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The Cover:

A Detroit mounted officer knows that his horse is an irresistible attraction to this city youngster—a public relations benefit of a mounted police unit.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20535**

William H. Webster, Director

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Director's Message


On one day, August 9, 1979, three Special Agents of the FBI were killed in the line of duty. A minister eulogized, "They stood for us." Johnnie, Robert, and Charles served their country and sacrificed their lives in that service, as did the 93 police officers who gave their lives for their communities last year.

Every law enforcement officer in our Nation stands for us in keeping the peace, that condition of our society which allows each citizen to pursue and enjoy the basic rights of freedom and justice on which this Nation was founded. Their badges are our shield. The worth of that shield cannot be questioned, nor can it be denied.

The men and women in the law enforcement profession have special responsibilities and face extraordinary risks. Our society demands of our police a special dedication to uphold the law, protect the innocent, and if necessary, give their lives in the performance of these duties. Regretfully, too many officers must do just that.

The FBI Special Agents and the police officers killed throughout the years were the servants of the people in that they accepted the responsibilities and risks assigned them. Their commitment became a frightful sorrow for their families.

We must, and will, strengthen our efforts to prevent these tragedies. We thank God that there are such dedicated men and women willing to stand for us.




William H. Webster,
Director

November 1, 1979

THE ST. LOUIS FLAIR SYSTEM

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


FLAIR control console.

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FLAIR, the acronym for Fleet Location and Information Reporting, is an automatic vehicle monitoring (AVM) system which was introduced in the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) in December 1974. The program initially involved 25 patrol cars in district 3, but has been expanded to include all of the city's 200 patrol vehicles.

The development of FLAIR (a Boeing Company trademark) followed the 1966 President's Commission on Crime and Law Enforcement recommendation to develop a system to provide increased command and control in police operations which would reduce response time and thereby increase apprehensions. The Commission's report stirred considerable interest within the industry to develop systems that could meet the basic requirements for automatic selection of



10 code panel in FLAIR-equipped car.

the closest police cars to an incident site, with the expectation of apprehending more criminals as a result of reduced response time.

As industry research and development activities progressed to the point where the feasibility of AVM systems had been proven, the chief of police determined that the SLMPD had a need for AVM and desired to sponsor industry in the development and demonstration of the AVM concept. In November 1973, the Boeing Company's Wichita Division was the successful bidder for a pilot program awarded by the SLMPD through a "high impact" crime prevention grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

The FLAIR AVM system, a new concept in mobile fleet deployment, continuously provides a command and control center and/or communication center with graphically displayed vehicle location and status information. Vehicle position information is reported automatically without effort from either the vehicle operator or the dispatcher. This status information is input by the vehicle operator and reported automatically to the dispatcher. The information is displayed for the dispatcher in a color television format on one or more display and control terminals. Thus, the dispatcher has a continuously updated picture of the deployed mobile force under his control. With this tool, the dispatcher can now direct strategic deployment of the force for pursuits or sealing off areas of burglaries or robberies in progress.

One incident involving the pursuit of a stolen truck proved the value of AVM to set up an effective roadblock, which enabled officers to trap a stolen rig within 8 minutes. The incident began when an alert police officer motioned a truck driver to pull his rig over to the side of the road, as he suspected the truck was stolen. The officer's suspicions were confirmed when, once out of his car, the truck accelerated down the highway. The pursuit that followed displayed an excellent example of FLAIR and voice radio interplay used by a dispatcher and the vehicle officer. The pursuing FLAIR car officer provided the dispatcher with changes in route and lead of the fleeing truck, thus providing the dispatcher positive information. The dispatcher followed the pursuit FLAIR vehicle on the dis-



Lieutenant Broaders



Col. Eugene J. Camp
Chief of Police

play screen, and knowing that the fleeing truck was directly ahead, directed other FLAIR vehicles to a successful intercept.

FLAIR is based on a very fundamental navigation principle, the principle of dead reckoning. That is, if you know where something started, how far it has gone, and in what direction, you can calculate its location. The FLAIR system combines dead reckoning and map-matching techniques to develop accurate vehicle location information. These concepts, along with the capabilities of modern radios, electronic data processing, and color television, are combined to provide the dispatcher with an accurate, current visual display of the location of each police car in relation to a city map. The status of each officer is also reported through FLAIR to leave the voice radio free for other important matters.


The mobile equipment in all FLAIR-equipped vehicles responds as follows: An odometer produces a signal that represents distance traveled; the heading sensor produces a signal that indicates the direction the car is going; and keyboard and emergency switches on the control panel are used to generate codes indicating vehicle status. These three inputs are fed to a vehicle data processor which stores the information in a format that can be transmitted by the mobile transceiver. When the transceiver gets a triggering signal from the base station radio, it automatically responds in a timeslot allocated to that vehicle transmitting the stored data. The reply takes approximately 5 milliseconds (1/200 second).

The base equipment at headquarters is much more complex. The base radio in the RF data terminal triggers all mobile transceivers at the same time and collects their replies as each sends its data in turn. The information received in radio signals is converted to digital data in the RF data terminal and fed to the computer through the

computer data link interface unit. The computer processes the information in real time (as it happens). Relative to a starting point, the computer has a location for each car stored in its memory. As new distance and direction information is received, the computer calculates the change in position and updates its memory. The status information for each car is likewise stored and updated as it changes. In its memory, the computer also holds a digitized city map. The digital information provided by the computer is then converted by the video processor to a television format that can be displayed by the display and control terminal.

The FLAIR system provides a number of operational features to give the dispatcher rapid and detailed information on individual vehicle location and officer/vehicle status. The information representing the assigned vehicle on the television map display (vehicle symbol/call number) is modified to indicate the officer's status, e.g., two-man vehicle, low priority call, high priority call, or emergency. A specific officer/vehicle can be located by entering either the assigned vehicle's call number or the vehicle's FLAIR number into the computer by using console controls. An open square symbol is then displayed on the television map around the vehicle location symbol.

One important FLAIR application is locating an officer who has signaled an emergency and dispatching the nearest officers to assist him. The dispatcher is alerted to the emergency situation by an audible alarm (warning horn), the vehicle number with an E symbol appearing at the top of the status column, and the addition of an E to the vehicle's location symbol. The six closest vehicles available are displayed in the closest cars column in order of proximity by a single action of the dispatcher. If the dispatcher desires that more than six vehicles be sent to assist an officer in trouble, the call numbers of other vehicles can be displayed on the television map by actuating the appropriate category select switch. However, only six vehicles are displayed at any one time in the closest cars column.



To service an incident, the dispatcher designates the point of interest with the cursor control. The call numbers of six available vehicles in their order of proximity to the location are displayed in the closest cars column on the dispatcher's display. All vehicles displayed on the television map are identified by call number. Since the dispatcher can view the continuous movement of all field forces, communication security can be provided by directing the officer to the incident by route rather than incident address. The dispatcher can avoid assignments to an incident requiring the officer to cross major barriers, such as rivers and freeways, as well as assist officers in finding an address. The display of the location and the availability of vehicles give the dispatcher the capability to assist directly in a high-speed chase.

With the exception of applying power, the operating controls for each display and control terminal are located on the control console. Other controls for the television and warning horn not normally needed to operate

the display and control terminal are located on the back of the television display. Each dispatcher has full control over his display terminal, and each functions independently of the others.

Each FLAIR-equipped vehicle has two identifying numbers, the call number and the FLAIR number. The call number is normally a four-digit number. Three-digit numbers are permitted for patrol vehicles. Any four-digit number (or three-digit number in the case of patrol vehicles) can be assigned to any FLAIR-equipped vehicle. When a call number has been assigned to a FLAIR-equipped vehicle, this becomes the number used to identify the FLAIR-equipped vehicle in the status column, closest cars column, and street map area of the display and control terminal. The first digit on the left of the call number is related to the five category select switches on the control console.

This enables selection of up to five types of vehicle categories, such as patrol, district, detective, administrative, and miscellaneous. Only patrol vehicles are in the system at this time. Local operating procedures define which number corresponds to which category.

The FLAIR number is also a four-digit number. However, the first digit on the left of the FLAIR number corresponds to the radio channel used by the mobile transceiver in the FLAIR-equipped vehicle. The other three digits correspond to the report timeslot assigned to the vehicle when the mobile equipment was installed. Unlike the call number, the FLAIR number is dependent on the configuration of equipment installed in the vehicle and does not change. Therefore, the FLAIR number cannot be assigned by the

dispatcher. The dispatcher can, however, use the FLAIR number to locate a vehicle. The FLAIR number is never displayed next to the vehicle location symbol, in the status column, or in the closest cars column.

The base station computer receives data, including distance traveled (from an odometer) and direction of travel (from a magnetic sensor). Such incremental data are transmitted to the base station computer from each patrol vehicle during an update period (about 1.2 second intervals) where the computer applies such updates to the previous data (and the car's original position) to present continuous tracking of the vehicle's location on the television display map at the dispatcher position. The computer uses a map-matching process to keep a car located on streets and corrects distance error when necessary. If there is too much of an accumulation of tracking error, the vehicle's call number and a V flag will be displayed on the dispatcher's console. At this point, it is necessary for the dispatcher to stop the vehicle, verify its location, and reinitialize it into the system. The initialization can also be performed by the patrol officer at designated initialization points established within each of the city's nine police districts.

The FLAIR AVM system objectives of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department have been established as follows:

1. Reduce response time.
2. Improve officer safety.
3. Reduce voice-band congestion.
4. Enhance command and control capabilities.
5. Improve supervision of the force.

The first four major objectives were established at the time the AVM system was contemplated for use in St. Louis. Less emphasis on objective No. 1 and the establishment of objective No. 5 occurred during the phase II evaluation (June 1976, to January 1978), which was supported by grants from LEAA.

The main thrust of the FLAIR program in the SLMPD through 1978 has been the development of an operational AVM system, advancement of technology, testing and evaluating the system, and personnel training. Much has been learned in St. Louis about implementing AVM for police service. FLAIR was the first attempt to monitor visually a police department's patrol fleet and has proven to be quite successful. Presently, the Boeing Company is in the process of installing automatic signposts (automatic updating of vehicle location) in the ninth police district, where an operational test of FLAIR is taking place with the use of an open-beat patrol.

The open-beat concept/experiment which began in the city's ninth police district on February 21, 1979, attempts to distribute the patrol according to the need. An accurate accounting of the district's daily crime is maintained, and this information, along with special events that might be occurring, recent incidents with lingering effects, and the planning of the district's command rank officers (with input from their subordinates) is used to distribute most effectively the patrol and to saturate the areas of greatest criminal activity. This mode of patrol did not require any changes in car beat or district boundaries. It does give the district command officers the authority to reduce or enlarge the area of his patrol units in order to alleviate any problems occurring within the district. The need for an AVM system is readily recognizable to accomplish this type of patrol, since the area patrol can change at any given time during the day or night and could be for a period of 1 to 24 or more hours (which would require a notification to the dispatcher reporting changes in the areas of patrol). FLAIR removes the necessity of announcing areas of patrol, since the dispatcher has the capability to locate visually and dispatch the closest vehicles to a scene requiring police service.

Prior to commencing the 6-month, ninth district open-beat experiment, a video monitor was installed in the ninth district commander's office. The monitor allows the district commander to view what the dispatcher sees on the monitor in the communication center. This system provides the district commander, his lieutenants, and sergeants a means by which they can view their vehicles to assure they are patrolling as directed. The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department through the use of FLAIR is attempting (with the open-beat patrol) to obtain the greatest degree of efficiency by effective application of command and control.

FLAIR has not been used as a disciplinary tool, even though it serves as a hidden supervision in that the patrol officers know they can be watched, which tends to influence them toward better behavior. This supervision is further served any time a vehicle is improperly tracking and generates a V flag at the dispatching console. Such an occurrence causes the dispatcher to call for a "FLAIR check," which directs the officer to stop his vehicle and state his location. If he responds over the voice radio with a location that is far down from his assigned area (and without cause), it would be normal for him to feel embarrassed and to reduce the frequency of such occurrences.

The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department feels that FLAIR is demonstrating the intrinsic value of AVM systems in combating crime. Many domestic and foreign cities have sent representatives to view the St. Louis system. All have shown considerable interest and can readily see how it could be adopted to their particular needs. The SLMPD believes that this new technology will have far-reaching effects on law enforcement. **FBI**

Management Training at the Police Executive Institute

"The police is the only large scale institution in our society that has not benefited from advances in management science," observed Prof. Egon Bittner in 1970.¹ However, the progress of the last decade is beginning to outdate that assertion. Thus, Professor Bittner did not repeat his lament to the May 1979 class of the Police Executive Institute (PEI). Created by the Police Foundation in 1976, the Police Executive Institute represents one such advance which enables police executives to apply management concepts to their departments.

The 4-day course at which Professor Bittner spoke dealt with managing organizational change, perhaps the most demanding of management skills. In Tampa in May 1979, as in San Diego 2 months earlier, the course emphasized the difficulties of bringing about major organizational change. The Tampa session began as 26 participants, chiefs, deputy chiefs, and sheriffs, interviewed each other in pairs and then introduced their partners to the group. They came from as far as Eugene, Oreg., San Jose, Calif., Phoenix, Ariz., and Rochester, N.Y., and most had already attempted organizational change. Some had attempted to work with the organizational chart, a number had adopted new operating procedures, such as case management in criminal investigations, many had concentrated on training their personnel, and a few were engaged in comprehensive change to develop the officer


on the street into a professional. A look at the substance of the course provides both an introduction to the work of the Police Executive Institute and a view of the state of the art of management training for police executives.

Lessons from the Ups and Downs of Change

The first case study examined by the course was the Dallas experience of 1971.² This ambitious attempt to transform the way in which officers deal with citizens undertook decentralizing the department to five districts, recruiting minorities, creating field training officers, and initiating a large number of other projects. Mary Ann Wycoff, who as the evaluator watched the changes as they occurred, and A. J. Brown, then a staff captain, both described how the bold vision ended in the resignation of the chief. The presentations emphasized the crucial role of implementation—the need to translate the grand goals into a series of steps toward those goals. A. J. Brown, who since his Dallas days has served as chief of police in Norfolk and Fort Worth, advised any chief who seeks to make substantial change in his department to reach an understanding—a psychological contract—with the community and his department. "This understanding must include the recognition that the process of change is like wallpapering or having a baby. Change is messy and will be so for everyone before things get better."

By DR. DOROTHY GUYOT

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Dr. Dorothy Guyot

Jacob Goodman, chief of police in Charlotte, N.C., unfolded with wry humor the story of how he guided his department into team policing. He had laid the groundwork over the years: Decentralized to five districts; gave district commanders 24-hour responsibility; developed a young, well-educated department; took affirmative action in hiring and promotions; consolidated city and county records; and installed computer-assisted dispatching. When the city's plan to annex suburban territory required expansion of the police department, Chief Goodman took the opportunity to shift the department to team policing. Deciding that he needed 10 teams and lacking 10 captains, Goodman promoted all lieutenants to captain, thus abolishing the rank of lieutenant. He permitted officers some choice in team assignment, starting with the captains, then sergeants and police officers. Next, he brought each of the 10 teams out on a 2-day retreat so that officers could begin to think of each other as teammates. At the beginning of each of the 10 retreats, he wagered a steak dinner for two to any officer who could introduce all 40 of his future teammates. Goodman never lost a dinner, but he won his point. From that moment, officers recognized their present lack of comradeship, and many eagerly started to build a joint enterprise. Goodman permitted team members to work out their preferences for shifts and vacations. Further, he permitted teams to set their own manning patterns. For example, he backed a team decision that two or three officers were sufficient to handle the work on midnights in a 24-square mile affluent residential section.

The Charlotte experience fits the touchstone advice that Professor Bittner had given in his opening lecture. While police agencies must strive for ordinary organizational efficiency, show improvement in the services they render, and make clear what is expected in individual performance, these three improvements are merely conditions for the most important change. That important change is to liberate the police officer to do his work with the citizens. This liberation, asserts Profes-

sor Bittner, is the essence of changing the craft of policing into a true profession.

Every speaker warned of the difficulties and pitfalls of change. Dale Carson, sheriff of Jacksonville, Fla., vividly described how he presided over a pell-mell consolidation of the city police department and county sheriff's department. Patrick Murphy, reflecting on his experiences as commissioner in four different cities, cautioned the participants concerning the realities of the struggle for power.

“ . . . the most important change . . . is to liberate the police officer to do his work with the citizens.”

Herman Goldstein, professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School, drew together some lessons from the range of presentations at the course and from his own experience as right hand to O. W. Wilson in the Chicago police department.³ He argued that the failure in Dallas was not due to an overly ambitious goal, but to a lack of attention to detail, a lack of orchestration, and a lack of realistic timing. Goldstein observed that outside funding is a major cause of unrealistic schedules, because the funding agency needs to be shown quick results. Professor Goldstein commented that in Charlotte, Chief Goodman had gained acceptance of team policing by providing a satisfactory answer to the dominant question throughout the department: “How does this change affect me?” Goldstein concluded that changes will succeed only if executives listen to the feedback from those affected and develop new systems of rewards consistent with the new goals.

A Movable Feast

This course at Tampa is part of what the Police Executive Institute's director, G. Patrick Gallagher, calls “a movable feast.” The course is one of a dozen dealing with key management issues: Labor relations, media relations, executive response to misconduct, executive time use, planning, and budgeting. The courses are offered at comfortable conference sites in a huge triangle defined by Washington, St. Petersburg, and San Diego. Faculty and participants alike converge from across the country so that every course reflects the diversity of different regional experiences. Each course is limited to approximately 25 participants in order to maintain the informality and intensity that small groups encourage. When the demand for a particular course is very strong, it is offered again on the other coast.

Since the presentation of the first course in November 1976, the institute has grown along these lines, which were laid out in the initial design. The institute is jointly funded by the Police Foundation and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Participants are the chief executives from among the Nation's 500 largest law enforcement agencies. About half the faculty for each course are police executives, reflecting the institute's belief that practitioners and researchers provide complementary perspectives. By early 1978, the Police Executive Institute had reached nearly 200 executives from 100 city, county, and State agencies. Yet from the very beginning the Police Executive Institute also felt a commitment to middle managers. Since 1977, the institute has conducted a 2-week course for selected middle managers whose chiefs had participated in the institute. Of the 59 participants, 30 have been promoted to the executive level.

To develop the courses, the institute has made three national needs assessments, polling chief executives regarding their priority concerns. By mid-1979, 375 executives from 170 departments had attended the national-level courses, some coming for one or two and others for six or more courses. (See fig. 1.) Initially, participants came

All levels of the bureau were suffering from a Kojak image of investigative work. Sicaras instituted accountability by having the detective sergeants work with a checklist of who is to do what and by developing his detective lieutenants as administrators. Extensive training developed individual competence to handle both crimes against property and crimes against persons. Consequently, the bureau had a reduced need for callbacks and achieved a 68-percent reduction in

The Police Executive Institute is a forum for the exchange of ideas far beyond the discussions which take place in the classroom. At the courses, police executives meet colleagues who are grappling with similar problems. Over a leisurely lunch or in an evening's conversation, police executives share their experiences of struggling with antiquated personnel systems and tight budgets. Commissioner William Hegarty of New Rochelle, N.Y., speaks for many when he calls this expanded colleagueship a special advantage for



overtime. Through a formal notification system, each detective reported the status of "your case" to the police officer who had made the preliminary report. If an arrest was made, both the detective and the officer received the credit. Detectives began to attend roll-calls, averaging at least three times a week, supervisors met, and members at all levels began to talk. Information began to flow. Further, Sicaras had developed performance and manning standards setting out how many detectives are necessary for given crime conditions, what is a reasonable case-load, and what are expected clearance rates. Throughout, Sicaras listened to the men, involving them and committing them to the changes.

In staccato phrases, Sicaras poured out plans, decisions, facts. Members of the group interrupted him to learn more details. This last session of the course ended before members could be satisfied on all aspects of his program. Within a week of his return to Hartford, Sicaras had received phone calls from nine participants asking for more specifics on how to upgrade criminal investigation.

The informal, ongoing exchange of ideas which William Hegarty and George Sicaras have experienced are examples of the operation of an "invisible college." Each individual police manager who attends a course meets colleagues with whom he shares ideas and adds to his circle acquaintances concerned with similar issues and problems. Each police manager develops his own "invisible college," the set of people who turn to him and to whom he can turn in thinking through his management problems.

Classroom work is not the only way in which the Police Executive Institute provides managerial training. In 1978 the institute took 13 police managers to England and Germany to meet with colleagues. The group visited Scotland Yard, Bramshill, and three provincial forces in Sussex, Bir-

mingham, and Manchester. In Germany they visited the Munich police department, in Weisbaden the *Bundeskriminalamt*, which is the German FBI, and then the special antiterrorist group, the *Bundesgrenzschutz*. Members of the group returned to their own departments with a fresh sense of alternatives to the present way American police departments are managed.

The National Executive Institute

The Police Executive Institute is, of course, not alone in providing man-

**“. . . changes will
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executives listen to
the feedback from
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agement training to top-level police executives. Familiar to the readers of the *Bulletin* is the FBI's National Executive Institute (NEI) at Quantico.⁵ Since 1976 the FBI has been holding annual sessions of the National Executive Institute, each consisting of four cycles and lasting 4 days. Cycle one places policing in the context of social, economic, and political trends. Cycle two deals with crime-control policy and the mass media. Cycle three concerns labor relations, affirmative action, and personnel problems. Cycle four covers future police organizations, financing, and time management.

Since 1976 the topics for each of the four cycles have continued to be similar to the initial cycle topics. The faculty for the institute is composed of national-level experts from universities, research institutes, business, and government. For instance, in the third cycle for 1979, held in May, Mayor Morial of New Orleans spoke concerning his city's police strike, Edward Kiernan, president of the International Union of Police Associations, formed a panel with two other police labor leaders, and Asst. Attorney General Drew Days III led a panel discussion on affirmative action.

Over 100 law enforcement executives have graduated from the National Executive Institute. The graduates of the first session included the leaders of the country's largest departments, Commissioner Michael Codd of New York City, Supt. James Rochford of Chicago, and Chief Edward M. Davis of Los Angeles. The chiefs who have graduated from the NEI come from cities as different as Denver and Newark, Honolulu and Boston, Vancouver and Jacksonville.

Both the Police Executive Institute and the National Executive Institute came into existence in 1976 to provide managerial training for incumbent chiefs of large police departments. Now both have waiting lists. How did the police field reach the state where the establishment of two substantial programs does not meet the need?

Managerial training for police has never been systematically established in America. Over the years, the courses offered by the few established police training schools, such as the Northwestern Traffic Institute, the FBI National Academy, the Southern Police Institute, have evolved from police techniques toward management subjects. For the most part, middle managers attended with chiefs of smaller departments. A number of universities began police administration or criminology programs in the 1930's which continue today, Michigan State, University of Southern California, Indiana University, and Washington State.⁶ Since the 1960's the International Association of Chiefs of Police has provided seminars on selected management topics. Even the vast expansion of college criminal justice programs brings management training to less than half of the Nation's police administrators.

The Roots of Inadequacy

The historic lack of managerial training for police executives has roots in two characteristics of American police departments which distinguish them from police agencies in Europe.

First, the tradition in America, unlike the class-conscious societies of Europe, has been a straight through career ladder in which everyone enters the organization at the bottom. The European tradition, long ago abandoned by Britain but continued on the Continent, is to provide a separate entry level for those expected to assume command.⁷ The usual requirement is possession of a law degree. Special inservice training then acquaints these managerial-level personnel with the knowledge required for their future positions. This separate recruitment makes obvious that administration is different from rendering direct service. However, if a man becomes a police chief by slowly rising through the ranks, there is no threshold at which it is obvious he must receive intensive managerial training before he is permitted to rise higher.

A second reason for the lack of managerial training is that American police departments have been local. The small size of a department's command staff makes impractical the development of formal management courses in any but the largest departments, while a national police force naturally requires a national academy to train all levels of personnel. Further, the local nature of American policing

reinforces a parochial outlook, which assumes the body of knowledge necessary to direct the particular department can be absorbed by an intelligent individual who watches what his superiors do. The lack of movement of personnel among police departments, much less between police and business or government, feeds the illusion that the concepts and techniques developed by the fields of business management and public administration have little relevance to police management.

“ . . . and develop new systems of rewards consistent with the new goals.”

In 1948 the British managed to establish a national police college, and its present program has been described recently in the *Bulletin*.⁸ Despite the local character of British police forces, the national government could provide an integrated system of management training, because it built upon the unique arrangement of shared responsibilities between the local police boards and the Home Office in London. The call for an “American

Bramshill” fails to consider how national-level training can fit into thousands of local promotion systems.

Professionals Led by Amateurs

The American thrust for upgrading personnel over the last 2 decades has been to increase the training and education of the officers on the street. The anomaly in this development is that comparable attention has not been paid to upgrading management skills of the administrators who direct the educated personnel. The first State training standards were set in California and New York in 1959, providing minimum length and content for recruit training. By 1968, 31 States had enacted training standards, but only 2 States had set standards for supervisory and management training.⁹ By 1975 recruit training was nearly universal, but only 10 States required training prior to or within a year of promotion.¹⁰ Until Maine took the lead in 1974, no State set any standards for the heads of law enforcement agencies.¹¹ The Maine system of certification specifies a minimum of 500 hours of approved training and two college courses for individuals with 5 years' experience in law enforcement. The amount of training and education for certification increase to 800 hours and a bachelor's

Figure 2

The Education Levels of Different Ranks in 1974

| | Line Patrol | Line Investigation | Supervision | Management |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-------------|------------|
| Less than high school graduate | 8.4% | 4.1% | 5.5% | 15.7% |
| High school graduate | 45.0% | 36.1% | 35.3% | 42.0% |
| 1-3 years college | 39.6% | 44.6% | 49.0% | 31.0% |
| 4 years or more college | 7.2% | 15.1% | 10.2% | 11.3% |
| Subtotal all college | 46.8% | 59.7% | 59.2% | 42.3% |
| N=approximately 492,000 | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Source: Lawrence W. Sherman, *The Quality of Police Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), p. 186, presenting data from the National Planning Association, “A Nationwide Survey of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Personnel Needs and Resources: Final Report,” unpublished manuscript. (Washington: LEAA, 1976), pp. 11-153.

degree for individuals with only 2 years' law enforcement experience. However, the certification system lacks teeth; the content of the college education is completely unspecified, incumbent chiefs and sheriffs are excluded, and certification is entirely voluntary.

Although it is not possible to compare the extent of management training received by police executives with the extent of generalist and specialist training received by the officers who deliver the direct service, a comprehensive comparison of education levels has been made. A congressionally sponsored study of almost all law enforcement personnel (492,000) found that managerial-level officers are slightly less educated than line patrol officers, who are slightly less educated than investigators and supervisors. (See fig. 2.)

Decentralized, Ad Hoc, and Voluntary

The impressive fact about higher education for police officers is that over 200,000 individuals have acquired some college education, although only 8 percent of the 97 largest agencies and only 5 percent of all agencies require any college education.¹² College education is apparently less frequently required for promotion than for entrance.¹³ Similarly, the impressive fact about managerial training is that so many administrators have participated despite the absence of departmental or State requirements and the absence of departmental policies that reward training with promotion.

Policing in America has never been accused of being too centralized, too systematic, or too regulated. In fact, the opposite characteristics—decentralized, ad hoc, and voluntary—describe the history of police management education and training. Management training has been offered by

colleges, police training schools, professional associations, management consulting firms, State or Federal agencies, and sometimes police departments themselves. Training programs have been developed in response to acutely felt needs and disappeared when the crisis subsided or the funds ran dry. Most police administrators who have received managerial training did so voluntarily, as individuals attending college courses. All police departments which sent administrators to police schools and sem-

"The Police Executive Institute is a forum for the exchange of ideas far beyond the discussions which take place in the classroom."

inars did so voluntarily, without such requirements being set by civil service or other State regulation.

The two differences from European systems, lack of a separate entry level for command staff and lack of a national police service, have perpetuated the inadequacy and unsystematic nature of managerial training. The particular strengths of American society as a whole—abundance and private initiative—have provided the means for managerial training. The history of police training schools and police science college programs has been the history of a small proportion of the abundant resources of this highly educated Nation being directed toward policing because of the initiative of a few farsighted individuals. The opportunities for managerial training are offered freely. They are free in the sense that their cost to individual participants or to participating police departments is less than operating cost. They are free in the sense that administrators are rarely required to participate and are not regularly provided with pay or promotion rewards after participation.

The Police Executive Institute sponsored by the Police Foundation and the National Executive Institute sponsored by the FBI are both within this decentralized, ad hoc, and voluntary tradition. Both offer opportunities which are eagerly accepted by the heads of police agencies. Neither institute program is formally linked to any police department process for selection of the top executive. They are providing a vital service to top management for updating and collegial exchange. The professional staffs of both institutes look forward to continued flexibility as they develop broader means of meeting the pressing need for managerial training. **FBI**

Footnotes

¹ Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society*, Crime and Delinquency Issues Monograph Series (Rockville, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health, 1970), p. 54.

² Mary Ann Wycoff and George L. Kelling, *The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform and Human Resources and Development*, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1978).

³ Goldstein has set out his views in *Policing a Free Society* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977), which is both a summation of the condition of policing today and a framework for viewing the future.

⁴ Interview with Commissioner William Hegarty and G. Patrick Gallagher on May 2, 1979, *Law Enforcement News*, July 1979.

⁵ "The FBI's National Executive Institute: Educating Law Enforcement's Top Level Managers," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, September 1976, pp. 3-8.

⁶ Lawrence W. Sherman, *The Quality of Police Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), p. 33.

⁷ The observations which Raymond Fosdick made on the eve of World War I are contained in his *European Police Systems* (New York: The Century Co., 1916) chs. 4 and 7.

⁸ Terry T. O'Connor, "Law Enforcement Management Training at the British Police College: An American Perspective," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, June 1979, pp. 1-5.

⁹ Charles B. Saunders, Jr., *Upgrading the American Police* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970), p. 147.

¹⁰ Goldstein, p. 235.

¹¹ Maine Criminal Justice Academy Police Chief/Sheriff Certification Criteria, Appendix B in IACP, *The Police Chief Executive Report* (Washington: LEAA, 1976), pp. 35 and 160-161.

¹² Sherman, p. 175, providing data from the National Planning Association study.

¹³ The 1977 Kansas City-Police Foundation administrative survey shows that 8 of 40 large departments required some college education for entrance, but none of the 8 required it for promotion. Five different departments required some college for promotion, but not for entrance. See Kansas City, Mo., Police Department and the Police Foundation, *Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey* (Washington: The Police Foundation, 1978), cols. 12a, 12b, and 12c.

Officer, Meet the Press

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*Assistant City Editor
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Throughout the United States, law enforcement agencies and the news media are in daily contact. Whether it is the routine calls from beat reporters checking for information, following up on a local human interest story, or seeking details about a major crime that ultimately may attract national attention, a relationship exists between the two groups.

At times, some of these relationships may become strained, the problem arising for a variety of reasons. For example, the reporter may have a deadline, the public may be pressing for results, or the police officer may not be the best person to communicate with members of the media. However, most strained relationships are caused by misinformation, a lack of information, or the misinterpretation of existing information. Most of these situations can be avoided.

One way law enforcement agencies, large or small, can avoid these problems and improve their relationships with the media is by being prepared to "meet the press." Being "prepared" means having the necessary information, knowing what to say, and how to say it.

This is particularly important to a small police department. Often, the small agency may be overlooked by the media, even though the same crimes which make news when handled by a large department occur within the jurisdiction of the small department. Large departments have the obvious advantage of being able to establish a Public Information Office (PIO) with people specially trained for the job. (See Mike Brake's article "Establishing a Public Information Office," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, October 1978, pp. 22-25).

The first step for a small department is to designate a person to be the information officer (IO). This person will be responsible for reviewing daily the reports on police activity. Attention must be paid to both the major and minor crimes, because the seemingly insignificant incident may be of interest to the media due to an unusual "twist or angle." This is especially true in areas where a "neighborhood" newspaper is published near a city or a smaller rural newspaper.

Secondly, the department must develop written guidelines for the IO regarding two important items: What kind of information may be released to the media, and then, what is the best way to release it?


Regarding the first point, it is beneficial for the information officer to contact the various media representa-

tives to determine what they consider newsworthy. In most locales, the police and the newsgathering agencies have definite policies (or hopefully will have) regarding the criminal situations in which they do or do not share an interest. These include reportable crimes, arrests, and nonreportable incidents. These criteria have to be agreed on and understood by both parties. Crimes of interest usually include:

1. Homicide.
2. Robbery.
3. Rape.
4. Burglary, when it involves large loss of property or some unusual angle. Minor burglaries for the most part are not of interest, as are larcenies from vehicles.
5. Traffic accident, when there is a fatality, a major injury, and/or a large amount of property damage.
6. Child abuse, a crime which has finally begun to receive attention in the Nation's media.

Arrests are of interest if they are:


1. Felonies.
2. Misdemeanors, if something or someone of interest is involved.
3. If there is some unusual angle to an arrest.
4. Climax of a large-scale crime investigation, especially if the local media has kept up with the investigation.



R. Douglas Gaddis



Charles R. O'Daniel



Chief Thomas E. Webster

Items that are usually thought of as nonreportable are:

1. Suicides. Unless they involve someone prominent, there is a good reason to keep these out of print. The exception would be when the death appears to have been a suicide, but later turns out to be a homicide.

2. Attempted suicides.

3. Bomb threats, hijackings, and terrorism. These generally are avoided since the person responsible may get a thrill by reading accounts of his crime in the paper and may perpetrate the crime again to obtain more attention.

Further, the department's information officer should be familiar with local and State laws regarding crimes and how they may be reported to and by the media. For example, Florida law does not permit police agencies to disclose the names of juveniles involved in crimes, nor can they identify victims of rape.

Additionally, the information officer handling media responsibilities needs to be aware of the rules of evidence in order to determine what may or may not be released, in view of what effect such disclosures may have on pending criminal investigations.

An excellent method for reporting police information to the press is to have a prepared form where all the IO does is "fill in the blanks." If care is taken when preparing the form and copies are available for the media representatives, the IO will not have to waste precious time trying to answer questions from reporters trained to find out "who, what, where, when, why, and how."

When developing a prepared police press release form (PPRF) to be used by the information officer, the following areas should be considered, even though the sequence and/or format will vary from one agency to another. If feasible, the form should be constructed so that the IO has to do as little writing as possible. Therefore, much of the input will merely consist of checking spaces and writing words and phrases. To save time the IO should fill in the blanks, have enough copies made for all of the media representatives, give them time to read the press release form(s), and then, if necessary, have a question-and-answer period. Many departments have these PPRF's in a central location for the media people to look through at their convenience. Usually, the question-and-answer period will only be necessary when there is a great amount of public interest in the investigation or arrest(s).

Here are the items that should be considered for use in a police press release form.

1. Report number. This can be coded by the type of crime, date, and offense number. This will make any subsequent location of the report easier in the event additional details are to be added and/or information is needed. This is usually of use to the IO when additional information is requested by media representatives.

2. Date and time of the offense. Express the time in civilian hours, i.e., 5:30 p.m., instead of military time, i.e., 1730 hours. This will help avoid confusion when the press release is read by civilian personnel.

3. Type of crime. This is the section of the police press release form that media personnel will most likely look at first. The type of crime and the people involved are of greatest interest to the media.

4. Person(s) arrested (if possible). It is important to get the person's complete name and commonly used nicknames. Be sure to pay particular attention to any unusual spellings of the names. Also include the person's age and current address.

5. Charges (if applicable). Be careful to only list those charges for which the accused was arrested. You can always add "other charges pending."

6. Date and place of arrest(s). State the exact time and complete address where it took place.

7. Investigation. This section describes the present status of the investigation.

8. Location, date, and time of crime. Be as specific as possible.

9. Complainant. Be specific regarding the person's name and address.

10. Summary of how the crime occurred. This should follow the same format as a crime reconstruction (which it actually is), including all circumstances of the offense and arrest. Be as specific as possible, and tell as complete a story as possible (or allowable).

11. Current status. If arrests occurred, state how. If no arrests have been made, state the present status of the investigation.

12. Property stolen and/or recovered. This is especially important in cases where detectives have been involved, and where it will be beneficial for the police if the public is informed. Also include a brief description of the items, their value, and state whether they were stolen and/or recovered.

13. Officers involved. If this is used, investigating officers should be identified by their first and last names (or initials), rank, division, etc. Many departments neglect this area in public releases, but make sure the officers are mentioned in departmental releases.

Other items to be considered, but not necessarily included in all PPRF's, are:

1. Additional cases that were cleared and value of recovered property. This will show where police were instrumental in doing investigative work to clear more cases.

2. If your jurisdiction set a bond, media personnel may be interested if multiple bonds are used and/or their total amount of money. This is a safeguard to insure that the person has indeed been arrested and booked.

3. Additional arrests pending may be added when they are in the making, or you want to try to scare an informant.

Figure 1 is a sample of the form used by the Temple Terrace Police Department.

Temple Terrace Police Press Release Form

1. Report Number _____

2. Date _____
Time _____

3. Type of Crime. _____

4. Arrests:

A Complete Name of Person Arrested, Age, Current Address.

B Charge(s).

C Date & Place of Arrest.

5. Investigation:

A Location Crime Occurred; Also Date and Time.

B Complainant's Name, Address.

C Brief Summary of How Crime Occurred,
and Events That Led To Arrests.

D If No Arrests, Brief Description of Crime and Current Status.

E Any Property Recovered With Arrests, and Value.
If NOT, Value of Items Stolen and Brief Description of Items.

6. Name of Police Officer(s) Involved in Investigation and Arrest.

What, then, are the values and benefits of establishing a press relations system for a small department?

Since crime occurs in small communities just as in the major metropolitan areas, the police are just as actively engaged in investigations and arrests as the large agencies. Such publicity helps to establish a good public image of the department. People in the area served by the department are aware of what police are doing.

Media coverage makes the public aware of the crimes and crime trends in their community. Many people do not realize that crimes are occurring unless they are reported in their local paper. They may become more crime conscious.

The police department is occasionally assisted when a citizen reads about a crime and reports that he might have important information about it. That speeding car he saw leaving the location of the convenience store might be related to the holdup that occurred at the same time.

Press coverage also allows the law enforcement agency to check up on the accuracy of local reporting. The IO should check all the printed media, cut out articles written from the PPRF, and then compare the two. If discrepancies occur, this can be pointed out to the media representative. In fact, the IO can help public relations by thanking the newsperson for the "kind words."

Finally, remember that the best way to promote good press relations is to be prepared, know what to say and how to say it, and keep the channels of communication open.

FBI

Basic Recruit Training 1979

By SGT. EDWARD DOONAN

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Sheriff's Department
Sacramento, Calif.*

Recruit Training in the Past

Historically, police basic training was limited to the recruit being "given a badge, a gun and a uniform and told 'use common sense in doing his job' . . ." ¹ or "if you keep the ten commandments and see to it that others do likewise, you won't have any trouble." ² As time went on, departments began sending recruits to "academies." Our first academies were housed in a dilapidated building in a local park. The training was 6 weeks, with the lecture being the primary medium of instruction. Often, instructors would begin their lecture with, "I don't know what I'm doing here. The Captain made me come out here and teach, so here I am. I don't want to be here any more than you do." The instructor would then read directly from some text or code book and then tell stories about the "good old days." After completing this lecture, this instructor would leave, and

Academy recruits practice vehicle stop.



the next one would begin his lecture in a similar manner. Until 1971, our training was based on hunches. For its time, it was adequate. However, as society became more complex, training requirements also became more complex.

In 1971, at the direction of Sheriff Duane Lowe and now retired Chief of Police William Kinney, the training program was vastly expanded. Sheriff Lowe states, "... recognizing the problems affecting society today, we are seeking the most competent officers available to cope with these problems ... [this training] marks the beginning of [a] most proficient and formidable training center in northern California. The success of any academy, however, can only be measured by the caliber of officers it produces. ..."³ Chief Kinney stated, "... the essence of the training process is change. The transformation of a civil-

ian into a policeman is no longer accomplished by handing a young man a star and a gun. ..."⁴

The Sacramento County Sheriff's Department and the Sacramento Police Department manage a basic peace officer training program known as the Sacramento Law Enforcement Training Center (S.L.E.T.C.). During the 1960's, the program consisted of 6 weeks of classroom lectures. In 1971, the program was expanded to 11 weeks, and in 1978, it was expanded to 13 weeks. Each expansion was due to increased needs of the departments and required more participation by each recruit.

The program is one of 27 basic courses certified by the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.). Since 1971, the S.L.E.T.C. has trained over 600 recruit officers from 40 law enforcement agencies in northern California. It is the only basic course in the


State of California consisting of three distinct phases—academic training, academy field orientation, and individualized recruit training.

Initially, there were many changes in the curriculum, particularly in the areas of criminal law, arrest techniques, and officer safety. To maintain relevancy, the curriculum has been constantly evaluated to insure that the program continues to meet the objectives of the departments.

A permanent staff was assigned to supervise and coordinate the program, counsel recruits, conduct some training, and document recruit performance. Instructors and staff were selected from officers known to be experts in their field. Only officers indicating a desire to teach were permitted to do so. At first, staff and instructors had very little teaching experience. However, today, all seven permanent staff members and most of the part-

Instruction on use of M.C.T. during field orientation.





Sergeant Doonan



Sheriff Duane Lowe

time instructors have California Community College teaching credentials.

During this evolution of our recruit training program, the recruits were required to participate more in their training, such as practical and role-playing exercises. Further, electronic media, such as video, films, and other audio-visual aids, were introduced to enhance the instruction. As we evaluated the program, we found many problems. Class sizes were too large (50) to accommodate the revised program. Now class size is limited to 36 members, and frequently, the class is divided into smaller groups to insure maximum individual participation. Another problem was establishing dismissal standards that would meet affirmative action guidelines. The problem was eliminated when standards were established and approved to meet the Civil Service Commission's guidelines.

P.O.S.T. Basic Course Revision Project

In 1975, our staff began working with a consortium of other training academies throughout the State on a project sponsored by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. The project developed approximately 630 performance objectives from a statewide task analysis for the position of patrol officer. These objectives are:

"... divided into twelve functional areas which describe the major functions of police work. These functional areas effectively serve our purpose for organization and reference. Each functional area contains the 'learning goals' describing that segment of the training program. In practice, these learning goals could describe individual course goals which could be established with this program. Each learning goal has one or more 'performance objectives' which describe the action or behavior which the student is expected to exhibit upon completion of the instruction and form the basis by which the student will be evaluated as to his/her knowledge and abilities." ⁵

Examples of a functional area, learning goal, and a performance objective are:

"Functional Area 8.0

Patrol Procedures

The student will possess the knowledge and skills required of an officer in safely and effectively accomplishing the patrol function." ⁶

"Learning Goal: The student will understand and practice basic observation skills." ⁷

"Performance Objective

8.3.2 Given a simulated situation wherein the student observes a scene and/or activity for a period of time specified by the school, the student will describe the scene and activity with at least 75 percent accuracy." ⁸

These are single examples of components of the instructional system. When analyzing a performance objective, it can be seen that the objective contains four critical elements. The learner (student), the behavior (will describe), conditions (simulated situation), and success criteria (75-percent accuracy). The revision project is in its implementation stage where each academy is going "... through a rigorous cycle of tryout/revise until they produce the pre-specified performance (objectives)." ⁹

Problems which continue to be of concern are: Sequencing of objectives, testing, documenting and tracking recruit performance, remediation, and many other areas of recruit training.

S.L.E.T.C. Revised Basic Course

In March 1978, our basic recruit course was expanded "... to correspond to the demands placed on the individual officer in the field." ¹⁰ The program was divided into three phases—academic, academy field orientation, and individualized recruit training.

Academic Training

During the first 8 weeks and last 3 weeks, the recruits receive their academic training which includes all critical basic skills (law, arrest techniques, first aid/cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), chemical agents, and firearms).

During this phase, all examinations must be passed with a score of 78 percent or above. If a recruit fails an examination, he/she is counseled and given a remedial assignment covering the problem area(s). The recruit is re-tested within 1 week. A second failure in any area results in dismissal from the academy.

Academy Field Orientation

This phase of the program is conducted during the 9th and 10th weeks. Each recruit returns to his/her own agency and performs specific tasks under the guidance of a training officer. The "... academy field orientation is not a portion of a regular field training program and satisfactory performance may not be acceptable in a regular field training program."¹¹ The reason is that during this phase of basic training, recruits are not expected to perform with the same proficiency as officers who have completed the basic

course. The primary goal of this phase of academy training is emphasizing the recruits' problem-solving ability and to identify skills that need improvement. Upon completion of this phase, the recruits return to the academy for debriefing and a continuation of their academic training. During the academy field orientation phase, each recruit will be evaluated on specific objectives within the following subject matter:

- "1.0 Patrol Procedures
 - 1.1.1 Observation techniques
 - 1.1.2 Interrogation
 - 1.1.3 Vehicle checks
 - 1.1.4 Prisoner transportation
 - 1.1.5 Crimes in progress
 - 1.1.6 Vehicle impound and storage
 - 1.1.7 Radio procedures
 - 1.1.8 Radio car operations
- 2.0 Traffic
 - 2.1.1 Traffic stop-warning/citation
 - 2.1.2 Non-felony traffic stop

2.1.3 Felony traffic stop

3.0 Communications

3.1.1 Inter-personal communications

3.1.2 Notetaking

3.1.3 Report writing"¹²

The evaluation of the recruits' performance consists of a narrative description of the performance including "... approach/safety, initial contact, action taken, communications, overall comments."¹³ The training officer and the recruit discuss the evaluation and both sign it.

During the academy field orientation, the permanent academy staff is assigned with recruits to the patrol operations. The reason for this is to assist the training officers in their evaluation of the recruits and to insure that the academy staff is kept abreast of contemporary police problems.

Upon the recruits' return to the academy, the staff reviews each recruit's performance. As needed, indi-

Crime in progress during field orientation.



visualized remedial training assignments are developed for recruits found to have deficiencies during the academy field orientation. To date, deficiencies have been found in radio procedures, map reading, arrest techniques, and report writing. However, after the completion of the remedial programs, the deficient recruits were ready to enter the regular field training program.

Individualized Recruit Training

Each recruit is provided with two workbooks that may be completed at a self-paced rate. Each workbook contains performance objectives that are to be completed in essay form. Many of these objectives have no specific right or wrong answer or deal with each agency's particular policies and procedures.

"Recruit Independent Study Workbook No. 1 consists of:

1. History of Law Enforcement
2. Law Enforcement Profession
3. Stress Factors
4. Department Orientation
5. Handgun
6. Use of Chemical Agents"¹⁴

"Recruit Independent Study Workbook No. 2 consists of:

1. Career Influences
2. Physical Disablers
3. Prevention of Disablers
4. Lifetime Fitness
5. Police/Community Relations
6. News Media Relations"¹⁵

Although the assignments are self-paced, the recruits are requested to complete at least one assignment per week.

Conclusion

The S.L.E.T.C. three-phase recruit training program is unique in that it is designed to develop recruit officers capable of performing critical tasks in a

safe, acceptable manner. The integration of academic theory and the reality of contemporary police problems will enable the recruit officer to be better equipped to perform duties required of peace officers in future years. **FBI**

Footnotes

¹ Allen Z. Gammage, *Police Training in the United States* (Charles C. Thomas, 1963), p. 5.

² John L. Sullivan, *Introduction to Police Science* (McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 226.

³ William J. Kinney and Duane H. Lowe, *Basic Cadet Training Sacramento Police and Sheriff's Departments*, p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵ Performance Objectives for the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training Basic Course, January 1977.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ "Management Guide for P.O.S.T. Basic Course" (Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Sacramento, Calif., January 1977), p. 5.

¹⁰ S.L.E.T.C. Academy Information, p. 1.

¹¹ S.L.E.T.C. Academy Expectations 9.3.

¹² S.L.E.T.C. Academy Field Orientation 78-1 (3/78).

¹³ Academy Field Orientation Performance Evaluation S.L.E.T.C. 78-3 (3/78).

¹⁴ S.L.E.T.C. Recruit Independent Study Workbook No. 1 77-24 (Rev. 8/78).

¹⁵ S.L.E.T.C. Recruit Independent Study Workbook No. 2 78/2 (8-78).

Investigation of a crime during field orientation.



Photographic Analysis of Bank Robbery Films

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The Bank Protection Act of 1968 prescribes certain minimum requirements for security procedures for financial institutions. Since this law was enacted, there has been an increase in the number of surveillance cameras installed in banks and a subsequent increase of surveillance films obtained during the course of bank robberies. The films are usually 35mm in 100-foot or 150-foot rolls. Although some limited success can be had with video tape, 35mm is definitely preferred. It is common to have 800 to 1,000 pictures of the bank robber, but less than a dozen that contain any useful information. These few can be important, though.

Initially, these films were used for facial identifications. However, numerous cases have occurred where the face was either covered with a mask or otherwise not visible. These are the films that challenge the photographic analyst. The technique of comparing the clothing depicted in a bank robbery surveillance film with the clothing in possession of an arrested suspect has proven very successful. Also, if the height of the bank robber can be calculated and matched with a suspect in possession of the clothing, the circumstantial evidence is increased.

It is not always readily apparent whether the clothing recovered is the clothing depicted in the surveillance film. The film is black and white, and the clothing is usually a variety of colors. The first step is to photograph the recovered clothing on a black and white panchromatic film that is similar to the surveillance film. The photographs of the recovered clothing are compared with those of the clothing in the bank robbery surveillance films to determine whether the same approximate gray tone renditions are present in both.

After the clothing has been examined for unusual patterns or defects, the bank robbery surveillance films are again reviewed to determine if these features are evident. The recovered clothing is modeled or positioned to simulate the views depicted in the bank robbery films. The comparisons are based on unique patterns or combina-

tions of patterns and/or defects in the clothing and are based on the same principles as those in document examination. It is the combination of photographic characteristics obtained from the collection of clothing that effects the identification, as well as a team effort by investigators, laboratory technical photographers, and examiners.

The left portion of figure 1 shows a jacket found in a get-away vehicle used in a bank robbery. The right portion is part of a mug shot photo in which the suspect was wearing the same jacket. The jacket is made of several different pieces of material cut and joined together in a random manner. The independent pieces are around the collar, the pocket, and along the zipper. These pieces and even the threading are easily comparable; the identification was effected by matching these comparable areas. Even though an article of clothing may be mass produced, discrepancies in pattern alignments may make the item unique enough for positive identification.




Figure 1.

Defects in Clothing

Defects in clothing are handled in the same manner. The clothing is examined for unique characteristics—paint stains, tears, frayed edges, holes, missing buttons or patches, and creases. The left portion of figure 2 shows a bank robber with a paint stain on the pocket of the left pant leg, a crease in the flap of the right shirt pocket, and two holes in the knit shirt that is pulled up over his face. These same characteristics are present in the recovered clothing depicted in figure 3 and the right side of figure 2. The side and back views of the same bank robber are depicted on the left in figures 4 and 5. A loose thread located on the right shoulder (figure 4) and a paint stain on the left pant leg (figure 5) were present in both the bank robbery film and the clothing recovered from the suspect.

Height Determination

Height determination can be used to eliminate suspects, to distinguish between bank robbers of different heights, and to aid in the identification of a single bank robber.

Two basic methods are used (a third method using single image photogrammetry is discussed separately). First, a photograph of the robber standing next to an object of known height, such as a table, chair, or counter, can be used to calculate the robber's height. The proportions of the known object can be projected to another object using a vanishing point if both are the same distance from the camera.

Given the distance of 53.5 inches from point A to point B (figure 6), the height of the bank robber can be determined by:

$$\frac{53.5 \text{ inches}}{\text{Measurement of A-B on photograph}} = \frac{\text{Height of bank robber}}{\text{Measurement of C-D on photograph}}$$

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| Measurement of A-B on photograph | = | Measurement of C-D on photograph |
|--|---|--|

The same technique is used to measure the height of the second bank robber (figure 7), given the height of the gate as 36 inches above the floor. It is noted that the robber's height is given with shoes, mask, and stretching over the gate. It is up to the jury, guided by the prosecutor, as to how much the shoes, mask, and stretching affect the total height.

The second method of determining the height of a bank robber is accomplished by positioning a height chart in the bank over a spot where the bank robber is depicted in the surveillance films. This technique is most successful when there is a pattern on the bank floor. The chart can be positioned exactly on the point where the robber was standing in the surveillance photograph. The chart is photographed using the same bank camera that exposed the original surveillance films. The photograph of the height chart is printed on a transparent material to the same scale as the photograph of the bank robber. The transparency is superimposed on the bank robber, and his height can be read directly from the transparent height chart.

Facial Comparisons

In surveillance films where the bank robber does not wear a mask and the face shows clearly in the photographs, comparisons can be made with known photographs of suspects. Again, a photographic transparency can be used. Photographs of the suspect are obtained as close as possible to the angle of view of the bank robber's photograph. A transparency can be made of the bank robber and superimposed on a photograph of the suspect. In effect, one photograph is used to make relative measurements on the other photograph. The size, shape, and symmetry of the eyes, eyebrows, nose, mouth, ears, creases, scars, marks, and head shape, as well as the interrelationship of these features, can be compared.



Figure 2.

Figure 3.






Figure 4.



Figure 5.

The facial comparison, by itself, results in a positive identification in only rare instances. However, in combination with the other techniques discussed, a very strong circumstantial identification is often the result.

Single Image Photogrammetry

The FBI Laboratory is capable of making measurements based on known heights of objects in the photograph. The only restriction is that the known objects must touch the floor and be vertical. This method may prove to be somewhat more convenient to the investigator, since measurements can be made at the time of the crime scene search and submitted to the Laboratory at the same time the photographs or film are submitted. Whenever possible, the original film should be submitted as this will produce the most accurate results.

This method uses known heights to compare graphically an unknown (such as the height of the subject) and arrive at a solution. Another method using known heights to establish a mathematical model from which other heights may be calculated is also possible.

Both methods rely on the availability of accurate, known heights, such as counters, standing ashtrays, desks, etc. These objects must be vertical and touching the floor. The mathematical model requires the vertical distance from the center of the lens of the bank surveillance camera to the floor, in addition to the other known heights.

Since these measurements are usually easily made, it is recommended that the investigator routinely submit measurements of the bank, which should at a minimum include counter height, height of camera lens above ground, and two or three other height measurements identifiable in the photograph. These measurements should be made to the nearest one-eighth of an inch.

The results of these methods will depend on the accuracy of the measurements made by the investigator in the field and on the accuracy of the reference points established in the

photograph. It is realized that some photographs will not adapt to this procedure and some estimating may be necessary where the background of the photograph does not lend itself to an accurate determination of the point where the subject's feet touch the floor or the top of the subject's head. In addition, the posture of the subject must be considered, as this will be reflected in the height measurement. Initial tests and practicable applications made in the Laboratory indicate that when these measurements are provided, accurate measurements and high-quality photograph heights can be determined within 1 inch.

Each time a film is analyzed, new variables are introduced. Lighting at the time of the robbery, film development, camera angles, lens focal lengths, shutter speeds, depth of field, and image size are a few of the variables that affect the end result. But techniques of forensic photographic analysis of bank robbery films are constantly expanding, and innovative approaches can be developed to meet each new situation.

FBI




Figure 6.




Figure 7.

Improvised Handcuff Key

The sheriff of Los Angeles County reports that some common safety razors issued to prisoners can be used to open standard handcuffs. (See photographs.)

Although the safety razor shown appears to be an innocuous three-piece instrument, figure 1 is in fact an easily manufactured unlocking device which will open standard model 90 Smith & Wesson handcuffs. The center piece (figure 1A), which is removed by unscrewing the handle, is bent until one of the edges breaks off. This piece (figure 1B) is then honed on cement or other abrasive material until the tip resembles a key.

Figure 2 shows an adjustable razor which can, without modification, open model 94 Smith & Wesson high-security handcuffs. This type of handcuff is used by many law enforcement agencies as "chain cuffs" for mass movement of prisoners.

The razor is disassembled by turning the handle counterclockwise until a retaining ring breaks, freeing the components as shown. The piece shown in figure 2B, which is constructed of metal or plastic, is nearly identical to a model 94 key and will open the handcuffs with ease. The component shown in figure 2A is similar to that of figure 1A and can be used in the same manner.

The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department has replaced all metal safety razors with plastic disposable razors.

Law enforcement personnel should be cognizant of the ease in which these razors can be used to manufacture unlocking devices for commonly used handcuffs. **FBI**




Figure 1.




Figure 2.

Invitation to the Station House

A Problem of Voluntariness

By DONALD J. McLAUGHLIN

Special Agent
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article should consult their legal adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law or are not permitted at all.

"Hello."

"Mr. Smith?"

"Yes, who is it?"

"Mr. Smith, this is Detective Sergeant Jones. I'm calling you about a burglary that occurred in your neighborhood a few nights ago. I'd like to ask you some questions. Are you free to talk to me this afternoon?"

"Sure, I'll tell you what I can."

"Well, then, why don't you come to my office at three o'clock today. I'm at the First Precinct, Second and Walnut Street. Or would you rather I came to your house?"

"No, your office is better. I get off work at two o'clock, and will come by on the way home."

"Fine, I'll see you at three."

At 3:15 p.m., while conversing with Detective Jones in his office, Mr. Smith makes a damaging statement that suddenly exposes him as the prime burglary suspect. Following the interview, at 3:30 p.m., Smith leaves the station house. Several weeks later, he is arrested and charged with burglary.

Before trial, Smith moves to suppress any incriminating statements made at the station house to Detective Jones on grounds that: (1) He was in custody at the time of his station house appearance; (2) he was not afforded a warning of rights prior to the questioning; and (3) in the absence of such warnings and a waiver of rights, any incriminating statement is inadmissible.

"A person is not arrested or seized under the fourth amendment if he is free to choose whether to enter or continue an encounter with police and elects to do so."

In response to the motion to suppress, the State argues that Smith's appearance at the police station was voluntary, the result of his willing acceptance of an invitation. Hence, there was no arrest, no custody, and no need to comply with procedural safeguards designed to protect those subjected to custodial interrogation.

The issue is an important one for police. Can officers invite an individual to the station house for an interview without opening the umbrella of constitutional protection afforded an accused in custody? The answer to this question will depend on whether the presence of the person invited or asked to the station house is voluntary.

The Test of Voluntariness

Traditionally, voluntariness has been defined in terms of free choice. Is the station house presence the result of an unconstrained and uncoerced decision by the suspect? A compelled appearance likely will be characterized an arrest, bringing into play the guarantees of the fourth amendment, and if no probable cause exists to justify the arrest, potential civil liability of the arresting officer.

As the hypothetical case described above suggests, the voluntariness of a person's appearance in the "coercive surroundings" of a station house is a constitutional problem usually raised in connection with defense efforts to suppress evidence in a criminal case. For example, the admissibility of confessions, physical evidence, and perhaps eyewitness identification testimony may turn on the status of the accused at the time the evidence was obtained. If a confessor is unlawfully detained at the time of his questioning, the confession may be fatally infected, notwithstanding compliance with the

preinterrogation requirements of *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). *Brown v. Illinois*, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Similarly, illegal custody may taint physical evidence derived from an otherwise lawful search, *United States v. Whitlock*, 418 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affirmed, 556 F. 2d 583 (6th Cir. 1977), or from an otherwise proper identification procedure, *United States v. Edmons*, 432 F. 2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970). Less frequently, the question of whether the accused appeared voluntarily at the police station, or was restrained against his will, becomes the critical issue in a civil action claiming false arrest or false imprisonment. See, e.g., *Dykes v. Camp*, 333 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mo. 1971).

In his treatise on the law of arrest, Professor Fisher has stated concisely the general rule on voluntary appearances:

"Consistent with the rule that in order to constitute an arrest there must be restraint of the person in the sense of seizure, actual or constructive, *one who willingly and voluntarily complies with the request of an officer to go to the police station is not under arrest.*" (Fisher, *Laws of Arrest* 56 (1967) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, an invitation or request to appear at a station house may be extended to an individual during the course of a police investigation. Acceptance of the invitation or acquiescence to the request does not make his presence in law enforcement space necessarily coerced, custodial, or involuntary. A recent Federal appellate decision illustrates the point.

A postmistress in a rural Florida town was robbed and shot to death. Federal officers and sheriff's deputies began an intensive investigation that uncovered one Glen Herman as a prime suspect. The next phase of investigation was aimed at locating Herman. His associates were identified and sought. One such associate, Thomas Brunson, was found at home by four Federal officers and a deputy sheriff.

The officers told Brunson they wanted to talk to him at headquarters. They advised him that they wanted him to come voluntarily, that he was not under arrest, and that they would bring him home after the interview. The officers also told his family where he was going and that he would be brought home later. The officers, though armed, did not brandish their weapons. They did not frisk, search, or handcuff Brunson and later testified they wanted to interview him at the headquarters because a crowd was milling about in the house and photographs of Herman were available at headquarters. The officers also testified that they would have interviewed Brunson at home, if he requested, and would have let him out of the car during the ride to headquarters, if he had asked. Brunson's testimony generally substantiated that the officers.

At headquarters, Brunson was given a warning of fifth and sixth amendment rights, more out of an "abundance of caution," as one officer observed, than because it was legally required. He signed a waiver of rights and made an incriminating admission. The officers thereafter formally arrested him and took his fingerprints. The prints later were matched to latent prints found at the post office.

Brunson moved to suppress the statement and the fingerprint evidence on grounds that they were taken from him during a period when he was under arrest without probable cause, in violation of the fourth amendment. He claimed the evidence was tainted by the illegal arrest. Brunson's motion was denied. The trial court held that his accompanying the officers to the station house was no arrest at all, much less an illegal one.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred. It was held that under the facts of the case, there was no "seizure" of Brunson's person, and hence no requirement that the fourth amendment standard of probable cause be imposed. The Federal court recognized what a majority of other courts have found to be the controlling principle: A person is not arrested or seized under the fourth amendment if he is free to choose whether to enter or continue an encounter with police and elects to do so. *United States v. Brunson*, 549 F. 2d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 1977).

Also see *United States v. Smith*, 574 F. 2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978) (voluntary appearance at airport Drug Enforcement Administration office at request of Federal agent not an arrest); *United States v. Lewis*, 556 F. 2d 446 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863 (1977) (interview noncustodial where suspect voluntarily presented himself at postal inspectors' office for questioning, even though the focus of investigation was primarily on suspect);

Starkey v. Wyrick, 555 F. 2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848 (1977) (rape suspect's voluntary appearance at police headquarters for purpose of being photographed was not custodial); *Barfield v. State of Alabama*, 552 F. 2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1977) (possible murder suspect who voluntarily came to police department at request of officer was not in custody); *Irwin v. Wolff*, 529 F. 2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1976) (following lawful investigative stop, defendant's voluntary ride with officers to police station did not constitute arrest); *United States v. Bailey*, 447 F. 2d 735 (5th Cir. 1971) (voluntary act of accompanying postal inspectors to main post office building did not constitute a de facto arrest); *United States v. Vita*, 294 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962) (confession made at FBI field office voluntary where suspect came to office voluntarily and stayed there of his own free will); *United States v. Barnes*, 443 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendant stopped for license check not under arrest while driving car to station house to confirm authorization to use vehicle); *United States v. Shelby*, 431 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Wis. 1977), affirmed in part and remanded, 573 F. 2d 971 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 58 L.Ed.2d 139 (1978) (confession voluntary and admissible when obtained from defendant who was invited to police station; circumstances were not coercive and custodial); *United States ex rel. de Rosa v. Superior Court of New Jersey*, 379 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.J. 1974) (subject who came freely to prosecutor's office on request and made incriminating statement was

not in custody); *United States v. Charles*, 371 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), affirmed, 490 F. 2d 1406 (2d Cir. 1974) (interrogation not custodial solely because conducted at law enforcement office); *Stiegler v. Anderson*, 360 F. Supp. 1286 (D.Del. 1973), affirmed, 496 F. 2d 793 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974) (interview of subject at police station noncustodial); *State v. Kelly*, 376 A.2d 840 (Me. 1977) (request that defendant come to police station did not result in "arrest" even though defendant believed he would be taken into custody if he did not accede to officer's request); *Cummings v. State*, 341 A.2d 294 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1975) (place of interrogation not conclusive factor in determining custody).

Some Contrary Views

The foregoing decisions suggest a generally consistent pattern in the courts' resolution of the station house appearance problem. However, there is a line of cases running contrary to the majority view. They are usually either distinguishable on their facts or involve an involuntary appearance at the station house. For example, in *Seals v. United States*, 325 F. 2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 964 (1964), a 19-year-old high school student was asked to come to the FBI field office "to talk further." He volunteered to go. Notwithstanding, the appellate court held that he was under arrest at the FBI office, where he was in the constant company of FBI Agents in a place difficult of access and exit and subjected to almost constant interrogation. These circumstances overcame the fact the defendant was advised he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Also see *United States v. Guana-Sanchez*, 484 F. 2d

"Acceptance of the invitation or accedence to the request does not make his presence in law enforcement space necessarily coerced, custodial, or involuntary."

590 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 420 U.S. 513 (1975) ("invitation" in the nature of an order to accompany officers to station resulted in arrest); *United States v. Jennings*, 468 F. 2d 111 (9th Cir. 1972) (street stop valid at inception becomes invalid where suspect, without consent, was taken to sheriff's office for purposes of fingerprinting and photographing); *United States v. Chamblis*, 425 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (action of narcotics agent in requesting detained suspect to accompany him to private office exceeded scope of lawful stop where there was neither consent nor probable cause to arrest).

The question which must be asked by the officer who considers inviting or requesting a person to come to the station house is the following: "What are the factors a court will use to determine if the presence is voluntary?" The answer can be found in the decisions involving station house appearances, as well as in the many cases defining voluntariness in the context of confessions and consent searches. See *Haynes v. Washington*, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (confession); *Schneekloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search); also see Kamisar, La Fave, and Israel, *Basic Criminal Procedure* 404, note g (1974) ("The question of whether a suspect 'consented' to go to the police station involves issues comparable to those which exist with respect to consent searches. . . ."); "Search by Consent," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 47, Nos. 3-5 (March-May 1979).

The Mathiason Decision

Language in some Supreme Court decisions lends weight to the argument that a voluntary station house appearance is simply no "seizure" within the terms of the fourth amendment. In *Davis v. Mississippi*, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), the problem concerned the seizure of fingerprints from a rape suspect detained at police headquarters without probable cause. The Court found the detention unlawful, yet noted that the State of Mississippi made no claim that Davis "voluntarily accompanied the police officers to headquarters . . . and willingly submitted to fingerprinting." *Id.* at 726. The implication, of course, is that given the proper circumstances, a voluntary appearance argument can be made successfully.

In *Morales v. New York*, 396 U.S. 102 (1969), a murder suspect confessed while being questioned at the police station. At issue was the lawfulness of Morales' detention at the station house on less than probable cause. The Court concluded that the record was not sufficiently complete to permit a satisfactory evaluation of the facts surrounding the detention and remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals. In doing so, the Court recognized that "the State may be able to show . . . that Morales' confrontation with the police was voluntarily undertaken by him. . . ." *Id.* at 105.

The Supreme Court most recently shed light on the custodial aspects of station house interrogation in *Oregon v. Mathiason*, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). In *Mathiason*, the suspect appeared at a State patrol office at the request of an officer to discuss a recent burglary.

The issue presented was whether, for *Miranda* purposes, the suspect was "in custody" at the time he appeared at the office for questioning, so as to trigger the need for warnings and waiver. The Court, in a *per curiam* opinion, held that no custody was imposed. In identifying the factors that negated a finding of custody, the Court said:

" . . . there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a ½-hour interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody 'or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' . . . Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect." *Id.* at 495.

What may be extracted from *Mathiason* are five factors of significance in deciding whether a suspect's presence at the station house is non-custodial, i.e., voluntary:

- 1) Suspect's free choice to come to station house;
- 2) No restriction on his freedom to depart, once there;
- 3) Advice to suspect that he is not under arrest or in custody;
- 4) Brief period of time at the station;
- 5) Suspect's actual departure after his appearance.

"... no single factor will be determinative of formal custody. . . a court will analyze the totality of surrounding circumstances . . .".

Other considerations that have surfaced in lower court decisions are:

- 6) Lack of physical contact, *United States v. Bailey*, *supra* at 737;
- 7) Absence of deception as to the purpose of the investigation, *id.* at 737-38;
- 8) Offer to return suspect to home after interview, *United States v. Brunson*, *supra* at 358;
- 9) No frisk, search, or handcuffing, *ibid.*;
- 10) Avoidance of transportation in law enforcement vehicle, *Starkey v. Wyrick*, *supra* at 1353;
- 11) Not keeping suspect in constant company of law enforcement officers, *Barfield v. State of Alabama*, *supra* at 1118;
- 12) Refraining from uninterrupted interrogation in an isolated place, *Seals v. United States*, *supra* at 1009.

Of the foregoing, no single factor will be determinative of formal custody. Rather, a court will analyze the totality of surrounding circumstances, following the approach approved by the Supreme Court in *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, *supra*. In doing so, it is likely to also consider such things as the age, physical and mental condition, education, and prior experience of the suspect or invitee.

Conclusion

An officer who contemplates extending a request or invitation to an individual for appearance at a police station can do so with confidence that his action will not necessarily result in an arrest. However, he should realize that the request or invitation will be subjected to careful scrutiny by the courts, and that, wherever possible, he should avoid any action that will impinge on the freedom of the invitee to depart. Courts are apt to be particularly sensitive to the 12 points noted above.

Equally important is the need to maintain an accurate account of what happened before and during the office appearance. Careful recording of the events and circumstances will enable the prosecution to retrieve the facts necessary to withstand successfully a claim that the appearance was involuntary.

Nothing in the preceding discussion should be construed as preventing an officer from making a warrantless formal arrest of a person who, during a voluntary appearance, makes incriminating statements that, when considered together with other evidence, satisfies the fourth amendment probable cause standard. See, e.g., *Barfield v. State of Alabama*, *supra*. Once custody has been imposed, the procedural safeguards required by *Miranda v. Arizona*, *supra*, must be afforded the accused.

In an early case alleging false imprisonment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the problem of a voluntary appearance and announced a principle which has withstood the test of time. It is as applicable today as it was when stated:


"If the officer, in the discharge of his duty, in good faith invited plaintiff to the police station for the purpose of interrogating him and investigating the charge, with a view of deciding upon future action, and without any intention at that time of putting plaintiff under arrest or restraint, no case was made by plaintiff. . . . From the testimony in the case the jury might well have found that plaintiff voluntarily accompanied the officer to the station and consented to be searched. Under such circumstances, there would be no arrest or false imprisonment." *Gunderson v. Struebing*, 104 N.W. 149, 150-51 (Wis. 1905).

FBI

WANTED BY THE FBI



Photograph taken 1975.



Photograph taken 1976.



Photograph taken 1977.

Lance Edward Fleming

Lance Edward Fleming, also known as Lance E. Fleming, John Edward Ross, Joseph B. Young, Joseph Bernard Young.

Wanted For:

Interstate flight—Murder.

The Crime

Fleming, who is reported to have a history of assaults on women, is being sought in connection with the shooting murder of an off-duty female police officer.

A Federal warrant was issued for his arrest on December 29, 1977, at Detroit, Mich.

Description

Age 30, born
September 13,
1949, Chicago, Ill.
Height 6'2" to 6'3".
Weight 170 to 175 pounds.
Build Slim.
Hair Black.
Eyes Brown.
Complexion Light.
Race Negro.
Nationality American.
Occupation Student.
Remarks Reportedly has a
metal plate in his
head and is
reported to
have received
psychiatric
treatment
in the past.
Social Security
Nos. Used 381-50-0746
386-44-8810.
FBI No. 646 233 L8.

Caution

Fleming is reported to be heavily armed and is considered very dangerous.

Notify the FBI

Any person having information which might assist in locating this fugitive is requested to notify immediately the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20535, or the Special Agent in Charge of the nearest FBI field office, the telephone number of which appears on the first page of most local directories.

Classification Data:

NCIC Classification:

13080304071209090316

Fingerprint Classification:

13 M 1 U III 7

M 1 U III



Right index fingerprint.

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Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

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Title _____

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City _____


State _____

Zip _____

BRASS KNUCKLE BUCKLE

During a recent investigation, the Sioux City, Iowa, Police Department confiscated a unique belt buckle from a juvenile. (See photograph.) The imprint at the bottom of the buckle reads, "For nostalgic purpose only, soft metal, use only as a buckle, not intended for other use."

Law enforcement officers should note the buckle is made of extremely hard metal and thus may be used as a dangerous weapon.



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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

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Interesting Pattern

This pattern at first glance appears to be a central pocket loop-type whorl. However, a closer examination reveals two separate loop formations. Therefore, the pattern is classified as a double loop-type whorl with an outer tracing.

