federal appellate court, responding to the question left unanswered in *Watson*, pointed out:

"The fact that Smith gave his consent when he was in custody at the police station, while another 'factor in the overall judgment,' does not justify a departure from the 'totality of the circumstances' approach established in *Schneckloth* and *Watson*. This case simply does not raise 'the specter of incommunicado police interrogation in some remote station house' alluded to in *Schneckloth*..." *Id.* at 1146 [emphasis in original].

See also *United States v. Haun*, 409 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (consent to search premises obtained from defendant under arrest and in detectives' office at police headquarters deemed voluntary); *Surianello v. State*, 553 P. 2d 942 (Nev. 1976) (consent to search motel room obtained from defendant in custody at police headquarters held voluntary). Decisions prior to *Watson* which hold that custody at the police station will not nullify an otherwise voluntary consent are cited in *United States v. Smith*, *supra*, at 1146.

Use of Force and Threats

The very purpose of a weapon is to coerce, to demand submission and cooperation. It is hardly surprising then that courts attach special significance to the use of weapons while eliciting consent to search. The question is whether this factor alone will vitiate the consent. Is consent obtained at gunpoint involuntary *per se*?

The totality of circumstances test, mandated by the Supreme Court in *Schneckloth*, makes plain that use of

a weapon, standing alone, will not invalidate a consent. The "presence or absence of a single consensual or coercive factor is not of itself controlling as a matter of law." *United States v. Hearn*, 496 F. 2d 236 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1048 (1974). Nonetheless, it is apparent that display of a firearm weighs heavily in any determination of voluntariness. And it is equally apparent that a reviewing court will pay considerable deference to the trial court's finding on the question of voluntariness.

In *United States v. Whitlock*, 418 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Mich. 1976), Federal narcotics agents arrested and handcuffed the defendant at gunpoint outside his apartment. He was returned to the apartment where a consent to search his wife's car was secured. One of the issues raised was whether his consent was voluntary. The court, in concluding that the consent was coerced, pointed to the "manner in which the defendant was initially approached and detained," which was "earmarked by surprise, fright, and confusion." A month earlier, the same court held that a consent obtained from an arrested narcotics suspect by police with service revolvers drawn was involuntary. The open display of weapons by the arresting officers was cited as a key factor in determining the voluntariness of the consent. *United States v.*

"The open display of weapons by the arresting officers was cited as a key factor in determining the voluntariness of the consent."

Edmond, 413 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (E.D. Mich. 1976).

See also *Kirvelaitis v. Gray*, 513 F. 2d 213 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 855 (1975) (nothing in record supports conclusion consent given at gunpoint is voluntary; overpowering armed police presence requires additional evidence that choice was uncoerced beyond defendant's mere assent to search); *United States v. Bergdoll*, 412 F. Supp. 1323 (D. Del. 1976) (dictum) (agents knocking on door with guns drawn constitutes precisely the kind of overt act and threat of force which Supreme Court has held to vitiate any consent to search).

Where other factors are present which tend to lessen the impact of the show of force, a voluntary consent may be found. For example, in *United States v. Cepulonis*, 530 F. 2d 238 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied 426 U.S. 908 (1976), the defendant was arrested outside a motel, returned to his room, and there was asked for consent to search. He was handcuffed and surrounded by officers, two of whom carried shotguns. As to whether these circumstances were coercive, the court stated that while the decision "could have gone either way," the trial judge was not in error when he held the consent voluntary. A persuasive fact in reaching this result was the defendant's prior acquaintance with violence and the police. He was "less likely than most to be intimidated by the agents' show of force." See also *United States v. Evans*, 519 F. 2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 916 (1975) (approach with drawn guns did not invalidate consent where defendant later acknowledged

Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law or are not permitted at all.

the act to be voluntary and where he was warned of his right to refuse consent); *United States v. Miley*, 513 F. 2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. *Goldstein v. United States*, 423 U.S. 842 (1975) (a few agents with weapons drawn as a precautionary measure does not invalidate consent to search); *United States v. Savage*, 459 F. 2d 60 (5th Cir. 1972), affirmance of conviction vacated, new judgment entered affirming conviction with leave to appeal 483 F. 2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant's will not overborne by armed officers who did not use weapons in threatening manner); *State v. Watson*, 559 P. 2d 121 (Ariz. 1976) (five officers with drawn guns, consent nevertheless voluntary).

The use of weapons is the most blatant example of force and duress. But other, more subtle, tactics are sometimes used. Where a defendant is held in incommunicado custody, isolated in a strange place, and questioned for over 2 hours, a consent thereafter obtained will be tainted. *United States v. Rothman*, 492 F. 2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973). The court further noted in *Rothman*:

"The psychological atmosphere in which the consent is obtained is a critical factor in the determination of voluntariness. . . . In looking at the factual issue of voluntariness, the court must be aware of the 'vulnerable subjective state' of the defendant as well as the possibility of 'subtly coercive police questions'." *Id.* at 1265.

Physical force therefore is not essential to a finding of coercion. The mere threat of some police action or the imposition of a condition that overbears the will of the consenting party is sufficient. See *United States v. Bolin*, 514 F. 2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975) (consent obtained during custodial interrogation and after suspect im-

pliedly threatened with arrest of girlfriend if he did not consent is involuntary); *United States v. Ruiz-Estrella*, 481 F. 2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973) (consent involuntary where suspect removed from boarding area at airport and isolated in coercive environment with uniformed sky marshal); *United States v. Enserro*, 401 F. Supp. 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) (consent to warrantless search obtained under erroneous threat that subject would face criminal penalties under Federal statute unless he signed consent does not justify the search by consent); *Padron v. State*, 328 So. 2d 216 (Fla. App. 1976) (requiring 16-year-old boy to make choice between permitting a search of premises or yielding to unreasonable alternative of evacuating premises on extremely cold night operated to strip consent to search of any voluntary character).

Submission to Authority

Numerous cases have considered the problem of consent given in response to an assertion of police authority, express or implied. Most involve the use or threat of a search warrant. *Bumper v. North Carolina*, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), is the leading case and the starting point. In *Bumper*, officers wanted to search the rural residence of an elderly grandmother. She was told the officers had a warrant, at which point she permitted them to enter and search. Incriminating evidence was found. Later, the State sought to validate the search not on the basis of the purported warrant, but rather on the consent given by the grandmother. In fact, the warrant was never produced. The Supreme Court rejected the argument on grounds that the consent to search was involuntary:

"When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has

the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in fact, any warrant at all. When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." *Id.* at 548-50.

Why would the prosecution attempt to justify a search on the basis of consent, with its heavy burden of proof, when the search was made under authority of a warrant? The answer to this question may be that the warrant was defective, *Commonwealth v. Pichel*, 323 A. 2d 113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (warrant invalid, consent made in response to announcement of warrant involuntary); or that there was no warrant at all, *State v. Basham*, 223 S.E. 2d 53 (W. Va. 1976) (State troopers "purportedly" obtained search warrant, no indication that warrant was ever produced, consent nevertheless voluntary). Where a legally sufficient search warrant has been issued, acquiescence to a declaration that officers have a warrant will not render the search unlawful. The entry and search may be justified under the warrant or by voluntary consent. *United States v.*

Pagan, 395 F. Supp. 1052 (D. P.R. 1975), aff'd 537 F. 2d 554 (1st Cir. 1976).

It would seem to make little difference whether the consent entry to premises follows announcement that officers possess an arrest warrant rather than a search warrant, if the process is later found invalid. A Texas appellate court reached such a conclusion in *Evans v. State*, 530 S.W. 2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Officers with a defective arrest warrant gained entry to premises by asserting they had a warrant for a person believed to be inside. Contraband was found in plain view. The court held that in the absence of a valid warrant, the entry could only be justified by consent, and consent under these circumstances was not freely given. Submission to authority cannot be disguised as a voluntary consent to search. *Id.* at 939.

The threat of obtaining a search warrant has frequently preceded a consent to search. Generally, a request for consent to search by an officer, accompanied by a statement that he can or will obtain a search warrant in the event of refusal does not, standing alone, invalidate the consent. The issue was squarely before a Federal appellate court in *United States v. Faruolo*, 506 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1974). FBI Agents had probable cause to believe defendant had stolen wearing apparel in his house. He was arrested in his yard, given *Miranda* warnings, asked for permission to search the house, and advised that he did not have to permit the search. One Agent also pointed out that if he did not consent, a "search warrant would be applied for and further conveyed his (Agent's) belief that one would be issued." The defendant consented, and evidence was seized.

"Generally, a request for consent to search by an officer, accompanied by a statement that he can or will obtain a search warrant in the event of refusal does not, standing alone, invalidate the consent."

On appeal, the court held the FBI Agent's statement that he would apply for a warrant, which conveyed the impression that one would be obtained, was not a coercive factor negating consent. Such a "well-grounded" statement does not constitute trickery or deceit.

Accord: *United States v. Tortorello*, 533 F. 2d 809 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 50 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1976) (statement that agent "could get a warrant" does not affect voluntariness of consent); *United States v. Gavic*, 520 F. 2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1975) (statement that agent "would procure a warrant" does not invalidate consent); *United States v. Miley*, 513 F. 2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. *Goldstein v. United States*, 423 U.S. 842 (1975) (statement that obtaining warrant was a mere formality, which was "wholly accurate," does not impair voluntariness of consent); *United States v. Agosto*, 502 F. 2d 612 (9th Cir. 1974) (statement that officers "would get a warrant" and premises would be secured in the interim does not constitute coercion as a matter of law); *United States v. Culp*, 472 F. 2d 459 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 411 U.S. 970 (1973) (indication that officers will "attempt to obtain" or "are getting" a warrant does not render consent involuntary); *People v. Hancock*, 525 P. 2d 435 (Colo. 1974) (statement that "warrant would be sought" if no consent does not negate voluntary consent).

Some courts have emphasized that advice to a consenting party that a warrant can or will be sought in the event of refusal is not improper, so long as the requesting officer in fact has probable cause to search. *Code v. State*, 214 S.E. 2d 873 (Ga. 1975), re-

flects this view. The Georgia Supreme Court noted that a detective's statement that he would obtain a warrant if consent were not forthcoming did not invalidate a consent since probable cause existed to get the warrant. See also *United States v. Miley*, *supra*; *United States v. Faruolo*, *supra*. In the absence of probable cause to search or arrest, such a statement has been deemed coercive. *Herriott v. State*, 337 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976).

"The language used by the officer in asking for consent to search can be important."


The language used by the officer in asking for consent to search can be important. Compare this statement: "If you do not consent, I will apply for a search warrant as soon as I leave here"; with: "If you do not consent, I'll be back here in a couple hours with a half dozen officers who will take this place apart." It is reasonable to expect a court to disallow a consent as involuntary when it follows the latter statement.

Both Federal and State decisions seem to find an officer's simple statement of fact acceptable. Thus, when he advises a person that he "will attempt to get a search warrant" if consent is withheld, such a statement is not coercive. *United States v. Boukater*, 409 F. 2d 537 (5th Cir. 1969). And as can be seen from the decisions cited above, assertions that the officer "could get" or "would procure" a warrant do not necessarily cause a coerced and involuntary response. See, e.g., *United States v. Tortorello*, *supra*; *United States v. Gavic*, *supra*. An indepth analysis of implied coercion, including the threat to obtain a warrant, can be found in *Whitman v. State*, 336 A. 2d 515 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).

(Continued Next Month)



WANTED BY THE FBI



Photographs taken 1974.

STEVEN MICHAEL MARTIN, also known as **Steve Martin**, **Steve Michael Martin**, **Steve Micheal Martin**, **Steve Martin Micheal**, **Lee Franklin Thompson**

Unlawful Interstate Flight to Avoid Prosecution—Murder; Assault to Kill

The Crime

Martin is alleged to have brutally murdered one victim and critically wounded another with an 8-inch-long hunting knife. The attacks, which occurred on January 4, 1976, at Kansas City, Mo., are believed to be the results of a narcotics robbery by Martin and an accomplice.

A Federal warrant was issued on February 13, 1976, at Kansas City, Mo., charging Steven Michael Martin with unlawful interstate flight to avoid prosecution for the crimes of murder and assault with intent to kill.

Description

Age----- 24, born January 31, 1954, Kansas City, Mo.
 Height----- 5 feet, 10 inches.
 Weight----- 165 pounds.
 Build----- Medium.
 Hair----- Light brown to blond.
 Eyes----- Blue.
 Complexion-- Medium.
 Race----- White.
 Nationality-- American.
 Occupations-- Asphalt layer, construction laborer.
 Scars and Marks----- Scar right eye, burn scar left wrist; tattoos: "PAM" upper right arm, "S" left wrist.

Remarks----- May be accompanied by wife and two small daughters.

Social Security No.

used----- 509-58-6462.

FBI No.----- 810,719 H.

Fingerprint Classification:

14 O 1 T OI 6

S 17 R III

NCIC Classification:

COTT1408061152091107

Caution

Martin, who is reported to be a narcotics user, may be armed with a handgun and a knife. He should be considered armed and dangerous.

Notify the FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating this fugitive is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.



Right thumb print.

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

FOR CHANGE OF ADDRESS ONLY—NOT AN ORDER FORM


Complete this form and return to:

DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

_____	_____	
(Name)	(Title)	

(Address)		
_____	_____	_____
(City)	(State)	(Zip Code)

THE DEFENDER—POCKET COMB



Pictured is a comb which has been marketed commercially as "The Defender" and is available with either a red or black case. While it was originally sold in large quantities for use as promotional and advertising handouts, it is now available for individual purchase. If one pushes the release button located on the end of this comb, a steel shaft, similar to that of an ice pick, springs out allowing the weapon to be put into action. Law enforcement personnel should be made aware of such an easily concealable and dangerous weapon.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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INTERESTING PATTERN



The interesting and unusual pattern presented here is classified as an accidental whorl. It consists of a combination of two different patterns, a loop and a whorl. The inner tracing is obtained by tracing from the left delta to a point opposite the extreme right delta. In this photograph the extreme right delta is obscured.