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Art Director

Brian K. Parnell

Assistant Art Director

Denise K. Bennett

Staff Assistant

Linda W. Szumilo

Internet Address

leb@fbiacademy.edu

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FBI Law Enforcement

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Law Enforcement and the Millennialist Vision

A Behavioral Approach

By CARL J. JENSEN III, M.A., and YVONNE HSIEH



Law enforcement professionals face more challenges today than ever before. Not since the advent of modern policing have agencies sought so arduously to examine and refine their missions, goals, and strategies to deal with increasingly ill-defined purposes. To make matters more difficult, this examination comes during a time of decreasing budgets, increasing legal and media scrutiny, and often-uncertain public relations.


The millennialist, apocalyptic view of the world, which many groups and individuals hold, likely

will become an area of increasing concern to law enforcement, especially as the year 2000 approaches. By examining the behavioral dynamics occurring in groups that adhere to millennialist philosophies, law enforcement agencies can identify potential dangers in order to appropriately respond to and interact with these groups.

MILLENNIALISM

Generally, millennialism refers to any movement that anticipates the "total transformation and purification of society."¹ In Western society, the most well-known religious

version of millennialism occurs in the biblical account of the apocalypse as recorded in the Book of Revelation, where John, who had been exiled to the island of Patmos, relates a vision in which the Messiah returns to engage in a battle with Satan.² While numerous interpretations of the events portrayed in the Book of Revelation exist, one of the most popular Christian interpretations maintains that following numerous tribulations and battles, God vanquishes Satan, and the "chosen people" come to dwell with the Messiah for 1,000 years of bliss (e.g., the millennium).



Special Agent Jensen serves in the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy.



Ms. Hsieh served as an honors intern in the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy.

Millennialism, however, does not belong exclusively to Christianity. Many other religions, secular groups, and societies have their own versions of apocalyptic battles in which the forces of good triumph over evil following a cataclysmic and often-supernatural period of battle.³

While the Bible does not provide a date for the apocalypse, many groups⁴ and individuals have concluded that they are currently living in the “end times.” To some individuals, the year 2000, with its numerical symmetry and obvious millennial correlation, represents the date of the great battle between good and evil. Many others do not adhere to a specific belief involving supernatural battles, but they fear that a general state of chaos may result. These beliefs and perceptions may cause greater involvement between law enforcement agencies and those groups that adhere to a millennial or apocalyptic philosophy. Due to the dynamics and beliefs of several groups, more

episodes involving suicides may occur by those who believe they follow God’s will. Perhaps on a more sinister note, police officers may find themselves the targets of apocalyptic groups that feel justified in violently resisting legitimate acts by law enforcement agencies.

Millennialism and Extremist Groups

For law enforcement purposes, extremism relates to groups and individuals engaged in criminal activity for the purpose of advancing or attempting to advance a political, religious, or social agenda. Unfortunately, many individuals unfamiliar with the distinction use the terms “extremist group” and “militia” interchangeably. For example, in the wake of the Oklahoma City tragedy, some members of the media portrayed militia group members as wild-eyed, violent, and uneducated. This caricature seriously misstates the reality that many militia group members represent intelligent, law-abiding

citizens who care deeply about their country but may question political and constitutional issues. Indeed, many militias condemned the Oklahoma City bombing.⁵ However, some militia, paramilitary, and extremist groups, as well as unaffiliated individuals, will engage in criminal activity to support their religious, social, and political philosophies.

For many individuals and groups, apocalyptic themes play a central role in their belief systems. According to some, the government⁶ has aligned itself with evil forces. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, then-President George Bush began making statements in which he used the phrase “New World Order.” For example, in a speech before the Council of Christian Broadcasters, he talked about “a moral and just war to defeat the tyranny of Saddam—a madman who threatens the burgeoning New World Order....”⁷ Most individuals who heard these words believed that President Bush was talking about an international community united by a sense of justice and the rule of law. Others, however, have cited those statements as proof that the U.S. government is involved with international forces in a plot to replace democracy in America with a tyrannical, Communist-like dictatorship.⁸ Others suggest that foreign troops have arrived clandestinely in the United States to await orders to round up any Americans who oppose this presumed New World Order. Some individuals allege that gun control legislation represents a ploy to assemble lists of gun owners in order

to arrest them and transport them to concentration camps, which supposedly are secretly under construction by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Still others have gone so far as to assert that the tragedies at Ruby Ridge and Waco served as dry runs for future government actions by New World Order storm troopers.⁹

THE APOCALYPTIC MODEL

Whether based on a religious or secular model, apocalyptic belief systems contain certain universal characteristics.¹⁰ At the core of each, a fundamental struggle exists between good and evil. In Christianity, this struggle occurs between God and Satan. For many extremists, the evil forces of the New World Order constantly struggle with those patriotic Americans who believe that the democratic principles of this country have almost disappeared. This perspective contains little gray area: those defined as evil remain unremittably sinister, while those defined as good stay unerringly righteous and pure.

To this end, even those apocalyptic belief systems that are primarily secular often contain religious or supernatural rhetoric and ideas. For example, many who deplore the New World Order make liberal use of religious imagery: those parts of the U.S. Constitution with which they agree are “sacred” and “holy,” while those that run counter to their beliefs (e.g., the 14th Amendment, which granted citizenship to former slaves) are cast in demonic terms.

The battle between the forces of good and evil generally represents the final chapter in an ongoing

struggle. For example, the conflict between God and Satan began in the Book of Genesis, while many who believe in the New World Order trace the roots of this grand conspiracy to the Knights Templars and the Crusades.¹¹

Another common apocalyptic theme concerns the grand and horrific nature of the final battle between good and evil. Some predict that many individuals will perish on both sides of the conflict. In certain Christian denominations, the chosen ones will proceed to heaven and

**“
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”**

miss the battle, while those not chosen will suffer horrible plagues and consequences on earth. Other religious and secular groups believe they will participate in the struggle and play a pivotal role in allowing good to triumph. For example, these groups purport that loyal patriots who have managed to save their weapons from confiscation will defeat the forces of the New World Order.¹²

The final component of the apocalyptic vision includes the contention that in the end, good triumphs over evil. In addition, those who have persevered in the fight

against evil will be rewarded with either everlasting life in heaven or the defeat of tyranny and the fulfillment of heaven on earth.

The Apocalyptic Timetable

In addition to articulating the alleged plan for the takeover of America, religious and secular spokespersons routinely provide timetables for its implementation. In many cases, the year 2000 represents the date when the apocalypse purportedly will begin. This date has significance for a variety of individuals. Those who follow the New World Order theory believe that 2000 represents the year for the takeover of America. For others, the year 2000 has great religious significance, and those with no particular political or religious agenda believe that the turn of the century will usher in a period of unprecedented floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters.

Certain existing conditions may appear to validate these beliefs. For example, government and private sector computer experts have acknowledged that in the year 2000, many computers will be unable to distinguish the year 2000 from the year 1900. Dubbed the Y2K Problem, it may cause widespread computer software failures. To some individuals, this problem signals impending societal discord and chaos and appears to complement and reinforce the predicted apocalyptic nightmare scenario.

AN EXTREMIST VIEW OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

For some extremists, political and religious symbolism often meld

together to create a dictatorial, anti-Christian future vision of America. To those who fear such a future, the solution appears obvious—righteous, courageous Americans who believe in a free America must obtain arms for its immediate defense. Subsequently, such individuals must consider against whom they must defend the country. They consider federal law enforcement officers, especially those who have primary jurisdiction over firearm and terrorism matters (e.g., the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the FBI) the enemies. Increasingly, however, state and local officers who contact citizens on a more routine basis have become victims of violent acts. In a recent, well-publicized example, an individual with alleged links to a white supremacist organization fired upon Ohio officers during a traffic stop. A review of the incident indicated that the individual who fired the shots possibly prepared himself for the confrontation by donning body armor and assembling available weapons while troopers questioned his brother.

Psychological Issues

The examination of domestic extremist groups reveals three social-psychological components that appear to interact to produce an effect known as the Lethal Triad.¹³ In particular, extremist groups physically and psychologically isolate their members from mainstream society. This isolation causes a reduction of critical thinking on the part of group members, who become more entrenched in the belief proposed by the group leadership. As a

result, group members relinquish all responsibility for group decision making to their leader and blame the cause of all group grievances on some outside entity or force, a process known as projection. Finally, isolation and projection combine to produce pathological anger, the final component of the triad.¹⁴

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Millennialism intersects with each component in different ways. In terms of isolation, some groups continually send apocalyptic images and messages to group members, who internalize their content and compare the messages to known reality or past learning. For many schooled in Christian thought, the apocalypse is not new. When a message of government malfeasance combines with a familiar belief, such as that of the apocalypse, the entire message may gain credibility. For example, accepting the notion of foreign troops on American soil might prove difficult, but if explained in the context of a belief that already has gained credibility (e.g., the coming apocalypse with its authoritative, biblical precedent), the entire concept may become plausible. Additionally,

scenarios such as the Y2K glitch serve to enhance the believability of an apocalyptic scenario in the minds of those already predisposed to this belief.

Group members' anger grows as they project blame onto outside sources. As a perceived threat becomes imminent, anger will grow accordingly. As the year 2000 approaches, the threat of the New World Order becomes more real and imminent to those who believe in its existence. According to the third component of the Lethal Triad, anger will grow, as will the potential for future violent acts. Many law enforcement professionals have reported a general increase in extremist group activities within their jurisdictions in the past few years.¹⁵ The question remains, however, whether this purported increase in criminality will achieve statistical significance and continue to increase as the year 2000 approaches.

Perhaps of equal importance to law enforcement, many potentially dangerous groups have indicated that they will not take offensive action against the government but will act only in a “defensive posture.” Unfortunately, the activities that will justify this defensive, or, more properly, reactive posture remain unclear. While major actions involving groups (e.g., mass arrests) may provoke a response, no one knows what may happen in other activities. Even the extremist groups do not appear sure of their responses. In light of the lethal triad methodology, the threshold for invoking a reactive posture may decrease as the year 2000 approaches.

That is, extremist group members may view standard police activity, such as stopping motorists for minor traffic infractions or serving misdemeanor warrants, as offensive measures and may respond with increasing violence. While definitive statistics do not exist to confirm or disprove this prediction, the Ohio traffic stop incident should serve as a warning—well-rehearsed and well-prepared adversaries may appear with greater frequency as the year 2000 approaches.

LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Some individuals in the militia movement view law enforcement as the enemy. Perhaps the worst course of action for law enforcement to take when dealing with these individuals is to engage in activity that validates their apocalyptic fears. Many critics have noted, for example, that the federal actions at both Waco and Ruby Ridge reinforced the belief of many individuals that their views concerning an impending tyrannical New World Order were correct. Subsequent to these incidents, the FBI developed and employed new techniques that included low-key negotiations coupled with a reduction in visible signs of a paramilitary and special weapons and tactics team presence. These techniques showed great success during the Freeman standoff in Montana in 1996. In addition, the peaceful resolution of this standoff likely had great symbolic significance to those who view the government as the enemy—in contrast to their presumption that the federal

government would use a heavy-handed approach to resolve the situation, the low-key, patient strategy employed deflated this perception. Indeed, many militia leaders praised the actions of the federal government in the Freeman affair.

Accordingly, state and local law enforcement should take steps to reduce the level of fear and distrust that may exist between their organizations and extremist groups operating in their jurisdictions. For example, after determining safety issues, police and sheriffs' department officials should consider contacting known militia group members in their areas. Such contacts should remain friendly and low-key in order to diffuse tensions and reduce misunderstandings between the police and group members.¹⁶ These contacts have proven very effective. In some cases, members of militia groups have assisted law enforcement agencies in preventing violent acts. Prior law enforcement familiarity with some extremist

groups has allowed for the peaceful resolution of potentially volatile arrest situations.¹⁷ At the same time, agencies should not attempt to gain or confirm intelligence information through these contacts or volunteer sensitive information to militia representatives.

Law enforcement agencies should remain aware of any potential threats to their personnel and stay abreast of any trends involving extremist group activities. For example, individuals driving in vehicles without license plates or with plates not issued by a legitimate licensing authority may be members of an organization that does not recognize the authority of a state or local policing agency. Lack of a valid vehicle registration or driver's license may offer further confirmation that the individual belongs to such a group.¹⁸

In addition to federal, state, and local law enforcement sources, many civilian and academic organizations track trends of

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extremist groups. These sources of information may prove extremely valuable to law enforcement officials, and using them on a regular basis as permitted under the law may, in fact, lead to better communication with extremist group members, ultimately aiding in avoiding deadly confrontations.

Finally, departments should continue to emphasize basic officer and street survival techniques on a regular basis. By combining threat analysis with specific methods of dealing with potentially lethal situations, law enforcement managers can help their officers reduce complacency and carelessness in performing everyday, repetitive tasks.¹⁹

CONCLUSION

As the year 2000 approaches, law enforcement agencies may face additional challenges from individuals and groups for whom the millennium holds great spiritual and symbolic significance. The Lethal Triad concept offers a concise explanatory model to understand the behavioral dynamics that underlie a belief involving millennial and apocalyptic themes. This approach can help explain how and why apocalyptic groups pose a challenge to law enforcement personnel.

As with most challenges facing police officers, knowledge of potential threats, good relationships with all members of the community, and an emphasis on basic street survival and officer safety hold the greatest potential for averting tragedy while providing the highest level of citizen protection and police services. While no one can predict the future, with forethought

and planning, law enforcement can fulfill its mission no matter what the new millennium holds. ♦

Endnotes

¹ Michael Barkun, "End Time Jitters: An Interview with an Expert in Millennialism," *Klanwatch Quarterly Intelligence Report* (Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, summer 1997), 16.

² Philip Lamy, *Millennium Rage* (New York: Plenum Press, 1996), 81-84.

³ Ibid.



⁴ For purposes of this article, the authors intentionally remain very general and will, for the most part, refrain from citing examples involving specific groups to promote a general understanding of millennialist philosophies while protecting the privacy and religious freedom of the subjects.

⁵ James E. Duffy and Alan C. Brantley, "Militias: Initiating Contact," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, July 1997, 22-26.

⁶ Historically, the government has meant the federal government. Increasingly, however, this term includes state and local governments, as well as institutions that many regard as extensions of local government, such as schools and clinics.

⁷ John Yemma, "Bush Addresses Christian Broadcasters," and John Yoder, "In Search of the 'Just War,'" *Boston Globe*, January 27, 1991.

⁸ Jonathan Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms: The Rise of America's New Militias* (New York: HarperPaperbacks, 1995), 76-78.

⁹ Supra note 2; John George and Laird Wilcox, *American Extremists* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996) and Jonathan Karl supra note 7.

¹⁰ For a comprehensive description of both millennialist beliefs and possible implications of those beliefs at the individual and societal level, see Lamy (supra note 2), 81-84.

¹¹ The Knights Templars were one of the earliest founders of military orders. Some individuals believe the Knights Templars left England for the Middle East and found gold, which they brought to England and have used to finance this ongoing conspiracy.

¹² Supra note 2.

¹³ Kevin M. Gilmartin, "The Lethal Triad: Understanding the Nature of Isolated Extremist Groups," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, September 1996, 1-5.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Mark Pitcavage's *Flashpoint America: Surviving a Traffic Stop Confrontation with an Antigovernment Extremist* (Militia Watchdog Website on the Internet: <http://www.militia-watchdog.org/trafstop.htm>) offers a general discussion of the increasing incidents of traffic stop confrontations involving law enforcement personnel and antigovernment extremist group members.

¹⁶ Supra note 5; See also James McNamara, "Community Policing and Militia Groups," unpublished paper prepared for the 190th session of the FBI National Academy (copies available from the author), for a discussion of this; and James E. Duffy and Alan C. Brantley, "Militias: Initiating Contact," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, July 1997, 22-26, which contains a typology to determine the dangerousness of militia groups. For a more general typology that examines the dangerousness of all types of groups, see Anthony J. Pinizzotto, "Deviant Social Groups," *Law and Order*, October 1996, 75-80.

¹⁷ Supra note 5 and see McNamara (supra note 16).

¹⁸ For strategies to employ in recognizing and confronting an extremist during a traffic stop, see Pitcavage (supra note 15).

¹⁹ Anthony Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller III, *In the Line of Fire: A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, FBI, and the National Institute of Justice, 1997).

Focus on Community Policing

Police Liaison for Schools

By Martin J. Dunn



In the mid-1980s, the citizens of the United States encountered a challenge never before experienced in such magnitude—drug abuse. Causing widespread damage from one border to another, this modern-day plague pushed America's social and government agencies to their limits. It also forced law enforcement agencies to reestablish priorities to address the new threat placed on public safety.

By 1987, a major influx of crack cocaine had forced the nation into a war against drugs. In fact, by 1990, drugs had successfully infiltrated many previously drug-free areas. The nation's schools, for example, have been plagued with drugs for the past several years. Local news agencies regularly report on drug-related acts of violence committed by youths in the community. Headlines such as "5th Grader Arrested on Cocaine Charges," "8th Grader Held in Knife Attack," and "Three Students Accused in School Gun Incident" have become common in nearly all communities—so common, in fact, that they rarely draw much attention. Some residents simply accept the stories as additional examples of a generation on the decline, and government reports that corroborate the connection echo their sentiments and predict a discouraging future for today's youth.¹

Hoping to change this dim forecast and because children spend a majority of their day in school, educators have joined the fight against drugs and violence. Unfortunately, they may not have the experience necessary to accomplish this task without the help of others. Realizing this, school administrators in Lower Camden County, New Jersey, have taken a proactive approach and joined forces with local law enforcement to combat their district's drug and violence problems.

The Lower Camden County Experience

The Lower Camden County Regional High School District (LCCD) employs approximately 700 employees and has 5,100 students in the 7th through 12th grades who live in 7 municipalities in Camden County, New Jersey. This school district consists of two junior high schools, two senior high schools, and a special-needs school.

Like many areas throughout the United States, Camden County experienced an increase in violent activity during the mid-1980s that has continued into the 1990s. As violence has increased in the community, it also has increased in the schools, including those in the LCCD. Incidents of drug use, fights, and assaults have increased, forcing school officials to spend more time addressing public safety issues than educating.

In 1993, the school district hired a security consulting firm for an on-site study of its five schools. After the firm reported its findings and recommendations, the district formed a committee—which included parents, law enforcement officials, and other members of the community—to further examine the findings.

The consulting firm recommended creating a security department and assigning a police officer to each of the high schools. In 1994, the committee endorsed this idea and implemented a pilot program at one junior high school and one senior high school. The LCCD hired sworn police officers from local municipalities and reimbursed the police department for the officers' salaries and associated expenses.

The students and staff of both schools welcomed the officers, and after 4 months, the district expanded the pilot program by creating a Department of Security staffed with five commissioned police officers,

including a director. The officers have full police powers, including authorization to carry firearms. The LCCD leases three of the officers from municipal police departments for the 10 months that school is in session and employs the other two officers.

The officers serve as the primary enforcement agents. When criminal activity takes place on school grounds, the police officers coordinate the response and follow-up investigation. Usually, officers arrive while the incident is in progress, which allows them to identify the perpetrator and take immediate action. Because officers are considered members of the school community, staff members and students cooperate with them when they conduct investigations.

The police officers perform a wide range of duties as community policing representatives. They remain proactive in crime prevention and drug education programs, and they serve as police liaison officers for the schools. In this way, they bridge the gap that often exists between schools and local law enforcement.

In addition, all four high schools in the LCCD have implemented a peer mediation program to address disputes among students. Individuals are referred to this program by either faculty, staff, police officers, or other students. The police officers and other school staff members coordinate this program, but student volunteers carry out the actual administration. These programs have successfully redirected many students' violent tendencies.

The district recently took advantage of federal funds by sending the two officers assigned to the junior high schools for training to earn certification as Gang Resistance Education and Training instructors. This crime prevention curriculum places a police officer in the classroom 1 day a week for 9 weeks to teach and interact with students about issues of violence and conflict resolution.

Results

Although it is too soon to report statistical findings in most areas, LCCD has experienced many positive developments. The police department in the

municipality that sends the greatest number of students to LCCD schools has reported a 10 percent reduction in juvenile crime since the program's inception. LCCD school principals have reported fewer incidents of fighting among students, and drug-related problems occurring in these schools also have dropped significantly.

Parents ultimately supported the program because it reduced or eliminated their former perceptions of dangerous problems common throughout the schools.

The police favor the program because they no longer dispatch officers to the schools to handle incidents, which allows them to refocus their attention to the rest on the community.

Conclusion

The active role the LCCD has taken in combating its drug and violence problems has paid off with impressive results. LCCD administrators have made a commitment to keep their schools safe in order for all students to

reach their learning potential in an environment that leaves teachers free to help accomplish this goal.

Police administrators must realize that their departments must play a significant part in the school community, providing drug education and crime prevention training on a regular basis. This allows officers to reach out to school children in an effort to teach them crucial information on the prevention of crime and the dangers of drugs that they may not get at home. By practicing this form of community policing, departments not only will help the educational process for students but also will make the community safer for all residents. ♦

Endnote

¹ See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, *Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan Report* (Washington, DC, March 1996); available from <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/jjplanfr.txt>, accessed January 7, 1999.

Chief Dunn serves as director of security for the Lower Camden County Regional High School District in Atco, New Jersey.

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School Violence

Lessons Learned

By STEPHEN R. BAND, Ph.D.,
and JOSEPH A. HARPOLD, M.S.

In Pearl, Mississippi, a 16-year-old boy allegedly killed his mother, then went to his high school and shot 9 students, 2 fatally. Three students were killed and 5 others were wounded in a high school in West Paducah, Kentucky; a 14-year-old student pleaded guilty. During a false fire alarm at a middle school in Jonesboro, Arkansas, 4 girls and a teacher were shot to death and 10 individuals were wounded when 2 boys, 11 and 13 years old, allegedly opened fire from the woods. A science teacher was shot to death in front of students at an 8th-grade dance in Edinboro, Pennsylvania; a 14-year-old awaits trial. Two teenagers were killed and more than 20 individuals were hurt when a 15-year-old boy allegedly opened fire at a high school in Springfield, Oregon. The deadliest incident of school violence recently occurred at a high school in Littleton, Colorado, when 2 young male students went on a killing spree and then committed suicide.¹

These and other incidents of school violence have shocked Americans and created an

atmosphere of fear and disbelief in many U.S. communities. How can youngsters commit such vicious attacks? Why are they occurring? What can be done to stop them? As the first responders to these tragic incidents, the law enforcement agencies directly involved face many difficult challenges and previously unthinkable situations. What lessons can the law enforcement

community learn from these wanton acts of violence?²

First and foremost, all aspects of a community need to work together. School violence is not the sole responsibility of the school system. Law enforcement, local government, civic groups, corporate entities, schools, and parents must form a partnership to combat these violent acts. Schools must




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prepare for these attacks. Law enforcement must develop response plans for handling such incidents. And, communities must work with both to prevent such tragedies from occurring.

PREINCIDENT PREPARATION

Memorandums of Understanding

Representatives from law enforcement, the schools, and the community should come together to sign memorandums of understanding (MOUs) that clearly define what each organization or agency will do from the beginning of the crisis to the end. MOUs should state what resources each participant will provide and identify the command structure (i.e., who will take charge and who will act as support). Also, MOUs should require ongoing liaison among all of the participants to enhance

communication and maintain readiness.

Most important, MOUs should assign specific tasks—such as processing the crime scene, conducting interviews, coordinating media coverage, administering victim/witness services, and handling other support systems—and encourage agencies to appoint the best employees to those tasks. Then, the participants should train together so that each individual involved will know exactly what to do and who is in charge. During a crisis, no time exists to address these issues.

MOUs and Law Enforcement

Because some of these tragic events have required officers to secure large areas for crime scene processing, MOUs should ensure that law enforcement agencies consider the need for adequate human resources and technical support. For example, in some of the school shootings, officers had to interview

up to 300 eyewitnesses immediately. Additionally, a considerable amount of computer support became necessary. Such major investigations often result in large databases that require the on-scene capability of data entry and management. Finally, MOUs should specify that all investigators receive annual training in how to handle juvenile criminals, especially young mass or spree murderers.

MOUs and Schools

Before any planning or training can occur, a good working relationship must exist between schools and police. To this end, school districts should establish a crisis response team made up of decision makers who can develop preincident plans and sign MOUs. The team should include the leadership of the school, such as the chief of the school's security force, as well as facilities engineers and architects, medical personnel, and legal representatives, if such exist. The school's media spokesperson also should participate.

Once they have developed preincident plans, schools must train with the other participants to learn their roles in crisis situations, including evacuation, and to understand the importance of their contributions, especially to the law enforcement agencies involved. Moreover, the police should educate teachers and school officials about problems in their communities that could influence students, such as gangs, drugs, and violence.

MOUs and the Media

MOUs must state clearly who will handle the media. This proves



Special Agent Band is the chief of the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy.



Special Agent Harpold is an instructor in the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy.

paramount because, in some instances, the media may arrive at the scene before the police. MOUs should state who will issue press releases and how often that will occur. Personnel assigned to handle the media must provide written, accurate updates to the press. These individuals also must know who is responsible for investigating rumors. Because rumors constitute a major problem in a crisis, quickly dispelling as many as possible should become a priority for investigators. MOUs also should encourage law enforcement and schools to include media representatives in the preincident planning and training process.

Critical Incident Response

Once law enforcement agencies have created partnerships with their schools and communities and have MOUs in place, they must develop a critical incident response plan. To effectively manage an incident of school violence, agencies should initiate a formal plan that clearly defines logistical considerations, communication needs, and victim/witness processing requirements.

Logistical Considerations

Agencies should create an emergency response crime scene team comprised of experienced investigators. They should designate a remote command post, away from the media and the crime scene. For press conferences, they should select a facility, such as a National Guard armory, away from the command post and the crime scene to keep both of these locations secure from the media and onlookers.

Communication Needs

Agencies should prearrange mobile radio communications for their officers and dedicate a telephone line that they can publicize to help gather information. Agencies also should train and assign to any incident of school violence full-time media or public information officers.

Initially, agencies should hold periodic briefings at prearranged times for the major participants of the investigation. As the investigation progresses, they should hold briefings as necessary. To combat rumors, agencies should establish a control center and assign officers to investigate rumors and dispel them as quickly as possible.

“Before any planning or training can occur, a good working relationship must exist between schools and police.”

Victim/Witness

Processing Requirements

Agencies should designate a large facility to accommodate victim/witness services. During a crisis, agencies should ensure that the facility remains secure from the media and onlookers. However, at the same time, they must publicize its existence so victims and witnesses will know where to go for

help. The facility should have contact information for various victim/witness resources, such as the National Organization for Victim Assistance³ and other local or outside sources, that agency personnel may access quickly.

POSTINCIDENT DEBRIEFING

Law enforcement agencies must remember that their officers have the same concerns as other parents when it comes to their children's safety. Before assigning them duties, commanders should allow officers to talk to their spouses and ensure that their children are safe.

Agencies must plan beyond the incident, ensuring the availability of follow-up counseling for personnel and their families, as well as others in the community. Agencies should make employee assistance and mental health professionals available for critical incident defusing and debriefing of law enforcement and other emergency response personnel as quickly as possible. Moreover, service providers themselves may need help in order to assist others. For example, in each of the six school shootings the FBI studied, the National Organization for Victim Assistance's Crisis Response Team arrived within 24 hours of the incident. All of the jurisdictions praised the team for helping the local emergency responders help others in their communities.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Law enforcement agencies, schools, and communities can

employ preventive measures that may help identify potential at-risk students and defuse violent confrontations. Anonymous reporting programs, school resource officers, zero-tolerance policies, educational programs, effective liaison, and legislative and social reforms constitute some of the ways communities can safeguard their children.

Implement Anonymous Reporting Programs

In all but one of the six school shootings, the suspects “leaked” their intentions to other students, but the police did not receive this information. At the time of the shootings, none of these schools had a Scholastic Crime Stoppers Program or an anonymous tip line or comment box in place. A tip line or similar program would facilitate the flow of anonymous information from the students to the police and would constitute a definitive preventive effort. To ensure effectiveness, school officials should monitor this tip line or comment box 24 hours a day or at least access it before the school day begins. A good working relationship must exist between school authorities and the police to ensure that the police receive the information in a timely way. If the targeted schools had had an anonymous tip program, the police probably could have caught several of the shooters as they entered their schools.

Employ School Resource Officers

In conjunction with a tip program, schools should consider school resource officers (i.e.,

officers permanently assigned to the school by the police department). These officers can provide positive information quickly, weed out rumors, and develop intelligence regarding potential or planned acts of violence. Besides school resource officers and other officers with school duties, patrol officers should adopt schools in their assigned areas and, whenever possible, have lunch at the school. This gives students an opportunity to develop trust and to talk to police officers in a neutral, nonthreatening atmosphere.

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Develop a Zero-Tolerance Policy

Schools should establish a zero-tolerance policy for students who make threats. Such a policy might include expulsion or suspension of students who threaten to kill or assault others and, if appropriate, quickly provide psychological evaluation or intervention for these students. When adults take threats seriously, students will realize that violence is not a condoned resolution to conflict.

Educate Teachers and Parents

The police should train teachers, school counselors, and parents to recognize students at risk of committing violence. While society can prevent or minimize violence, it rarely, if ever, can predict it because of the numerous human variables involved. Therefore, teachers and parents must look for “leakage” in student behavior that may signal the potential for violence. One behavior leakage that was present in all but one of the shootings involved the stated or implied desire to commit a violent act or suicide.

Other general warning signs or personal background indicators include:

- a history of violence;
- a close family member who has committed a violent act;
- a history of alcohol or drug abuse;
- a precipitating event, such as a failed romance or the perception of a failed romance, which was the case in several of the school shootings;
- the availability of a weapon or the means to commit violence;
- a recent attempt to commit suicide or an act of violence, as was the case in several of the school shootings;
- a lack of coping skills or strategies to handle personal life crises with no controls to prevent anger or positive ways to release it; and
- no apparent emotional support system.

When teachers, school counselors, or parents see a problem, they should notify school security personnel and the police. Police should meet with parents and teachers to encourage them to seek counseling for youths who exhibit symptoms indicating a need for intervention. However, because many incidents and changes in life can cause changes in student behavior, it becomes difficult to know what is normal student behavior and what constitutes grounds for concern and possible intervention.

One method for discovering potentially violent students involves having students write about their lives as a window into their thoughts. This would have helped in some of the school shootings if the teachers had had the essays and then been able to interpret their content and style. For example, one of the shooters' work was influenced heavily by the 19th-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who is best known for having proclaimed the death of God and for calling himself an "immoralist," one who opposes all morality.⁴ Another suspect's writing was inspired by the musician Marilyn Manson who reportedly based his song "Antichrist Superstar" on Nietzsche's book *The Antichrist*, a critique of Pauline Christianity.⁵ While these influences and writing styles may not uncover a potential school shooter, they do represent signs that educators and parents should take seriously and explore further.

Maintain Communication

No easy solutions exist for curbing violent behavior. No one group can accept the blame for the

increasingly violent actions of students. For example, research has shown that violence depicted in the media has a small impact on a large number of children and a large impact on a small number of children.⁶ Therefore, as a way of identifying the small number of children greatly impacted by violence in the media, uniformed officers should visit schools as often as possible to

establish rapport with students, teachers, and staff. Liaison, trust, training, and intelligence must exist for prevention programs to succeed.

Moreover, communities must send positive messages to all of their children that they are valuable and important to the community. Parents and other concerned adults must find ways to sincerely praise children, positively recognize their

Violence Indicators

Several factors exist that may indicate that individuals have the potential to commit violence. While these indicators are by no means certain or present in every case of violence, children who exhibit these symptoms should receive counseling services in an effort to prevent the potential of future violent acts.

- The individuals demonstrate low self-esteem.
- The individuals have committed previous acts of cruelty to animals. This is a symptom of child abuse, along with setting fires, bed-wetting (beyond a normal age), and being abusive to adults. FBI research has found that these indicators frequently appear in the childhoods of serial violent sexual offenders and may exist in cases of juvenile violence.
- The individuals are fascinated with firearms. In the six cases of school violence, the offenders used firearms, which they allegedly obtained without parental or guardian consent or stole outright.
- The individuals' mothers or other family members disrespect them. This creates a feeling of powerlessness when coupled with chronic abuse and can initiate the need to exert power over and control another. It also can result in extreme anger.
- The individuals see violence as the only alternative left for them. In the six school shootings, the suspects carefully planned their crimes and thoroughly premeditated the actual events.

Offender Profile

The suspects involved in the six school shootings that the FBI reviewed displayed similar traits. While any one of these characteristics alone may not describe a potential school shooter, taken together, they provide a profile that may assist law enforcement, schools, and communities to identify at-risk students.

- The suspects were white males under 18 years old with mass or spree murderer traits.
- They sought to defend narcissistic views or favorable beliefs about themselves, while, at the same time, they had very low self-esteem.
- They experienced a precipitating event (e.g., a failed romance) that resulted in depression and suicidal thoughts that turned homicidal.
- They lacked, or perceived a lack of, family support. Two of the suspects killed one or both of their parents.
- They felt rejected by others and sought revenge or retaliation for real or perceived wrongs done to them.
- They acquired firearms generally owned by a family member or someone they knew.
- They perceived that they were different from others and disliked those who were different (i.e., self-loathing). They needed recognition, and when they did not receive positive recognition, they sought negative recognition.
- They had a history of expressing anger or displaying minor acts of aggressive physical contact at school.
- They had a history of mental health treatment.
- They seemed to have trouble with their parents, though no apparent evidence of parental abuse existed.
- They were influenced by satanic or cult-type belief systems or philosophical works.
- They listened to songs that promote violence.
- They appeared to be loners, average students, and sloppy or unkempt in dress.
- They seemed to be influenced or used by other manipulative students to commit extreme acts of violence.
- They appeared isolated from others, seeking notoriety by attempting to “copy-cat” other previous school shootings but wanting to do it better than the last shooter.
- They had a propensity to dislike popular students or students who bully others.
- They expressed interest in previous killings.
- They felt powerless and, to this end, may have committed acts of violence to assert power over others.
- They openly expressed a desire to kill others.
- They exhibited no remorse after the killings.

contributions to the community, and actively show children that they are loved and respected. At the same time, communities should encourage zero tolerance for violence whether committed by children or adults.

Explore Legislative and Social Reforms

Law enforcement, schools, and parents can do only so much to prevent school violence. Society must begin to explore ways to combat these vicious attacks. Such

initiatives could include legislation that

- provides for mandatory custody to evaluate any juvenile found in the possession of a firearm or other deadly weapon;

- requires school officials to report to the police any criminal offenses committed at their schools and to furnish blueprints of their facilities to local law enforcement authorities;
- enables law enforcement, schools, juvenile authorities, and other criminal justice agencies to share information for the purpose of criminal investigations or identifying children who may pose a danger to themselves and others; and
- allows courts to try as adults juveniles who commit homicide.⁷

Besides supporting legislative action, communities should develop programs that denounce

violence and encourage respect for life and education, along with initiatives that increase individual and parental responsibility and accountability. Communities also should advocate mental health services for individuals who need it, meaningful sanctions for those who demonstrate an unwillingness to conform their behavior to the law, and avenues for obtaining information that may enable behavioral scientists to better identify predictive behavior and thresholds of behavior that require intervention (treatment or sanctions, as appropriate).

CONCLUSION

Many Americans may find the old adage an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure difficult to believe. But who would have thought that such horrible acts of

school violence could occur in rural areas of the United States? Unfortunately, Americans need to accept that grisly, violent acts can occur anywhere and be committed by almost anyone, even a child.

If a youngster can take a gun to school and pull the trigger, then communities must come together to deal with this problem in a multidisciplinary approach. The phenomenon of school violence is complicated and will take a great deal of wisdom to address properly. Meanwhile, law enforcement agencies must develop comprehensive plans for responding to such attacks, and they must join with their schools and communities to implement prevention programs. Doing so will make American children feel good about themselves, their families, their

Scholastic Crime Stoppers

The Scholastic Crime Stoppers Program promotes school spirit, pride, and responsibility. It allows students to take action against victimization and crime by anonymously reporting such activities to the school administration. The students receive a monetary reward ranging from \$5 to \$100 if the tip proves instrumental in solving a crime. This program is found mostly in high schools, but elementary and junior high schools, along with universities and colleges, have begun to implement such initiatives.

The program is operated by students who appoint a board of directors composed of students who market and advertise the program,

raise funds, review information about crimes, and determine rewards. However, the success of the program often depends directly upon the amount of support and encouragement that the school administration provides.

Schools should tailor the program to fit their specific needs. Some schools have implemented Crime Stopper hot lines, billboards, contests, designated Crime Stopper days, and parades to deliver their message of zero tolerance against crime.

For additional information, visit the Scholastic Crime Stoppers Web site at: <http://www.c-s-i.org/scs.htm>.

neighborhoods, and their country. To paraphrase a familiar saying, all it takes for the triumph of evil is for a few good people to do nothing.⁸ ♦

Endnotes

¹ "America Under the Gun: Assaults in U.S. Schools," *The New York Times*, April 26, 1999, available from <http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/guns-schools.html>; accessed April 26, 1999.

² These lessons resulted from a 2-day school violence summit hosted by the FBI's Little Rock Field Office and the Arkansas State Police and moderated by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit in August 1998. Representatives from Pearl, Mississippi; Stamps and Jonesboro, Arkansas; Edinboro, Pennsylvania; Springfield, Oregon; and Paducah, Kentucky, shared their experiences. The suggestions they offered for dealing with school violence form the basis of this article.

³ The National Organization for Victim Assistance is located at 1757 Park Road, NW, Washington, DC 20010-2101 and can be contacted at 202-232-6682 or 800-TRY-NOVA or at its Web site <http://www.try-nova.org>.

⁴ Maude Marie Clark, "Nietzsche, Friedrich," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1998.


⁵ Ibid. The musician wrote an article about the shooting at Littleton, Colorado. See Marilyn Manson, "Columbine: Whose Fault Is It?" *Rolling Stone*, May 1999, available from <http://www.marilyn-manson.net/press/rolling-stone-may-1999.ntm>; accessed June 4, 1999.

⁶ Deborah Prothrow-Stith, *Deadly Consequences* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 29-47.

⁷ Supra note 2. These suggestions were contributed by a chief of police attending the seminar.

⁸ The original quote, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing," is attributed to Sir Edmund Burke in John Bartlett, *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, 16th ed., ed. Justin Kaplan, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 332.

Wanted: Photographs



The *Bulletin* staff is always on the lookout for dynamic, law enforcement-related photos for possible publication in the magazine. We are interested in photos that visually depict the many aspects of the law enforcement profession and illustrate the various tasks law enforcement personnel perform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or color prints or slides, although we prefer prints (5x7 or 8x10). Appropriate credit will be given to contributing photographers when their work appears in the magazine. We suggest that you send duplicate, not original, prints as we do not accept responsibility for prints that may be damaged or lost. Send your photographs to:

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Director, *FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin*,
FBI Academy, Madison
Building 209, Quantico,
VA 22135.

Case Study

Timber Theft **A Solvable Crime**

By David L. Windsor




Photo © PhotoDisc

When picking up a pencil, opening a door, or using the hundreds of other everyday items made from wood, people seldom consider that those items originated as trees in a forest. Someone harvested, processed, and formed the wood needed to create those items. Although most timber is harvested legally, several thousand trees are harvested illegally each year throughout the United States.

Unfortunately, many of these illegal harvests or thefts go unreported, and those reported often remain unsolved. Many times, when a law enforcement agency receives a report of a timber theft, the department considers it an unsolvable crime. Because most officers have little or no knowledge of the timber industry or timber thefts, they frequently make the mistake of thinking that someone has trespassed to cut firewood and assume that no evidence exists that they can trace to a suspect. Investigations also are hampered because the thefts often occur several weeks or even months prior to their discovery.

What Is Timber Theft?

In most states, the unauthorized control of someone else's property, including timber, constitutes theft. Occasionally, states may include a specific dollar value as part of the prerequisites for theft, and contrary to common belief, timber does have a value.

An officer may ask, "Why would someone want to steal a tree?" The motivation to steal timber is the same as it is to steal any item—profit. Superior quality logs can sell for a high price. The value of timber depends on the species, the quality, the length, and the diameter of the log and will vary depending on current market prices. For example, the current worth for a medium-grade black-walnut veneer log delivered to a veneer mill is \$5 per board foot.¹ According to one of several methods used in the industry to price timber, a log with a diameter of 18 inches and a length of 14 feet has 171 board feet and a value of \$855.

One Officer's Experience

An officer with the Indiana Department of Natural Resources received information that someone had taken several trees from a farm near an interstate. The officer met with the landowner, who advised that he had found several stumps on his property but that only certain parts of the trees were missing. He advised the officer that the thieves apparently had driven through a neighbor's field, cut his fence, and entered his property. The landowner also believed the theft had occurred within the month.

The officer and the landowner went to the woods and found six black-walnut trees cut with a portion of each missing. Apparently the thieves were in a hurry because each stump had splinter pulls—the uncut fibers of the tree that remain after the tree falls. The thieves had cut the stumps 14 inches or more above the ground, similar to firewood cuts, as opposed to the very low cuts of veneer harvesters. The officer conducted a preliminary crime scene survey and found over 20 empty beer cans scattered throughout the woods, a shoe print on one of the paths, and tire tracks in several locations. The landowner mentioned to the officer that he had seen similar tracks leading into another wooded area approximately 2 miles north of his woods.

After taking photographs and collecting evidence, the officer checked the second woods mentioned by the landowner. The officer observed similar tire tracks and found nine black-walnut stumps cut like those in the first case. The officer also found beer cans scattered, along with other debris, throughout the scene.

While surveying the scene of this theft, the officer noticed that the vehicle driven into the woods had scraped various trees leaving paint. The officer photographed and collected paint samples and beer cans from this scene, as well.

Next, the officer needed to determine the value of the stolen property. He contacted a state forestry expert to “re-create” the stolen log. The forester used a technique, accepted in the forestry profession, that uses the stump diameter, the diameter of the second cut at the tree top, and the distance between the indentation where the tree fell and the second cut at the tree top to determine the diameter and length of the stolen log. Determining the quality of the log is a more difficult task; however, by examining the remaining portions of the tree for defects in the wood and the quality of the surrounding trees, the forester can estimate accurately the quality of the stolen log.

The forester estimated the value of the logs taken from the first scene as \$2,946 and the total value of the downed trees to be \$3,266. The logs taken from the second woods were worth \$6,100; the total value of those trees was \$6,300. It remains important to determine the value of both the stolen logs and the downed trees because the property owner was deprived of the ability to harvest the trees and sell them legally.

The police laboratory processed the evidence collected from both scenes and found a single fingerprint on one of the beer cans. Although the print was identifiable, the police had no suspects or witnesses to either crime. They suspended this investigation for nearly 2 years. They reopened the case when a landowner in a nearby county caught a suspect stealing black-walnut trees from his property.

The officer from the first case learned that the landowner from the second case was holding the suspect’s truck until he received payment for the logs. The officer obtained a search warrant and took paint samples and other evidence from the truck, including a receipt from a nearby veneer mill.

Then the officer met with the owner of the veneer mill, who produced documents showing that the mill bought several black-walnut logs from the suspect. The officer surmised that the suspect had stolen each of the logs because he was not a licensed timber buyer in Indiana. The mill owner informed the officer that he had stopped doing business with the suspect when the suspect had attempted to steal a log from the

mill several months earlier. The mill owner thought the suspect also had sold logs to another local veneer mill.

Contact with the employees of the second mill revealed that the suspect had sold logs to them and continued to bring in logs weekly. The mill employees cooperated in the investigation and notified the officer each time the suspect sold logs to them. Upon notification that the suspect had visited the mill, the officer would photograph the logs and obtain copies of the payment receipts given to the suspect. Because the pattern of annual rings and the shape of the tree trunk provide unique information similar to fingerprints, the officer took a cutting from the end of each log for possible comparisons in any future thefts.

After a fourth theft was reported, the officer again found evidence similar to the previous cases. After a thorough crime scene search, the officer recognized an unusual characteristic in one of the stumps. He compared the sample cuttings from the veneer mill and matched three cuttings to the stumps at the new crime scene. He then filed charges against the suspect.

The suspect was charged with theft in state court and later charged with theft in two other counties and once in federal court for theft on a federal wildlife refuge. The courts found the suspect guilty in each case. Additionally, state revenue investigators

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In most states, the unauthorized control of someone else’s property, including timber, constitutes theft.

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charged the suspect with tax evasion for failure to report the income he had received from the sale of over 400 logs. The suspect paid restitution to the landowners and spent a total of 6 years in prison.

How to Investigate Timber Theft

The first officers on the scene of a timber theft must determine who owns the property and if the owner has made any arrangements that would allow a renter to sell timber from the property. Some reported cases of timber theft become civil cases due to misunderstandings and landowner-tenant disputes. Once officers determine that a timber theft has occurred, they can process the crime scene as they would any other.

Officers must remember that every crime scene contains evidence, regardless of the location, and a timber theft crime scene is no exception. Each scene always will contain traceable evidence of the timber's being taken, such as tire tracks, occasional paint transfers, stumps, and various other items that the thief may have purposely discarded or accidentally left behind. Keeping this in mind, officers should secure the scene and protect any potential evidence for later use or identification.

Before investigators begin the search for stolen timber, they should have an idea of how it may be used. For example, in the Midwestern states, where such trees as black-walnut, white and red oak, maple, and black cherry remain abundant, high-quality logs are harvested and processed into veneer to use as paneling or processed into furniture and other wood products. In such states as Oregon and Washington, Douglas fir and hemlock are harvested for commercial firewood, and cedar is harvested for shake shingles and fence posts. Many other species are

commonly are used for other products ranging from building materials to baseball bats.

Once officers determine the suspected use, they can begin to look at various mills in their area.

Investigators should not limit their focus to their own jurisdictions but should expand to a large area, including surrounding communities and, in some cases, other states. Forestry experts can help investigators distinguish tree species from their unique identifiers, determine timber quality and value, explain common harvest practices, locate potential timber buyers, and even identify potential suspects.

Conclusion

Although timber theft investigations may sound unique, they are conducted much the same as any other criminal investigation. Often, the lapse of time between

when the logs are stolen and when the landowner reports the theft can hinder an investigation. By making contact with area mills; state, national, and private foresters; timber buyers; and other timber industry personnel, officers can gain valuable knowledge that will save them crucial time when a timber theft occurs and will help them in apprehending the thief more quickly. ♦

Endnote

¹ A board foot is an industry standard unit of measure equal to a board 1 inch thick by 12 inches long by 12 inches wide.

Lieutenant Windsor serves as the training officer for the Indiana Department of Natural Resources, Law Enforcement Division, Indianapolis.



Bulletin Reports

Reducing Gang Crime

The Los Angeles Police Department employed a deceptively simple tactic, traffic barriers, to block automobile access to streets as a way of reducing gang violence. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ)-sponsored evaluation of Operation Cul-de-Sac (OCDS), as the program was called, examined whether the tactic could reduce gang crime.

In its 2 years of operation, 1990-1991, OCDS appeared to reduce violent crime. Homicides and street assaults fell significantly in both years and rose after the program ended. Property crime decreased substantially during the first year, but it also declined in the comparison area that had no OCDS operating, indicating that other factors besides the traffic barriers caused the reduction. Moreover, in the second year of the program, property crime rose, suggesting that the street closures affected only violent crime. Lastly, crime was not displaced to other areas. This may have occurred because the areas of potential displacement are the turf of rival gangs.

Agencies can use traffic barriers as part of an approach to maximize neighborhood residents' defensible space by increasing their span of control. Zones configured with the barriers heighten the visibility of suspect activities and can prove effective when combined with "natural guardians," people who serve as informal sources of surveillance and social control. To order a copy of this report, *"Designing Out" Gang Homicides and Street Assaults*, NCJ 173398, contact NIJ's National Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800-851-3420, or access the home page at <http://www.ncjrs.org>.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Releases New Publications

1998 Annual Report on School Safety (NCJ 173934) provides parents, schools, and communities with an overview of the scope of school crime and describes actions schools and communities can take to address this critical issue. The report shows what measures some schools have taken to prevent or address school violence and provides parents, students, and educators with information and resources to evaluate and enhance their own school's level of safety.

Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence (NCJ 173950) profiles 60 demonstrated or promising programs and strategies that address the problem of gun violence; examines the nature of the problem from a national perspective, including current trends; and discusses the process of developing a solution. The report also includes a section on resources for research, technical assistance, and education; geographical and alphabetical program indexes; and a matrix of participating agencies.

Individuals interested in obtaining free copies of these reports or obtaining a list of additional publications produced by OJJDP should contact the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse at 800-638-8736.

Controlling Drug and Disorder Problems


Law enforcement agencies across the United States have implemented many strategies to reduce drug and disorder problems. One strategy gaining prominence applies civil remedies (e.g., fines for code violations and threats of legal action) to persuade or coerce nonoffending third parties, typically the property owner or manager, to take action against criminal or nuisance behavior. The Oakland, California, Police Department developed the Beat Health program, which uses civil statute sanctions as leverage to encourage managers to address drug and disorder problems on their properties. Researchers gathered basic data at 50 control sites (where police engaged in standard patrol responses to drug and disorder problems) and at 50 Beat Health program sites throughout the city over a 39-month period. Researchers used calls for service, social observations, and interviews with managers to explore the impact of the program.

The combined efforts of the police and municipal authorities led to noticeably cleaner properties, more legitimate use of the street, less illicit and uncivil behavior, and fewer drug-related calls for service, especially in residential sites. Specifically, during the 12-month postintervention period, the density of drug calls for service per square mile in the Beat Health residential sites decreased by 16.2 percent and increased by 5.4 percent in the control residential sites. The density of drug calls related to commercial Beat Health sites increased by 45.8 percent during this period and by 282.2 percent at the commercial control sites.

These findings suggest that the Beat Health program is particularly effective in residential locations, and that the patrol response is particularly ineffective at commercial locations. For a copy of this National Institute of Justice report, *Controlling Drug and Disorder Problems: Oakland's Beat Health Program*, NCJ 175051, access NIJ's Web site at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij>.

Office for Victims of Crime Training and Technical Assistance Center

The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) provides federal funds to support victim assistance and compensation programs around the country and advocates the fair treatment of crime victims. The OVC Training and Technical Assistance Center serves as a centralized access point for information about OVC's training and technical assistance resources to federal, state, and local agencies and special emphasis organizations involved in providing services to crime victims. The center provides expert, focused support and mentoring in such areas as program management, program evaluation, and policy/procedure development to facilitate long-term, systemic change to improve services to crime victims. It establishes an annual training calendar and ensures that training materials developed by OVC, in partnership with its discretionary grantees, are available to the victim services field. The center supplies speakers for conferences, focus groups, and other meetings and maintains a consultant pool of experts capable of providing effective on-site technical assistance to address operational problems and needs. For more information, contact OVC at 800-627-6872 or at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/>.



Safeguarding Our Schools

By DENNIS BRIDGES

“Several students have been shot at the high school. Gunmen are holding hostages.” No law enforcement agency ever wants to receive this kind of call. However, in the emergence of recent school shootings, law enforcement agencies should have a tested emergency response plan to handle such situations.

The schoolyard shootings that occurred in several states during the 1997/98 school year prompted school officials and police to examine their procedures for reacting to

these tragedies. Schools should have safety procedures in place that cover all possible catastrophes and disasters. Although shooting incidents can occur even with extensive prevention programs and campus security measures, with appropriate safeguards, law enforcement agencies can help students be prepared if violence erupts in their school.

IMPLEMENTING PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS

U.S. public schools are not designed as fortresses. However, by using basic crime prevention

techniques and precautionary measures, communities can help create safer schools. For example, schools should limit access to their property by locking all unmonitored entrances and requiring all visitors to check in at the office. They should issue distinct identification for visitors to wear while on campus and require, where legally permissible, student dress codes or uniforms to identify intruders more easily. Schools should assign specific individuals to monitor campus perimeters and hallways and provide two-way radios for staff members

responsible for monitoring campus activities. School personnel should conduct routine security inspections of the exterior and interior of the campus and report any suspicious activity to school officials or, if warranted, to the police.

Schools also can safeguard their campuses by requiring that students wear visible student identification at all times. In certain instances, schools can help eliminate weapon possession by requiring that students use backpacks and other book carriers made of clear material to allow visibility of their contents.

PLANNING RESPONSES

While schools can take certain preventive measures to safeguard students, communities still must plan for the possibility of school violence. Following the Jonesboro, Arkansas, school shooting, one school official said, “Those two kids had a plan, so they were already one step ahead of everyone else. There was such thought and detail in their actions. They knew specifically where the teacher and those girls would come out and when to pull the fire alarm. We need to get as smart as they are.”¹

Developing an effective emergency response plan requires that all facets of the community work together. Law enforcement agencies must form a partnership with school administrators and parents to discuss and design strategies to ensure student safety. Before a crisis occurs, students, teachers, and administrators should know how to respond, as well as how to help alleviate fears. Plans should include straightforward directions that

students and school personnel can learn easily. Because students generally range in age from 5 to 18 years old, planners should ensure that emergency responses remain appropriate for particular ages.

As part of the planning process, local law enforcement agencies should obtain school maps or site plans, which will assist officers who respond to shooting and hostage incidents. Additionally, local police departments should have master keys to all school classrooms and offices to ensure that special weapons and tactic (SWAT) teams have the quick access they need when confronting shooters or rescuing students and staff members. Finally, plans should stress the importance of law enforcement and school personnel remaining in constant contact during a crisis.

Audible Warning System

A warning system using an audible mechanism—such as a bell,

horn, or intercom system—can signal when a school receives a threat and enters into an unusual mode (e.g., “lockdown” or “classroom evacuation”). The audible warning system will alert students and teachers to remain inside or to respond to classrooms and offices. In a lockdown, all doors remain locked to prevent unauthorized individuals from entering rooms. Officers should direct school officials to ensure that students remain in or respond to a particular classroom or office until the “all clear” signal sounds, which should originate only from the principal or the appropriate designee.

In the past, schools have used classroom evacuation for fire alarms, bomb scares, and hazardous material spills. However, law enforcement officials may direct schools to use this technique during a school shooting if circumstances permit.

“
Developing an effective emergency response plan requires that all facets of the community work together.
”



Lieutenant Bridges serves in the Youth and Community Services Section for the Fresno, California, Police Department.

Resources

Office for Victims of Crime
U.S. Department of Justice
810 7th St., NW, Seventh Floor
Washington, DC 20531
202-305-4548
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc>

National Organization for Victim Assistance
1757 Park Rd., NW
Washington, DC 20010-2101
202-232-6682
800-TRY-NOVA
<http://www.try-nova.org>

National Crime Prevention Council
1700 K St. NW, Second Floor
Washington, DC 20006-3817
202-466-6272
<http://www.ncpc.org>

National Criminal Justice Reference Service
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000
800-851-3420
<http://www.ncjrs.org>

Response to Gunfire

Reactions to gunfire vary. The ability to learn reaction skills depends on the age of the student (e.g., young children will not remember complicated reaction instructions). Officers should provide the easiest training, thereby increasing students' abilities to recall instructions and react appropriately. Training should remain as consistent as possible with human instinct, which people usually rely on when under pressure. Most individuals react instinctively to surprise gunfire. Therefore, law enforcement agencies should train students and school staff members how to respond when they hear gunfire without receiving a previous warning signal. Officers also should encourage school personnel and students to try and remain calm during such occurrences.

Police officers should advise school students and staff members to stay away from windows and to shield themselves behind or with objects that will stop or significantly impede a bullet (e.g., a desk). In cafeterias, tables and benches may offer the quickest form of cover. In some instances, when safe to do so, students should close and lock all windows and close curtains or blinds.

Students outside of classrooms should take evasive action when possible to minimize their chances of getting struck by a bullet. They should use the closest cover for protection or seek concealment if cover is not available. Concealment can provide an alternative to taking cover by hiding a person from the shooter, although it might not protect an individual from a bullet (e.g., a bush). In open areas

with no immediate access to cover or concealment, police officers should instruct students to "drop and hold"—get as close to the ground as possible, cover their heads, and remain still. However, in cases where the threat does not pass (i.e., an intruder walks through a playground shooting at students), dropping and holding provides vulnerable, nonmoving targets for the shooter. Therefore, students should seek to eliminate or reduce the target they present by seeking cover or concealment as soon as possible.

PRACTICING RESPONSES

Practice drills will confirm that students and staff members understand what steps to take when responding to a threat of or an actual shooting on campus. School administrators never should surprise

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Author Guidelines

GENERAL INFORMATION

The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* is an official publication of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of Justice.

Frequency of Publication: Monthly.

Purpose: To provide a forum for the exchange of information on law enforcement-related topics.

Audience: Criminal justice professionals, primarily law enforcement managers.

MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS

Length: Feature articles should contain 2,000 to 3,500 words (8 to 14 pages, double-spaced). Submissions for specialized departments, such as Police Practice and Case Study, should contain 1,200 to 2,000 words (5 to 8 pages, double-spaced).

Format: Authors should submit three copies of their articles typed and double-spaced on 8½-by 11-inch white paper with all pages numbered. When possible, an electronic version of the article saved on computer disk should accompany the typed manuscript.

Authors should supply references when quoting a source exactly, citing or paraphrasing another person's work or ideas, or referring to information that generally is not well known. For proper footnote format, authors should refer to *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6th ed., by Kate L. Turabian.

Writing Style and Grammar: The *Bulletin* prefers to publish articles in the third person (Point of View and Perspective submissions are exceptions) using active voice. Authors should follow *The New York Public Library Writer's Guide to Style and Usage* and should study several issues of the magazine to ensure that their writing style meets the *Bulletin's* requirements.

Authors also should contact the *Bulletin* staff for the expanded author guidelines, which contain

additional specifications, detailed examples, and effective writing techniques.

PHOTOGRAPHS AND GRAPHICS

A photograph of the author(s) should accompany the manuscript. Authors can submit photos and illustrations that visually enhance and support the text. Black-and-white glossy prints (3- by 5-inch to 5- by 7-inch) reproduce best. The *Bulletin* does not accept responsibility for lost or damaged photos or illustrations.

PUBLICATION

Judging Manuscripts: The *Bulletin* judges articles on relevance to the audience, factual accuracy, analysis of the information, structure and logical flow, style and ease of reading, and length. The *Bulletin* generally does not publish articles on similar topics within a 12-month period or accept articles previously published or currently under consideration by other magazines. Because it is a government publication, the *Bulletin* cannot accept articles that advertise a product or service.

Query Letters: Authors may submit a query letter along with a 1- to 2-page outline before writing an article. Although designed to help authors, this process does not guarantee acceptance of any article.

Author Notification: The *Bulletin* staff will review queries and articles and advise the authors of acceptance or rejection. The magazine cannot guarantee a publication date for accepted articles.

Editing: The *Bulletin* staff edits all manuscripts for length, clarity, format, and style.

SUBMISSION

Authors should mail their submissions to:
Editor, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy, Madison Bldg., Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135; telephone: 703-632-1952; fax: 703-632-1968; e-mail: leb@fbiaacademy.edu.



Book Review

When Good Kids Kill by Michael D. Kelleher, published by Praeger Publisher, Westport, CT, 1998.

Most juvenile violence research focuses on youths with a history of troubled backgrounds (e.g., school dropouts, runaways living on the streets, abuse victims, and those from broken homes). In contrast, *When Good Kids Kill* addresses the violent crimes committed by juveniles who 1) have supportive families and stable homes; 2) do not have police records; 3) maintain average grades in school; and 4) participate in athletics. Juveniles' killing peers or family members remains one of the most frustrating and complex categories of violence.

The author of *When Good Kids Kill* specializes in threat assessment and strategic and human resource management, bringing a multitude of research, analysis, and writing experience to the juvenile violence topic. The book provides valuable insight to the law enforcement and investigative communities by interviewing youths and providing much-needed information on an important topic.

The author addresses crimes that range from juveniles' murdering their babies from social fear and killing from feelings of rage or retribution to senseless thrill killing and murdering family members and friends. In the first three chapters, the author discusses the sex of youths who murder and their relationship to their victims and then narrows the research to focus on crimes hard to detect due to low-level predictors and limited known patterns to law enforcement. For example, if juveniles have not come into contact previously with law enforcement, it may be more difficult to prove them capable of violent acts. Additionally, the book includes charts supporting this research. Most of the cases the

author presents have received national coverage but provided limited information.

When Good Kids Kill is a well-designed and progressive book that analyzes the development of real scenarios involving juvenile violence. Each chapter begins with an anecdote correlating that specific chapter's title and theme. The author presents seven violent incidents committed by girls, over 12 incidents involving boys and girls who kill, and 15 case-by-case snap shot profiles of these young criminals. The research reinforces the need for law enforcement agencies to perfect crime scene skills and develop knowledge of kids in society who seldom, if ever, come into contact with law enforcement until an incident occurs requiring a response.

The fact that mitigating circumstances associated with the killings usually do not exist creates a common thread in each of the scenarios for law enforcement officers and prosecutors. Even though some low-level indicators suggest that violence might occur, most officers do not take juveniles' comments seriously. The book concludes with a section advising parents to communicate and become good friends with their teens, as well as to demonstrate and prove their love to them—good advice for all members of society. Additionally, *When Good Kids Kill* could provide instructional reference to support juvenile instruction programs.

Reviewed by
Larry R. Moore
U.S. Army Military Police Corps (ret.)
Certified Emergency Manager,
National Coordinating Council on
Emergency Management

Gang Congregation Ordinance Supreme Court Invalidation

By DANIEL L. SCHOFIELD, S.J.D.



Photo © Tribute

On June 10, 1999, in the case of *City of Chicago v. Morales*,¹ the U.S. Supreme Court held by a 6-3 vote that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance is unconstitutional. Understanding the law enforcement implications of *Morales* is complicated because the decision includes six separate opinions. This article begins with a description of the ordinance and the reasons for its enactment. Next, the article summarizes

the differing views of the justices. Finally, the article assesses the likely impact of *Morales* on using ordinances and injunctions to combat gang activity.

CONSEQUENCES OF LOITERING GANG MEMBERS

The Chicago City Council's Committee on Police and Fire conducted hearings to explore the problems created by the city's street

gangs. Based on evidence from residents and other sources, the council determined that public loitering by gang members had 1) increased the murder rate; 2) escalated violent and drug-related crimes; and 3) enabled gang members to establish control of areas that intimidated residents and created a justifiable fear for the safety of people and property in those areas. Of particular significance, the city council found that criminal street gangs

avoided arrest by committing no offense punishable under existing laws when they knew the police were present.

CHICAGO GANG CONGREGATION ORDINANCE

The ordinance created a criminal offense based on the following four predicates: 1) an officer must reasonably believe that at least one of the two or more individuals present in a “public place” is a criminal street gang member; 2) the individuals must be “loitering,” defined as “remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose”; 3) the officer then must order “all” of the individuals to disperse and remove themselves from the area; and 4) a person must disobey the officer’s order. If any person, whether a gang member or not, disobeys the officer’s order, that person is guilty of violating the ordinance.²

After the Chicago Police Department issued a general order providing guidelines to govern enforcement of the ordinance, officers, issued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested more than 42,000 people over a 3-year period. An Illinois court invalidated the ordinance, ending its enforcement and beginning years of litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court’s deciding that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.

THE MORALES DECISION

Six justices concluded that the Chicago ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide adequate standards to guide

police discretion. Three of those justices (the plurality) also concluded that the ordinance infringes a constitutional right to innocent loitering and fails to give residents adequate notice of how to conform their conduct to the confines of the law. Three justices dissented, finding the ordinance constitutional.

Majority—Inadequate Limits on Police Discretion

Six justices (the majority) agreed that the ordinance reaches a substantial amount of innocent conduct and is unconstitutional because the city council failed to “establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”³ The absence of such guidelines “necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.”⁴


The majority focused on the vast discretion conferred on police to determine whether a person is “loitering,” which the ordinance defined as “to remaining in any one

place with no apparent purpose.”⁵ That definition provides officers absolute discretion in deciding whether to issue a dispersal order. “The ‘no apparent purpose’ standard for making that decision is inherently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is ‘apparent’ to the officer on the scene.”⁶

The majority noted somewhat disdainfully that the ordinance directs the police to issue an order for individuals to disperse without first making any inquiry about their possible purposes⁷ and then observed:

It matters not whether the reason that a gang member and his father, for example, might loiter near Wrigley Field is to rob an unsuspecting fan or just to get a glimpse of Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark; in either event, if their purpose is not apparent to a nearby police officers, they may—indeed, they “shall”—order them to disperse.⁸

“
Six justices concluded that the Chicago ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide adequate standards to guide police discretion.
”



Special Agent Schofield is the chief of the Legal Instruction Unit at the FBI Academy.

The majority was troubled that an officer could treat an innocent purpose such as engaging in idle conversation as too frivolous to be “apparent” or order dispersal “even though an illicit purpose is actually ‘apparent.’”⁹ And literally interpreted, the “no apparent purpose” definition of loitering would have no applications to loitering that has an obviously threatening or illicit purpose that excludes “from its converge much of the intimidating conduct that motivated its enactment.”¹⁰

The majority rejected the argument that requiring officers to reasonably believe that a group of loiterers contains a gang member is a sufficient limitation but then added that police discretion could be sufficiently limited “if the ordinance only applied to loitering that had an apparently harmful purpose or effect, or possibly if it only applied to loitering by persons reasonably believed to be criminal gang members.”¹¹ Finally, the majority concluded that the general order issued by the police department limiting enforcement to certain designated areas in the city did not cure the otherwise-unconstitutional ordinance because those internal rules would not provide a defense to a loiterer arrested in violation of those rules as long as the arrest was consistent with the broader provisions of the ordinance.¹²

Plurality—Ordinance Infringes Constitutional Right to Loiter

Three justices (the plurality) premised their decision to invalidate the ordinance on the notion that “liberty,” protected by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, affords citizens a *right* to engage in loitering that is entirely harmless in both purpose and effect.¹³ They also concluded that the ordinance failed to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause because “it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.”¹⁴

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”**

The plurality focused on the uncertainty of what loitering is covered by the ordinance and what is not. Even though loiterers are not subject to arrest unless they disobey a dispersal order, the loitering is the conduct that the ordinance is designed to prohibit. Therefore, the plurality reasoned that “if the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty.”¹⁵ Moreover, the terms of the dispersal order compound the inadequacy of the notice because it is unclear how long the loiterers must remain apart and how far they must move.

Dissenters—Ordinance Affords Police Traditional and Constitutional Peacekeeping Authority

Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia joined, begins with this ominous prediction: “By invalidating Chicago’s ordinance which was enacted to prevent gangs from establishing dominion over the public streets, the Court has unnecessarily sentenced law-abiding citizens to lives of terror and misery.”¹⁶ In support of his conclusion that “[t]he ordinance does nothing more than confirm the well-established principle that the police have the duty and the power to maintain the public peace, and when necessary, to disperse groups of individuals who threaten it,”¹⁷ Justice Thomas offered several arguments.

First, neither history nor Court precedent support the plurality view that “the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Furthermore, the ordinance does not criminalize loitering *per se* but instead penalizes the failure to obey an officer’s order to disperse. Justice Thomas offered historical and legal support for the proposition that “as peace officers, the police long have had the authority and the duty to order groups of individuals who threaten the public peace to disperse.... The authority to issue dispersal orders continues to play a commonplace and crucial role in police operations.”¹⁸ Second, police must inevitably exercise discretion in performing their peacekeeping responsibilities. Based on the

requirement that officers issue dispersal orders *only* if they “observe a person whom they reasonably believe to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place,” the ordinance is a constitutionally acceptable allocation of police discretion. Conceding the possibility that some officers may abuse that discretion, Justice Thomas wrote:


Instances of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance, like any other law, are best addressed when (and if) they arise, rather than prophylactically through the disfavored mechanism of a facial challenge on vagueness grounds.¹⁹

Third, the ordinance is not vague in terms of what is forbidden and what is permitted because “there is nothing vague about an order to disperse.”²⁰ Because there is no “fundamental right to loiter,” it is erroneous to assume, as the plurality did, that the ordinance proscribes constitutionally protected conduct. Moreover, persons of ordinary intelligence sufficiently understand what it means “to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.”²¹

Justice Thomas concluded his opinion by criticizing the majority for focusing on the rights of gang members and their companions at the expense of the residents of Chicago, who suffer the consequences of gang loitering. “By focusing exclusively on the imagined rights of the two percent, the Court has denied our most vulnerable citizens the...freedom of movement.”²²

Concurring Opinions Illustrate Narrow Scope of Decision

Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer wrote opinions in which they concurred with one another in part and also concurred in the judgment. The concurrence of Justice O’Connor that Justice Breyer joined is noteworthy for the following suggestions it offers on how the Chicago ordinance and other gang



loitering ordinances might be structured to pass constitutional muster:

- 1) if the ordinance applied *only* to individuals reasonably believed to be gang members;²³ 2) if the ordinance only applied to loitering that had an apparent harmful purpose or effect;²⁴ 3) if the ordinance incorporated limits on the area and manner in which the laws may be enforced;²⁵ 4) if the ordinance directly prohibited the presence of a large collection of obviously brazen, insistent, and lawless gang members and hangers-on on the public ways that intimidates residents;²⁶ 5) if the term

“loiter” had been narrowed to mean “to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose other than to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities”;²⁷ and 6) if there were limitations that restricted the ordinance’s criminal penalties to gang members or that more carefully delineated the circumstances in which those penalties would apply to nongang members.²⁸

CONCLUSION

All Supreme Court justices in *Morales* recognized that lawmakers and law enforcement officers face many difficult challenges in trying to combat the serious problems caused by gang-related activities. Justice Scalia noted that those difficulties are compounded by the fact reliance on existing laws that prohibit intimidating and unlawful conduct (that are presumably constitutional) are rendered largely ineffective when, as the Chicago City Council found, “gang members cease their intimidating and unlawful behavior under the watchful eye of the police officers but return to it as soon as the police drive away.”²⁹

Chicago’s solution to that reality was to enact an ordinance that gave police discretion to clear the streets of loitering gang members and their associates. In Justice Scalia’s view, Chicagoans “decided that depriving themselves of the freedom to ‘hang out’ with a gang member is necessary to eliminate

pervasive gang crime and intimidation—and that the elimination of the one is worth the deprivation of the other.”³⁰

While the Court in *Morales* invalidated Chicago’s ordinance, lawmakers should carefully consider structuring gang loitering ordinances in accordance with the suggestions in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion. An ordinance that is deemed constitutional by Justices O’Connor and Breyer presumably also would be upheld by the three dissenting Justices in *Morales*.

Finally, the article “Combating Gangs: The Need for Innovation” that appeared in the February 1998 issue of the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* addressed the use of civil injunctions to abate gang activity

under the theory that ongoing gang activity is a public nuisance.³¹ Importantly, the holding in *Morales* has no apparent effect on the continued use of injunctions to prohibit named gang members with a documented history of intimidating residents and unlawful conduct in designated areas from *loitering together* in those areas. ♦

Endnotes

¹ 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)

² *Id.* at 1854.

³ *Id.* at 1861.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.* at 1862.

⁷ *Id.* at 1861.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.* at 1862.

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.* at 1857.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 1859.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 1860.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 1879.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 1881.

¹⁸ *Id.* at 1884.

¹⁹ *Id.* at 1886.

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ *Id.* at 1887.

²² *Id.*

²³ *Id.* 1964.

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ *Id.*

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Id.* at 1964-65.

²⁸ *Id.* at 1865.


²⁹ *Id.* at 1878.

³⁰ *Id.* at 1879.

³¹ Regini, J.D., “Combating Gangs: The Need for Innovation,” *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, February 1998, 25-32.

Law enforcement officers of other than federal jurisdiction who are interested in this article should consult their legal advisors. Some police procedures ruled permissible under federal constitutional law are of questionable legality under state law or are not permitted at all.

The Bulletin's E-mail Address



The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* staff invites you to communicate with us via e-mail. Our Internet address is leb@fbiaacademy.edu

We would like to know your thoughts on contemporary law enforcement issues. We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Please include your name, title, and agency on all e-mail messages.

Also, the *Bulletin* is available for viewing or downloading on a number of computer services, as well as the FBI’s home page. The home page address is <http://www.fbi.gov>.

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face each challenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actions warrant special attention from their respective departments. The *Bulletin* also wants to recognize their exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.



Sergeant Snider



Patrolman Pressley

After receiving a call of a house fire early one morning, Sergeant Gregory Snider and Patrolman Butch Pressley of the Clinton, South Carolina, Police Department

arrived at the location within minutes. An elderly citizen was trapped inside the burning house, and the officers heard faint cries for help. Unable to gain entry through the front of the residence, both officers, without protective clothing or breathing apparatus, entered the back of the house. Due to heavy smoke and heat, they crawled on their hands and knees, located the victim, and pulled him to safety. Without Sergeant Snider's and Patrolman Pressley's bravery and respect for human life, the victim would have died before fire personnel arrived.



Officer Snyder

While patrolling behind a building late one night, Patrol Officer Stacy Snyder of the McPherson, Kansas, Police Department observed an elderly female who had fallen in a large snowbank in a nearby field. The woman was on her knees and unable to get up. The windchill had brought the temperature down to -9 degrees and it was unknown how long she had been in the snow. Because the woman was unable to move on her own, Patrol Officer Snyder picked her up, carried her to safety, and notified emergency medical services. Patrol Officer Snyder's alert observation and quick reaction saved the woman's life.



Officer Albarran

While off duty at a shopping mall, Officer Miguel Albarran of the Marta, Georgia, Police Department observed a man, who had a bandana covering his face, leave the women's rest room carrying women's clothing. At the same time, Officer Albarran heard a cry for help from the rest room. He immediately chased, captured, and then subdued the man after a struggle. Further investigation revealed that the subject had attempted to rape the woman at knifepoint in the rest room.

Officer Albarran's quick and decisive action led to the prompt apprehension of a dangerous sexual offender.