



FBI

May 1986

Law Enforcement Bulletin



Peace Officers Memorial Day

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The Cover:

With the observance of Peace Officers Memorial Day on May 15th, tribute is paid to those law enforcement officers who made the ultimate sacrifice while keeping the peace and enforcing the law.

FBI

Law Enforcement Bulletin

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20535

William H. Webster, Director

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Director's Message

This month on the 15th we honor the memory of officers killed in the line of duty with observance of Peace Officers Memorial Day. These guardians of our peace at home died enforcing the laws which we also honor this month on the 1st, Law Day.

The conjunction in the same month of these observances for the rule of law and for those who have died to enforce that law is appropriate, for as one of the first British police historians, Charles Reith, wrote: "(if laws) are not observed, the most perfect laws which the wit of man can devise are useless."

Law Day was established in 1958 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who noted for the occasion, "It is fitting that the American people should remember with pride and vigilantly guard the great heritage of liberty, justice and equality under law..." The American Bar Association, which conceived this observance, includes as one of the purposes of Law Day the "support (of) those institutions and persons charged with law enforcement."


To this end 3 years later, President John F. Kennedy approved the law establishing Peace Officers Memorial Day to be observed on May 15th each year. The calendar week that includes this date is celebrated as Police Week. The congressional resolution first establishing this observance in 1962 noted that through slain police officers' "enforcement of our laws our country has internal freedom from fear of the violence and civil disorder that is presently affecting other nations."

Today, unfortunately, violence and civil disorder still affect many other nations, but this country to a lesser degree because we are the beneficiaries of a system of government that answers to the rule of law and is responsible to our citizenry. Our system of government owes its existence to that remarkable document which is 200 years old next year, the United States Constitution.


It is the "rule book" that not only every citizen should understand but particularly every law officer. The Constitution reserves to the individual States the powers that enable each State and local peace officer to "keep the peace" and enforce the law. The Constitution also places restrictions on the police power insuring that American police serve the law, not the government. This has prevented our Nation from developing a totalitarian police system that serves the government instead of the law.

Two hundred years is not a longevity record for a document in the long view of world history, but no other written constitution has lasted this long. No other constitution has survived to celebrate a bicentennial. In fact, two-thirds of the national constitutions have been adopted or revised since 1970; of the 160 national constitutions in the world today, only 14 existed prior to World War II!

As we mark this year's solemn observation of Peace Officers Memorial Day and as we celebrate the bicentennial of our Constitution during the next year, let all of us in law enforcement resolve to do our utmost to carry out our professional obligations in the manner that the Constitution demands of us and the American people expect of us.



William H. Webster
Director
May 1, 1986



FBI and DEA Join Forces in the Drug Training Effort

By
LAWRENCE J. MONROE

*Special Agent
Chief, Inservice and
Student Services Unit
FBI Academy*


and

MICHAEL L. MULLEN

*Special Agent
Chief, Domestic Training Section
Drug Enforcement Administration
Quantico, VA*

The FBI/DEA relationship is no recent phenomenon. Long before the formation of the joint study group in 1985, DEA and the FBI had instituted comprehensive cross-training programs both in the field and on in-service, New Agent, National Academy, counselor/instructor, and supervisory levels. With such groundwork laid, the joint study group unanimously recommended the relocation of DEA's Office of Training from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

(FLETC), Glynnco, GA, to the FBI Academy. Then, on May 24, 1985, with the concurrence of the Director of the FBI and Mr. John Lawn, Administrator of DEA, the Attorney General authorized the transfer, scheduling implementation for fiscal year 1986. The story of the FBI/DEA relationship as it emerged and as it has evolved since the agencies collocated in Quantico on October 1, 1985, is an important one, for the foundation of joint training that has been laid will determine the future



Special Agent Monroe



Special Agent Mullen

of joint field operations, and indeed, this Nation's ability to combat international drug trafficking.

In late 1981, a comprehensive FBI/DEA cross-training program was initiated that was designed to enhance the technical and investigative skills of both agencies' personnel and to increase the effectiveness of future joint field operations. Early training, conducted both in the field and at respective agency training facilities, focused on Title 18 and 21 field orientation sessions, on DEA developing financial investigative training courses with FBI assistance, and on FBI personnel participating in narcotics specialized training at the FLETC. Long term cross-training objectives were established in early 1982 that expanded the program to include the exchange of personnel in many of the two agencies' training programs.

Since the inception of the cross-training program, more than 1,200 DEA Agents have received FBI instruction in such areas as management, media relations, law, firearms, forensic science, crisis management, economic and financial crimes, and organized crime matters. Moreover, DEA's supervisory and mid-level management programs have been conducted on an annual basis at the FBI Academy since 1982. Similarly, in excess of 700 FBI Agents have participated in narcotics specialized training under the auspices of DEA Agents. During this past year, in particular, both agencies accelerated efforts to exchange personnel, including firearms instructors and Agent counselors, to support both agencies' entry-level New Agent training programs.

For example, two FBI attorneys and one FBI firearms instructor were assigned to the DEA's Office of Training at FLETC. Other kinds of training initiated in 1985 included the expansion of DEA's participation in the FBI's field training program and the increase of DEA instruction in both the FBI New Agents program and its National Academy program.

Recognizing the importance of the cross-training program and determining to reduce duplication of effort and to improve the effectiveness of investigative operations, a joint study group was assembled in January 1985, to explore the advisability and feasibility of relocating DEA's Office of Training from FLETC to the FBI Academy. When Attorney General Meese authorized the transfer of DEA training functions to the FBI Academy, he described the transfer as a step in the evolutionary process that had been under way since 1982. "For three years now," he said, "the FBI and DEA have worked side by side in the war against drugs with heartening success. Both organizations have special strengths, which makes combining the two so effective in fighting crime traffickers." He added that the considerable compatibility of the two organizations' New Agent training programs indicated the curriculum of each would be enhanced if training was done at a single facility. Furthermore, DEA training was expected to benefit from access to FBI instructors and support services as well as from closer contact with DEA Headquarters in Washington, DC, an hour's drive away.

Accordingly, DEA scheduled its first Basic Agent Class to commence training at the Academy for October 1, 1985—and both agencies were suddenly faced with critical deadlines. The FBI needed to acquire office and allied


"... the foundation of joint training that has been laid will determine the future of joint field operations, and ... this Nation's ability to combat international drug trafficking."



The first DEA Basic Agent Class October 1985

Left: FBI Range

Below: Lecture on cocaine



space that would accommodate a full 18-percent increase in the Academy's resident staff in an already crowded facility, and more importantly, it needed to complete a plan that would provide the ways and means to improve the training process of both agencies. DEA, on the other hand, faced the incredible task of maintaining operations at FLETC through September 13, 1985, while relocating to the Academy the 50 instructors and support staff, equipment, and materials that would start up the October 1st Basic Agent Class without any break in DEA's training schedule. Such relocation, of course, included all the hardships of moving households and families in the middle of the year.

To meet DEA's space and training requirements, approval was granted to accelerate the construction of certain

portions of the FBI Academy's long-range development plan, specifically the Academy's Practical Problem Training Complex (PPTC). The PPTC is, in brief, a small city complex that will provide a realistic training environment to develop such practical skills as crime scene investigation, photography, surveillance techniques, mechanics of arrest, raid planning and execution, and moot court training. The first phase of the PPTC, scheduled for completion in the fall of 1986, will include a motel/classroom, a maintenance building, and a practical problem training support center. Additionally, the Academy's photography, graphic arts, and TV studios, its audiovisual reproduction staff, and DEA's audiovisual complement will be located on this site, all of which will increase the realism and effectiveness of the exercises as well as make accessible necessary support services. In future years, the facility is expected to include a courtroom and bank build-

ing, to expand as necessary to house incoming DEA programs and personnel, and to improve the overall effectiveness of all Academy training programs.


To understand the magnitude of DEA's relocation, one must understand the structure of its Office of Training. This office is divided into two main sections—the International and the Domestic. The International Training Section, which is scheduled for relocation to the Academy in the near future, trains approximately 1,500 foreign police officials annually, some in the United States and some abroad. Three mobile teams furnish training in foreign nations, and one static team is responsible for providing advanced international drug enforcement training in the United States to senior foreign drug enforcement officers. DEA's foreign training program is funded by the

Below: Deputy Administrator Thomas C. Kelly presenting DEA plaque to FBI Assistant Director James D. McKenzie at FBI/DEA Staff Reception, November 8, 1985.



U.S. Department of State. The Domestic Section, on the other hand, not only provides training for New Agents and veteran DEA personnel but is also responsible for a nationwide training program for U.S. police officials. In 1984, for instance, over 14,750 State and local officers received DEA training assistance.

In large measure, due to the tenacity and dedication demonstrated by DEA's training staff, the first DEA Basic Agent Class graduated from the FBI Academy on December 20, 1985. Representing the Attorney General at the graduation ceremonies was Mr. Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, who extolled the graduates for their perseverance in training and their commitment



Mr. Jack Lawn, DEA Administrator, speaking at DEA's first Basic Agent Class graduation at the FBI Academy, December 20, 1985.

"DEA and the FBI together are a formidable force in the world of international drug trafficking."

to the international drug enforcement mission. Importantly, this historic ceremony symbolized joint FBI/DEA dedication to combat this Nation's number one crime problem.

DEA's successful transition to the FBI Academy stands as a testament of both agencies' resolve to integrate key agency functions. DEA will exercise autonomy over its own training program, but it will also have instructional responsibilities in the FBI New Agent and National Academy programs. Already, DEA firearms, physical training, and audiovisual personnel have been assimilated within existing FBI Academy units. While FBI instructors will provide most of the legal and forensic science training to DEA personnel, DEA instructors will provide training to

FBI and New Agents personnel in areas such as defensive tactics and firearms proficiency.

DEA and the FBI together are a formidable force in the world of international drug trafficking. Each has special strengths and investigative skills that complement the other, and each selects and produces quality Agents through mission-based training programs. Housed in the same facility, these training programs have already increased in strength and effectiveness. Instructors and trainees alike can easily interchange information and ideas, use enlarged pools of training resources, and develop conformity in the important areas of firearms, legal procedures, forensic science techniques, and physical training. Above

all, they can establish and nurture the professional working environment they will need to combat drug trafficking together in the field.

Despite the difficulties and personal hardships that have attended the collocation—and there have been many—a spirit of cooperation among students and staff members has prevailed. Rather than following *the FBI way* or *the DEA way*, personnel of both agencies are seeking the *best way*. The commitment of both agencies to training excellence is as gratifying as it is essential. All would agree with the Director that "training is not an expense, but an investment in the future."

FBI

"M-2" Derringer


National Park Service Rangers recently discovered pictured weapon in the possession of an outlaw biker. The derringer-type pistol, manufactured in Texas, is legal because part of the barrel is rifled. It is capable of firing shotgun shells in addition to pistol bullets. Officers should be aware of these weapons for their own safety.


(Photo courtesy of the Tucson, AZ, Police Department)



Peer Support for the Surviving Family

By
SGT. BRUCE KELDERHOUSE
*Employment Services Bureau
Police Department
Phoenix, AZ*





Sergeant Kelderhouse



Ruben B. Ortega
Chief of Police

What responsibility does a law enforcement agency have toward the secondary victims of our profession? In all probability, there is no local ordinance in any jurisdiction which mandates specific responsibility, other than to facilitate workmen's compensation, pension, and other possible benefits to the survivors of deceased employees. However, there are some police administrators, like those in Phoenix, AZ, who are answering this ethical question in terms of formal lines of communication with the police survivors and an informal peer support organization through which volunteers assist the surviving family members.

There is a thread of commonality which runs through the traditional expectations police managers have for the on-duty performance of their police officers. The basic requirement for "street" performance throughout our country is to provide crisis intervention to meet the current security needs of society. Some management teams are taking this problem-solving approach in their own extended departmental family by assisting to develop networks which are specifically designed to provide for the needs of a slain officer's grieving family through the use of volunteers, many of whom suffered the same loss.

The well-being of our police survivors, although not logically tied to the traditional mission of any law enforcement organization, is a matter which speaks directly to the idealistic motivation of all police personnel. Many police managers who do not subscribe to the "thin blue line" concept of unilateral

police interdependency do recognize the bonds of loyalty and brotherhood which exist in our vocational subculture. The loss of any member of the law enforcement community is felt by all who wear a badge. The unspoken message contained in the solemn honor of a "police funeral" is of concern and support to the grieving family, as well as tribute to a fellow officer.

Unfortunately, after the funeral, most police survivors are left with empty statements of emotional commitment ringing in their ears from well-meaning law enforcement personnel. The concern and support for the grieving family is rarely translated into sufficient action. The offer of "call me if you need anything" becomes sadly impossible, as the widow or widower feels isolated from the very agency for which a spouse died serving. Many feel physically and emotionally deserted by the police agency which should be one of the greatest sources of emotional support.

The Phoenix Police Department is combating this perceived lack of support through an organized support system. The death crisis intervention of the department consists of a formalized procedure, assignment of a Personnel Bureau supervisor in an attempt to manage the logistic and human concerns of the situation, and use of a volunteer police survivor support group.

A formalized written procedure, in planning for any eventuality, is an accepted approach to sound management. Many police departments have written policies on police funerals and applicable financial death benefits and/or policies which dictate proper procedure for death notification, contact of local fraternal or charitable agencies, etc. Only a few police

"... some police administrators ... are [establishing] ... formal lines of communication with the police survivors and an informal peer support organization through which volunteers assist the surviving family members."

agencies have adopted a written policy which also directs agency personnel to perform nontraditional duties of crisis management.

The Phoenix Police Department has one supervisor assigned to counsel the family, muster the assistance of resource agencies, and assist in planning and organizing to manage the residual effects associated with an employee's death. This individual is assigned to the family as soon as there is an apparent need. Assuming that the supervisor can establish an effective and trusting relationship with the family, there is an opportunity to provide the much-appreciated service to the family that all law enforcement agencies would wish to have, but have yet to discover the vehicle which could be used to deliver these services.

The "active listening," counseling-trained supervisor must rely on his communication skills to facilitate the grief process and determine situational needs. Sometimes, police personnel exhibit inappropriate, emotionally detached behavior to police survivors because of an individual problem of coping with the sometimes overwhelming grief associated with a fellow officer's death. All police officers must remain "tough" to survive, but as Christina Maslack and Susan Jackson reported in *Psychology Today*, "More subtle, and yet, more important is the policeman's carefully developed tough skin—his emotional cool, his suspiciousness, and his sense of caution—which cannot be taken off and put away as easily as his uniform. These qualities become second nature to him, an integral part of relating to all people..."¹ The supervisor that is assigned to work with the family should

be able to exhibit tender, caring emotions, which will help the family to communicate their needs and yet remain effectively objective to meet the situational demands.

The Phoenix supervisor is responsible for assisting the family by coordinating the services of volunteer support groups. Volunteer support groups, like the nationwide Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.), can provide the emotional support that is so desperately needed by the grieving family. The emotional support that police survivor groups supply is given and accepted with the common understanding of the unique tragedies of an "in-line-of-duty" death. The Phoenix police supervisor and survivor volunteers attempt to ease the grief process of the family.

The Phoenix police survivor support group provides continual assistance to one another and identity to law enforcement through affiliation with the Phoenix Police Department. The volunteers, many of whom have lost a loved one in a line-of-duty death, give their time to listen to another survivor with a personal crisis.

The existence of organizations, such as Concerns of Police Survivors, substantiate the need for law enforcement agency affiliation. The memory of the officer's death brings to the family a sense of loss and yet prideful satisfaction in the caliber of a person he or she was.

Many agencies have family members of deceased police officers living within their jurisdictions who they can help. The emotional support from the agency and police survivor group is accepted by the family because they recognize the commonality of grief and law enforcement identity that is shared by all concerned. Bereavement and loss induce an affinity in all surviving

families. Many police survivors have a special kinship with law enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies, because we in law enforcement, as well as our families, recognize that all people face death at some time, but police officers routinely confront the limits of their own mortality. It might be advisable for all managers who are inclined to assist their extended departmental family of police survivors to consider similar policies and use of volunteers as a vehicle for the delivery of support services.

FBI

Footnote

C. Maslack and S. Jackson, "Burned Out Cops and Their Families," *Psychology Today*, May 1979, p. 81.

Concerns of Police Survivors

In 1982, 10 young police widows traveled to Washington, DC, to attend National Peace Officers Memorial Day and then shared with each other the tragic details of their spouses' deaths. They also shared their experiences that followed, many of which were also appalling and lamentable, and their fears for the future. Each realized that something must be done to help other police survivors and to work to make things easier for those who would one day suffer the same loss. From this fledgling group arose Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.)

C.O.P.S. is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization funded by a grant from the National Institute of Justice. Its purpose is to minister to the special

needs of police survivors and to focus on the problems facing them.

The main thrust of C.O.P.S. is a National Police Survivors Seminar held during the week of the National Peace Officers Memorial Day. Widows, children, parents, and siblings of fallen law enforcement officers are invited to attend the 2-day seminar. During the individual sessions, grief counselors, victim rights' advocates, government officials, and child psychologists address the problems police survivors face in their attempt to bring normalcy back into their lives. Police survivors are also called upon to tell of their anxieties and the problems they faced with the community, the press, the criminal justice system, and perhaps, even the

police department for which their loved ones worked. These seminars also provide the survivors a chance to meet, to grieve together, and to find strength in one another.

C.O.P.S. reaches out to help America's police survivors, with the goal of educating police families and police departments so that the survivors can learn to cope with the tragic, often violent, loss.

For further information, contact:

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16921 Croom Road
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(301) 888-2264

Law Enforcement Officer Killings Rise

Seventy-nine law enforcement officers were killed feloniously in the line of duty in 1985, according to preliminary Uniform Crime Reporting figures. Last year's total was up from the 72 officers slain in 1984. Law enforcement agencies have cleared 74 of the 79 slayings occurring in 1985.

Firearms were used to kill 70 officers last year. Handguns were used in 58 of the murders, rifles in 3, and shotguns in 9. Among the remaining victim officers, 5 were killed when intentionally struck by vehicles, 2 with blunt ob-

jects, 1 with personal weapons (hands, fists, feet, etc.), and 1 with a knife.

Thirty officers were attempting to apprehend or arrest suspects when slain. Among those 30, 12 were attempting to thwart robberies or were in pursuit of robbery suspects, 6 were involved in drug-related situations, 4 were responding to burglaries, and 8 were attempting arrests for other crimes.

Sixteen victims were killed while enforcing traffic laws, 13 upon answering disturbance calls, 9 while

investigating suspicious persons or circumstances, and 7 were ambushed.

Four officers were murdered while handling or transporting prisoners.

Geographically, 36 officers were killed in the Southern States, 15 in the Midwestern States, 11 in the Northeastern States, 10 in the Western States, 6 in Puerto Rico, and 1 in Mexico. Forty-four of the victims were city police, 21 were county officers, 13 were employed by State law enforcement agencies, and 1 was a Federal officer.

"Terrorism as a Crime"

"The cooperation of the law enforcement community is vital for the successful investigation of terrorist activity."

It is as an international association that I should like to address you today. The shrinking world in which we live has created similar crime problems for all of us. Narcotics traffickers continue to employ new techniques to smuggle their illicit drugs into our countries. International financial institutions are used by criminal enterprises to disguise and launder their illegal profit. Organized criminal groups attempt to spread their corrupt influence and control throughout the world.

These are but a few of the many challenges confronting today's law officers. But I'd like to discuss another serious crime problem facing our cities and indeed the countries represented here—the cold, stark, fear-producing word "terrorism." In the past year, we have seen an innocent air traveler murdered and others held hostage in Beirut. American Marines in El Salvador have fallen victim to terrorists' bullets, evoking again the terrible tragedy of our Marines in Beirut and our embassy in Beirut and Kuwait. Here in the United States, right-wing terrorist groups espousing racial hatred have waged a war of arson, robbery, and murder.

This past week, we have experienced the theater, the politics, and the media attention surrounding a terrorist incident in the Mediterranean. Behind all the political rhetoric being hurled at us from abroad, we are bringing home one unassailable fact—the wanton act of violence out there was a crime by any civilized standard, committed against innocent people, away from

the scene of political conflict and must be dealt with as a crime. All of us experienced, I think, and shared the exhilaration that came with knowing that the President's incisive action would at least demonstrate that we could be effective against this kind of assault on American citizens outside the United States.

But in our recognition of the nature of terrorism as a crime lies our best hope in dealing with it. To deal effectively with these threats to society, it is essential that the law enforcement community understand the basis of terrorism. At the FBI, we define terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

In pursuit of these objectives, the terrorist invariably resorts to violence to emphasize ideological statements or to reinforce political demands. To the terrorist, violent actions are the means for political change. How foreign to the provisions of our Constitution which permit change by lawful means according to the will of the people.

Some may argue that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. But the late Senator Henry Jackson drew the distinction quite clearly when he said, "Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women and children;

By
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

*Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC*

These remarks were presented before the International Association of Chiefs of Police annual meeting in Houston, TX, on October 15, 1985. Director Webster asserted that terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging crime problems confronting the international law enforcement community. Cooperative investigative efforts—combining the resources and expertise of Federal, State, and local agencies—have proven effective in combating terrorism.

"We must be relentless in our efforts to bring terrorists to justice."

terrorist murderers do." Jackson also added, "It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists."

Democracies have always been—and I suspect will continue to be—the targets of terrorism. Our constitutional rights, the limits on police action, and the due process of the law which sometimes seems unduly attenuated—the very qualities that terrorists despise in our society—are also the qualities that make us vulnerable to acts of terrorism. Although we may feel frustrated by this irony, free societies also have the necessary tools to fight and even prevent terrorism before it occurs. Tried and true law enforcement techniques—the showing of probable cause, the use of court-authorized surveillance, search warrants, and grand juries—enable us to fight terrorism in the United States as the *crime* problem it is.

By using established crime-fighting procedures, we can ensure that the terrorist does not upset the critical balance between the rights of the individual and society's right, as a whole, to protection. A government that reacts to terrorism by repressive measures and suspends individual liberties plays into the hands of terrorists. It is important that we do not signal that our nations are under siege. This is a message we never want to communicate to the terrorists.

By separating the crime from politics, those of us charged with law enforcement can begin the task of responding to the threat of terrorism. In the United States, the FBI is the lead agency in investigating terrorism. We have authority to conduct domestic terrorism investigations under Attorney

General guidelines. The FBI also investigates cases of international terrorism that occur inside the United States. International terrorism originates outside the United States and the terrorist activity transcends national boundaries. Attorney General Counterintelligence Guidelines establish FBI authority for these investigations.

Our goal is to detect, and where possible, prevent domestic and international terrorist activity in the United States. By utilizing all of the investigative tools available—informants, electronic surveillance, and undercover agents—we have achieved successes in reducing terrorist incidents here. In 1977, there were 112 incidents of terrorism in the United States. By 1982, we had reduced that number to 51. In 1983, despite all of the activity we had, there were 31 terrorist actions; and in 1984, with the World's Fair, the Olympics, and two national conventions, there were but 13. So far in the 10th month of this year we have experienced only four incidents of terrorism in the United States, although I must report to you that the incident in Los Angeles just a few days ago—the assault on the Arab-American Anti-Defamation League, and the murder of its executive director—will very probably become number five. Still, that is a very low number compared with 112 in 1977. But of even greater importance, we have prevented at least 23 separate acts of terrorism in the United States this year alone. Getting there before the bomb goes off becomes a realizable objective.

While we are the lead agency in meeting the challenge of terrorism in the United States, many incidents occur beyond our borders. In many cases, the FBI may have extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate these international terrorist incidents. The Pro-

tection of Foreign Officials Act has allowed the United States to investigate the bombing of the American embassy in Lebanon, as well as the Marine killings in El Salvador. And these investigations have produced extremely helpful material. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, a tremendous boost forward for all of us in law enforcement, has given us jurisdiction in air piracy and hostage taking cases that involve U.S. carriers and U.S. citizens, such as the hijacking of TWA flight 847 which we are currently investigating. And of course, we are deeply involved in the investigation of the hostage taking on the Italian cruise liner, Achille Lauro. FBI teams are in Italy. An FBI Agent has flown to Damascus with evidence we hope will be useful there. And other steps have been taking place internationally to pursue to justice the fugitives in that case, and we will support fully all of the work of the Italian authorities under the Italian magistrate.

The cooperation of the law enforcement community is vital for the successful investigation of terrorist activity. Terrorist cases often combine the jurisdiction of State and local, national and international agencies. To prevent the duplication of efforts, cooperation must replace the competition that might otherwise exist among law enforcement personnel. In 1979, the FBI and the New York City Police Department formed a joint task force to coordinate bank robbery investigations in the city. Both agencies signed a memorandum of understanding that clearly outlined task force responsibilities and administrative duties. The joint task force was better able to utilize valuable personnel and technical equipment. The task force cut through bureaucratic red tape to gain quick

access to both the New York City Police Department's and the FBI's law enforcement resources. That new sense of professional comradeship resulted in a very significant reduction in the number of bank robberies in the New York City area. This successful experience soon led to the formation of a joint FBI/NYPD terrorism task force.

These task forces combined their efforts in 1981 when a Brink's armored car was robbed of \$1.6 million in Nanuet, NY. Two police officers and the security guard were killed as a result of this robbery. Cooperation among the New York City Police Department, the New York State Police, the New Jersey State Police, the Rockland County District Attorney's Office, the Nyack Police Department, and the FBI helped to identify a previously unknown community of terrorists. This terrorist network consisted of various left-wing groups—several leftover radicals from the 1960's—who financed their operations by committing crimes throughout the United States. This investigation provided invaluable information about how terrorist groups operate in the United States, and as the scope of the investigation widened, the task force was initiated in FBI field offices throughout the United States. The joint task forces have been directly involved in the collection of intelligence and directing investigative activity that led to the arrest of two fugitives in this investigation—Marilyn Buck and Dr. Alan Berkman.

The terrorism task forces on the east coast have been vital to the investigation of several domestic terrorist groups, including the United Freedom Front, the Armed Resistance Unit, and the May 19 Organization. These

groups have been charged with a series of robberies and bombings on the east coast. A valuable lead developed by a State trooper assigned to the Connecticut task force led to the arrest of some of the principal players in these investigations, including Raymond Luc Levasseur, who at that time had been on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List since 1977.

Internationally, the United States has been the principal target of terrorist activity in stark contrast to the diminished record within the United States. The U.S. State Department has estimated that over 40 percent of terrorist activity in the past 10 years has been directed against U.S. citizens, institutions, or property. The most recent events in the Mediterranean only underscore this international threat to our citizens. In recognition of this international problem and immediately following the hijacking of TWA flight 847, President Reagan appointed a task force on combating terrorism. This task force, chaired by Vice President Bush, has been created to review the entire scope of the U.S. Government's efforts against terrorism, particularly abroad. To emphasize his own concern, the President appointed the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and seven other cabinet officers and agency heads, including myself, to this task force. President Reagan has directed the task force to review all U.S. policy and capabilities in combating terrorism. The task force is composed of a staff working group, a research and analysis group, and a senior review group, all headed by former Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jim Holloway. Executive Assistant Director Buck Revell is the FBI's representative on this review group. The task force will also receive input from outside the executive branch. Members of Con-

gress, retired military personnel, distinguished statesmen, and concerned citizens will make further recommendations on how to improve our capability to deal with terrorism.

We have made tremendous progress here at home working with law enforcement agencies around the world. We can, we must come to grips with this mounting international crime. Progress in the United States, in the United Nations, and in the Interpol organizations gives us hope that other countries of the world formerly willing to put these issues aside as political rather than questions of crime and law enforcement are now focusing upon that area which clearly is a crime, which affects innocent persons outside the zone of conflict, and which would be a crime in any nation of the world. They are willing to give assistance to the nations suffering the terrorists assaults.

Finally, there must be no doubt about our resolve. We must work within our own laws and within the treaties and protocols that exists between cooperating nations. We must be relentless in our efforts to bring terrorists to justice. As President Reagan said last week, the message is, "You can run, but you can't hide." Our legal systems throughout the world may not always mesh. Political considerations may sometimes seem to intervene. But let us use the tools that we have. Let us invoke the cooperation we have a right to expect around the world, and with that cooperation, let us shrink the dark and dank areas of sanctuary until these cowardly marauders are held to answer as criminals in an open and public trial for the crimes they have committed, and receive the punishment they so richly deserve.

FBI

Interagency Agreement

By
CHIEF MELVIN KILBO
Police Department
Orono, MN

"Cooperation between municipal police and the sheriff's department is ... an important aspect of law enforcement's pledge to serve and protect the community and its citizens."


EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is primarily of interest to small law enforcement agencies. According to Uniform Crime Reporting figures, 4,362 (70%) of the 6,161 police departments in the United States have less than 25 employees. This could lead to the staffing problem addressed in this article.



Officer Mark Tomczyk, Orono PD and Deputy Robert Fischer, Hennepin Co. SO

Much has been written about the need for cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Proof of such cooperation exists in Hennepin County, MN. The Orono City Council and the Hennepin County Board came to an agreement whereby a sheriff's deputy came to work for the City of Orono because of the long term absence of a city officer injured on duty. The agreement was set forth under powers rendered by Minnesota State Statute 436.05, which allows a sheriff to furnish supplementary service to a municipality, and under the Joint Powers Agreement pursuant to Minnesota State Statute 471.59. It is a credit to both units of government and their staffs that this agreement was completed.

On February 1, 1985, an Orono officer was injured in a head-on accident, in which his squad car was totaled. The police department was able to compensate for the injured officer's absence by having fellow officers work overtime. However, by the middle of August, the officers were "burned out" and requested relief from overtime duties. The injured officer's status under workmen's compensation would not reach maximum rehabilitation for approximately 4 months, requiring the city administrator and police chief to look for solutions to the problem. Several options were examined before the city requested assistance from the Hennepin County Sheriff's Department.



Chief Kilbo

In a preliminary discussion, the sheriff was asked if he could assign a deputy sheriff to Orono to cover the injured officer's position until December 31, 1985. The sheriff's department believed it would be appropriate to honor this request in view of the department's efforts to assist and supplement law enforcement in the county.

During a meeting attended by administrators of both agencies, a mutual agreement was reached. The agreement stipulated that from September 1, to December 31, 1985, the sheriff would provide to the City of Orono one post-licensed deputy sheriff who had at least 1 year of patrol-related experience. This deputy would be sworn in as a police officer and be subject to the control and supervision of the chief of police or his designee. He was also required to adhere to the department's rules and regulations, including personnel rules, and if discipline was warranted, such discipline must be approved by both parties. The agreement further stated that general law and traffic enforcement services would be within the jurisdictional limits of the City of Orono. If needed, the agreement could be renewed with the consent of both agencies.

According to the agreement, the deputy would remain on the sheriff's payroll, and the sheriff would then bill the City of Orono for actual costs. With regard to liability, indemnification, and insurance, the city agreed to a "hold harmless agreement" to the sheriff's department and also to provide the county with sufficient liability insurance. The municipality also agreed not to hire the deputy as a municipal police officer or for any other purpose for a 1-year period from the termination date of the agreement. Vacation, holiday pay, and sick leave were all covered within the agreement, as was a cancellation clause.

Since the assignment was to commence at the end of the boating and vacation season, the sheriff assigned a 12-year veteran from the water patrol division to the municipal police agency. Deputy Robert J. Fischer had prior experience with two municipal departments before joining the sheriff's department. While in the sheriff's force, he served as a jailer and a deputy in the patrol division.


As stated in the agreement, Deputy Fischer wore his sheriff's uniform and drove an Orono squad car. Although he had been working for the county in a rural area with major highways running through it, some differences were experienced. These included more calls for service in a smaller area of travel, more alarm calls from residents and commercial businesses, and better backup response times.

Deputy Fischer brought with him a willingness to work, doing needed followup on cases received during his tour of duty. He was also aware of and assisted Orono officers with overweight/overwidth truck violations, making numerous arrests.

No complaints were received from citizens concerning a deputy working in a municipal squad car, although there were some surprised expressions. And acceptance from Orono officers has been excellent. The most important factor to the City of Orono was that the department was up to complement, taking pressure off the patrol officers.

Cooperation between municipal police and the sheriff's department is possible and is an important aspect of law enforcement's pledge to serve and protect the community and its citizens.

FBI



“... an agency or department should establish preventive measures and have a clearly defined policy for the care of [training] injuries.”

Management of Training-Related Injury

By

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Law enforcement training programs must be physically strenuous and demanding if they are to meet the needs of the profession. The very nature of an aggressive program makes injuries in the training setting commonplace. Because a certain number of injuries are inevitable, an agency or department should establish preventive measures and have a clearly defined policy for the care of these injuries. The key objectives of the policy should be the elimination, or at least minimization, of the amount of training time lost to injuries (TTLI) and the return of the trainee to full participation as safely and quickly as possible. A TTLI is defined as any training-related injury which necessitates the alteration or elimination of any scheduled training activity. For example, if an ankle sprain prevents a student from participating in a class run, the injury is classified as a TTLI.

At the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the responsibility for injury prevention is placed with the athletic trainer of the Physical Techniques Division (PTD), Office of

Special Training. This function was established in June 1976, with injury prevention, analysis, and care being its main objectives. The branch is currently staffed with three National Athletic Trainers Association certified athletic trainers (ATC); two are permanent employees and one is a graduate student intern who is appointed on a 1-year basis. The athletic trainers operate under the supervision of the medical officer, and all treatment procedures are under his direction. Constant communication between the athletic trainer and the medical officer is of utmost importance for cohesiveness of this function. Weekly meetings are conducted between the senior athletic trainer and medical officer to discuss patient progress and restrictions and to plan treatment strategy involving the more-complex cases.

The function is fully equipped with the latest physiotherapy equipment, including whirlpools, ultrasonic/muscle stimulation, and cold treatment units. A wide range of rehabilitation equipment, such as the weighted ankle boot, exercise bicycle, and upper leg develop-



Dr. Callicutt



Charles F. Rinkevich, Director
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

ment table, is used on a continuous basis to insure the safe return of the injured trainee to full training status as quickly as possible.

At the time of injury, the athletic trainer handling the case compiles a complete history of the trainee. The history includes such pertinent information as the name of the injured student, Social Security number, week of training, date, time, class number, general nature of the injury, how it occurred, name of the instructor supervising the class and the trainer, and the trainer's clinical impression (which can be defined as opinions of the conditions of the injury). There is also a standard Privacy Act explanation and a certification that the injury was sustained in performance of duty, which is verified by the student.

An injury analysis form is also a primary part of the initial history procedure. Injury analysis is performed by a computer program coupled to the FLETC central computer system with a terminal located in the athletic trainers' office. The program is designed to analyze the following data:

- Visit type (new or prior injury, etc.),
- Location of injury (right, left, etc.),
- Body part involved (trunk, ankle, etc.),
- Injury type (sprain, strain, etc.),
- Activity involvement at time of injury (running, defensive tactics, etc.),
- Injury cause (lifting, blow from person, etc.),
- Surface on which injury occurred (sand, carpet, etc.),


- Whether there was a warmup prior to the activity,
- Whether shoes were worn,
- Whether the trainee had regular exercise habits prior to attending the FLETC,
- Time of injury,
- Number of hours of training time lost (TTL),
- Therapy performed (whirlpool, cold packs, etc.), and
- Rehabilitation used.

Treatment

All treatment should be under the direction of a physician. This is of paramount importance to insure the health and well-being of the student and to protect the trainer and the agency from future litigation involving acts of negligence. The physician prescribing both treatment and medical restrictions should be apprised of the type of training activities that are required of the student. A member of the training staff should accompany the injured student to the hospital or physician's office in order to ensure the well-being of the officer and to establish a direct line of communication between the medical community and the agency.

Treatment need not be complicated, but it should be correct and consistent. For many years, trainers and physicians have worked under the premise that there is no proven method of treatment that will speed the human body's natural healing processes, but that correct treatment procedures can facilitate healing.

Emergency treatment should consist of ice, compression, elevation, and protection. The first three elements—ice, compression, and elevation—will aid in the reduction of swelling, and therefore, make the injured trainee more comfortable. The



Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, GA

fourth element, protection, will tend to prevent further injury and pain.

Ice can be applied by the use of crushed ice, cold water, or commercially prepared chemical ice packs. Compression can be as simple as leaving a shoe on an injured foot or ankle. Also, elastic bandages are a universal method of providing uniform compression to an injured joint. Eleva-

tion can be achieved by the use of an arm sling or by simply placing the injured limb above the rest of the body.

The protection phase can be as simple as preventing the trainee from walking on or moving the injured part of the body. The entire process can be remembered as "ICEP" (ice, compression, elevation, protection.)

Class Injury Analysis

For research purposes, seven police training classes and seven criminal

investigator classes totaling 504 students were analyzed for injury frequency and cause. One hundred and sixty eight students were attending a 9-week police training program designed for land management personnel who have law enforcement responsibilities. Among the organizations involved in this program were the National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and U.S. Forest Service. In addition to numerous other

"The first and foremost aspect of injury prevention is stretching and proper warmup."

training courses, these students received instruction in arrest techniques and defensive tactics. They also participated in a five-item physical assessment test (PEB) consisting of agility, body composition, flexibility, strength, and cardiovascular endurance.

The criminal investigator classes consisted of 336 students attending a 8-week course designed for agencies such as U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Marshals Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and criminal investigators of the various Inspector General offices. Their program consisted of similar training in arrest techniques, defensive tactics, and a physical assessment.

Review Of Data

Following the review of injury data, it was determined that off-duty recreation accounted for the largest percentage of injuries—34 percent in the criminal investigator (CI) program and 23 percent in the police training (PT) program. Off-duty running was the leading cause of injuries in the CI program, followed by basketball, weight training, and racquetball. Running injuries were also the primary category in the PT program, followed by basketball and weight training activities. This comes as no great surprise

Figure 1

Injury Frequency Analysis

ANALYSIS AREA	INVESTIGATOR CLASSES	POLICE CLASSES
Total Number of Students	336	168
Total Number of Injuries	98	94
Total Number of PEB Injuries	11 (11%)	8 (8%)
Greatest Risk Areas		
Off-Duty Recreation	34%	23%
Basketball	32%*	5%*
Racquetball	20%	*
Running	47%*	15%*
Weight Training	29%*	2%*
General Conditioning	22%	
Defensive Tactics	9%	18%
Most Frequent Injury Sites		
Leg/Knee	62%	60%
Arm	20%	17%
Trunk	10%	15%
Head/Neck	9%	
Lost Time Participation (LTP) Injuries		
LTP Injuries	8	19
Number of LTP Hours	11	42
Average Number Hours Lost Per LTP	.60	2.3

*Percentage breakdown of total off-duty injuries

since a total of 46,973 students participated in the FLETC recreation program during the study. The program is viewed by all concerned as a superior vehicle by which to promote morale and establish rapport within the almost 60 participating organizations using FLETC. (See figs. 1 & 2.)

Evaluation Of Injury Data—Program Review

At the culmination of each class, the senior athletic trainer meets with the assistant chief of the Physical Techniques Division to discuss prime injury-producing training activities. Preventive strategies are discussed, and if needed, changes in instructional techniques and other modifications are implemented in an effort to bring about a lower incidence of training-related injuries.

Prevention Of Frequent Injuries

The first and foremost aspect of injury prevention is stretching and proper warmup. This procedure prepares the body for any strenuous demands placed upon it in the exercise regimen and increases flexibility. Pre-exercise stretching is directed toward the prevention of strains (muscles) and

Figure 2

PT/CI Class Injury Analysis

ACTIVITY	HEAD/NECK INJURIES		TRUNK INJURIES		ARM INJURIES		LEG/KNEE INJURIES		OTHER INJURIES		TOTAL INJURIES	
	CI	PT	CI	PT	CI	PT	CI	PT	CI	PT	CI	PT
General Conditioning	3	2	4	4	4	12	17	11	0	0	28	29
Defensive Tactics	3	1	1	2	2	11	3	3	0	0	9	17
Arrest Techniques	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	2
PEB:												
Agility	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	4	1
Flexibility	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bench Press	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
1.5 Mile Run	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	0	0	5	3
Intramurals	0	2	0	0	1	2	4	2	0	0	5	6
Off Duty	0	0	3	2	11	0	26	18	1	1	41	22



sprains (joints), but is also helpful in the prevention of overuse injury. A basic definition of an overuse injury is one which occurs when the muscles, ligaments, tendons, or bones are unable to adapt to stresses which are imposed on them. This may occur for several reasons, such as exercising in a strenuous manner without proper warmup.

Stretching should be performed at a slow and gradual (static) pace and should be comfortable, not painful. The stretch should be held for a full 30 seconds and then relaxed. This process should be performed three times, attempting to increase the range with each stretch. Bouncing stretches cause a shortening of the muscle and

should be discouraged. The areas which should be stretched include the neck, upper and lower back, shoulders, hips, thighs, groin, hamstrings, trunk, ankles, and Achilles tendon. Stretching should be performed for 15 minutes both preceding and immediately following any strenuous exercise. Additional gains in flexibility may be attained with post-exercise stretching because the muscles and joints are warmed up. This will further reduce the risk of injury.

The warmup should precede the actual workout and contain activities similar to the workout. This may include jogging a quarter-mile prior to running long distances or practicing kicks prior to performing defensive tactics. This phase prepares the body for specific activity by activating the neuro-muscular pathways.

Helpful Hints For Prevention

Before embarking on any exercise program, which includes running, there are several easy guidelines one should follow to reduce the likelihood of an overuse injury.

Running Shoes

Foremost consideration should be given to the selection of a well-designed and well-constructed running shoe. The age-old saying, "You get what you pay for," is particularly true in this case. There are a large variety of acceptable shoes by various manufacturers, usually in the \$35 to \$50 price range. The shoe length should be adequate to prevent the toes from contacting the front of the shoe. However, the width should be snug since the shoe will have a tendency to widen with use. The rear of the shoe should contain a proper cushion to support and protect the Achilles tendon. The shoe should have a sturdy heel, as well as a wide heel base. Finally, it should have a sufficient inside arch support, and above all, should be comfortable for the wearer.

Exercise Intensity

The use of graduated intensity is the safest method of exercise. Any exercise program should be gradual and progressive in nature. A large number of overuse problems are due to exercising "too much too soon." Common symptoms of such training errors include loss of appetite, insomnia, nausea, dizziness, moodiness, and any unusual pain in the lower extremity. A good general guideline for running is to increase mileage by 10 percent each week. Patience is certainly a virtue when it relates to beginning any exercise program.

Running Surface

A running program should begin on soft surfaces, such as grass or dirt. This allows the muscles and bones to adapt gradually to the stress involved. After approximately 1 week, the gradual inclusion of harder surfaces, such as roadways or tracks, is acceptable.

When running on a paved road, it is extremely important to spend approximately equal amounts of time on both sides of the road. Since the road is sloped for drainage, spending more time on one side may stress certain areas of the lower extremity, causing an overuse injury.

Running on hills is especially hard on the knees and should be avoided as much as possible. Avoiding uneven surfaces, roads with pot holes, or high grassy areas will help prevent knee or ankle sprains.

Treatment

If any pain of the lower extremity is experienced following exercise, ice should be applied for 20 minutes. This procedure will aid in the prevention of a chronic or long-lasting injury. If an injury does not disappear in a week, immediately contact a physician familiar with training-related injuries.

Defensive Tactics

Data gleaned from the injury analysis highlighted defensive tactics as another training activity with a high number of injuries. By the very nature of defensive tactics, injuries are commonplace. The strenuous exertion required and the numerous procedures that involve use of force and body contact establish conditions whereby the trainee is exposed to injury-producing situations. The arm area is the anatomical part receiving the most stress,

and therefore, takes the brunt of the injuries. The following precautions should be employed to reduce the likelihood of injuries occurring in this area.

Warmup/Stretching

Methods for warmup and stretching have been discussed previously in this article and should be performed prior to any instruction in the defensive tactics area.

Proper Instruction

This important phase is the responsibility of the instructor. He or she should be aware of the level of proficiency of each student in the basic skills prior to progressing to the more-advanced levels. Improper techniques should be immediately recognized and corrected, since this will prevent serious time lost injuries.

Protective Equipment


Good quality protective equipment is a must for preventing injuries in defensive tactics. Protective equipment such as "head gear" and padded "kicks" should be used when participating in such activities as sparring. Broken equipment should not be used.

Safe Training Areas

Many injuries are caused by carelessness due to unsafe conditions in the defensive tactics training room. Two examples of carelessness are improperly padded poles and poor lighting. All windows should be covered with a protective shield to prevent breakage. Adequate matted space should be provided for maneuvers such as throws and take downs.



... the injury analysis highlighted defensive tactics as another training activity with a high number of injuries."



"Most adverse reactions to environmental heat and humidity occur during the first few days of training."

Heat Illness

Excessive heat may affect the body in a variety of ways; conditions which often result are heat cramps, heat exhaustion, or heat stroke. During the conditioning process, persons who are most susceptible to heat illness are individuals unaccustomed to working in the heat, overweight individuals, ill individuals, or those with an infection, fever, or gastrointestinal disturbances.

Heat cramps due largely to loss of salt (sodium and potassium) from the body involve muscular pains and spasms. Heat exhaustion is the excessive depletion of salt and water through sweating. It usually causes fatigue, a general weakness, or total collapse. Heat stroke is a response to heat characterized by extremely high body temperature (106° or higher). It is also coupled with a complete breakdown of the sweating mechanism. The following are signs and symptoms of heat exhaustion and heat stroke:

Heat Exhaustion

- Normal or subnormal body temperature,
- Pale, cold, and clammy skin,
- Profuse perspiration,
- Fatigue and weakness,
- Headache/perhaps cramps,
- Nausea/dizziness, and
- Possible fainting.

Heat Stroke

- High body temperature (106° or higher),
- Skin is hot, red, and dry,
- Pulse is rapid and strong initially, then becomes irregular and weak, and
- The victim may be unconscious.

Most adverse reactions to environmental heat and humidity occur during the first few days of training. It is nec-



essary to acclimatize to heat to participate in activity in hot and/or humid environments. Exercise is a must for full development of physical adaptation to heat. Acclimation to heat allows an individual to work effectively in 80° heat, whereas the physically unfit can not perform in environments much above 65° to 75°. Excessive fluid loss and electrolyte depletion, including potassium, can constitute important factors in the production of heat stress complications. Water depletion heat exhaustion is an early weight loss of 2 percent which may be followed by a severe 7-percent weight loss. For this reason, a weight check is useful in the prevention of this heat disorder. Adhering to the following commonsense suggestions will help to prevent heat illness:

- Evaluate your general physical condition.
- Be aware of daily temperature and humidity.
- Acclimatize to heat gradually.
- Reduce your level of activity immediately when your body warns

you that the heat is too much.

- Replace fluids; take frequent water breaks during activity.
- Replace salt (sodium and potassium minerals) losses.
- Intake of fluids containing adequate amounts of electrolytes, similar to ranges found in sweat, is recommended after activity.
- Avoid rubberized sweatsuits that will not allow body sweat to evaporate.
- Rest between heavy activity to dissipate accumulated body heat.

Summary

Injuries can be held to a minimum with a cooperative effort of the athletic trainers, the medical officer, and physical techniques instructional personnel. As in any joint venture, good communication, along with mutual understanding and patience, is essential.

FBI

Raiding the Computer Room

Fourth Amendment Considerations

(Part I)

"Computer-related crimes present new challenges in the establishment of probable cause..."

For several decades, electronic computing machines have been changing the world. Businesses now record their activities by computer, law enforcement agencies maintain criminal records by computer, children are entertained by computer-driven electronic games, and authors process their words by computer. Even tasks such as medical diagnoses are being performed with the aid of computers.

In the last decade, the proliferation of low-cost "home computers" has facilitated the spread of computer power and knowledge to vast numbers of citizens. Thus, it should be no surprise that criminals have begun to use computers to commit crimes and to record the activities of their criminal enterprises. Consequently, law enforcement officers are finding it increasingly necessary to search for, examine, and seize computers and computerized records in successfully investigating and prosecuting many criminal acts.

While conducting investigations of computer-related crimes, officers must comply with an 18th century prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures"¹ and contend with 20th century electronic technology. For example, investigators may at times find themselves searching for intangibles rather than familiar physical evidence,


such as guns or stolen stock certificates. As one court has noted, the target of a search may be "records [that] exist as electronic impulses in the storage banks of a computer."² This new technology creates the possibility of a criminal armed with a home computer in Wisconsin contacting a computer in New York by telephone and illegally causing funds to be transferred electronically to a bank account in France. Regardless of these technological advances, search and seizure by law enforcement officers continues to be governed by the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution.³

This two-part article will examine issues that arise when officers seek a warrant to search and seize a computer and the information it has processed. Part I will address the application of the fourth amendment warrant requirement to computer-related searches, focusing on special problems officers may encounter in establishing probable cause to search and particularly describing the computer equipment to be seized. Part II will address the description of computer-processed information to satisfy the particularity requirement and then consider issues that may arise in the execution of a warrant authorizing the seizure of a computer and computer-processed information.

By
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Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law or are not permitted at all.



Special Agent Sauls

WARRANT REQUIREMENT

The fourth amendment protects the right of the people to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" against unreasonable Government intrusion.⁴ This protection extends to computers, which are effects, and to information processed by this electronic technology, which can be categorized as papers. The constitutional demand upon the officer seeking to seize a person's computer or computerized information is that the seizure be reasonable.⁵ The U.S. Supreme Court, in establishing guidelines for reasonable searches and seizures, has stated a preference that they be made pursuant to a judicially issued search warrant. The "Constitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the citizen and the police . . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."⁶ This requirement that a warrant be obtained prior to a search or seizure is applied with special strictness where business or residential premises, the places computers are most likely to be located, must be entered to perform the search.⁷

The fourth amendment sets forth certain procedural requirements that must be met if a valid warrant is to be issued. There must be a showing of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and the warrant must particularly describe the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized.⁸ In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the probable cause determination must be made by a neutral, detached magistrate.⁹ The requirements of oath or affirmation and of presentation to a neutral, detached magistrate raise no special problems where computer searches are concerned; however, the probable cause and particularity requirements pose unique problems where computers are the search target, and these issues merit discussion.

Probable Cause To Search

Central to the protections provided to citizens by the warrant requirement is the command that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.¹⁰ This language has been interpreted to require that before a search warrant may be issued, the Government must set forth facts that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that it is probably true that (1) a crime has been committed, (2) that evidence of that crime is in existence, and (3) that the evidence presently exists at the place to be searched.¹¹ Obviously, satisfying this requirement necessitates the collection and presentation of information, and law enforcement officers perform this task daily in regard to numerous crimes. Computer-related crimes present new challenges in the establishment of probable cause though, because of the unfamiliar technology involved. Although a magistrate likely already understands how a murder may be committed with a gun, he may require considerable explanation before finding that an embezzlement was committed by means of a computer. The problem is largely an educational one.

Inasmuch as computers may be used in a wide variety of criminal endeavors, ranging from fraud to espio-

"... an officer seeking to convince a magistrate that a novel crime has been committed should use care to ensure that the explanation of the mechanics of the crime is clear and easily understood."

nage, it is difficult to state concisely what is required to satisfy the probable cause requirement in a computer-related crime. In general, probable cause will be established just as it would in a case where no computer was involved, except that additional facts will have to be presented regarding the role of the computer in the criminal activity.

That a Crime Has Been Committed

The first hurdle in establishing probable cause to search is articulating facts to indicate that a crime probably has been committed. In determining what additional facts a magistrate will need to make such a finding where a computer is involved in the crime, it is helpful to examine the role played by the computer in the criminal activity. For example, where a computer is stolen, the crime is the same as any other theft, and the required factual showing, describing the computer as the object of the crime, would likewise be the same. Where a computer is used as a tool to commit a crime, facts must be presented to show the crime was committed and to explain how the computer was used in the commission. Because computer systems are commonly installed so they may be used from distant locations by means of electronic communication over telephone lines, novel criminal opportunities have been created.¹² Valuable data may be transferred from one computer to another or modified to achieve advantage for the computer criminal.¹³ Inasmuch as the means used to commit these crimes are unfamiliar, the officer must convince the magistrate that such a crime has been committed by detailing how it was committed.

An example of an officer successfully obtaining a search warrant in a case where new technology was being employed to commit the crime of fraud is found in the case of *Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.*¹⁴ Ottensmeyer, who ran a telephone answering service, decided to provide an alternative to his customers to normal, commercial long-distance telephone service. He found a strategically located town that enjoyed nontoll calling service to a larger city on either side, despite the fact that a call from one of the larger cities to the other was a toll call. Ottensmeyer installed an electronic device in the small town that allowed a customer in one of the large cities to "patch" a call to the other large city through the device, thereby avoiding a toll call and defrauding the phone company of revenues to which it was entitled.

The investigator, a police officer who had special training in electronic technology and telecommunications, sought a warrant to search the premises where the "patching" device was located. In his affidavit, the officer "informed the judge of his experience in the electronic field and of his independent investigation and conclusions."¹⁵ The officer articulated facts that explained how the scheme to defraud functioned, and drawing on his expertise, cited inferences he had drawn from the facts he had observed. The warrant was issued and the search performed.¹⁶

Obviously, an officer seeking to convince a magistrate that a novel crime has been committed should use care to ensure that the explanation of the mechanics of the crime is clear and easily understood. If the officer wishes the magistrate to consider the officer's interpretations of the facts he has observed, he must inform the magistrate in his affidavit of the experience and training that accredit these interpretations. Consideration of such inferences by a magistrate determining probable cause has been approved so long as the officer sets forth the training and experience upon which they are based.¹⁷

An officer seeking to establish probable cause where the crime is unusual or unfamiliar may also elect to use the services of an expert. An example of using information provided by experts in affidavits for search warrants is found in *United States v. Steerwell Leisure Corp., Inc.*¹⁸ Steerwell was charged with infringing upon the copyrights of a number of electronic video games, and the question of whether a crime had been committed turned on whether the games Steerwell was distributing were sufficiently similar to the copyrighted games to violate the copyright statute. The affidavits to support search warrants presented the magistrate with results of expert analysis in comparing the games distributed by the defendants with the copyright-protected games. In determining the validity of the warrants issued on those affidavits, the court concluded that the magistrate was entitled to accept the conclusions of the experts, but noted the "magistrate's determination of probable cause would be facilitated if the agents' affidavits contained more details concerning the comparisons between protected games and infringing games."¹⁹

"The primary rule of particularity should be to make the description of the items to be seized as precise as the facts will allow."

The court also made reference to the importance of explaining to the magistrate how the crime was committed, in this case by duplication of the circuit boards that control the action of electronic games.²⁰ Again, the task of the officer includes providing sufficient technical details in layman's terms to familiarize the magistrate with the mechanics of an unusual crime.

That Evidence of the Crime Exists

The second hurdle for an officer seeking to establish probable cause to search is setting forth facts to convince a magistrate of the probability that evidence of the crime exists. Where a computer is stolen, the stolen computer is evidence of the crime. If the theft is established factually, then the existence of the computer as evidence is likewise established. Similarly, where facts establish that a computer was used to commit a crime, the same facts establish that the computer used was an instrumentality of the crime. This was demonstrated in the *Steerwell Leisure Corp.* case where if the magistrate found that the circuit boards in question violated the copyright laws then the boards would also constitute evidence of that violation.²¹

Where an investigator seeks to establish that computerized records of criminal activity are in existence, his task is essentially the same as establishing the existence of noncomputerized records. He must factually establish that records of the criminal activity have probably been created and retained. There is authority for the position that it is unnecessary to establish factually in the affidavit the physical form in which the records sought are expected to be found.²² If the officer

can establish factually the creation and retention of the records, he need not specify (or know) whether they are being maintained in written, magnetic, or some other form. In *United States v. Truglio*, audio cassettes were seized during the execution of a search warrant authorizing the seizure of "... books, records, indices, movies regarding the interstate prostitution operation located at the King of the Road Health Club..."²³ In approving seizure of the audio cassettes, the court noted that "it would have been more precise for the warrant to have specified 'written or electronic records,' " but then stated that "[s]tandards of pragmatism and commonsense must necessarily be adaptable to changing times and technological advances."²⁴ The court concluded by saying that "[w]hile decades ago it might have been difficult reasonably to infer that records existed in some form other than written, in the mid-1980's commonsense demands that we refrain from remaining so inflexible."²⁵

That Evidence of the Crime Presently Exists at the Place to be Searched

Finally, the investigator seeking to establish probable cause to search must factually establish the probability that the evidence sought is presently located at the place he is seeking authorization to search. Whether this requirement of recent information has been met is "... determined by the circumstances of each case."²⁶ As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that ... evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."²⁷

The requirement for recent information is easily satisfied where the investigator can set forth reliable information that the object sought has been recently observed at the proposed search site. Where such facts are not available, other facts must be used to infer that the items to be seized are presently at the place to be searched. At times, having a computer or its records as the target of the search may simplify meeting this requirement. If a computer has been used to commit a crime telephonically, it is possible that it has also been set up to "answer" incoming calls, to allow other computer operators to call it using their computer terminals and a telephone. If such an operation exists, an incoming call will be answered with a tone called a "carrier."²⁸ When a particular phone is answered with a "carrier," it seems reasonable for a magistrate who has been informed of the significance of the "carrier" to find that a computer and related equipment are probably present at the location of the telephone.

A somewhat analogous case involved a search warrant issued for the seizure of a "blue box," an electronic device used to create tones on the telephone system to facilitate the making of long-distance calls without being billed for the toll charges.²⁹ In this case, tones such as those produced by a "blue box" had been monitored by the telephone company on a particular telephone for a period of weeks, ending the day prior to the issuance of the warrant. This information was related to the magistrate in the affidavit. In

upholding the validity of the resulting search warrant, the court concluded that "[t]he affidavit set forth substantial information establishing clear probable cause to believe that a device emitting a 2600 cycle tone and Southwestern Bell multifrequency tones was being utilized ... at [the] residence."³⁰

Where computerized records are sought, the magistrate should consider that records by their nature are created to be kept for at least a minimum period of time, along with the other facts presented, in determining whether the records are presently at the place to be searched.³¹ Although each case must be evaluated on its own facts, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have held that under certain circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that records seen 3 months previously will still be present at that same location.³²

Particularity

The fourth amendment commands that "no warrants shall issue except [those] ... particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."³³ This provision requires that a warrant authorize only a search of a specific place for specific named items. Coupled with the probable cause requirement, this provision prevents general searches by ensuring that the warrant describes a discrete, defined place to be searched, describes only items connected with criminal activity for which probable cause has been established, and describes the items so definitely that it removes from an officer executing the warrant the discretion of determining which items are covered by the warrant and which are not.³⁴ It also provides a signal of when a search is at an end, that is, when all items named in the warrant have been located and seized or when all possi-

ble hiding places for items not located have been explored.³⁵ Since the "place to be searched" portion of the particularity requirement has no special impact on computer searches, it will not be discussed. However, the "things to be seized" portion of the requirement has a marked impact in seeking a warrant to authorize the seizure of a computer or information processed by a computer. This portion will be examined in regard to both the computer and the processed information.

Describing the Computer

The primary rule of particularity should be to make the description of the items to be seized as precise as the facts will allow. A court measuring the particularity of a description in a search warrant may consider what facts could reasonably be known by the investigator at the time application for the warrant was made, so long as the investigator includes all the facts known to him in the affidavit.³⁶ Consequently, the circumstances of each case can help determine whether a description is sufficiently particular. The nature of the item sought also is considered in determining the degree of particularity required. A less precise description is required of items which are contraband, such as controlled substances.³⁷ Conversely, greater particularity is demanded when the item sought is of a type in lawful use in substantial quantities.³⁸ Generally, where computer equipment is sought for seizure pursuant to a search warrant, a quite particular description will be required.

Where a computer has been reported stolen, it is reasonable to expect that the owner will provide a detailed description of the stolen item.

Therefore, if the object of the search is a stolen computer, a detailed description, including manufacturer, model number, and serial number if known, will probably be required. This is especially true if the computer sought is a type commonly in lawful use. Care should be taken to ensure all available descriptive information is included.

Where computer equipment is sought because it was used as an instrumentality to commit a crime, the most precise description the facts will allow may be a more general one.³⁹ Where a victim complains that his computer system has been accessed telephonically by an unknown person and a loss has resulted, it is likely that the investigator will only be able to determine generally what types of devices were used to accomplish the crime. He may, for example, learn that a computer terminal (a keyboard and display monitor) and a modem (a device that allows digitally encoded computer information to be transmitted over telephone lines) were necessary to perform the acts accomplished, but will have no information regarding the manufacturers of the equipment, model numbers, or serial numbers. If a telephone trace reveals the location from which the intruding call originated, the investigator may have probable cause to search. Under these circumstances, the general description of "a computer terminal and a modem of unknown make or model" may suffice.

An analogous case is *State v. Van Wert*,⁴⁰ where police had probable cause to believe Van Wert was using equipment to forge checks. A search warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of "check protectors and typewriters used in preparation of forged checks." The court approved use of this general language based upon the nature and information known con-

"Where a computer is used as a tool to commit a crime, facts must be presented to show the crime was committed and to explain how the computer was used in the commission."

cerning the crime, stating that greater particularity "... was not needed in this case where defendant was under investigation for forgery rather than theft of a certain item."⁴¹

Similarly, the warrant in *United States v. Harvey* authorized the seizure of "a 'blue box,' an electronic device that allows a caller to make long distance calls without them being recorded for billing by the telephone company."⁴² The Agents executing this warrant ultimately seized audio cassette tapes that had tones such as those produced by a "blue box" recorded on them. The court noted that the affidavit clearly established that a device emitting "blue box" type tones was being used at the place to be searched and then addressed the particularity question, observing that "[n]either the Southwestern Bell officials nor the FBI Agents knew the actual physical form which the device would take, and they assumed it would be in the form familiar to their research and experience..."⁴³ The court, in approving the seizure, said, "[t]he cassette tapes constituted 'an electronic device that allows a caller to make long distance phone calls without them being recorded for billing by the telephone company' and were thus properly seized as within the limitations of the warrant."⁴⁴

Since computer systems are often comprised of a number of component parts,⁴⁵ an investigator applying for a warrant to seize a computer should ensure that the warrant describes all parts of the computer system that are probably present, as well as the various types of storage devices upon

which the machine's operating instructions (computer programs) are maintained. It is prudent to consult an expert concerning the items to be listed. Equipment components will probably include a central processing unit, printers, terminals (keyboards and display screens), magnetic tape drives, and magnetic disc drives. Storage media will include magnetic tapes, magnetic discs, punched cards, and paper tapes. Computer printouts will also likely be present.⁴⁶ If information that has been processed is being sought, it is especially important to particularly describe the storage media. Consultation with an expert will increase the likelihood of a thorough listing of the items of evidence probably present, and provided the expert's education and experience are set forth in the affidavit, will give the magistrate a sound basis for concluding that the items sought are probably located at the place to be searched.

Part II of this article will conclude the particularity analysis and discuss problems with executing this type of search warrant.

FBI

Footnotes


- ¹U.S. Const. amend. IV.
- ²*United States v. Hall*, 583 F.Supp. 717, 718 (E.D. Va. 1984).
- ³*See Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
- ⁴U.S. Const. amend. IV.
- ⁵*See Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
- ⁶*Id.* at 357.
- ⁷*See Michigan v. Tyler*, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
- ⁸U.S. Const. amend. IV.
- ⁹*Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
- ¹⁰U.S. Const. amend. IV.
- ¹¹*Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 436 U.S. 547, 556-557 n. 6 (1978), quoting Comment, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 664, 687 (1961).
- ¹²For a discussion of computer telecommunication crime, see Marbach, "Beware: Hackers at Play," *Newsweek*, September 5, 1983, p. 42.
- ¹³For an interesting discussion of computer crimes, see T. Whiteside, *Computer Capers* (Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1978).
- ¹⁴756 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1985).
- ¹⁵*Id.* at 990.
- ¹⁶*Id.* at 990, 991.

- ¹⁷*See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz*, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). *See also Johnson v. United States*, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
- ¹⁸598 F.Supp. 171 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
- ¹⁹*Id.* at 176.
- ²⁰*Id.* at 177.
- ²¹*Id.*
- ²²*United States v. Truglio*, 731 F.2d 1123 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 83 L. Ed.2d. 130 (1984).
- ²³*Id.* at 1126.
- ²⁴*Id.* at 1128.
- ²⁵*Id.*
- ²⁶*Sgro v. United States*, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
- ²⁷*Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
- ²⁸*See Fitzgerald and Eason, Fundamentals of Data Communication*, pp. 42-43 (John Wiley & Sons, 1978).
- ²⁹*United States v. Harvey*, 540 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1976).
- ³⁰*Id.* at 1354.
- ³¹*United States v. McManus*, 719 F.2d 1395 (6th Cir. 1983).
- ³²*Andresen v. Maryland*, 427 U.S. 463, 478 n. 9 (1976).
- ³³U.S. Const. amend. IV.
- ³⁴*See Marron v. United States*, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). For a thorough discussion, see 2 W. LaFave, *Search and Seizure* 95-101 (1978).
- ³⁵*See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure* 162 (1978).
- ³⁶*Cf. Andresen v. Maryland*, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
- ³⁷*See, e.g., Steele v. United States*, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
- ³⁸*Supra* note 35, at 99.
- ³⁹*Id.* at 104. *See, e.g., Quigg v. Estelle*, 492 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1974).
- ⁴⁰199 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 1972).
- ⁴¹*Id.* at 515-516.
- ⁴²*Supra* note 29, at 1353.
- ⁴³*Id.* at 1354.
- ⁴⁴*Id.*
- ⁴⁵For a discussion of computer system components, see T. Schaback, *Computer Crime Investigation Manual*, secs. 2.3-2.6 (Assets protection, 1980).
- ⁴⁶An example of a detailed description of a computer system is: "One Alpha [Brand] Micro computer central processing unit, approximately four Alpha [Brand] Micro computer terminals, computer printers, and computer manuals, logs, printout files, operating instructions, including coded and handwritten notations, and computer storage materials, including magnetic tapes, magnetic discs, floppy discs, programs, and computer source documentation." Quoted from *Voss v. Bergsgaard*, 774 F.2d 402, 407 (1985) (warrant invalidated on other grounds).

WANTED BY THE FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating these fugitives is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.

Because of the time factor in printing the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, there is the possibility that these fugitives have already been apprehended. The nearest office of the FBI will have current information on these fugitives' status.



Photographs taken 1971

Albert Louis Bradford,

also known as Malik El Assaalam, Albert Louis Bardford, Louis Cable, Malik Hakim, Malik El Saalam, "Al." N; born 12-11-33, St. Louis, MO; 5' 11"- 6'0"; 170-185 lbs; med bld; blk hair; drk brn eyes; drk comp; occ-artist, musician, porter, teacher; scars and marks: scars on back of right hand; tattoos: insect, teepee, "DEX," "BERNICE," "KENO" on left arm. Wanted by FBI for INTERSTATE FLIGHT—FORCIBLE RAPE.

Fingerprint Classification:

17	L	25	W	IOO
M	14	U	OOI	12

I.O. 4522

Social Security

Number Used: 500-58-7177

FBI No. 683 609 A



Right little fingerprint

Caution

Bradford, who reportedly attempted suicide in the past, is being sought for rape during which the victim was viciously beaten with a hammer and sharp instrument. Consider armed and very dangerous.



Photographs taken 1974

Stephen Allen Maser,

also known as "Sam," "Steve." W; born 7-20-49, Raleigh, NC; 5' 10"; 165-175 lbs; med bld; sdy bld hair; bl eyes; med comp; occ-automobile salesman, operator boutique store; scars and marks: surgical scar across abdomen from side to side. Wanted by FBI for BANK ROBBERY; ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONER.

NCIC Classification:

210506141117COO71212

I.O. 4669

Social Security

Numbers Used: 246-78-8485; 267-82-4929

FBI No. 990 344 G

Fingerprint Classification:

21	M	1	U	IIO	11
L	3	W	OII		



Left index fingerprint

Caution

Maser, who is being sought for escape, shot at bank manager and police during commission of a bank robbery. Consider armed, dangerous, and an escape risk.



Photographs taken 1970

Stephen Correlus Parker,

also known as Nathaniel Butler, John Collins, Steve Parker, Steven Parker, "Bitsy," "Damel." N; born 4-5-44; Indianapolis, IN; 6' 1"-6' 2"; 180-195 lbs; med bld; blk hair; brn eyes; med comp; occ-youth counselor, home repairs; remarks: enjoys jogging, somewhat reserved. Wanted by FBI for INTERSTATE FLIGHT—MURDER.

NCIC Classification:

PO1517PO21DI17142016

I.O. 4650

Social Security Number Used: 288-38-0582

FBI No. 321 502 G

Fingerprint Classification:

15	O	13	U	OOO	21
L	17	U	OOO		



Left thumbprint

Caution

Parker is being sought as an escapee from the Tennessee State Prison where he was serving a lengthy sentence for the shooting murders of two law enforcement officers. He may be accompanied by Charles Lee Herron, TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVE, FBI Identification Order 4163, William Garrin Allen II, FBI Identification Order 4640, and Ralph Canady, FBI Identification Order 4644. Consider armed, extremely dangerous, and an escape risk.

WANTED BY THE FBI



Photographs taken 1973 & 1974



Left thumbprint

Wayne J. Rux,

also known as Ray Bowman, Jerry L. Emery, Chuck Harper, Mark Huddleston, Jerry Matthews, Ray Rux, Wayne Lee Rux, Robert Glenn Solberg, and Jerry E. Wells. W; born 11-16-37, San Francisco, CA; 6'2"; 175-180 lbs; sldr bld; brn hair; brn eyes; med-freckled comp; occ-gambler, laborer; tattoos: "W.R." left forearm, "Wayne" right forearm; remarks: reportedly travels with wife, who may also be armed, and a Yorkshire terrier; has great fondness for sailboating and yachting. Wanted by FBI for BANK ROBBERY.

NCIC Classification:

DM16161716P113161416

I.O. 4652

Fingerprint Classification:

16 M 5 U OOO 16
I 17 U OOO

Social Security Numbers Used: 465-52-8574;
531-50-6264

FBI No. 774 325 B

Caution

Rux reportedly carried a handgun in bank robbery for which he is sought. Allegedly has a briefcase full of handguns. Consider very dangerous.



Photographs taken 1969



Right thumbprint

Freddie Scott,

also known as F. Scott, "Four," "Lil Four," "Little Four." N; born 2-3-33, New Orleans, LA; 5' 11"; 155 lbs; sldr bld; blk hair; brn eyes; drk comp; occ-baker, barber, longshoreman; scars and marks: mole under right eye, scars on left side of cheek, upper lip and left wrist, right index finger crooked and tip crushed; remarks: may wear thin-line mustache, reportedly disguises self by dressing as a woman. Wanted by FBI for INTERSTATE FLIGHT—ARMED ROBBERY; ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONER.

Fingerprint Classification:

8 S 5 U OOI 15
0 2 U OII

I.O. 4621

Social Security

Numbers Used: 438-04-9584; 438-40-9585

FBI No. 503 433 B

Caution

Scott escaped from the Orleans Parish Prison, New Orleans, LA, where he was serving concurrent Federal and State sentences after conviction for bank robbery. He previously had exchanged gunfire with police officers during the commission of an armed robbery for which he was convicted. He reportedly carries a .357 magnum pistol in the waistband of his trousers. He should be considered armed and very dangerous.

William Garrin Allen II,

also known as Bill Adams, Bill Allen, William Garbin Allen, William Garren Allen II, William Garvin Allen III, William L. Huff, Robert L. Huff, Robert L. Williams, Louis Williams, Robert Lewis Williams, "Bitsy," and others. N; born 9-18-45, Nashville, TN; 6' 1"-6' 2"; 175-184 lbs; med bld; blk hair; brn eyes; lt brn comp; occ-laboratory technician, shoe salesman, youth counselor, home repairs; scars and marks: scar on left hand; remarks: may be wearing short Afro hairstyle, mustache, small goatee and sideburns, reportedly is left handed. Wanted by FBI for INTERSTATE FLIGHT—MURDER.

NCIC Classification:

06040810060454051105

Fingerprint Classification:

6 S 1 U III 6 Ref: T
S 1 R III R

I.O. 4640

Social Security

Number Used: 412-70-3333

FBI NO. 200 035 G

Caution

Allen is being sought as an escapee from the Tennessee State Prison where he was serving a lengthy sentence for the shooting murders of two law enforcement officers. He may be accompanied by Charles Lee Herron, TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVE, FBI Identification Order 4163, Ralph Canady, FBI Identification Order 4644, and Stephen Correlus Parker, FBI Identification Order 4650. Consider armed, extremely dangerous, and an escape risk.



Photographs taken 1970



Right middle fingerprint

Questionable Pattern

This pattern, at first glance, appears to be a central pocket loop-type whorl. A closer inspection, however, reveals the lack of a recurve in front of the inner delta. This pattern is classified as a loop with 13 ridge counts. However, a reference search would be conducted as a central pocket loop-type whorl with an outer tracing.



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FBI

Law Enforcement Bulletin

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The Bulletin Notes

Officer Raymond LaRue of the Wheeling, WV, Police Department was on patrol in June 1985, when an employee of a local department store summoned Officer LaRue, as a baby had stopped breathing in the store. Officer LaRue administered mouth-to-mouth resuscitation until the child was breathing again. This officer's chief noted that CPR courses are a part of the department's training program, and the Bulletin joins the chief in commending Officer LaRue's lifesaving action.



Officer LaRue
