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Law Enforcement Bulletin

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THE COVER

Development of a positive attitude toward law enforcement may well begin at a school crossing. Mr. Kelley's Message, beginning on page one of this issue, discusses the alarming extent and implications of juvenile criminality. Photo courtesy of Nassau County, N.Y., Police Department.



Message from the Director . .



JUVENILE CRIMINALITY IS A CRISIS of staggering dimensions with profound implications for our Nation's future.

The statistics concerning this category of crime offenders are grim. In 1975, one out of every four persons arrested in the United States was under 18 years of age. Individuals in this age group comprised 23 percent of all arrests for violent crimes, 43 percent of all arrests for serious crimes, and almost half of all arrests for property crimes. One of every ten persons arrested for murder had not reached the age of 18. During the period 1960–75, arrests of these young offenders for serious crimes increased 144 percent.

Youngsters from virtually every economic stratum, cultural setting, and social milieu are represented in these tragic figures. Characteristically, however, they tend to represent male adolescents from broken homes set amidst impoverished conditions in teeming inner cities environments where temptations involving drugs, alcohol, gambling, and petty thievery abound, exerting a strong influence on the course of their lives.

Although extensive study has been afforded this major aspect of our crime problem, it continues to pose a highly complex and formidable challenge—one that substantially relates to the fundamental structures and processes of our society.

Clearly, the most desirable approach to juvenile criminality is one of *prevention*. Efforts to strengthen the basic positive influences of family, school, and neighborhood should certainly be encouraged and advanced. Social and religious institutions dedicated to building character, inculcating sound moral principles, and promoting personal responsibility and self-discipline should receive broad community support. Wherever possible, recreational programs, vocational training opportunities, counseling services, and employment possibilities for youths should be improved or expanded. Far greater attention should also be given to reducing the opportunities and temptations that lead to youthful criminality.

In relation to the police function, there must be a continuing effort to keep abreast of youth problems and needs and to fully utilize community referral programs. Efforts should be made to establish and maintain positive contact with teenaged groups, particularly youth gangs. In handling errant youths, officers should avoid imposing any unnecessary stigmas. Sizable police departments should have specially trained juvenile officers constantly available as well as separate and adequate juvenile detention facilities. Of major importance, too, is the vigorous enforcement of laws against drugpushers and others who exert a corruptive influence on our youth.

Law enforcement, of course, constitutes only one element in the juvenile justice system—an overburdened entity whose primary mission must be narrowed to dealing with the most serious offenders. Toward this end, greater attention must be given to decriminalizing status offenders (such as truants, runaways, and ungovernables) and diverting minor and, where prudent, nonviolent offenders. These options naturally depend on the availability of sufficient alternative resources and facilities in the community as well as prop-

MESSAGE

erly trained professional, paraprofessional, and volunteer staffs. Services of this nature must also be soundly administered and closely coordinated with the juvenile justice system.

For those serious offenders who are repetitive and dangerous to others, society must—for its own protection—adopt a firm stance. In these instances, the deterrent value of swift apprehension, certain prosecution, and effective sanction should not be minimized. The safeguards of impartiality and due process must, of course, attend each step of the process, and rehabilitation should still be an ideal goal. These are only a sampling of measures considered desirable for preventing, curbing, and handling juvenile criminality. If there is to be any hope of succeeding in this endeavor, communities throughout the Nation must be prepared to commit the necessary resources to support such measures. When sound families, quality schools, decent neighborhoods, adequate community youth services, and an efficient juvenile justice system become the norm in every American community, the prospects are good that juvenile criminality will become what it should be—an infrequent aberration.

Contelley

CLARENCE M. KELLEY Director

NOVEMBER 1, 1976

MANAGEMENT

Designing the Job to Motivate

By

Thomas J. Baker Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C.

The Question

One of the biggest issues in police management today, perhaps the prime issue throughout management in general, is "How do we get people to work?" How do we motivate people? Can we motivate people? How do I get my people to do something? HOW DO WE GET ANYBODY TO DO ANYTHING?

Actually, what we are talking about is the essence of management. Lawrence A. Appley, the former president of the American Management Association, defined management as "getting things done through people." Although subject to further qualification, a manager's job, simply stated, is to direct or handle employees in such a manner that the desired work is performed willingly and well.

In police management, there have

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"There are two separate sets of factors at work concerning people performing on the job. Among one set of factors is the cause (or causes) of all our dissatisfaction... and among another entirely separate set of factors is the cause (or causes) of our satisfaction on the job."

been numerous ideas put forth in recent years concerning various ways of motivating people. In this regard, aside from traditional talk about merit pay raises and proper supervision, we have too often become hung up with assigning fancy job titles (police specialist, police agent, master patrolman, police generalist, senior patrolman), or initiating specialized pay programs (shift differential, education incentive pay), or concentrating on the incidental trappings of the job (the patrolman's white shield versus the detective's gold shield).

Motivation—Hygiene Theory

Prof. Frederick Herzberg has developed a theory concerning the motivation to work, which he expanded upon in several books.¹ Herzberg calls his concept the MOTIVA-TION-HYGIENE THEORY. Through his approach, he helps us to sort out the various incentive programs that have been put forward. What he tells us is this: There are two separate sets of factors at work concerning people performing on the job. Among one set of factors is the cause (or causes) of all our *dissatisfaction* on the job, and among another entirely separate set of factors is the cause (or causes) of our *satisfaction* on the job.

The dissatisfiers, Herzberg identifies as relating to salary, status, working conditions, supervision, company policy and administration, interpersonal relations, security, and personal life.

In police work, we confront these factors often but sometimes we know them by different names. For example, Herzberg's factor, company policy and administration, has probably never been specifically uttered by any American patrolman; however, the ubiquitous "The Department" (as in "The Department did it to me again.") would be included under that factor. The concern of patrolmen over their physical working conditions has been well documented and is seen in the old saying "a good cop never gets wet." ²

Herzberg calls these dissatisfiers the hygiene factors because they describe the job hygiene, the job surrounding. They do not deal directly with the task itself. If the hygiene factors are not favorable, or are lacking in some fashion, the employees are dissatisfied-they are not happy with their job. The way to eliminate this dissatisfaction is to favorably modify or improve hygiene factors responsible for this condition. This will reduce employees' dissatisfaction but, according to Herzberg, will not give them job satisfaction. It merely allows for an absence of dissatisfaction. The reason no satisfaction occurs, he says, is that satisfaction springs from an entirely different set of factors.

The factors that produce satisfaction on the job Herzberg labels "the motivators." He has identified them as the work itself, accomplishments Herzberg's "Hygiene Factors" (Dissatisfiers) Salary Status Working Conditions Supervision Company Policy and Administration Interpersonal Relations Security Personal Life

on the job, recognition for accomplishments, growth in skills, growth in responsibilities, and advancement on the job.

These six motivators all have one factor in common—they deal directly with performing the job itself. These are the things Herzberg has found, through numerous job attitude surveys, that give employees their satisfaction. These satisfiers comprise the elements that motivate people to perform better on the job.

This theory has been widely accepted in both management and academic circles today.

In conducting his job attitude surveys, Herzberg used a variety of instruments including questionnaires and interviews. Those surveyed range from highly skilled professional people to low-skilled manual laborers, in both public and private organizations. Although his published studies

Herzberg's "Motivators" (Satisfiers)

The Work Itself Accomplishments on the Job Recognition for Accomplishments Growth in Skills Growth in Responsibilities Advancement on the Job show slight variances in the results obtained from group to group, overall it can be said that approximately 80 percent of the people he queried listed a *motivator* as a source of *satisfaction* in their work while approximately 70 percent listed a *hygiene factor* as a source of *dissatisfaction*.

Law Enforcement Canvass

I have asked numerous and diverse groups of law enforcement officers to whom I have lectured on the topic of motivation, the following: "Write down on a sheet of paper what has given you the most *satisfaction* in your work." After a few minutes have elapsed, I would then ask the group, "Now write down what has given you the most *dissatisfaction* in your work."

These questions would be asked before any discussion regarding the

"In conducting his job attitude surveys, Herzberg used a variety of instruments including questionn a i r e s and interviews. Those surveyed range from highly skilled professional people to low-skilled manual laborers, in both public and private organizations."

motivation to work, so that the answers would not be prejudiced or influenced by such discussion. The answers obtained from each group were later reviewed and discussed in connection with the session on Dr. Herzberg's theory.

Over the past $2\frac{1}{2}$ years, I have asked these two questions at all the police management schools I participated in. As one of the instructors on the FBI management team, which has traveled throughout the country giving management instruction to State and local police officers, I have asked these questions during sessions at 35 different locations in 23 different

States. Individuals represented in this sample consisted of approximately 1,000 State and municipal police officers. The same exercise was also performed by my students in the Management for Law Enforcement class at the FBI National Academy during the 93d through the 103d Sessions. This latter sample comprises approximately 2,000 State, municipal, or Federal police officers representing every State and territory of the United States. In addition, during the past year this exercise was also conducted with approximately 400 Special Agent Supervisors who are assigned throughout the 59 field offices of the FBI.

This total of around 3,400 law enforcement officers with whom this exercise was conducted must be recognized as a substantial sample in this occupational category.

The results were surprising and significant. One hundred percent of those questioned listed in writing one of Herzberg's *motivators* as their greatest source of *satisfaction*. Some of the responses were general in tone, such as "helping others," while others were more specific; e.g., "finding a lost child." Some combined many of the motivators, for example, "becoming sheriff" (this example would combine several motivating factors—accomplishment, recognition, advancement. and responsibility).

In response to the second question concerning the greatest source of *dissatisfaction*, approximately 75 percent of the officers listed one of Herzberg's dissatisfiers (hygiene factors). The most prevalent dissatisfiers in the police survey were interpersonal relations and money matters, both of which were often linked with or expressed as a working condition. Statements such as "inability to effectively communicate police role and needs to city residents," and "having to discipline people," in the written responses, showed the linking of two of the most prevalent dissatisfiers—working conditions and interpersonal relations. Money or salary items were often listed. "Money constraints," "budget items," "money issues," and "limited resources" were some of the terms utilized by the police officers to express this dissatisfier.

It must be granted that this exercise was rather simple when compared with the more complex and scientific surveys Professor Herzberg conducted. But despite its informality and simplicity, it is nonetheless impressive that not one of these approximately 3,400 law enforcement officers responded with one of Herzberg's hygiene factors when as ked to name their greatest source of satisfaction on the job.

Occupational Considerations

Herzberg's survey samples included lower level supervisors, professional women, agricultural administrators, men about to retire from management positions, hospital maintenance personnel, manufacturing supervisors, nurses, food handlers, military officers, engineers, scientists, housekeepers, teachers, technicians, female assemblers, accountants, Finnish foremen, and Hungarian engineers.3 The results of his surveys were found to reinforce his theory. However, none of them had the unanimity of response, on the motivator side, as did the sample of law enforcement officers. Herzberg, to my knowledge, has never published a study of this nature limited to the profession of law enforcement. However, recently he has helped redesign jobs in the public sector using this theory.4

But why is this one occupational group, police officers, so unanimously positive to the motivation factors when none of the others Herzberg studied were (granting that differences in the survey format exist)? This was discussed with officers following each exercise. The simple answer proposed was that most police officers basically want to perform their job. This is in



contrast to workers in many other occupational groups, such as assembly line workers, many of whom work strictly for the income derived therefrom.

Police officers, for the most part, chose their occupation because they like and want to do police work. This was expressed by officers in various ways; however, it boiled down to the fact that these individuals became police officers based on a desire to accomplish something worthwhile on the job. They actually want to do

"Police officers, for the most part, chose their occupation because they like and want to do police work."

police work. Very often, however, the job is not designed so that they can see their accomplishments, or other motivating factors are lacking. Thus, job design is a key point of concentration in assessing and discussing motivation as it relates to law enforcement work.

Analyzing the Results

The question that comes to mind after looking at these results is, what do they tell us? First let us look at what Professor Herzberg says. He tells us that the answer to the question of handling people on the job involves two parts: (1) How we treat people, and (2) how we use people.

How we treat people on the job is related to the hygiene factors. To oversimplify, we must treat our employees as well as we can. This means good pay, adequate working conditions, advantageous fringe benefits, proper supervision and sound company policies and administration. This will eliminate most dissatisfying elements, but it will not necessarily motivate employees to perform well on the job.

The motivation for performance on the job comes from the way we utilize our employees. We must employ people in such a manner that they have interesting work, that they can accomplish or achieve observable results, that their achievements are recognized, that they have ample opportunity to grow in skill and responsibility and that they have opportunities for promotion.

Certainly all policemen are not unmotivated or dissatisfied and many police jobs already contain most, or all, of the motivators Herzberg has identified. However, when a few or many of these motivators are not present, one approach to remedy this situation might be to redesign the job itself.

From the works of sociologists, psychologists, and other behavioral scientists, we are told that there are two basic factors that influence human behavior. One involves the individual, the other his environment. We are familiar with the ancient argument in criminology between those who say we should try to reform the criminal and those who contend we should try to change his environment. In any problem in management, there are basically the same two options open to us. If we have a problem in a unit in our organization, we can get a new man or men for the job (changing the individual); or, we can try to change or modify the unit or the design of the individual job(s) within it (changing the environment).

When we look at the various literature prepared in the police management field, we see that for the past 20 years, or so, we have heard a great deal of talk about changing the individual police officer. We have seen calls for more educated officers. On the other hand, there are some studies that say we do not need a college trained police officer. Some say hire older, more experienced men, perhaps military veterans, while others say hire younger men as cadets and train them. Some suggest hiring more minority group members. Others say hire more women. Now some say hire shorter men, and others oppose this suggestion.⁵

All of these recommendations are concerned with getting different types of individuals in the job—finding the right shaped peg to put in the hole. Few proposals have been advanced which suggest changing the shape of the hole to fit the peg. Perhaps this is where we should look.

Motivating people by changing the design of the job itself may be the answer. What would that design be? It would be redesigning the job so that, as Herzberg tells us, the workers would be used in such a manner that they would have interesting work, could achieve accomplishments on the job, could obtain recognition for their accomplishments, and could grow in both skills and responsibilities.

Team Policing

There have been only a few attempts in recent years to improve police performance by changing the design of the job itself. One such attempt at job redesign has been the concept of team policing. It must be recognized that in some quarters this concept is still considered highly theoretical and controversial.

Team policing can have many variations and differing objectives. The primary objective may be improved police-community relations or improved crime control, or both.⁶ However, here we are looking at how police officers are used in a model team policing project, one where an officer, or officers, have primary responsibility for all police-related functions in an assigned area or "beat."

As already stated, police officers usually want to do the job at hand. In team policing, the patrol officer has a better opportunity than usual to accomplish results on the job.

In traditional patrol work, the patrolman would typically, after some initial action on his part, turn a criminal matter over to detectives. In team policing, the patrol officer has the opportunity to continue with the investigation until the case is resolved, or unresolved, thereby resulting in an accomplishment. Because of this potential, the team policing concept patrol officer also now has more opportunities to be recognized by his superiors for accomplishments on the job. It is often pointed out that due to their very nature, many crimes have a low solution rate and, therefore, the officer may fail to make an accomplishment. producing a negative effect. This is a true observation; however, other motivators are also inherent in the team policing concept. The patrol officer. for example, must expand his skills most team policing models, however, many of the motivators identified by Herzberg are incorporated therein.

Team policing has somewhat different connotations in the various communities where it is being tried and there have been some difficulties experienced with it.⁸ However, it is one of the few attempts being made to improve performance of police officers by restructuring the specific job itself rather than merely trying to change the individual we put in the job.

Conclusion

There seems to be a great reluctance on the part of police managers to tamper with the basic job itself. In discussing jobs in general, Herzberg warns us:



and knowledge in many areas formerly reserved only for specialists. Because the team policing member ideally will be working in the same geographical area and following virtually all the cases arising therein from their inception to their (hopefully successful) conclusion, his overall responsibilities also increase.

A detailed analysis of team policing is not being set forth as most in law enforcement are familiar with its basic elements due to widespread publicity about it in recent years.⁷ In Approach these jobs with the conviction that they can be changed. Years of tradition have led managers to believe that the content of the jobs is sacrosanct and that the only scope of action that they have is in ways of stimulating people.⁹

In a sense it is odd that many police administrators do regard the police job, especially the urban patrol job, as sacrosanct, something that cannot or should not be changed. The American municipal police job is modeled on the English version. It was only 147 years ago, in April 1829, when Sir Robert Peel introduced in Parliament his bill for establishing the London Metropolitan Police.¹⁰ In the United States, our urban police forces were created even more recently than their English model.

We may assume that due to man's nature and activities there have been police of some sort on the earth for as long as human societies have existed. Yet, in many respects, the current model of the police job is only 147 years old. In my view, it is certainly not too old or too new to be redesigned. This redesigning should be such, however, that job motivation is higher, thereby producing better performance, and—ultimately—more effective and efficient police service.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The Motivation to Work, with Mausner and Schneiderman, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1959, and Work and the Nature of Man, World Publishing Co., 1966. (Unless otherwise noted, most of the material I refer to concerning Herzberg was taken from these two books he authored.)

² Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1969, p. 135.

³ Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?" Harvard Business Review (January-February 1968), p. 57.

⁴ Frederick Herzberg and Edmund A. Rafalko, "Efficiency in the Military: Cutting Costs with Orthodox Job Enrichment." *Personnel* (November December 1975), p. 38.

⁵ For a review of this literature, see, for example, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice Task Force Report: The Police (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); Egon Brittner, "The Functions of the Police in Modern Society," (National Institute of Mental Health, November 1970); O. Glenn Stahland and Richard A. Staufenberger, "Police Personnel Administration," (The Police Foundation, December 1974); Terry Eisenberg et al., "Police Personnel Practices in State and Local Governments," (International Association of Chiefs of Police, December 1973).

⁶ James Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime*, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1975, p. 91.

⁷ See, for example, Lyle G. Smith and Jack W. Green, "The Tacoma Police Team," *The Police Chief* (April 1974), p. 42.

⁸ Lawrence Sherman, Catherine H. Milton and Thomas V. Kelly, *Team Policing: Seven Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1973).

⁹ Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?" p. 61.

¹⁰ Raymond A. Cook, "British Law Enforcement Perceived Through the Eyes of an American Policeman," *The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (September 1975), p. 23.

FORENSIC SCIENCE

CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW CRIME LABORATORY

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The planning of a new crime laboratory can take many options, from the enviable position of designing from scratch a building, as well as the interior facility, to merely rearranging an existing location. Whatever the approach, certain basic concepts can be employed which will increase the utility of the facility over a long period of time, reduce costs, and positively contribute to a pleasant working environment.

Consolidation

The Washington State Patrol was

When planning a new crime laboratory, "certain basic concepts can be employed which will increase the utility of the facility over a long period of time, reduce costs, and positively contribute to a pleasant working environment." confronted with the opportunity for planning a new Western Washington State Crime Laboratory facility in Seattle due to the expansion of laboratory services statewide and a consolidation of the Seattle Police Department and King County Department of Public Safety crime laboratories. The consolidation of laboratory facilities involved three levels of government and has proven to be highly successful.

As a part of the consolidation agreement, the Seattle Police Department agreed to provide 10,000 square feet of floor space on the second floor of







Mr. Ishii

Chief Bachofner

their Public Safety Building. Prior to consolidation, the Seattle Police Department Crime Laboratory and the Western Washington State Crime Laboratory coexisted within the same facility jointly sharing instrumentation and facilities, but were in cramped and

"... the architect spent considerable time getting a 'feel' for the operation of a crime laboratory...."

limited facilites with no provision for the addition of any new personnel. The wet chemistry area consisted of approximately 300 square feet with firearms, questioned documents, and administrative services also located on the same floor. Total square footage shared by the two laboratories prior to consolidation was 2,500 square feet.

Preliminary Planning

In January 1974, active planning began for the design of a new laboratory facility anticipating the successful consolidation agreement of laboratory services. We were fortunate to have had the experience of building an Eastern Washington State Crime Mr. Kuest

Laboratory in Spokane 2 years earlier.

A major concern was to develop funding for the new laboratory. Our first obstacle was to request funding without knowing the actual construction estimates. The funding package had to be prepared before an architect was retained, yet it was the architect's responsibility to prepare plan specifications for estimates that would indicate the actual cost. This was obviously a backward approach, but we didn't have the time to engage in a two-stage project. An initial estimate of \$35 per square foot was established but was soon found to be conservative due to inflation and was revised to \$50 per square foot.

A construction grant was made available through the Washington State Law and Justice Planning Office to supplement State funding which was appropriated by the legislature to match Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funding.

In the initial planning and discussion phases, five major points were identified. These included: (1) Remodeling the existing facility was going to be more costly than constructing a new facility; (2) the facility was long and narrow thus presenting some constraints in the design; (3) the laboratory had to be proximate to the major users; (4) the laboratory had to have an open concept, decompartmentalizing classical laboratory functions. We felt the open concept was desirable in that possible revision at a later time would be easier and less costly; (5) it was absolutely important to have a long-range projection of the growth and expansion of laboratory functions within the laboratory. This meant knowing the maximum capacity of personnel and equipment by kinds and types of functions that the facility could accommodate so that the laboratory was built not so much for today as for where it is projected to be in 10 years.

We were faced with the problem of estimating caseloads and productivity projections with a limited data base. Productivity and caseload information for Seattle and King County from ongoing services of those two laboratories was available. The State laboratory was providing only controlled substances services, but an estimate of full-service caseloads for document and criminalistics services statewide had to be made without a complete history. The Seattle and King County information was combined with an extensive national survey, visitation, and information derived from the FBI Uniform Crime Report. After estab-

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lishing productivity projections by type of crime, a 10-year projection of Washington State crime rates was made, related to productivity, and 10year projection for manpower was then developed.

The Pivot Point

In April 1974, an architect was retained for the design and planning of the new laboratory. The selection of an appropriate architect is one of the most important decisions that will be made in a laboratory construction project. Often it appears that one of two circumstances occurs when an architect is selected. Either the architect is given total and full responsibility to design the facility with very little, if any, input from the laboratory, or the architect is retained for the purpose of preparing drawings but the design is solely done by the laboratory director. We felt both approaches were unsatisfactory. The relationship established with the architect, complementing his approach, was that of a participating partner in the design of the laboratory system.

Early in the discussions with him, responsibilities for each individual were established. It was agreed that the architect was retained due to his knowledge and expertise in the analysis of form, function, utility, and design, and should be used to the maximum extent in those areas. It was also recognized that the laboratory director and staff of the crime laboratory were most familiar with the unique needs, relationships, and requirements of a laboratory system. Each individual in the planning process respected each other's knowledge and responsibility in the planning process and a synergistic and catalytic relationship developed.

Early in the design phase, the architect spent considerable time getting a "feel" for the operation of a crime laboratory, asking many questions regarding why procedures were done in certain ways, why policies were established, what was the rationale for certain policies; developing an awareness for security aspects; and developing an awareness of the interrelationship of various functions within the crime laboratory.

Early in the planning phase, awareness of the relationship between policy and design became apparent. The policies regarding access, security, and evidence handling became key factors in how the eventual layout of the laboratory would take shape. Orientation of the architect to the laboratory system and vice versa was a process that took 3 months. Once the architect developed a familiarity and appreciation for the functioning of the laboratory system and became better aware what each section did, he then began to design "spheres of functional activity." These spheres were circles drawn on a sheet of paper. Each sphere represented an activity such as controlled substances/chemistry, firearms, criminalistics, questioned documents, administration, library, photography, restrooms, and lunchrooms. The larger the sphere, the greater number of people and square footage was estimated as being required.

Factors influencing the size of each functional sphere included an estimation of required square footage per anticipated person within each area, nature of the function, whether the kind of activity was desk or workbench oriented, whether special instrumentation and equipment were required, an analysis of mechanical and electrical needs, and identification of specialized joint-use areas within that section. The interrelationship between the spheres of functional activity were considered on the basis of cross-traffic patterns, personnel safety, amount of security required, kinds and types of physical evidence that would be examined, requirement for close interrelationship to other functions within the laboratory, and requirements for fume exhaust, waste drain, and electrical needs.

Features unique to each functional area were identified which may have a potential impact on the relationship of one sphere of functional activity to another. These were identified as follows:

Chemistry (drugs). Works with small amount of evidence; compact unit, therefore should have outside view; must be accessible to instrumentation; and extent of fumes in air must be considered.

Firearms (bullets, guns, toolmarks). Must be secure and enclosed; test firing cannot bother the rest of the laboratory or other floors within the building; fumes must be considered; must have separate firing room of special construction to contain accidentally discharged bullets and prevent ricochet; and must have a separate examination area from the firing room.

Criminalistics (hair fiber, glass, paint, biological stains, etc.). Works with all types of evidence which often involve large items; must have provisions for large exhaust due to putrid clothing and material being in the laboratory; and must provide space for specialized joint-use areas such as microscopy and serology.

Instrument Room (large, permanently fixed expensive equipment). Must have common access to chemistry and criminalistics section without cross-traffic patterns; must be an enclosed area; must have special floor drains; unique electrical needs must be considered; must be physically removed as far as possible from the Seattle Police Department Communications Center to eliminate radio interfer-



Schematic of the new laboratory.

ence; provisions for solid grounding capabilities must be considered; must be planned for expansion and acquisition of additional instrumentation.

Questioned Documents and Illustration Section (handwriting, ink, printed and typed material). Not required to be proximate to instrument room; needs natural light as well as darkroom area; and open working, desk-oriented function, yet must be secure.

Administration (clerical, administrative offices, library). Must be central to eliminate cross traffic; must be adjacent to evidence vault; must be adjacent to public access; must be kept open as much as possible; must have separate conference room outside of secure laboratory area; and must have a central receiving area outside of the secure area.

Photography. Less stringent security; exhaust consideration; electrical needs; plumbing needs; and not a part of the State patrol (being operated by the Seattle Police Department, thus not in the secure laboratory area).

Lunchroom. To be jointly shared by the crime laboratory and the police communications center personnel, Seattle Police Department; outside secure laboratory area; and food storage and meal preparation in the event of emergencies involving Seattle Police Department communications.

Evidence Vault. Must be central to reduce cross-traffic patterns; designed as a high-security area; has exhaust needs; and must have floor-to-ceiling cement block walls with reinforced steel rods.

Chemical Storage Area. Exhaust needs; personnel safety features; work area to mix batches of chemicals; and fire, explosion prevention features.

While the architect was preparing spheres of functional activity, the laboratory staff participated in the design by identifying needs for each functional activity. We found the total involvement of the laboratory staff highly beneficial. Many important design features were generated from staff involvement. The identification of needs and recommendations by the laboratory staff were given to the architect to incorporate into the spheres of functional activity. An example of staff involvement was the analysis of safety needs. A staff proposal included 13 recommendations for improved safety. Twelve were incorporated into the design. The 13th, for an inert gas fire suppression system, will be implemented within 2 years.

Working Drawings

The next step for the architect was to apply these spheres of functional activity to the exterior dimensions of the available facility to better analyze security aspects, cross traffic, and needed interrelationships between different functions. It was only after a complete and thorough functional analysis was performed for each area within the laboratory that the architect began the actual preliminary design of a floor plan itself. It is our evaluation in looking back at the plan-

"... the functional planning of the laboratory was the essence of the planning process and was the heart of the design of this laboratory facility."

ning process that the functional planning of the laboratory was the essence of the planning process and was the heart of the design of this laboratory facility.

It was determined there would be two levels of security within the laboratory. This was partially determined by the fact that the Seattle Police Department communications facility,

as well as the photo laboratory, was on the same floor and was a part of the remodeling project. Two security areas were designed: A high-security area and a minimum-security area. It was determined that central reception, as well as a conference room and adjacent polygraph room operated by the Seattle Police Department, would be minimum security. Also included in the minimum-security areas were the crime laboratory artist-illustrator, lunchrooms, and restrooms. Included in the high-security area would be questioned documents; clerical functions; library; administrative offices; criminalistics; chemistry, firearms, and toolmarks sections; and instrument room.

Once a preliminary floor plan was designed, an extensive review process was held to examine cross-traffic patterns, total personnel which could be accommodated within each section, and the centralness of multiple-use areas such as instrument room and evidence vault. At this point, important technical functions such as exhaust needs, electrical needs, lighting, plumbing, location of fixed instruments and equipment, and arrangement of laboratory benchwork came into play for evaluation. Each section head reviewed the proposed drawings and indicated approval or modifications and suggestions. Periodically, administrative review was also held.

Since we had a fixed-physical area which was not the most ideal configuration, i.e., long and narrow, many desired features had to be modified to accommodate the physical dimensions of the laboratory area. It became apparent that the desire for openness

Incandescent spotlights in the ceiling and low-volume exhaust hoods at each workbench are two of the features in the new chemistry section.



was going to present problems. The use of glass walls became a very desirable compromising feature.

Construction

Since the laboratory would have to be relocated temporarily while construction occurred, a search began for an alternate location that would accommodate the laboratory for the approximate 12-month construction period. A former convent college located 20 miles from Seattle at Issaguah was selected as the alternate laboratory facility since a chemistry and biology laboratory was available and not being utilized. The facility was not large enough to accommodate all the instrumentation during the period of relocation: however, basic and essential functions were made available and were provided. Since there are few vacant facilities that could be used as a crime laboratory, we were fortunate to find satisfactory temporary quarters which did not require expensive yet temporary modifications. The questioned document section and the crime laboratory artist-illustrator were able to remain in the Seattle Police Department building, and the King County Department of Public Safety generously offered temporary facilities for the police department photography laboratory.

Construction began on the new laboratory in January of 1975 and was completed in December of that same year. Due to extensive planning during the design phase and close positive working relationships with the architect, the construction period presented minimal trauma to the laboratory staff.

The laboratory was dedicated on January 8, 1976. Sharing in the ceremonies were representatives from the Seattle City Council, Seattle Police Department, King County Department of Public Safety, FBI, Washington State Patrol, and over 200 guests from the criminal justice system.

Coordination

One other key feature that contributed to the successful design and completion of the laboratory facility was the coordination of city, State, Federal, and private agencies which were involved in various stages of the project.

Evaluation

Evaluation is always an enjoyable part of a major project. That is the time when great wisdom, foresight, and thoroughness can be attributed to events that in reality occurred to everyone's surprise or were answers

The criminalistics section with wide work bays for each analyst.



to prayer. We do feel that extensive preplanning and review did make the difference between a satisfactory facility and one that is functional, safe, and pleasant, and will serve our needs for many years to come. An

"The new facility was designed to meet our service needs but did not substitute for other administrative procedures and processes which would influence and increase employee morale."

evaluation of this whole process which took over 3 years to accomplish indicated some key features which are universally applicable to developing any crime laboratory. A crime laboratory system must know in advance the potential expansion capabilities of that laboratory for at least 10 years. The laboratory should not be designed based on current needs but rather on optimistic projections for 10 years into the future.

An architect who is a full and participating partner in the design process is most essential.

The involvement of all laboratory staff in the identification of needs and ideas positively contributes to the design process.

Functional planning before any lines are drawn on a floor plan is most important and is the heart of the planning process.

Constant and continued coordination with all parties involved is an essential ingredient.

An open concept of the laboratory is most desirable. Compartmental organization with doors and walls builds barriers to communication and contributes to isolation of functions.

The interior should be esthetically pleasing.

The policy of security and access must be established and then become an integral part of the laboratory design.

Occupational Safety and Health Act standards should be

The chief criminalist uses the emission spectrograph with laser microprobe in the instrument room.



incorporated although not required. Employee safety ranks highest in design considerations.

Stainless steel ductwork and glass drains are a must. Cheaper material is available but the replacement costs in 5–10 years will far exceed an initially larger investment.

One factor kept in mind during the design process was that an improvement in working conditions prevents dissatisfaction but cannot produce satisfaction. As cramped as the previous facilities were, we realized that within several months after moving into the new facility this was not going to be a buyoff or panacea for improving employee morale. The new facility was designed to meet our service needs but did not substitute for other administrative procedures and processes which would influence and increase employee morale.

Style is a subjective term, yet we felt that style was important while being consistent with judicious use of public funds. We realized that each employee would be spending one-half of their waking hours in the laboratory and therefore it required as much

"The one word which best exemplifies the development of the State Crime Laboratory System is quality."

care and concern when being designed as our own homes did.

The end result of the laboratory after being completed and in operation for several months had validated our planning process. The laboratory had been designed with style and is attractive and yet, one of the most unique features of all, the laboratory was completed within budget. Even though the planning and construction project extended over a 3-year period when inflation was running completely out of control, we are able to stay within the funding that was made available through State and Federal funds.

Statewide System

On January 1, the State Crime Laboratory began statewide services on all death investigations. It has been impossible to build a full-service laboratory system overnight. The State Crime Laboratory System is now 6 years old. Through consolidation of the Seattle Police Department and King County Department of Public Safety crime laboratories, we are providing full crime laboratory services to Seattle and unincorporated King County serviced by the King County Department of Public Safety. By July 1977, we hope to be able to provide statewide service on all crimes against people with full crime services for all types of crimes by 1980.

Experience indicates that most States cannot afford to build a fullservice crime laboratory system at one time. Each section within the laboratory has been designed for increased services allowing expansion for people as well as instrumentation. Planning for controlled incremental services has been closely integrated with the design of both State Crime Laboratories. I am confident that as we are able to increase services, the two facilities are capable of accommodating manpower and additional instrumentation without rearrangement of the physical layout.

The one word which best exemplifies the development of the State Crime Laboratory System is quality. Any effort whether it be the building of a laboratory, casework, or the building of a crime laboratory system has been undertaken with one standard—whatever we do, we do it well. There are no shades of quality. As an example, there is great need for full crime laboratory services. Due to the great costs necessary to staff a fullservice crime laboratory, we have chosen to provide incremental service based upon our ability to give every case the deserved attention and care required. Because of this policy our capabilities have not been overextended and our laboratory has developed a reputation throughout the criminal justice system for quality and accuracy. Knowing this approach, law enforcement agencies have been extremely patient with limited services. They also appreciate that quality is better than quantity and is well worth the wait.

Building a laboratory is no different than building a laboratory system. When teamwork, mutual respect, brainstorming, planning, review, staff involvement, and evaluation are utilized to their full value, great events occur.

CRIME INCREASES DURING FIRST HALF OF 1976

The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports indicate that serious crime in the U.S. rose 3 percent during the first 6 months of 1976 over the same period in 1975. This compares with an increase of 13 percent during the first half of 1975 over 1974.

Violent crimes of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, as a group, decreased 6 percent during the first 6 months. Reported offenses of murder decreased 12 percent and robberies were down 10 percent while aggravated assaults and forcible rape decreased 1 percent each.

Property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft, as a group, increased 4 percent. Burglary was down 5 percent and motor vehicle theft offenses were down 3 percent.

The overall increase of 3 percent for the quarter was primarily due to the many larceny-theft offenses reported to law enforcement—up 11 percent nationwide.

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES

Preliminary Field Tests for Crooked Dice

qualified expert to testify concerning the characteristics of the dice, it has been found that investigators under field conditions, with a minimum of study and practice, can spot a good majority of the common types of alterations. The following are intended to furnish the investigator with methods for field testing which can be beneficial in undercover work, ex-

Whenever a dice gambling game is played, the house has a built-in mathematical advantage or takes a percentage of the pot. However, unscrupulous operators (or sometimes the players themselves) may increase their edge (or the players attempt to defeat the edge) by use of crooked dice. (See fig. 1.)

The Gambling Unit of the FBI Laboratory frequently receives dice for analysis to determine whether the dice have been manufactured or altered in such a way as to affect their use in a fair game. A showing that dice have been significantly altered may be important for prosecution in two ways: (1) Many State statutes

"... investigators under field conditions, with a minimum of study and practice, can spot a good majority of the common types of [dice] alterations."

have separate offenses for the socalled "crooked" games, usually based on a theory of fraud, where the defendant takes an unfair advantage of the other players; and (2) even under the general types of gambling statutes, the courts may allow a showing that in an otherwise "fair" craps game altered dice were used-as an aggravating circumstance or simply to show fully the method of operation of the game. Moreover, the possible apathy of a player-witness toward prosecution of "friendly dealers" may be removed if he learns the game was in fact crooked.

Types of Alterations

While a full and complete examination of dice must necessarily be done under laboratory conditions using precise measuring devices, X-ray photography, etc., and while many courts would prefer or require a



ecuting search warrants, and dealing with witnesses and informants.

The following are the more common types of altered dice together with methods of recognizing them.

Misspots

Fair dice are so manufactured that the faces or sides bear spots numbered from 1 through 6 and that two opposite sides added together always total 7. Misspots are so made that all 6 numbers are not represented and that all pairs of opposite sides do not total 7. (See fig. 2.)

One type of fairly obvious misspot has only the 5 on each face and, when coupled with a die having only a 6 and a 2 on each face, can only throw the numbers 7 and 11—quite an ad-



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vantage on the "come-out" throw in a dice game when 7 and 11 are naturals and instant winners.

A more subtle type of misspot has only three different numbers on the six faces, with each of the three numbers being repeated on the opposite face. Inasmuch as one can only see three faces of a die at any one time from any one position at a table, it is more difficult for players to spot these dice. As an example of such dice, whenever a pair of identical misspots bearing either 1-3-5 or 2-4-6 only are used, no odd numbers can be thrown. Thus, on the come-out throw in craps, the player could not throw a natural 7 or 11. However, if such dice are thrown together after the come-out throw, then it would be impossible to throw a 7 (or loser). If a 1-3-5 and 2-4-6 misspot are thrown together on the come-out throw, the number of craps or losing points that could be thrown are cut in half by eliminating the points 2 and 12. Other types may be used in various combinations either to eliminate the throwing of certain numbers or to favor or disfavor the throwing of others.

In order to check for this type of alteration, the investigator should first look at each opposite pair of sides to determine that they are 1–6, 5–2, and 4–3. If misspots are found, there is little need to check for further alterations—they are crooked enough.

Loads

The interior portions of dice may be altered most commonly by two methods:

1. Part of the plastic material from which the die is made may be removed and heavier substance added, such as lead (usually beneath one or more spots), to cause the die to tend to fall with that side down, thereby favoring the opposite side. This type of alteration is easiest in opaque dice where the load cannot be seen. It is more difficult in translucent dice, such as the more expensive type used by legal casinos, inasmuch as the alteration can be seen more rapidly. The spots are usually drilled out to a somewhat greater depth than before, the substance, such as lead, inserted, and then recovered with paint.

In order to check for loads, the dice should be very lightly held between the thumb and index or middle finger at two opposite corners. The die should be allowed to pivot, and if it does, a load is indicated. (See fig. 3.) The die should be held by various opposite corners to insure a complete test. With a little practice, most loaded dice of this type can be found except those with only very light loads. By carefully checking the various corners, it can be determined which face or faces are favored.

In addition to this test, a careful visual examination of translucent dice in some cases can disclose that certain spots have been drilled noticeably deeper than others.

2. The other common interior alteration of dice is the insertion of either a magnetic substance or a substance that may be attracted by a magnet. However, in this type of a magnetic dice, the load need not be so heavy as to be detectable by the above finger-holding test. The best method of field testing for such gaffing is to slowly pass a bar magnet past the various faces of the dice to see if an attraction is produced. (See fig. 4.) The crooked operator, in order to utilize magnetic dice effectively, either has an electromagnet installed in or about his dice table, or may be able to carry a magnet in his hand or on his person in such a manner as to be



Figure 2. Duplicated spots on misspotted dice are reflected in mirror.

Figure 3. Testing for the spin of loaded dice by holding various opposite corners.





Figure 4. By passing a bar magnet over all sides, a test for magnetic dice can be made.

close enough to attract the dice.

Although the above tests can be quite effective, particularly important is a laboratory test, such as by X-ray, not only to establish if there is a load, but more importantly, to prove it in court pictorially, rather than simply to rely on someone's opinion that the dice are loaded.

Flats or Bricks

Another common type of altered dice is referred to as a "brick" or "flat." Such dice are so called because they are more or less flattened or brick-shaped. Thus the dice are not perfect cubes. This may be accomplished by sanding or flattening one side; by heating the dice and applying a heavy weight or vice to the dice to squash them; or by simply having dice so manufactured as not to be perfect cubes. The tolerance in the shape of good quality, fair dice is







lower than the mate.

Rockers or Bevels

Another alteration, though less common, sometimes referred to as "rockers," also results in dice that are not true cubes. In rockers, certain entire faces are rounded, so that they tend to roll toward the favored surface, such as the 6-ace surfaces.

This type of dice may be found by placing the various sides of two dice against each other and attempting to rock them. If rockers are found, certain surfaces placed together will have a decided rocker effect. (See fig. 6.)

Edge-work

The last common alteration is done on the edges of the dice, often in conjunction with either rockers or flats. Most good dice have essentially razorsharp edges. Fair dice with beveled edges should have the edges cut at 45° angles. When edge-work is employed,

Figure 6. By attempting to rock the dice, a test for "rockers" can be made.

usually 0.001", whereas bricks are often 0.02" or more off true cubes. Experience has shown that the vast majority of brick dice are "6-ace flats," i.e., they are flattened so that the six and ace opposite sides have larger surfaces than the other four. In a craps game, this disfavors the shooter.

Any substantial variance in the cube-shaped character of the dice may be felt and usually observed by laying the pair of dice alongside each other on a perfectly flat surface and feeling across the top of the dice to find a difference in height. (See fig. 5.) Then one-at-a-time each die should be rolled over on one side and rechecked with the other die alongside it. As in the common 6-ace flats, when the 6 or ace side is face up and placed alongside its mate with the 4, 3, 5, or 2 up, a decided unevenness is felt when rubbing the finger across the top. The die with the 6 or ace up will feel Figure 7. Example of edge-work (improperly angled edge) on the 6 side.



the edges are not sharp (or rightangle-shaped) or not 45° angles, but are filed in such a manner as to result in one or more surfaces having an increased area. Very often the edges of the 6 and ace sides in 6-ace flats have decidedly beveled edges on only these surfaces. (See fig. 7.)

This type of alteration may be determined by close inspection of each edge of the dice. This is greatly facilitated by the use of a magnifying glass. However, close eye inspection will reveal most significant edge-work.

Tests for Alterations

In summary, the following tests should be used to spot the great bulk of altered dice:

Be sure opposite sides total
 (for misspots).

2. Lightly hold opposite corners to see if dice spin or rotate (loads) and pass magnet over each side (for magnetic dice).

3. Lay dice alongside each other and feel across the tops to see if level, checking all surfaces in this manner (for flats or bricks).

4. Put various surfaces against each other and see if they have a rocker effect (for bevels or rockers).

5. Visually, or with a magnifying glass, inspect all edges for improper angles (for edgework).

It should be noted that in other than misspots, a testing of suspected altered dice by throwing them, even numerous times, will seldom produce significant results. The value of most altered dice (other than misspots) is in the long run, and the true effect can only be accurately calculated after many thousands of controlled tosses. For example, under laboratory conditions, at least 10,000 trials should be undergone before reaching definitive test conclusions. To illustrate this, if a test were run with fair dice on the



Figure 8. Common signed for crooked dice—die on left has three spots running wrong, die on right is correct.

throwing of the number of 7's in 50 throws, laws of probabilities say you would throw 7 about 8 times, but statistically you could reasonably expect this to vary an vwhere from 3 to 14 times. On the other hand, if there were a test of 10,000 throws, probabilities tell us you should throw 7 1.667 times, while the statistical variance would only be about 37 times more or less than 1,667 times. This is a difference in expected variance from the total throws of about 24 percent in 50 throws to only about 1.5 percent in 10,000 throws. Contrary to popular belief, a pair of strong loads or obvious bricks, when thrown together. will not throw the favored numbers every time or even a majority of the time. Again, the crooked gambler merely wants to alter the fairness of the game in the long run.

It might also be pointed out that in many cases the manufacturer of crooked dice may purposely tip off knowledgeable cheats by changing the manner of spotting the 3 side. By laying the die with the 6 spot upward running toward the viewer and the 3 side facing the viewer, the 3 spot should run from lower left to upper right (in fair dice), rather than from upper left to lower right (crooked dice). If the 3's are found to run in the wrong direction, this may suggest the dice are altered and point to a very careful inspection. (See fig. 8.)

Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be emphasized again that the above tests are only field tests, not intended to replace careful laboratory examination, nor will this type of field test catch some more sophisticated alterations. Nevertheless, a familiarity with the tests can certainly benefit the investigator on the scene and may suggest additional laboratory testing.

Physical Security and the Police Facility: A Total Program

By EDWARD L. LEE II Regional Security Officer The American Embassy Nicosia, Cyprus

Police agencies generally are doing their utmost to halt the continuing increase in the volume of crime in the United States. However, while many agencies have expended a great deal of time and energy toward protecting citizens and their homes, these same agencies have, in many ways, neglected to adequately protect their own home base—the police facility.

The scope of this article is to provide the police profession a basis for measuring the degree of security afforded this facility. For clarification, the term "facility" is used to denote centralized or decentralized buildings from which police services are provided.

Naturally, the concepts of police services and security of the facility conflict somewhat in that police services, which generally involve interpersonal contacts with the public, are often delayed or altered by facility security. Therefore, it is essential that a security arrangement be designed in such a way as to provide the highest



". . . it is essential that a security arrangement be designed in such a way as to provide the highest degree of security possible, yet give the citizen access to the services which are so basic to the police mission." degree of security possible, yet give the citizen access to the services which are so basic to the police mission.

It is, of course, recognized that facility design, security problems, and financial resources vary widely among police agencies. Nonetheless, there are some basic security concepts applicable to all in protecting their facilities.

Protective Barriers

While most law enforcement agencies do not generally have walls or fences surrounding their buildings, protective barriers should be employed. All entrances and exits should be made secure, either by use of a lock or by the presence of a guard. Any openings in the building such as exhaust tunnels, heating ducts, and air and water intakes should be protected by secure grills or bars. Windows should be lockable or designed in such a way as to preclude entry. In the facility where there may only be

a few officers on duty after daylight hours, intrusion alarms might be considered to preclude unauthorized entry.

Access Control

While it is understood that some police agencies are more vulnerable than others, it is elementary to any police facility security program that the identity of all visitors be established. Obviously, visitors may fall into many categories, including not only those seeking police services, but

"While it is understood that some police agencies are more vulnerable than others, it is elementary to any police facility security program that the identity of all visitors be established."

maintenance, custodial, and concession personnel, and others who are not police or civilian employees of the agency.

To properly identify visitors, a police officer or security guard may be assigned this duty at the public entrance. To utilize manpower to its fullest and provide additional control of visitors, only one entrance of the facility should be open to the public. All others should be locked or be accessible only to authorized personnel.

Depending on the physical size of the facility and the volume of visitor traffic, it may be necessary to establish a pass system whereby all personnel as well as visitors are issued passes which are visibly displayed and readily identify the wearer's status. Ideally, the pass system might include utilization of one of the many photoidentification systems which permit quick issuance of a pass.

Agency employees should permanently retain their passes and display them each time they enter the facility. Visitors, on the other hand, should



A pushbutton cypher lock suitable for access control on police only entrances.

be issued temporary passes by the officer or security guard at the visitor entrance with instructions that passes be returned when leaving the building. To insure the return of passes, the motor vehicle driving permit (or other recognized identification) of all visitors should be photocopied or at least the number recorded.

Whether the visitor control officer issues passes or merely ascertains their identity, the following information should be recorded for each visitor: full name; driving permit or other identification number (if possible); purpose of visit; and office to be visited.

A visitor log should also be established and placed in a suitable location to permit visitors to print their names, indicate the purposes of their visit, and record the time they entered and departed the facility.

Another aspect of access control includes the designation of restricted areas. The fact that a visitor has been identified does not justify complete freedom of movement within the building. For instance, every visitor need not have access to the crime laboratory, communications center, computer section, or offices which contain case evidence. To preclude such accessibility, it is recommended that the agency centralize areas of this type in one section of the facility and insure that it is protected from public access. To do so, secure doors should be equipped with key or combination locks to prevent general access.

Insofar as police entrances are concerned, they should be exactly that. Some agencies have accesses where visitors may routinely enter the facility through unlocked rear doors marked *police only*. Unfortunately, these visitors, in many cases, pass through police offices, rollcall rooms, and equipment areas which may or may *not* be occupied. It is suggested, therefore, that an electric cypher lock be connected to police only entrances, thereby permitting only police personnel to have access—at the touch of a button.

To prevent a multitude of problems, it is desirable that all restrooms in the facility be locked. Most locks permit duplication of keys, in which case sufficient keys can be reproduced for all police offices to have one on hand for use by employees and visitors. Similarly, all offices and areas not occupied by agency employees should be locked. As criminal histories tell us, far too many crimes (theft, arson, assault, rape, bomb plants) have taken place in the unprotected, accessible area.

Protective Lighting

To help prevent crimes from taking place on facility property, insure that parking lots and garages, walkways, and entrances to the facility are well lighted. A police officer, while not an ideal target, is by no means immune from robbery, assault, and automobile theft.

Just as important as protective lighting, if not more so, is the existence of an alternative power supply for the facility. Obviously, few buildings are as dependent on power as is the police communications center. Thus, if not already in place, consideration should be given to installing an emergency power system which will automatically activate when normal city power is interrupted.

Package Control

Inasmuch as the purpose of package control at a police facility is to prevent weapons and explosives from being brought into the building by criminals, extremists, and mentally ill persons, the agency might implement one of two types of package control. One approach is to install a walk-through metal detector with the activation console located at the visitor control officer's desk. Several models are now available which permit calibration of sensitivity. In this way, the detector can be preset to activate only when certain items, such as a handgun, pass through the sensor base.

The other approach to package control, which is much more traditional and suitable to modest budgets, is that of the hand search. Thus, after identifying the visitor, the visitor control officer requests that briefcases, packages, and purses be opened for visual inspection.

Vehicle Control

Regardless of the physical arrangement for parking, there should be some kind of control on nonpolice parking. For example, if the police facility has an underground garage, efforts should be made to restrict it to only police vehicles. When visitors have the option of parking in such areas, vulnerability to bombings and other crimes is significantly increased.

If the facility has open-air parking for all vehicles, the agency should endeavor to segregate parking by building concrete islands or barriers and clearly marking parking areas for *police vehicles only* and *visitors only*. This kind of segregated parking arrangement acts to protect police vehicles from theft and reduce the opportunities for ambush attacks. Furthermore, it facilitates and increases the security of police-prisoner movements into the facility.

Mail Screening

An integral part of any efficient facility security program is that of mail screening or precautions against bombs received in the mail.

A bomb sent via mail is clearly a tactic of a careful individual. The bomb is addressed to the target (e.g., chief of police, senior official, individual officer) and delivered by the Postal Service. The bomber takes little, if any, personal risk. In view of the lethal and cunning nature of these bombing attacks, it is imperative that the agency establish a mail screening program to protect not only the target but others who may be endangered, such as the mailclerk who may open the envelope or package before it reaches the target victim.

Surprisingly enough, a mail-screen-

"An integral part of any efficient facility security program is that of mail screening or precautions against bombs received in the mail."

ing program can be instituted for less than \$100. Commercially manufactured metal detectors can be purchased for examining letters and larger packages, usually one type for letters and another for larger items, in view of the sensitivity variance to metal.

As for their characteristics, letter bombs generally have the following peculiarities: Business envelope format; width and weight of the device generally exceed normal mail (e.g., $1/_4$ -in thick at the center of the envelope, and weighing approximately 2 to 5 oz.); envelope feels rigid, as if containing cardboard; and an unexpected letter with an unknown return address.

If the individual screening mail detects metal in a specific postal item, the following action should be taken:

Contact the facility's bomb control officer or bomb squad or other appropriate personnel trained to handle suspected bomb devices;

Transport the suspect device in a holding container and iso-

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A sample bomb-threat call form which should be distributed to all agency offices.

late it a logically safe distance from other persons;

If possible, photograph both sides of the suspect device;

Contact the addressee as soon as possible and ascertain if the item is expected or if he can provide any information on its contents; and

Do not permit anyone other

than a bomb expert to touch the device.

Other Bomb Threats

Ideally, in addition to mail screening, the agency should have a specific, formulated bomb-threat plan which has been explained or disseminated to all employees. This plan should be developed by the agency's bomb

"Ideally, ... the agency should have a specific, formulated bomb-threat plan which has been explained or disseminated to all employees."

squad, or in the absence of such a unit, by a police officer designated as the facility bomb control officer. This officer should be afforded some formal training in handling bomb threats. Also, if the department does not have a bomb squad, a chief executive should endeavor to work out a technical assistance arrangement with an agency which has and can provide bomb disposal services.

While bombs may come in the mail or be brought into the facility by unsuspecting persons, bomb threats are most commonly received by telephone, and although they most often turn out to be hoaxes, one should never assume this to be the case. All sworn and civilian members of the agency should be briefed on how to react to such a call and the type of information that should be elicited from the caller. To assist in this regard, it is best to distribute a bomb-threat call report form to all employees so that it can be kept near office telephones in the event it is needed.

Threat Analysis

Once a bomb-threat call has been received, and the completed form turned over to the bomb control officer (or bomb squad), the validity of the call and potential harm must be evaluated. For instance, if a juveniletype call with laughing in the background is received, it *may* only be a nuisance call. Yet, a complete search of the building should be conducted.

On the other hand, if, for example, the caller states in a serious manner that he has placed a briefcase contain-



A hand-held metal detector can be used to screen mail.

ing a time bomb comprised of ammoniated dynamite equipped with a mercury switch (to cause detonation if tilted) in the restroom on the second floor, you may very well have a genuine threat on your hands.

At any rate, appraise the credibility of the threat and act accordingly. If the agency does not have its own bomb squad, notify an agency of an adjoining jurisdiction which has the manpower, equipment, and expertise to respond to the threat and with which a technical assistance agreement has been made. Assemble available officers and maintenance personnel, methodically divide up areas to be searched, and commence the search, preferably using floor plans to be sure that the entire building is covered. Also, remind searchers that if they do discover a suspicious object, they should employ the "Don't touch it!" rule, isolate the object, and notify the bomb control officer.

Evacuation

The difficult question of evacuation is invariably related to threat analysis. For example, if the bomb-threat call comes in 5 minutes before a bomb is expected to activate on the fourth floor of the facility, there is obviously insufficient time to totally evacuate the building. Under such conditions, the most judicious decision may be to order an evacuation of the specific area described by the caller. If time permits, not only the indicated floor but, as a minimum, those directly above and below it should be evacuated.

Another factor to keep in mind is the risk involved in a total evacuation. While police opinions vary, there are indeed disadvantages to such a decision. The evacuation may take the evacuees through an area of the building where the undiscovered device is located, thus exposing even a greater

number of people to possible injury than would normally occur. The bomber may well design his attack around a total evacuation policy. In other words, an "always evacuate" policy may cause facility occupants to be guided from the building to a parking lot containing a car bomb which can be activated by remote control.

If, on the other hand, the call is very specific as to the type of device and its location, it is recommended that the bomb control officer order a partial evacuation of the area described by the caller. In this way, injuries are avoided which might result from a total evacuation, search crews can go about their duties in the suspect area, and critical police services can be continued.

Regardless of how the bomb-threat plan is written, methods for ordering a general evacuation (if this is your philosophy), or partial evacuation, should be established. The specific persons who will comprise the search crew should be determined in advance as should the procedure for notifying them in the event of a bomb threat.

In general terms, when confronted with a bomb threat, continually keep in mind that:

Actual explosive devices will generally be found in the facility which is either partly or completely accessible to the public;

The greater the controls on accessibility to a facility and the greater the physical protection afforded the facility, the less likely that an actual bomb will be placed;

If a bomb is actually planted in the facility and explodes, damage is likely to be confined to a specific area (rather than damaging the entire building);

A dramatic reaction to the bomb threat (e.g., a mass evacuation of the building) may create subsequent threats;



The essential ingredients in protecting a police facility.

The more specific and credible the warning, the greater the chance that an actual bomb has been placed in the facility;

A vague threat from what seems to be a child, drunk, or mentally ill person generally de-

"Consider relocation, if at all possible, of a police facility when its location makes it particularly vulnerable. . . ."

notes that the threat is not serious;

If a suspect device is found, keep occupants of the facility at least 300 feet away from it. Also, prior to evacuation, leave doors and windows open in order to vent a possible explosion.

Unprovoked Attack

Each year police officers are attacked while working in a police facility. To reduce these threats to officers, the following countermeasures are recommended:

Install shatter proof glass on all windows to preclude fragmentation in the event of explosions close to the facility as well as from rocks and bottles thrown at the facility during a civil disorder;

Utilize draperies, venetian blinds, or opaque glass to conceal the movements of officers within the building, particularly at night;

Avoid placement of desk officers on ground level where they are easily visible through glass doors or windows;

Consider adoption of lightweight bullet-resistant vests for all uniformed officers;

Establish underground parking for all police vehicles, or insure that the parking lot used for police vehicles is concealed by a wall at least 6 feet high;

Consider relocation, if at all possible, of a police facility when its location makes it particularly vulnerable (e.g., a facility situated below an expressway interchange, thus increasing the chances of objects being thrown onto the roof from passing vehicles overhead);

Thoroughly document all threats made against officers. In some cases, surveillance of persons who have made serious lethal threats against police officers may be justified.

Although this article is by no means a comprehensive discussion of facility

"Without an adequate regard for its own protection, a police agency needlessly jeopardizes its ability to protect the public."

security, it has attempted to emphasize the importance of physical security, contingency planning, and various countermeasures in protecting the police facility and its personnel. Without an adequate regard for its own protection, a police agency needlessly jeopardizes its ability to protect the public.

Inventorying Impounded Motor Vehicles— South Dakota v. Opperman

By

LARRY E. RISSLER Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C.

n 1925, the Supreme Court of the United States noted a constitutional difference between motor vehicles and fixed structures such as houses and offices.1 Since that time, scores of cases have been presented to the Court in which the legitimacy of warrantless vehicle searches was at issue. The reported decisions in these matters often appear to depend on subtle factual distinctions peculiar to the cases themselves. However, as a general proposition, it can be said that a law enforcement officer may search an automobile without a warrant if: he has probable cause to believe a mobile ve-

"Quite frequently, and usually unexpectedly, evidence of a criminal violation is discovered during a routine impoundment inventory."

hicle contains evidence; ² a defendant has been lawfully arrested while in the vehicle; ³ the auto is lawfully held as evidence pending institution of forfeiture proceedings; ⁴ or a reasonable belief exists that the car contains an object which might endanger the general public.⁵

But until this year the Court had never considered the constitutionality of the common police practice of inventorying the contents of vehicles which had been impounded for temporary storage.⁶ This procedure is routinely performed not for the purpose of searching for criminal evidence but merely to catalog and secure the contents of the vehicle. Its justification, it is said, rests on the

twofold need to protect the owner against loss of valuables from his vehicle and the police against civil suits arising from claims of loss or damage.7 Quite frequently, and usually unexpectedly, evidence of a criminal violation is discovered during a routine impoundment inventory. The admissibility of this evidence in a subsequent trial has long been a troublesome issue for the courts. Some have admitted it by characterizing the inventory as a mere administrative function not intended to discover evidence. and thus not within the scope of the Constitution.8 Others have held that the practice involves a substantial invasion into the owner's privacy and label the inventory a "search" and thus subject to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment.9 On July 6, 1976, with its opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman,10 the Supreme Court addressed the issue.

The Opperman Case

In December 1973, an automobile owned by Donald Opperman was impounded by the police in Vermillion, S. Dak., after it had been issued two overtime parking tickets. The vehicle, which was locked, was towed to the city impound lot where its contents were inventoried pursuant to standard police procedure. A plastic bag containing marihuana was located in the glove compartment, and Opperman later was arrested and convicted of its possession. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota overturned the conviction on the ground that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, and in a 5-4 decision held that the procedure of the Vermillion Police Department which located the marihuana was reasonable.11 Because of the significance of this case to the daily operations of most police agencies, the following comments are

offered in an attempt to offer suggestions for the legitimate inventory of impounded vehicles.

Lawful Impoundment

The Court's opinion makes it clear that police must have a lawful basis for acquiring custody of a vehicle before an inventory will be proper. ("The Vermillion police were indis-

"The Court's opinion [in South Dakota v. Opperman] makes it clear that police must have a lawful basis for acquiring custody of a vehicle before an inventory will be proper."

putably engaged in a caretaking search of a *lawfully impounded automobile*.³⁷ ¹²) This is consistent with the position taken by most lower courts that if officers have no reason to impound a vehicle, a subsequent inventory is invalid.¹³ Several methods of impoundment have been suggested in previous court decisions. For instance, vehicles may be seized legitimately if they constitute evidence of a crime,¹⁴

Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal advisor. Some police procedur es ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law, or are not permitted at all.

are subject to forfeiture,¹⁵ or are abandoned.¹⁶ In addition, the *Opperman* decision specifically embraced those impoundments performed in order to protect the public safety and convenience and those prompted by a desire to further the police community caretaking function.¹⁷ Familiar examples are seizures of vehicles which violate parking ordinances, removal of automobiles which have been involved in accidents, and impoundment of cars which constitute nuisances or interfere with the flow of traffic, such as disabled vehicles. A factor common to impoundment under these circumstances is the frequent inability of the owner to arrange for his vehicle's removal or safekeeping because of absence or incapacity.¹⁸

A more difficult situation, and one not presented to the Opperman Court, arises when a defendant is arrested in his vehicle away from his home. As a general rule, the lower courts have permitted impoundment under these circumstances in order to avoid leaving an unattended vehicle on a public highway or city street.¹⁹ A leading Federal case phrased the issue in terms of a duty owed by the arresting officer to the arrestee's automobile:

"[The defendant] having been validly arrested and taken to the police station, the officer would have been derelict in his duty if he had left the car unattended in a dark alley in the middle of the night. The police have as much a duty to protect the property of a suspect as they have to protect the property of the rest of us, and that is what they did in this case by towing the car to the police impound [lot]."²⁰

Other decisions, however, have suggested that impoundment may be improper if the driver can take reasonable steps to safeguard his car at the time of arrest.²¹ For example, it has been held that impoundment is unnecessary if: other passengers could have taken charge of the auto;²² the arrestee's friend could have removed the vehicle from the precinct station within a few hours; ²³ the defendant would be absent from the car for only a brief time to post bond;²⁴ or a co-officer could have driven the car to a nearby parking area where it would be reasonably safe.²⁵ The Court's opinion in *Opperman* does not address this issue directly, however, a fair reading of its language could lead to the same conclusion. ("The owner . . . was not present to

". . . impoundment inventories are searches and must conform to the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness."

make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings." ²⁶) Additionally, a case relied on heavily by the majority, *Cabbler* v. *Superintendent*,²⁷ points to the same result:

"[W]e hold that the police do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they impound a vehicle to protect it . . . after arresting the driver away from his home, and he has no means immediately at hand for the safekeeping of the vehicle." ²⁸

Whatever the mode or method, lawful impoundment is the threshold requirement for a reasonable inventory search.

Reasonable Inventory

As noted earlier, the decision held that impoundment inventories are searches and must conform to the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness. In reaching the conclusion that the Vermillion Police Department's search of Donald Opperman's vehicle was reasonable under this criteria, the Court attached significance to the fact it was carried out pursuant to standard police procedure and that the officer's motives were protective, not investigative.²⁹ Had the Court been convinced that the purpose of the inventory was to seek evidence of crime, the warrant clause of the fourth amendment would have been applicable and the search could have been justified only by a showing of probable cause.³⁰ Here (as in most inventory cases) there apparently was no probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence. Several obvious measures are available to police agencies in order to avoid suggesting that an inventory is merely a pretext concealing an investigative police motive.

First, the "standard police procedure" referred to by the Court should be reduced to writing, possibly in the form of a departmental regulation. This will facilitate proof if the existence of the regulation is challenged and might also prove beneficial in other respects. For example, in a recent Federal case, a defendant attempted to suppress counterfeit \$50 bills located during the inventory of his car. The officer who conducted the search admitted that he expected to find some bogus bills but that the procedure was required by a departmental regulation. The Court of Appeals sustained the search attaching significance to the fact that the police directive required the inventory. It "was not a mere pretext for searching, though the finding of contraband was not unexpected." 31

The regulation should make mandatory the inventory of all impounded automobiles. If only selected vehicles are subjected to the procedure, a court might legitimately be skeptical about an officer's good faith concern for the safekeeping of a car's contents. It also should call for prompt inventorying of impounded vehicles. A substantial time delay between impoundment and inventory might cast doubt on the validity of the examination. To avoid this, some departments require that the inventory be performed at the time the vehicle is taken into custody, prior to removal to the storage area.

Scope

Another consideration bearing directly on the reasonableness of the inventory is the scope of the examination. As with any fourth amendment situation, the permissible scope of a search should be as limited as possible to accomplish its underlying purpose.³² Following this maxim, one leading State decision has held that if the principal purpose of an inventory is to relieve the police of civil liability for lost valuables, merely rolling up the windows, locking the doors, and securing those items in plain view will accomplish the objective.33 In fact, when considering Opperman's appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court held

"As with any fourth amendment situation, the permissible scope of a search should be as limited as possible to accomplish its underlying purpose."

that under State law this procedure would have absolved the Vermillion police from any liability for lost or stolen articles.³⁴ But other legitimate purposes also underlie the inventory process. The protection of the vehicle's owner against loss and the public from vandals who might find a firearm or contraband drugs were both sanctioned by the Court and justified the intrusion into the unlocked glove compartment.³⁵

Given these two additional reasons for the inventory, it seems a logical extension of the Court's holding to expand the search to locked areas in a vehicle such as the trunk and glove box. If a thief or vandal could break into a locked car ³⁶ and remove valuables from its interior, he certainly could do the same to a locked glove compartment or trunk. As stated by the Supreme Court of Arizona in a

case sustaining the inventory of a shaving kit found within an impounded vehicle:

"If one of the reasons for conducting the inventory is to safeguard valuables which might be present, it is illogical to prohibit law enforcement officials from searching those areas wherein valuables are most likely to be placed." ³⁷

Commentators have also supported this view:

"If the purpose of the inventory is to record the valuables and other personal property found in the car, it would seem unrealistic to limit the search to a superficial inspection of the vehicle. In view of the fact that a person who does carry valuables in his car will most probably place them in as safe and inconspicuous place as possible, the conscientious investigator will conduct as thorough a search as the circumstances permit." ³⁸

In view of this reasoning and the Court's reliance on Cady v. Dombrowski,³⁹ a case in which evidence was located in a locked trunk, it would appear that a reasonable inventory search could extend to those areas within a vehicle in which valuables might be stored.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). ² Id.

³ Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).

⁴ Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).

⁵ Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).

⁶ The Court's earlier decisions in Cooper v. California, supra footnote 4, and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), are distinguishable in that the Cooper vehicle was being held pursuant to a forfeiture statute and the Harris vehicle as evidence. In the ordinary inventory case, the police hold the car for the benefit of the owner and cannot deny him possession. Cady, supra footnote 5, is distinguishable because the police were searching for a known item. ⁷ Note, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 849 (1974).

⁸ People v. Sullivan, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 945, 272 N.E.
 2d 464 (1971); State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.
 2d 372 (1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970).

⁹ United States v. Lawson, 487 F. 2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 484 P. 2d 84 (1971). Quite often a private garage will take custody of an impounded vehicle. Evidence in the car located by an employee of the garage will be admissible inasmuch as its discovery is not a "search." (Provided, of course, that the garage employee does not act at the request of the police.) Kau/man v. United States, 453 F. 2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971).

¹⁰ 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976).

¹¹ On oral argument, the attorney for South Dakota expressly abandoned the contention that the inventory was exempt from the fourth amendment. Id. at 1006, note 6.

12 Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).

¹³ State v. Volk, 291 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); United States v. Pannell, 256 A. 2d 925, 926 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).

14 Harris v. United States, supra footnote 6.

15 Cooper v. California, supra footnote 4.

¹⁶ Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).

17 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1005.

¹⁸ Opperman was not present when his vehicle was impounded. In *Cady* v. *Dombrowski*, *supra* footnote 5, the owner was comatose and in a hospital.

¹⁹ People v. Kern, 67 Misc. 2d 495, 324 N.Y.S. 2d 442 (1971); State v. Armstrong, 428 P. 2d 611 (Mont. 1967).

²⁰ Cotton v. United States, 371 F. 2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1967).

²¹ United States v. Lawson, 487 F. 2d 468, 477 (8th Cir. 1973).

²² Virgil v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968).

²³ United States v. Pannell, 256 A. 2d 925 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).

²⁴ State v. Singleton, 9 Wash. App. 327, 511 P. 2d 1396 (1973).

²⁵ People v. Nagel, 17 Cal. App. 3d 492, 95 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1971). Even if a vehicle is parked legally, impoundment may be justified if the car is located in an area where vandalism is likely. *Mattson v. State*, 328 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (vehicle parked in nightclub area late at night).

26 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1009.

²⁷ 528 F. 2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert.
 filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3675 (4-12-76) (75-1463).
 ²⁸ Id. at 1146.

²⁹ 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1009.

³⁰ The Court has previously approved warrantless searches of vehicles which were removed to the station house following the arrests of their drivers, when probable cause existed to believe the cars contained evidence. *Texas* v. *White*, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1975); *Chambers* v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

³¹ United States v. Kellehar, 470 F. 2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1972).

³² Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry
 v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

³³ Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 484 P. 2d 84 (1971).

³⁴ State v. Opperman, 228 N.W. 2d 152, 159 (S.D. 1975).

35 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1009.

³⁶ The Vermillion police routinely locked vehicles stored at the impound lot. Id. at 1003, note 1.

³⁷ In Re One 1965 Econoline, 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.
 2d 168 (1973).

³⁸ Szwajkowski, 1968 U. of Ill. Law Forum 401, 407.
 ³⁹ 413 U.S. 433 (1973).

SERIOUS AND VIOLENT CRIME INCREASES REPORTED

Uniform Crime Report figures reveal that serious crimes increased 10 percent in the United States during 1975. An estimated total of 11,256,600 serious crimes were reported to law enforcement agencies in 1975 as compared to 10,253,400 the previous year. Crimes are classified as serious based on their nature or the volume in which they occur. In this category are the crimes of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.

As a group, violent crimes totaled 1,026,280 in 1975. This reflects a 5percent increase over 1974 figures. Crimes considered violent are murder, forcible rape, robber y, and aggravated assault. Violent crimes comprised 9 percent of the total serious offenses reported.

Property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) increased 10 percent during 1975 totaling 10,230,300 offenses overall. Within this category, larceny-theft offenses showed the biggest single increase, rising 14 percent.

Suburban and rural areas experienced the largest increase in serious crime with 10- and 8-percent rises reported, respectively. Large-core cities—those having populations of 250,000 or more—recorded, as a group, an increase in serious crime of 7 percent.

It is noted that the actual volume of crime is not known, as many criminal actions occur that are not reported to official sources.

(In most instances, percentages set forth in preceding paragraphs reflect rounding to the nearest whole number.)

WANTED BY THE FBI





HOWARD WILLIAM VRADENBURGH

Bank Robbery

Description

Howard William Vradenburgh is currently being sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for bank robbery.

The Crime

Vradenburgh, who allegedly robbed a bank in Los Angeles, Calif., on August 2, 1971, was apprehended by FBI Agents and Los Angeles police authorities on December 8, 1971, at which time he confessed to this bank robbery and four subsequent robberies in the Los Angeles area. He was released on bond after his arrest, and, on December 20, 1971, was indicted on five counts of bank robbery. On January 10, 1972, he failed to appear for a hearing and a Federal warrant for his arrest was issued at Los Angeles.

Age	40, born July 21, 1936, New- burgh, N.Y.
Height	5 feet 10 to 11 inches.
Weight	150 to 155 pounds.
Build	Medium.
Hair	Dark brown.
Eyes	Blue.
Complexion	Medium.
Race	White.
Nationality	American.
Occupations	Laborer, stock clerk.
Scars and Marks	Operation scars both sides lower abdo- men; tattoo of ''H o w i e'' upper left arm.
Social Security	
No. used	129-28-1767.
FBI No	106,334 C.

Right thumb print.

Fingerprint classification: 20 L 29 W OIO I 8 W OOM NCIC classification: 18PO10POPOPIPM11PM14

Caution

Vradenburgh has threatened to use a gun during the commission of a robbery and should be considered dangerous.

Notify the FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating this fugitive is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

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and the particular of the part	(Address)	and the second second
(City)	(State)	(Zip Code)

POLICE CHAPLAIN SLAIN

On March 5, 1976, in Detroit, Mich., the Reverend William A. Paris, chairman of the Detroit Police Chaplain Corps, died of a gunshot wound received 2 days earlier as he courageously attempted to persuade the surrender of a barricaded and dangerous gunman who subsequently wounded a police officer before he himself was killed. Among the many civic leaders and law enforcement representatives who attended Chaplain Paris' funeral were police officers from throughout the United States. According to police authorities, Chaplain Paris was the first Detroit police chaplain killed while acting in this capacity and, insofar as is known, the first in the Nation.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

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